The regulation of innovation by Pace, Nicholas A.
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Pace, Nicholas A. (2005) The regulation of innovation. PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5395/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
THE REGULATION OF INNOVATION 
PhD THESIS 
Institute of Law and Financial Studies 
University of Glasgow 
Dr Nicholas A. Pace 
The Regulation of Innovation 
3 
Table of Contents: 
1) Setting the scene 7 
The doctor patient relationship 9 
Defining and classifying interventions 12 
Experimentation is research, innovation is 
therapy 
Brushwood 13 
Dickens 13 
A contrary view- innovation is not therapy 16 
A third view: Experimentation is a separate 
entity, distinct from research 17 
A Continuum 18 
Experimentation -a part of innovation 20 
Personal innovation 21 
Introducing and adopting new technology 23 
Staging 28 
Different arrangements 33 
Conclusion 36 
2) Failures of regulation 38 
Experimental innovation: Transplantation 39 
Liver transplantation 40 
Heart transplants 41 
The UK's first heart transplant 44 
The first artificial heart 48 
Personal Innovation: The Bristol Affair 52 
The GIVIC's findings 53 
Keylssues 55 
Conclusion 57 
3) The Professions and self-regulation 59 
Three forms of law 60 
The introduction of self-regulation 61 
The General Medical Council 62 
The experiment of heart transplantation 64 
The moratorium 66 
Personal innovation: Bristol 67 
Learning curves 69 
Supervision 72 
Openness 72 
A hospital system 72 
Evidence of acceptance of 
Recommendations 73 
Supervision - revisited 73 
Performance tables 75 
The impact on consumer actions 77 
The impact on providers 78 
The reliability of league tables 79 
Therapeutic Innovation and Self regulation 81 
Criticism 82 
Does self-regulation work? 83 
SERNIP 85 
Research 86 
Regulating research 86 
Concerns? 87 
Fraud and misconduct 88 
Conclusions 90 
4 
4) Regulation by Government 93 
Government proposals 95 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence 95 
Evidence-based medicine 97 
Limitations 97 
Rationing and cost-effectiveness 102 
Limitations 104 
Variation 107 
Limitations 107 
Clinical guidelines 108 
Benefits 108 
Limitations 109 
The Commission for Health Improvement 113 
Limitations 115 
Regulating Innovation 116 
5) Legal Regulation 122 
Medical Malpractice 123 
Battery 123 
Negligence 124 
Duty of care 124 
Standard of care 124 
Causation 127 
Criminal Law 128 
Innovation 128 
Analysis of Liability 132 
Justifying the experiment 136 
'Recognised risk avoidance' 137 
Legal limitations 139 
Karp v Cooley 142 
The law regarding guidelines 145 
Personal Innovation 151 
Nettleship v. Weston 152 
Reconciling different requirements 156 
Change the law 156 
Supervision 162 
Hospital liability? 163 
Conclusion 166 
6) Consent 168 
Informed consent and autonomy 170 
The elements of consent 173 
Competence 174 
Disclosure 174 
Understanding 178 
Voluntariness 180 
The Law 181 
Battery 182 
Negligence 188 
Professional standard test 188 
Patient centred standard 189 
Causation 189 
Beyond Bolam 192 
Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal 
Hospital Governors 192 
Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA 196 
Pearce v. United Bristol 
Healthcare NHS Trust 201 
Deference 202 
5 
Consent and innovation in the UK 205 
Heart transplants revisited 206 
Bristol revisited 210 
Two meanings of consent 212 
Disclosure in the research setting 215 
Foreign law - in brief 218 
UK law- revisited 220 
Evidence of change? 229 
An ethical foundation 230 
7) Summary and Conclusions 233 
A new model of contact- innovation 234 
A continuum 235 
Examples of innovation 235 
Self-regulation 236 
Government regulation 237 
Legal regulation 238 
Failure of legal regulation of experimentation 240 
Failure of legal regulation of personal 
Innovation 243 
Solutions? 244 
Consent 247 
Consent and Innovation 250 
An ethical foundation 255 
Practicalities 256 
Conclusion 260 
Bibliography: 262 
Word Count: 106,054 (not including footnotes) 
6 
The thing that strikes me now, looking back on it, was the relative 
freedom that everybody had to do it. If one was making a world- 
shaking advance now, one would probably have to apply to statutory 
bodies for permission, acquire the funds and get it approved by many 
committees. I imagine that it would be much more difficult today. ' 
1 Joseph S. in Wellcome Witnesses to Twenbeth Century Medicine vol 3: Early Heart Transplant Surgery in the UK. 
Tansey EM, Reynolds LA (Eds). Welcome Trust 1999 at p13 
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CHAPTER 1: SETTING THE SCENE 
Britain's National Health Service [NHS] was constituted in 1948 as a universal 
system, funded predominantly by taxation, to provide health care without 
financial barriers to access. At its inception it was essentially a paternalistic 
service where the professionals delivering the care defined the needs of 
patients and set up services to meet those needs. Within this model the 
expectation was that high individual professional integrity and competence 
would lead to a high quality service. 
Indeed, many books on medical law or ethics highlight the high esteem the 
medical profession enjoys in the eyes of the general pubi iC. 2 For example, the 
British Medical Association, in the introduction to its book The Handbook of 
Medical Ethics, states: 
Because of their special knowledge and the vulnerability of their 
patients, members of the medical profession have traditionally been 
regarded as particularly trustworthy and responsible by the public. 
From the profession, therefore, society expects high standards, not 
only of scientific education and clinical skill, but also of professional 
and humane cond UCt. 3 
In turn Braziet4states that the medical profession, the patient and the public 
have a common need for: 
a) the medical profession to be properly regulated and controlled, 
b) a clear definition of the rights and obligations of patients, doctors and other 
health professionals, 
c) an adequate and rational system for compensation for patients suffering 
injury, 
d) effective means of investigating medical accidents and errors and 
e) doctors and patients to be given comprehensible guidance on those areas 
of medical practice of moral and ethical sensitivity. 
A fundamental difficulty, however, is the fact that the doctor's relationship with 
his patient is not equally balanced; just as the lawyer knows more about the 
law than does his client, the doctor knows more about medicine than does his 
patient. The patient, therefore, needs to trust in the learning of another at a 
time of great uncertainty when suffering ill health. However, the easy 
availability of health information, coupled with a sense of entitlement, is 
shifting the power in the doctor-patient relationship. Patients are now asking 
for greater involvement and control over what happens to them, reflected by a 
gradual evolution in the legal control of medical practice. 5 This control may 
vary according to the form that the doctor patient relationship takes. 
2 Brazier M. Medicine, Patients and the Law. 3rd ed. Penguin 2003, p4-5. 
3 British Medical Association. The handbook of medical ethics, BMA, 1980, p9. 
4 Brazier M. Medicine, Patients and the Law. 3rd ed. Penguin 2003, p8 
5 British Medical Association. Rights and responsibilities of doctors. BMA, 1992,2nd ed, p xxi. 
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THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP: 
A doctor may come in contact with a patient in one of three ways: 
Firstly, a person may consult a doctor as part of the normal therapeutic 
doctor/patient relationship. The patient consults the doctor because of illness 
and the doctor is then responsible for that patient's treatment. 
Secondly, a doctor may come into contact with patients when involved in 
clinical research. 
Thirdly, a doctor may act as an impartial medical examiner, reporting to a third 
party. 
In each model of contact there is a difference in the attitude of the patient, the 
constraints on the doctor and the relationship between patient and doctor. 6 
The fundamental difference is the objective of the contact between patient 
and doctor. When part of a therapeutic relationship, the doctor's main 
objective is the well being of the patient and improvement in that patient's 
health. This is the 'therapeutic' model. When involved in research the doctor's 
aim is the accumulation of medical knowledge. The benefits may therefore be 
designed to aid future patients, although there is still potential for the research 
subject to obtain benefit. This is the 'research' model. Finally, in the third 
setting, when acting as an impartial medical examiner accountable to a third 
party who commissions their services, as for example on behalf of an 
insurance company, the doctor's concerns lie with obtaining information for 
that third party. The normal therapeutic doctor-patient relationship therefore 
does not arise. In this, the 'medical examiner' model, any tests carried out on 
the patient are not done primarily for the purposes of the health care of that 
patient but rather are done on behalf of the third party and in the interests of 
that third party. 
There are thus different objectives in the contact between doctor and patient. 
Thus: 
[in the therapeutic setting] the physician is seen as acting wholly in the 
patient's interest, with pure undiluted humanistic motives whereas in 
the [research setting], the interests of the patient are generally 
assumed to have been subordinated, be it only slightly, to another 
objective. 7 
A Royal College of Physicians Report summarised this distinction: 
The distinction between therapy and research derives from intent. In 
medical practice the intention is to benefit the individual patient not to 
gain knowledge of general benefit, though such knowledge may 
incidentally emerge from the clinical experience gained. In medical 
research the primary intention is to advance knowledge so that patients 
in general may benefit; the individual may or may not benefit directly. 8 
6 British Medical Association. The handbook of medical ethics, 1980, pl 1. 
7 Edsall G. A Positive Approach to the Problem of Human Experimentation. In Experimentation with human subjects. 
Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970.276-292 at p279. 
8 Royal College of Physicians. Research Involving Patients. Royal College of Physicians, London, 1990 at 5 
10 
It is therefore clear that, because there are different objectives in the contact between patient and doctor, ethical and legal rules and guidelines may vary 
according to the model of contact. For example, it would be quite improper for 
a doctor to examine a person purportedly on the basis of a normal therapeutic 
relationship when in reality the doctor is acting as a medical examiner on behalf of other third parties, such as an insurance company. Promoting the 
patient's own health interests and protecting their confidentiality are not the 
goals of this interaction. 9 In this situation, the person may volunteer 
information he or she would otherwise not have divulged, had it been known 
that the doctor was acting on behalf of the insurance company. 
Similarly, the ethics of clinical care should not be confounded with those of 
research. 10 In a randomised clinical trial comparing two treatments, the null 
hypothesis, that there is no difference between the two treatments, is the 
starting point in the design of the study, the aim of which is the generation of 
knowledge. As mentioned, it may be that only future patients will benefit and 
not the research subject. Indeed, in a randomised placebo-controlled trial, 
some patients will only receive a dummy treatment and thus be denied active 
treatment. Further, in non-therapeutic research, there is not even an element 
of therapy for the research subject. 
Controlled clinical trials are often defended by arguments that stress 
the benefits that will accrue to future patients. Modern societies have 
come to expect steady advances in medical care and, as a public 
service, controlled [clinical trials] are required so that real advances are 
efficiently distinguished from those that are illusory. " 
The main impetus for regulating medical research and formalising a set of 
ethical guidelines arose out of the Nazi war crimes trials at Nuremberg, 
resulting in the Nuremberg code. 12 13 This later led the World Medical 
Association to draw up the Declaration of Helsinki. 14 15 The ethical principle of 
respect for the research subject's autonomy underpins research regulation. 
In later chapters it will be shown that the law has different expectations when 
doctors undertake research as opposed to normal therapy. Thus, ethical 
codes of conduct and laws of consent, confidentiality and negligence may all 
vary according to the role played by the doctor and the objective of the 
9 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMA, 2004, p27. 
10 Horng S, Millar FG. Is placebo surgery unethical? N Engl J Med 2002; 347: 137-9. 
11 Chalmers 1, Silverman WA. Professional and public double standards on clinical experimentation. Cont Clin Trials 
1987; 8: 388-91 at 390. 
12 Dictionary of Medical Ethics. Duncan AS, Dunstan GR, Welbourn RB (eds). Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 
1981 
13 Katz J. Experimentation with human beings. Russell Sage Foundation, 1972, p305-6 
14 The World Medical Association. The Declaration of Helsinki. Recommendations guiding medical doctors in 
biomedical research involving human subjects. 1964 (revised 1975,1983,1989,1996 and 2000). 
15 Declaration of Helsinki (2000): World Medical Association. Bull Med Ethics 2000; 162: 8-11. 
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contact between patient and doctor. Evidently, therefore, misplacement into 
the wrong model could potentially have serious consequences. 
However, this traditional division into three doctor patient relationship models 
has a major shortcoming. Although the three models appear cleady defined, 
in reality it may be difficult to place a particular mode of contact into one of the 
three. This is especially so when attempting to distinguish between the 
therapeutic model and the research model. The line between undertaking 
research on a patient and doing the utmost for him under the therapeutic 
model is blurred. Furthermore, questions arise about the boundary between 
research and innovation. 1613razier uses the recent legal case of Simms v 
Simms and another 17 to illustrate this point. 
... if a doctor caring for patients with new variant CJD attempts a novel treatment as a last resort, knowing that there is no conventional 
treatment that will prolong the patient's life, has he crossed that line 
and made his patient a research subject? 18 
Similarly, the recent use of sildenafil (Viagra) in three newborn babies with 
pulmonary hypertension in India caused controversy over the unauthorised 
use of the drug. The doctor concerned was criticised by local non- 
governmental organisations and the national media for the unethical and 
illegal administration of the drug. Using the drug on three patients was held to 
have been a planned experiment. 19 Others, however, were disappointed to 
hear of the criticism. 20 Physicians and researchers are thus still unclear about 
what is treatment and what is research. 
Levine believes a distinction should be made. 
We fail to distinguish adequately between research, on the one hand, 
and the accepted and routine practice of medicine on the other. 
Because we fail to make these distinctions, we commonly find 
ourselves developing ethical norms, guidelines, and regulations that do 
not fit the class of activities for which they are designed. 21 
Thus the introduction of regulatory codes, such as the previously mentioned 
Declaration of Helsinki2223' that govern medical research requires the 
establishment of where routine therapeutic practice ends and research 
begins. The need to make these distinctions therefore flows from the adoption 
16 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMA, 2004, p489- 
17 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All ER 669. 
18 Brazier M. Medicine, Patients and the Law. 3rd ed. London: Penguin, 2003, p405. 
19 Kumar S. Indian doctor in protest after using Viagra to save'blue babies'. BMJ 2002; 325: 181 
20 Oliver J, Webb DJ. Sildenafil for'blue babies'. BMJ 2002; 325: 1174-5. 
21 Levine RJ. In: Legal and ethical issues in human research and treatment. Ed Gallant DM, Force R. Halsted Press, 
New York, 1978, p86 
22 Declaration of Helsinki (Doc. 1 7. c) (1996) World Medical Association. Bull Med Eth 1999; Aug: 16-17. 
23 Declaration of Helsinki (2000): World Medical Association. Bull Med Ethics 2000; 162: 8-11. 
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24 of regulatory codes for medical research . However, while it is possible to identify some procedures or treatments as clearly medical practice or clearly 
research, many lie in the grey area between, as the above examples of the 
use of sildenafil and the novel treatment of new variant CJD illustrate. It is 
also unclear how procedures, such as the development of new surgical techniques or implants, are ethically and legally regulated. Should they be 
considered a form of therapy or come under the auspices of research 
regulation or is it more appropriate for them to be considered separately? 
A recent editorial stated: 
Throughout the world, systems are in place to ensure that any new 
drug is subjected to rigorous trials, appraisal, and approval before 
unrestricted use on patients. Medical devices are also subject to 
scrutiny and approval. By contrast no system exists for interventional 
procedures, many of which are done by surgeons but increasingly by 
other specialists as well. Recent press reports of surgical scandals and 
heightened public concern have led to political and consumer pressure 
for formal systems to assess new interventions. 25 
Thus, new surgical and other invasive procedures appear to enter clinical 
practice without an assessment of their safety and efficacy being 
undertaken. 26 For example, novel designs of hip prostheses can come to 
market with limited evaluation of their clinical performance. 27 There is 
therefore growing concern that the introduction of new interventional 
procedures appears to be unregulated. Before considering how to regulate 
them, however, better definitions are required. 
It should be pointed out that the previously described third category of contact 
between doctor and patient, namely that of the doctor acting as an impartial 
medical examiner, has no relevance to this thesis and will not be considered 
further. 
DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING INTERVENTIONS: 
Classifying the various activities undertaken by doctors into different 
categories can be difficult because the meanings of the terms used to 
describe the categories are ill defined. Problems of ambiguity and lack of 
clarity in basic concepts pervade the area. 28 As mentioned, the dividing line 
between treatment and research appears fine and further confused by the 
issue of innovation. Furthermore, different authors have confusingly used 
different definitions. For example, some have described new surgical 
interventions as being innovations while others classify them as 
24 Gaze E, Dawson K. Distinguishing medical practice and research: the special case of IVT. Bioethics 1989; 3: 301- 
319. 
25 Campbell B, Maddern G. Safety and efficacy of intervenfional procedures. BMJ 2003; 326: 347-8. 
26 Dent T, Wortley S, Campbell B. New interventional procedures. BMJ 2004; 329: 3-4. 
27 Faulkner A, Kennedy LG, Baxter K, Donovan J, Wilkinson M, Bevan G. Effectiveness of hip prostheses in primary 
total hip replacement: a critical review of evidence and an economic model. Health Technol Assess 1998; 2: 6. 
28 Price P. Legal and ethical aspects of organ transplantation. 2000, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p419. 
13 
experimentation. Some use the words 'research' and 'experimentation' 
interchangeably while others make a clear distinction between the two. It is 
therefore appropriate to define what exactly is meant by the terms 
'innovation', 'research' and 'expedmentation' in this thesis. 
Experimentation is Research, Innovation is Therapy: 
Brushwood: 
Commenting on a case of 'experimental' drug therapy that reached the US 
courtS29 , 
Brushwood states that, in the strictest scientific sense, experimental 
drug therapy is the use of a drug in circumstances where the goals of the 
experiment take precedence over the goals of therapy. 30 Thus, in his view, an 
experiment is an exercise designed to test rigorously a causal hypothesis by 
manipulating a treatment variable and observing the effects of this 
manipulation on one or more dependable variables. Clearly, the purpose of 
such an experiment is to gain new knowledge, although an additional result 
may be the relief of suffering in those subjects who have been assigned to the 
treatment group rather than the control group. 
It is therefore clear from this that Brushwood equates experimentation with 
research. He further claims that innovative therapy, although sometimes 
referred to as experimental therapy by other observers, should not be called 
that. He believes the purpose of innovative therapy is to relieve human 
suffering, although a happy additional result may be the acquisition of new 
knowledge. He states that in an experiment, one refers to investigators and 
subjects, while in innovative therapy one refers to health care providers and 
patients. Innovative therapy differs from standard therapy because the results 
are more difficult to predict. However, innovative therapy is still therapy. It is 
not experimentation because there is no experiment. 31 
In summary, Brushwood equates experimentation with research and 
considers innovation to be distinct from experimentation and be a form of 
therapy. While appearing clear-cut, his definition implies there is no grey area 
between research and therapy. A medical intervention, even if novel, is a form 
oftherapy. 
Dickens: 
A somewhat more confusing picture emerges when considering the definitions 32 
used by Dickens. He at first appears to agree with Brushwood. By reducing 
procedures to their elements, he claims that therapeutic procedures are 
intended to yield knowledge for aiding the patient, whereas experimental 
procedures are intended to yield knowledge for its own sake, irrespective of 
the patient who in this regard is better described as the subject. 
29 Henderson v. Bodine Aluminium, Inc., 70F. 3d 958 (8th Cir 1995) 
30 Brushwood DB. Challenging denial of coverage for innovative therapy. Am J Health-Syst Pharm. 1997; 54: 572- 
4. 
31 Brushwood DB- Challenging denial of coverage for innovative therapy. Am J Health-Syst Pharm. 1997: 54: 572- 
4. 
32 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975; 113: 635-9. 
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He continues: 
... a treating physician may be inspired in giving a patient bona fide therapy by a strong sense of novel enquiry. Therapeutic innovation in 
seeking to aid a patient may be acknowledged. The fact of novelty 
alone, however, does not make the procedure experimental. 33 
Thus, he clearly also equates experimentation with research and regards 
innovation as being a distinct entity and a form of therapy. For example, he 
believes the first human heart or kidney transplant was not experimental, 
although by definition it was novel. Heart transplantation, to his mind, was a 
form of therapy. 
However, the picture becomes a bit more confusing as Dickens then appears 
to contradict himself. 
When orthodox therapy is available, and a new treatment is 
administered to see if it will prove more successful, use of the new 
treatment would be experimental, even though upon proving more 
successful it will become the new orthodox treatment. 34 
Indeed, he claims that 
if 
... an orthodox treatment exists, any departure from it will be 
experimental if deliberate, and negligent if not. 35 
This argument had previously been used in the 1871 case of Carpenter v. 
Blake. 36 In it the physician concerned argued that his unorthodox procedure to 
correct a dislocated shoulder represented innovation rather than negligence. 
The court, however, ruled that any deviation from standard practice that 
lacked the approval of respectable practitioners was not acceptable when it 37 did not benefit the patient. This is very similar to the Scottish case of Hunter 
v. Han1eY38 that will be discussed later. 
To return to Dickens' argument, he now appears to define a novel treatment 
as being part of either therapy or experimentation by ascertaining whether 
there is a current orthodox treatment available. If no orthodox treatment exists 
a new intervention is described as innovative treatment and forms part of 
therapy. On the other hand, if there is an orthodox treatment the deliberate 
use of a novel intervention will be deemed to be experimental and thus 
research. 
33 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975; 113: 635-9 at 635. 
34 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975,113: 635-9 at 636. 
35 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975; 113: 635-9 at 636. 
36 Carpenter v. Blake, discussed in Faden R, Beauchamp T. The History and Theory of Informed Consent. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986, p100. 
37 Carpenter v. Blake, discussed in Faden R, Beauchamp T. The History and Theory of Informed Consent. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986, p100. 
38 Hunter v Hanley (11955) SC 200 
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On this basis it should be noted that although the physician in Carpenter 
argued his novel treatment was innovative, Dickens would have defined it as 
experimental because an orthodox treatment already existed. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that Dickens would not have considered the defendant to be 
negligent because the attempted unorthodox procedure was undertaken 
deliberately. Clearly Dickens' argument does not hold because it implies that, 
provided the attempted novel treatment is deliberate, negligence will not be 
found. 
Dickens' argument also implies that if no orthodox treatment is available, 
doctors are free to try any new treatment they wish on a patient under the 
guise of therapy, thus using ethical and legal codes of conduct designed for 
ordinary treatment. This was the argument used to allow the introduction of 
organ transplants. Some of the surgeons involved in the early heart 
transplants rejected the use of the word experiment and considered the new 
technique to be therapy. Regarding the first heart transplant Christiaan 
Barnard stated 
I wouldn't like to call this operation an experiment. It was treatment of a 
sick patient. 39 
Similarly another transplant surgeon, Reemtsma, believed the distinction 
between therapeutic and experimental procedures was merely qualitative. 
Experimental merely meant that the outcome was uncertain but the 
procedures were undertaken with therapeutic purposes in mind. 40 
Shumway, who had undertaken much of the early work in developing heart 
transplantation, also objected to the idea that cardiac transplantation was 
human experimentation. In his view it was clinical investigation. 41 
Heart transplantation is therapeutic from the perspective of the 
designated recipient. Heart transplantation continues, however, to be a 
field of clinical investigation from the viewpoint of the medical scientists 
involved. 42 
Beecher in turn claimed that transplantation was a desperate effort to save a 
desperate situation. It was a therapeutic effort that would become widely 
practised once the rejection problem had been overcome. The operation also 
'focussed attention on a great need. 943 
39 Barnard CN. quoted in Time, 29/12/67. 
40 Reemtsma K. in Ethics in medical progress. Wolstenholme GEW, O'Connor M eds. Boston: Little, Brown. 1966: 
164-6. 
41 Stinson EB, Dong E Jr, Then AB, Shumway NE. Cardiac transplantation in man. 3. Surgical aspects. Amer J Surg 
1969; 118: 182-7 at p 187. 
42 Shumway NE. Transplantation of an unpaired organ, the heart. Proc Nat Acad Sci USA 1969; 63: 1032-3. 
43 Beecher HK. Scarce Resources and Medical Advancement. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund 
PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970.66-104 at 96. 
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A Contrary View- Innovation is not Therapy but Research: 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, if innovation is classified as part of 
therapy, patients subjected to innovative treatments such as organ 
transplantation will not be afforded adequate protection. There is thus a 
contrary view to what has just been described and this is that new treatment, 
given to see if it will prove more successful in a specific patient, is by definition 
an innovative treatment that needs to be distinguished from ordinary 
treatment. 
Dickens, once again, appears to contradict himself when at one point he 
concedes that research and experimentation are not identical. He claims that 
a different dilemma arises when considering randomised controlled clinical 
trials, in which two orthodox treatments are compared to see which gives the 
better progress. In so far as each treatment is orthodox therapy, he believes 
the situation appears non-experimental and although the patient's selection to 
receive one form of treatment or another is designed to produce useful 
knowledge, the procedure itself is no less a therapy. He states that this is 
human research but it does not constitute medical experimentation. 44 
He further claims that it is important not just to seek the predominant motive of 
a treatment but also any signs of an investigational motive. This thereby 
allows protection of the patient from even minor experimentation being 
concealed within the interstices of orthodox therapy and exposes it to the light 
of peer review and ethical (including legal) assessment. 
Evans and Evans agree with this. They believe that the evolution of new or 
revised techniques and procedures in clinical practice at the very least implies 45 the conduct of clinical research on patients. It should be noted that they use 
the word 'research'where Dickens would use the word 'experimentation'. As 
previously mentioned, the use by different authors of the same word but with 
different meanings or the use of different words but having the same meaning 
has lead to much confusion in analysing the various concepts. 
Kennedy and Grubb, in turn, believe that: 
Innovative therapy should properly be regarded as one of two things: 
either research, with all that flows therefrom; or therapy, where the sole 
intention is to care for the particular patient involved. Consequently, the 
law does not inhibit development. It says, however, that any 
development must be defended as research or justified as appropriate 
albeit innovative therapy, against the background of a possible claim in 
negligence. 46 
44 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J 1975; 113: 635-9 at 636. 
45 Evans D, Evans M. A decent proposal: ethical review of clinical research. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1996, 
p54 
46 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Bufterworths: London. 3rd ed, 2000, p1742 
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However there are few doctor-patient interactions where the sole intention is the care of that patient. Thus, according to the above definition, therapy per 
se would virtually cease to exist and practically all interventions would need to 
be regarded as research. Furthermore, since by definition, innovative therapy 
cannot have as its sole intention the care of the particular patient due to Its 
investigational aspect, it also would need to be considered research. 
This would also apply when a doctor is learning how to perform a particular 
recognised technique. Future patients will clearly benefit by the doctor 
learning how to perform this technique, although the current patient on whom 
the technique is being learnt should also benefit, provided the attempted 
procedure has been successful and no unnecessary complications have 
arisen. This form of innovation, called personal innovation for the benefit of 
this thesis, will be considered in greater detail later. 
To return to Kennedy and Grubb's statement, the first part implies that all 
innovation should be treated as research. This however does not sit logically 
with the second part of their statement where the appropriateness of the 
innovation appears to be given prominence and, in their view, makes it 
'therapy'. 
A Third View: Experimentation is a separate entity, distinct from Research: 
Clearly there are a number of the inconsistencies in the previous arguments. 
A different argument is that experimentation is a separate entity from both 
therapy and research. Mason, McCall Smith and Laurie, for example, e uate 
experimentation with innovation and furthermore distinct from research , 
97 
They believe that research implies a predetermined protocol with a clearly 
defined end point. Experimentation, by contrast, involves a more speculative, 
ad hoc, approach to an individual subject (my italics). The individual's 
response may indeed lead to the experiment being modified to allow greater 
benefit of the individual. A research protocol, however, will tie the researcher 
to a particular course of action until such time as its general effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness is satisfactorily demonstrated. 
Price agrees with this distinction. 48 He contends that a novel treatment is by 
its nature experimental, although it is not necessarily also research. He 
believes the distinction is founded on the intention of the clinician. Similarly, 
Nicholson believes that innovative therapy consists of the performance of a 
new or non-standard intervention as part of a therapeutic activity but not as 
part of a formal research projeCt. 49 
Much innovative therapy is surgical in nature, since surgeons often try out 
modifications to existing surgical procedures and occasionally try out new 
operations. In general these are not subject to peer review or review by a 
research ethics committee and this, to reiterate, is the problem with accepting 
47 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. 2002.6th ed, London: Butterworths, p573. 
48 Price D. Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2000, at 
419. 
49 Nicholson RH. Medical research with children: Ethics, Law, and Practice. Oxford University Press, 1986, p37 
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Dickens' argument, which concludes that if no orthodox treatment is available, 
novel innovative treatments form part of therapy and, by implication, are not 
subject to more analytic review. The consequences of such a point of view will be examined in the next chapter. 
A more reasonable viewpoint is that taken by a Royal College of Physicians Report, which states that 
when a clinician departs in a significant way from standard or accepted 
practice entirely for the benefit of a particular individual patient, and 
with consent, the innovation need not constitute research, though it 
may be described as an experiment in the sense that it is novel and 
unvalidated. 50 
This statement is consistent with the previous arguments put forward by 
Mason and colleagues, Price and Nicholson. This is the position that this 
author intends to take; namely that experimentation can be seen to be distinct 
from both research and normal therapy. 
This distinction is fundamental and thus it is appropriate to recap on the 
definitions and objectives of the various modes of contact between doctor and 
patient. 
During normal therapy the doctor's objective is the well being of the patient 
and improvement in that patient's health. It implies there is a standard 
accepted practice which is undertaken to benefit a particular patient. 
Experimentation entails a more speculative departure from routine therapy, 
such as a modification of an established surgical technique, where the 
intention is to benefit the health of the patient. By definition, such a departure 
is unvalidated. 
In contrast, the main objective of research is the generation of new 
knowledge. Although the research subject may obtain benefit, this is only a 
secondary objective. Indeed, research can be further subdivided into 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic subsets depending on the degree of this 
secondary objective, a point that will be returned to later in this chapter. 
A CONTINUUM: 
Despite such distinct definitions, it may be difficult to clearly differentiate 
between the different entities. For example, there is always an element of 
treatment or clinical care in any experiment and furthermore a 'preoccupation 
with the therapy that is distinct and absent from pure research ., 
51 Normal 
everyday medical practice is by its very nature expedmental to some degree. 
Medical experimentation on human beings, in its broadest meaning 
and for the good of the individual patient, takes place continually in 
50 Royal College of Physicians. Research Involving Patients. Royal College of Physicians, London, 1990 at 5 
51 Starzi TE. Experience in hepatic transplantation. Philadelphia: WB Saunders Co. 1969; 144. 
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every doctors office. Hence the general question of human 
experimentation is one of degree rather than of kind. 52 
Thus, merely giving a patient an aspirin involves a degree of experimentation. Will the patient respond and symptoms disappear or will the patient react in 
an unfamiliar way? Is the dose insufficient and need to be increased? Are the 
reported side effects worse than any perceived benefits? A doctor cannot be 
absolutely certain how a patient will react. There are no guaranteed outcomes in medicine. Medical education strives to instil in every doctor a sense of inquiry, an intuition for biological variables, and an innate desire to evaluate 
evidence realistically. Each doctor should therefore employ some of the 
essential features of the scientific and experimental method in the daily 
treatment of every patient. 53 
There thus appears to be a continuum ranging from routine medical 
treatment, through experimentation, to research and, as previously 
mentioned, clearly delineating where each one ends and another starts may 
be difficult. 
In normal, routine, medical treatment the main element (and intention) is 
therapy for the patient. However, within this concept and at the patient level 
there is still a small element of experimentation since, as previously argued, 
patients do not all behave in the same way. 
As the novelty of the proposed treatment increases we come to 
experimentation, although the point at which treatment becomes 
experimentation is ill defined. Indeed, it is probably quite difficult in certain 
instances to completely separate experimentation from therapy. Physicians 
throughout history have seized opportunities to combine therapy with the 
generation of knowledge. Doctors have always modified methods of 
investigation and treatment in the light of experience. 
... medicine ... has realized how difficult it is to separate the practice of 
medicine from experimentation. ... there is a realization that 
experiment and therapy have much in common and that knowledge 
can only be acquired by experimentation, ultimately only by 
experimentation on man. 54 
The purpose of experimental therapy, such as when the first organ transplants 
were carried out, is still partly therapeutic in that it is undertaken to relieve 
human suffering. However it has the additional and significant intention of the 
52 Shimkin MB. The Problem of Experimentation on Human Beings: The Research Worker's Point of View. Science 
1953; 111: 205-7 at p205- 
53 Moore FID. Therapeutic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical trials of new drugs and surgical 
procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970,358-78 at 
p359. 
54 Katz J. The Education of the Physician-Investigator. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New 
York: George Braziller. 1970.293-314 at p294. 
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acquisition of new knowledge. 55 Here the clinician may depart from accepted 
practice for the benefit of a particular patient. It differs from standard therapy 
because the results are more difficult to predict and there is also an element 
of research, though this is not overwhelming. The degree of digression from 
usual practice will be an important consideration when analysing its 
acceptability. 
With experimental therapy, such as the development of a new technique, 
generalisable knowledge may be acquired on the basis of individual cases. 
Such experimental therapy is undertaken not just for the benefit of individual 56 patients but also to test its efficacy for later use in others. More debatable is 
Leffingwell's claim that'whether the procedure pertains to medicine or 
surgery, so long as the amelioration of the patient is the one purpose kept in 
view, it is legitimate treatment. 57 The legitimacy of experimental treatment, 
such as organ transplantation, will be discussed later. 
Finally, as we progress along this continuum, the therapeutic element 
decreases to such an extent that the motive and primary aim is the acquisition 
of new knowledge. This is research, although coincidentally the patient may 
still benefit. Indeed, research can be subdivided further into therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic subsets, depending on whether the patient can potentially 
benefit. Thus, non-therapeutic research lies at the extreme end of the 
continuum described because the object of such research is purely scientific, 
with no diagnostic or therapeutic value to the person subjected to the 
research. 
A continuum has thus been described ranging from routine therapy, through 
experimentation, to therapeutic and non-therapeutic research. While it may be 
difficult to decide precisely where one starts and another ends, in individual 
cases it should be possible to ascertain the nature of a particular intervention. 
This depends on what the degree of the primary and secondary intentions and 
aims of the intervention are. The greater the intention to treat the patient as 
compared to generating new knowledge, the more the intervention will be 
seen to be at the therapeutic end of the continuum. Conversely, the greater 
the intention being to generate new knowledge, the more the intervention 
should be considered to be at the research end of the continuum. 
EXPERIMENTATION -A PART OF INNOVATION: 
A further question that also needs to be considered is whether 
experimentation is distinct from the term 'innovation. ' Moore, a pioneer of 
early transplantation operations, used the terms interchangeably. He was 
concerned with a few of the ethical questions of therapeutic innovation 
raised by the application of new treatments to sick people. These are 
initial trials, carried out in human patients, or drugs or operations that 
55 Brushwood DB. Challenging denial of coverage for innovative therapy. Am J Health-Syst Pharm. 1997; 54: 572- 
4. 
56 Anon. Ethical emergencies. Lancet 1992; 339: 399. 
57 Leffingwell AT. An Ethical Problem. New York: CP Farrell, 1916, p290. 
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may benefit the subject. This is the largest single category of medical 
experimentation - if that is a suitable term for therapeutic innovation - currently practised at the clinical level. 58 
However, according to the Shorter Oxford English DictionarY59, 'innovation' 
means 'the introduction of novelties, a novel practice or method'. 
Experimentation, on the other hand, is 'an action or operation undertaken in 
order to discover something unknown. ' They therefore have similar meanings 
but while they are not entirely identical, they are also not mutually exclusive 
terms. Indeed, it could be argued that experimentation forms part of 
innovation. 
PERSONAL INNOVATION: 
There also appears to be a further distinction within the concept of innovation. 
It has already been established that if a practitioner is trying something that 
nobody else has attempted, such as the first heart transplant, this is defined 
as experimentation. However, if the technique has already been established 
elsewhere and the practitioner himself is trying it for the first time, then it can 
be described as personal innovation. 
This concept is of such fundamental importance to this thesis that it bears 
repeating. When a normal routine therapeutic intervention is being undertaken 
by an individual for the first time as part of his or her learning process, 
personal innovation is occurring. Although the main aim is the treatment of a 
particular patient, there is a substantial secondary aim, this being the 
acquiring of new personal knowledge and experience that will benefit future 
patients. 
This distinction from normal routine therapy was fundamental and led to many 
of the recommendations in the Bristol Report , 60 , the public 
inquiry into 
children's heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary. One of the defendants, 
Dhasmana, tried to excuse the level of mortality and morbidity in his practice 
as being due to his learning curve '61 
blaming 'beginner's bad luck' for some of 
the deaths. 62 
This concept of a learning curve for the development of operative skills has 
always been important in surgical training. There are two different varieties of 
this. One format is where doctors need to perform a certain number of 
procedures to maintain a particular skill, as for example learning how to use 
the technique of fibreoptic intubation in anaesthesia. This involves passing a 
fibreoptic scope into a patient's trachea while the patient is awake. This skill is 
58 Moore FD. Therapeutic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical trials of new drugs and surgical 
procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970,358-78 at 
p359. 
59 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 3rd ed, 1973. 
60 Learning From Bristol: the report of the public inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. HMSO 2001 (CM 5207) 
61 Dyer C. Surgeon blamed beginner's bad luck for cardiac deaths. BMJ 1998; 316: 1114. 
62 Dyer C. Surgeon blamed beginner's bad luck for cardiac deaths. BMJ 1998; 316: 1114. 
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essential in anaesthetic practice and can be life saving when needed. The 
problem is that it is very rarely needed and thus the skill can easily be lost. In 
an effort to maintain their skills, some anaesthetists have a very low threshold for employing it, thereby subjecting some patients to an uncomfortable 
procedure that many other anaesthetists would not deem appropriate. 
Another, more common, format occurs when some doctors have already learned the new technique and others are 'playing catch-up. ' It is of course in the interests of society that doctors keep up to date and learn to use the latest technology and techniques. Thus, Lord Cameron stated: 
I think it is well that the search for further knowledge and experience 
should not be inhibited by undue apprehension of charges of 
negligence for the consequences to a patient of treatment or diagnosis 
where such may diverge from the normal.... Medicine is not an exact 
science and the solutions of its problems are not susceptible of 
mathematical calculation, while the frontiers of medical knowledge are 
always moving and advance may often be achieved only at the cost of 
what in retrospect appear to be errors and divergences from the correct 
path as that is ultimately mapped OUt. 63 
A more extreme view was stated by one of the surgeons involved in the first 
heart transplants. 
People must die! It's no good to speculate that somebody might have 
done a better job, that somebody else might have cut this or that 
differently ... But unless you do the surgery, how then are you going to become good? 64 
And later: 
some patients must be sacrificed to the God of Experience. Excellence 
comes out of experience and nothing else. A doctor can reach the 
supreme pinnacle of technique, but only after he has done many, many 
cases and perhaps participated in many, many deaths. If every patient 
in the world got the best possible surgery, then there would be no 
resident program and, consequently, no new surgeons. Some surgery 
must be done by those who are less than perfectly qualified. ... 
A 
surgeon who is the best is a surgeon who has gained the most 
experience. And some of the first few people that surgeon operated on 
are dead. ... 
I know a lot of patients who are dead today because I 
operated on them early in my career. If I could do them tomorrow, 
they'd be alive. 65 
While it is understandable and desirable that doctors gain experience, this 
should not be accomplished at the expense of individual patients' health. It is 
63 McHardy v Dundee General Hospitals' Board of Management. (1960) SLT (Notes) 19 
64 Hallman G. in Thompson T. Hearts. New York: McCall 1971 at p245-6. 
65 Hallman G. in Thompson T. Hearts. New York: McCall 1971 at 246. 
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difficult to see how the two can be reconciled. These issues will be discussed 
in later chapters. 
Thus innovative practice can be further analysed by being subdivided into 
two. If a completely new intervention is being attempted, this is termed 
experimental innovation. If, on the other hand, the technique has already been 
established but the practitioner concerned has not attempted it before or is 
still learning how to perform it, this is termed personal innovation. This issue 
of learning on the job, leading to a 'learning curve' being established, can be 
particularly problematic and will be discussed later. 
In summary, innovation can be analysed separately from normal therapy and 
research (both therapeutic and non-therapeutic), although all lie on a 
continuum. Innovation, in turn, can be further subdivided into two forms, 
experimental innovation and personal innovation. 
INTRODUCING AND ADOPTING NEW TECHNOLOGY: 
What is accepted as routine medical practice, innovation (whether of the 
experimental or personal innovation type) and research is never static. The 
normal process by which procedures move over time from being part of a 
research protocol, to experimental treatments, to becoming accepted as part 
of orthodox medical practice and subsequently learned by other doctors, is of 
considerable importance in relation to regulatory codes. Although the process 
may not necessarily start by subjecting the procedure to research, it is 
important briefly to discuss how new technology is introduced and adopted 
and then to examine the factors useful in deciding where a new treatment lies 
on the continuum described above. 
Historically surgery has been largely unregulated, and there have been few 
obstacles, other than the obtaining of consent from the patient for the 
operation, to prevent surgeons from developing and introducing new 
practices. By contrast a scientific evaluation of a new drug almost always 
requires approval by a Research Ethics Committee, which may seek 
assurances about the inclusion of a control group, adequacy of the proposed 
sample size, data collection and monitoring. 
It goes without saying that novel surgical interventions should have proven 
advantages and be demonstrably effective. Implementation should be based 
on evidence and the need for such assessment is widely acknowledged. 
However, new techniques are sometimes widely implemented and only 
subsequently found to have no advantage, be less effective, or worse are 
more harmful than those they were intended to supplant. For example the 
Gamma nail was introduced in the late 1980s for fixation of extra-capsular hip 
fractures. This nail was thought to have theoretical advantages over the 
established fixation device, the sliding hip screw. However, a systematic 
review of ten randomised controlled trials has shown the nail to be associated 
with an increased risk of operative fracture of the femur and with later fracture 
of the femur and re-operation. 66 Patients who had their broken hip fixed with 
66 Parker MJ, Handoll HHG, Robinson CM. Gamma nail versus sliding hip screw for extracapsular hip fractures. 
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this nail could thus be considered part of an expedment where a new technique was developed and implemented. It is unclear whether such 
patients knew of their involvement and the question of consent and information disclosure will be analysed in later chapters. 
Advances in medical knowledge and technique do not normally occur in giant 
steps and typically involve overlapping steps. The stage of development of a 
new treatment is 
more accurately viewed as a process or a continuum that moves from 
animal [research] to clinical trials with terminally ill patients beyond the 
help of conventional therapies, then to the use of the treatment on less 
and less critically ill patients. 67 
It can take many years to progress through the stages. For example, it took 
twenty years of kidney transplantation before it could be said that it had 
become a 'generally practical aspect of human biology. 68 Furthermore, this 
evolution is not always continuous, unbroken or in one direction. As the 
investigations progress, unanticipated problems may come to light 
necessitating return to further animal research. In some cases there may even 
be a clinical moratorium where the clinical use of the innovative treatment is 
suspended, as happened in heart transplantation. 
How long investigators maintain scientific optimism in the face of uncertainty 
and feel justified in continuing 'depends on where on the spectrum from 
experiment to therapy they believe a particular clinical innovation falls. 69 This 
changes as the new treatment evolves. 
The first stage in the development of any technique or procedure is to attempt 
it in animals. 
Laboratory study puts the stamp of human and ethical acceptability on 
therapeutic innovation more than does any other characteristic. 
Preliminary laboratory trial is the only way to provide information, 
however incomplete or inadequate, which might lead to an acceptable 
informed consent. 70 
There are, however, limitations to using animal research as a basis for future 
human experimentation. It can be difficult to create an animal model of a 
particular human illness and extrapolation of such research may not be 
applicable to humans as the human response may be very different. Animal 
research will not answer all the questions posed by human patients. New 
Cochrane Library. Oxford: Update Software, Issue 1,1999 
67 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p64. 
68 Moore F. Medical responsibility for the prolongation of life. JAMA 1968; 206: 384-6 at p385. 
69 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p58. 
70 Moore F. Therapeufic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical trials of new drugs and surgical 
procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970,358-78 at 
p367. 
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operations are being employed which depend for their success on 
complicated physiological or pharmacological interactions. These can be 
complex and often specific to man. They are also often paradoxical or 71 
unpredictable . 
Imaginative experimentation is indispensable to the progress of 
medical science. Had ... transplantation never moved from the ... laboratory to the operating room, problems peculiar to human subjects 
would have to remain unknown and therefore unsolved, and persons 
living today with transplanted kidneys would surely have died. If all 
forms of treatment were, in fact, withheld until everything is known 
about them, physicians would not even be prescribing aspirin or 72 performing appendectomies today. 
Similarly, there is no quick way to reproduce in the laboratory the passage of 
years. The human experiment always carries a few surprises when contrasted 
with preliminary laboratory work. 73 
At what stage does an investigator working on animal laboratory research 
decide it is time to try the new technique on human subjects? There are no 
guidelines defining when to move from animals to trial in humans. If this is 
premature then it is deemed controversial and perhaps immoral. For example, 
some believed this prematurity was the root cause of the controversy that 
accompanied the introduction of heart transplants. 74 
Others, however, disagreed, claiming there appeared to be a consensus at 
the time that sufficient basic and developmental research in the laboratory 
had been conducted to warrant the extension of heart transplantation to man. 
For example, Shurnway believed that the way was clear to try human heart 
transplantation. A degree of experience with heart transplantation in the 
laboratory had been achieved which left him confident he could take 
appropriate care of the patient with a cardiac transplant. 75 
However, as a consequence of the many unknown and uncontrolled factors, 
and the severe illness of the patients involved in this early phase of clinical 
trial, successful outcomes are often rare and death rates high. 76 Thus the new 
71 Moore FID. Therapeutic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical trials of new drugs and surgical 
procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970,358-78 at 
p364. 
72 DeBakey ME. Medical research and the Golden Rule. JAMA 1968; 203: 574-6 at 574.. 
73 Moore FID. Therapeutic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical trials of new drugs and surgical 
procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970,358-78 at 
p367. 
74 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p70. 
75 Shurnway NE, Lower RR, Doig E. A heart transplantation narrative: the earliest years. in: History of 
Transplantation: Thirty-Five Recollections. Terasaki PI (ed). Los Angeles: UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991. 
435-449. 
76 Swazey JP, Fox RC. The Clinical Moratorium: A Case Study of Mitral Valve Surgery. In Experimentation with 
human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970.315-357 at p335. 
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intervention cannot yet be regarded as an accepted form of therapy and has to be viewed as a scientific exploration of the unknown. 
For example, there were many deaths when the use of artificial kidneys was 
first attempted in the early 40's. Similarly, Lawler, who undertook the first 
kidney transplant in June 1950, reported that this first operation was a 
complete failure due to tissue incompatibi I ity. 77 
Earlier, 23 percent of the first two hundred children who had a 'Blalock' shunt 
inserted to correct cardiac malformations died. However, all children were 
hopeless cases and thus saving a significant number was considered a 
sensational achievement. 78 
Similarly, in 1948 Brock operated on a number of patients with heart 
conditions previously though of as inoperable. The first died on the table but 
the next three survived. 79 
At the same time, in Philadelphia, Bailey's first three patients died but he then 
was successful in repairing a stenosed mitral valve in a twenty four year old 
woman, who then accompanied the surgeon to medical meetings as living 
proof of his success. 80 
Many of these early efforts were severely criticised. Early renal transplantation 
to treat terminal kidney failure for example was described as a 'pioneer era 
doomed to failure' in which the 'risk imposed' and the death rate were both 
'exorbitant' . 
81 The experimental nature of these transplants was not 
acceptable to many and led to a letter to a Paris newspaper in May 1952 
referring to one patient as 'a needless victim of a needless experiment. ... how many other patients, in spite of the ominous example, have since been 
sacrificed on the altar of surgeons' ambitions. , 82 
The early high mortality of these transplants was however recognised by the 
surgeons concerned. When heart transplants were started one stated: 
I think we must face the fact that in the beginning stages of a 
procedure as radically different as cardiac replacement, one is going to 
have to take patients who are far from ideal candidates ... there are 
really no contra-indications for cardiac transplantation at this early 
stage except that patients might be too well to need it. 83 
77 Lawler RH, West JW, McNulty PH, et al. Homotransplantabon of the kidney in the human. JAMA 1950; 144: 844. 
78 Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 at p28. 
79 Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 at p30. 
80 Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 at p30. 
81 StarzI TE, Marchioro T. The past and future of organ transplantation. Radiology 1965; 85: 369-72 at p369. 
82 Anon in Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 at p1 12. 
83 Lillihei CW- In Experience with human heart transplantation. Proceedings of the Cape Town Heart Transplantation 
Symposium, 1968. Ed Shapiro HA. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1969, p17. 
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Similarly, in his final report on surgery for mitral valve disease, Cutler insisted that the high mortality figures (90%) should not deter further investigation 
since they are to be expected in the opening up of any new surgical field-84 
Innovations such as the early transplants involve doctors and patients in 
explorations of the medical unknown that are as perilous as they are 85 
promising. On the other hand, it is essential that boundaries are extended 
and dogma refuted. For example it was believed that wounds of the heart 
were necessarily fatal and the beating heart could not withstand manipulation. 
Surgery of the heart has probably reached the limit set by Nature to all 
surgery: no new method, and no new discovery, can overcome the 
natural difficulties that attend a wound of the heart. 86 
This was stated in 1896. If it had been accepted, and pioneers actively discouraged from making advances, much of what is routine practice today in 
medicine, cardiology and cardiac surgery would not exist, to the detriment of today's patients and society. Problems of uncertainty are therefore inherent in 
all aspects of medical practice but these are encountered with greater 
frequency and acuteness in therapeutic innovation. 
In transplantation surgery this uncertainty was very much greater and was 
especially so in the early years. 
In most cases of organ transplant surgery, there is as much an element 
of ... continued experimentation and investigation as there is of therapy. In a real sense, organ transplant surgery remains at such an 
early stage of development that nearly every organ transplant patient 
has to make a 'critical choice' of whether or not to submit to medical 
experiment or to die ... The competent surgeon must strike a balance between the experimental and the therapeutic. That is, there must be a 
balance between what the surgeon knows will help the patient and 
what new procedures deserve to be tried out in the interests of 
medicine as well as for the benefit of the patient. 87 
The attempt to compare clinical and investigative responsibilities is related to 
a basic problem; determining how experimental and/or therapeutic a new 
operation, drug or other procedure is at a given time in its development and 
for a given class of sick patient. This evaluation is essential in determining on 
whom and in what circumstances it may justifiably be used. 88 
84 Cutler EC, Beck CS. Present status of Surgical Procedures in Chronic Valvular Disease of the Heart Final Report 
on All Surgical Cases. Arch Surg 1929; 18: 403-16. 
85 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at xiii 
86 Paget S. The Surgery of the Chest. Bristol 1896, p121 quoted in Swazey JP, Fox RC. The Clinical Moratorium: A 
Case Study of Mitral Valve Surgery. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George 
Braziller. 1970.315-357 at 318. 
87 Leinward G. Transplants: Today's Medical Miracles. New York: Franklin Watts, 2nd ed. 1992, at p50 
88 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p63. 
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Staqinq: 
Deciding where along the research- experiment- therapy continuum a new treatment lies depends on a number of factors. 
The medical profession attaches special significance to the mortality rate as a 
primary indicator of where a particular form of innovation, such as heart transplantation, lies on the continuum . 
89This, in turn, leads to a number of 
questions. If the mortality and morbidity rates are not acceptable should the 
procedure only be undertaken when part of a research project? Should it be 
stopped until further questions can be answered? Are there other aspects of the procedure that require further understanding, as for example the problem 
of rejection in the early heart transplants despite the surgical technique itself 
being well established? 
Thus a treatment that was still very experimental would be one in which the 
problems of uncertainty are numerous or of basic importance; 
the death rate is high and the survivors do not do very well so that the 
only suitable human candidates are patients so totally incapacitated 
that their death is imminent. 90 
On the other hand, the mortality associated with a particular operation would 
have to be compared with the mortality of the disease itself. Thus, the 
mortality of heart transplantation in its early development stages had to be 
offset against the fact that the patients were at death's door. When the 
mortality rate of an innovative treatment falls to a sufficiently low level it then 
starts to become part of accepted treatment. It is now termed successful 
treatment. However, it may still not be clear at what point the procedure can 
be applied to less than terminally ill patients. 
Indeed, patient selection criteria are themselves important determinants of 
how experimental or therapeutic a procedure is. 91 For example, in the early 
years of kidney transplants, the patients had no alternative as dialysis was still 
in the very early stages. 
The standards for acceptability of operation were therefore lowered to 
give the patient at least some chance for recovery. In many of these 
early desperate attempts, experiences were gained which later made it 
possible to raise the standards of acceptability for other patients with 
less urgent situations. 92 
Thus the use of kidney transplantation in patients who were not terminally ill 
suggested that a new stage had been entered. The procedure was no longer 
experimental and had now become part of routine treatment. 93 In other words, 
89 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p340. 
90 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p67. 
91 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p340. 
92 Moore F. Medical responsibility for the prolongation of life. JAMA 1968; 206: 384-6. 
93 Merrill JP. Medical aspects of transplantation. Transpl Proc 1969; 1(2): 162-70. 
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the use of procedure in progressively less unwell patients moved It along the 
continuum from experimental towards ordinary routine therapy. 
Other criteria suggested to help in assessing whether a procedure is 
experimental or part of ordinary medical practice are how many centres and 
surgeons are undertaking it, the predictability of outcome, and the amount of 
mass media coverage. 94 
However, even if a large number of centres are undertaking a procedure this does not automatically mean that it is not experimental. For example, there 
was a bandwagon phenomenon involved in heart transplantation that fizzled 
out after a few months. Most surgeons only undertook one or two. Similarl ý9 Starzl describes the introduction of kidney transplantation as a 'gold rush'. At 
the beginning of 1963 there were only three centres in the United States 
actively undertaking kidney transplants. Within the next year more than 25 
new ones sprang up. Kidney transplantation seemed to have become a 
clinical service overnight, despite the fact that the results were still 
disastrous. 96 
Similarly it is also important to examine the capabilities of the institution in 
which the surgeon works. There are many other aspects apart from surgery 
which are essential if the project is to succeed, such as what equipment and 
personnel are available, where is the funding to come from, is it adequate, do 
the staff have experience in performing similar operations and so on. 
Another aspect that may help define whether a procedure has become routine 
is by the degree of attention afforded to it by the media. Medawar stated: 
the best quantitative measure of the success of clinical transplantation 
is the degree to which is does not receive publicity, i. e. the degree to 
which we take its accomplishments for granted. Kidney transplantation 
is no longer reported in the papers unless some particularly macabre 
circumstance surrounds the act of grafting. ... 
in other words, it has 
been almost completely received into the ordinary repertoire of surgical 
practice. We will have succeeded with liver and heart transplantations 
97 when they are no longer news... 
A further factor defining the status of an innovation, at least in some countries, 
is the method of reimbursement. For example, in the United States defining 
the status of a procedure as experimental or therapeutic has a profound 
implication on how the procedure will be paid for. It is thus not merely a 
medical decision because there are political and economic pressures as well. 
94 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p74. 
95 Starzi TE. My Thirty-five year view of organ transplantabon. in: History of Transplantation: Thirty-Five 
Recollections. Terasaki PI (ed). Los Angeles: UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991.145-182 at p 159. 
96 Starzl TE. My Thirty-five year view of organ transplantabon. in: History of Transplantation: Thirty-Five 
Recollections. Terasaki PI (ed). Los Angeles: UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991.145-182 at pl 59. 
97 Medawar P. The future of transplantation biology and medicine. Transpi Proc 1969; 1(2): 666-69 at p666-7. 
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For example, in the early years most health insurance agencies refused to 
pay for dialysis support because it was 'experimental'. 98 
Clearly there are ambiguities in deciding at what stage along the continuum between therapy and research a particular innovative treatment lies. A further 
problem is that clinical fervour leads physicians to overestimate how far a 
treatment has progressed along the continuum towards the therapy end of the 
spectrum. 99 
Also it has been noted that: 
Initially investigators respond to new discoveries with enthusiasm and 
hope. It is not only their intellectual excitement over solving a scientific 
problem that accounts for their buoyant reaction, but also their 
expectation that the advances made will allow them to care for patients 
more effectively. But with every such breakthrough new uncertainties, 
therapeutic limitations, and negative aspects are gradually discovered. 
... investigators [tend] to deal with uncertainty by focusing on the 
positive ... in their publications, they typically write first of 'encouraging 
results' and later of 'discouraging results. 100 
Hence, there are no clear guidelines or signposts telling the investigators that 
the time has arrived to move to the next stage in the development of the 
procedure. There is a need continually to assess the state of the art, their own 
capabilities, the probable risks and benefits to their patients, the possible yield 
in knowledge that might help other patients and the proper allocation of 
scarce resources, such as manpower, equipment, facilities and funds. 101 
Fox and Swazey believe that there is thus a complex, multivariate nature to 
the development of therapeutic innovation. There are not only biological and 
medical, but also psychological and social factors involved in the unfolding of 
such an innovation. 102 Their analysis disclosed several alternative phase- 
movements between the early clinical trials and the established therapy points 
on the proposed spectrum. 
The transplantation sequence has suggested that after a medical 
innovation has moved past early clinical experimentation into what 
might be termed the it pretherapeutic" stage of its development, patient 
selection may take one of several forms. Trials with a procedure or 
drug may advance directly to the stage where it is used in the 
treatment of progressively less critically ill patients. This is the post 
experimental /pretherapeutic pattern of patient selection that we 
98 StarzI TE. My Thirty-five year view of organ transplantation. in: History of Transplantation: Thirty-Five 
Recollections. Terasaki PI (ed). Los Angeles: UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991.145-182 at pl 59. 
99 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p68. 
100 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at 55-6. 
101 Swazey JP, Fox RC. The Clinical Moratorium: A Case Study of Mitral Valve Surgery. In Experimentation with 
human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970.315-357 at p335 
102 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at 340,343 
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originally postulated. But we have found that at least two other 
possibilities exist. The therapeutic innovation may be extended to terminally ill patients with a wider, more inclusive range of serious diseases and medical problems than was characteristic of those who 
were the subjects of earlier clinical trials. This is currently [in 1978] the 
case with renal transplantation and the "all risk" patients who have become its recipients. There is a third alternative patient selection trend that has become apparent. This is exemplified by the field of heart transplantation, which continues to choose recipients from among 
patients who are dying of end-stage cardiac disease as it did at its inception but has now gone on to select the "best risk" patients - psychologically as well as biomedically - within this otherwise "doomed" category. 103 
They believe this perspective of a relatively conservative, low key, hard 
working, clinically focussed approach stands in marked contrast to the phases in ideology and goals that often precede it, that is: 
the exuberant, aggressive, frequently hubris-ridden outlook that 
characteristically prevails in the very first period of early clinical trials 
[with] the expectation of imminent ... breakthroughs. 
104 
In turn, assessment of any new technology needs to include systematic 
review and sgthesis of a range of evidence on the effects of the 
intervention. C5 For technology assessment to improve health care for 
patients there must also be institutions responsible for disseminating high 
quality evidence to relevant target audiences, thereby promoting the uptake of 
effective measures and the discontinuation of ineffective or harmful ones. 
In the United Kingdom, the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination at the 
University of York, funded by the National Health Service Research and 
Development Programme, fulfils this role. A database of abstracts of reviews 
of effectiveness prepared by the Centre is available through the Cochrane 
Library. 106 Such reviews can contribute to the establishment of clinical 
guidelines, issued by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). The 
role of NICE, clinical guidelines and evidence based medicine in regulating 
innovation will be considered in a later chapter. 
However, problems can arise at each stage in the assessment of a new 
surgical procedure. At the very start of the process, it is difficult to know when 
to give a new procedure priority for evaluation. If an assessment is done too 
early, before surgeons have mastered the technique (i. e. early in the learning 
103 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at 341-2. 
104 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at 342. 
105 Chalmers 1, Hetherington J, Elbourne D, Keirse MJNC, Enkin M. Materials and methods used in synthesizing 
evidence to evaluate the effects of care during pregnancy and childbirth. In: Chalmers 1, Enkin M, Keirse MJNC, eds. 
Effective care in pregnancy and childbirth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989: 39-65 
106 The Cochrane Library. Oxford: Update software, Issue 1,1999. Website address- hftp: //www. update- 
software. com/ccweb/cochrane/cdsr. htm 
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curve), there is a risk of rejection of an effective procedure. If too late, the 
technique may have diffused and become established, by which time it may at first be considered unethical to withhold it, although subsequent assessments 
may show it to be ineffective or even harmful. 
Indeed, as mentioned, what makes a surgical technique new is not always 
easy to define because surgical procedures generally evolve in small steps, 
making it difficult to decide when a procedure has changed sufficiently to 
justify formal evaluation. 
The uptake of minimally invasive surgical techniques provides an example of 
some of the problems that can arise. Laparoscopic cholecystectomy was 
adopted in preference to mini-cholecystectomy by many surgeons without any 
evidence of its effectiveness and resulted in a higher rate of bile duct injuries 
while surgeons were still learning the technique. 107 Formal evaluations were 
hampered by widespread optimism about the effectiveness of the minimally 
invasive approach, which was subsequently found to be exaggerated. 
Furthermore, it was very difficult to perform a randomised controlled trial to 
compare the two techniques. Such trials are more straightforward to conduct 
when assessing therapies adjuvant to surgery rather than comparing 
alternative surgical procedures. This is because placebo controls cannot be 
undertaken and if two surgical techniques are to be compared, differences in 
wound site and size would allow bias from both patient and doctor, thereby 
confounding the results. 
Other problems arise in other branches of medicine. For example, efficacy 
has not been proven for many interventional radiological procedures. 108 This 
is because interventional radiology is both consumer and technology driven 
and rapid and frequent modifications of equipment and devices make the 
methods and the results of studies obsolete before they are completed and 
published. 109 
On the surgical front, the possibility that some surgeons may have better 
outcomes with one procedure than other surgeons with an alternative 
procedure - that is there is an interaction between surgeon and technique - 
creates a particular difficulty. If there is an interaction between surgeon and 
procedure, pooling the results across surgeons would give a misleading 
picture, and quantifying the interaction would require a very large sample size. 
Randomising patients to surgeons who use different procedures, while 
studying patients of different surgeons observationally, may represent the 
pragmatic alternative but addresses a different question - namely what are the 
effects of the alternative procedures when carried out by surgeons who prefer 
them? "o 
107 Richardson MC, Bell G, Fullarton GIVI, et al: Incidence and nature of bile duct injuries following laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy: An audit of5193 cases. Br J Surg 1996: 83: 1356-60 
108 Dondelinger RF Advances in abdominal interventional radiology. Lancet 1999; 353 (Supplement 1): 1-5-18 
109 Dondelinger RF Advances in abdominal interventional radiology. Lancet 1999; 353 (Supplement 1): 15-18 
110 Reeves, B. Health Technology Assessment in Surgery. Lancet 1999; 353 (Supplement 1): 3-5. 
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The difficulty of performing randomised control trials of new surgical 
procedures means that in a recent update of the Cochrane Library there are few systematic reviews of the effects of surgical procedures, "' although there 
are many more reviews of adjuvant surgical therapies. 
Furthermore, since the Bristol Report' 12 , the General Medical Council has been grappling with the problem of measuhng and comparing surgical 
outcomes. This problem will be considered in a later chapter. 
There can also be difficulties in weighing up the benefits and costs of new 
surgical techniques. Adopting a new procedure may not be straightforward 
since it is likely to require a surgeon to acquire new practical skills and to 
develop competence over a number of cases. The costs of mastering the new 
procedure are likely to be substantial for patients, surgeons, and health 
services, since surgeons who are learning a new technique typically take 
longer to carry out a procedure and have a higher rate of complications than 
do experienced ones. Thus, once a previously experimental therapy has 
been in use and accepted as routine therapy, the problems of personal 
innovation need to be considered. Furthermore the gradient of the learning 
curve may vary considerably between surgeons. ' 13 
The introduction of new prosthetic joints in orthopaedics illustrates another 
problem; that is, the need to assess long-term outcomes for some 
procedures. Clinically and economically important differences in the failure 
rate of alternative prostheses are unlikely to emerge for several years and 
manufacturers are understandably reluctant to invest in the long-term and 
expensive evaluations that are needed to show benefit. 
Devising ways of encouraging surgeons to recognise uncertainty about the 
effects of surgical procedures and to be less susceptible to the lure of new 
and expensive technologies that have not been fully evaluated probably 
represents the greatest challenge to health technology assessment in 
surgery. A greater awareness of the need to assess surgical technologies 
should lead to more and higher quality evaluations of effectiveness, the 
opportunity to synthesise evidence from individual studies in systemic 
reviews, and the incorporation of high quality evidence into guidelines. There 
also needs to be wider acknowledgement of the difficulty of carrying out 
randomised trials in some circumstances and a greater appreciation of the 
potential value of assessments with non- randomised designs when 
randomised trials prove to be impractical. 
DIFFERENT ARRANGEMENTS: 
As previously mentioned, there is a striking contrast between the 
arrangements that exist in many countries for evaluating new forms of drug 
111 The Cochrane Library. Oxford: Update software, Issue 1,1999. Website address- http: J/www. update- 
software. com/ccweb/cochrane/cdsr. htm 
112 Learning From Bristol: Summary and Recommendations. HMSO 2001 (CM 5207(ii) 
113 Reeves, B. Health Technology Assessment in Surgery. Lancet 1999; 353 (Supplement 1): 3-5. 
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treatment, using formal, controlled research studies, and other forms of health 
I care therapy of the experimental varýiety such as infertility treatment. '14 
For example, in the UK, licensing decisions for medicinal products are based 
on trials involving on average around 1500 patients. ' 15 New drugs are 
introduced following rigorous testing in animals, followed by carefully 
controlled testing in humans with appropriate follow up observation. Although 
there are elaborate and expensive arrangements for protecting patients from 
the unexpected and unwanted effects of drug research and routine therapy, 
similar arrangements do not appear to be in place to protect patients from the 
adverse effects of surgical innovation. Many of these non-drug interventions 
can be both ineffective and dangerous. As has been said: 
By default this double standard actively promotes poorly controlled 
clinical experimentation within a sizeable segment of the health 
services. ' 16 
Thus new surgical operations may or may not be tested in animals, may be 
introduced as human therapy with or without review by a research ethics 
committee and with or without a formal research design, and may or may not 
be evaluated by long term follow up observation. 
Surgical technology has advanced exponentially in recent years, but attitudes 
towards its introduction into normal routine practice remain archaic. Whereas, 
as mentioned, strict licensing laws exist for the introduction of new drugs, 
surgical innovation is assimilated relatively unchecked. ' 17 This occurred 
regularly in the past, as for example in the introduction of operations such as 
heart transplantation (discussed laterý, but also for relatively new techniques 
such as minimal access surgery-' 18 1 
Indeed Moore felt that experimentation was of greater concern than pure 
research. 
A far more important biomedical-ethical problem arises daily in 
thousands of hospitals concerning the initial use of drugs, treatments, 
or operations (as well as) the initial employment of untrained personnel 
in the care of patients. Here the subject-patient stands to benefit from 
the 'experiment' if it is properly done; the line between experiment and 
therapy is never clearly drawn. Every new operation, for example, is an 
experiment; indeed every operation of any type contains certain 
114 Gaze E, Dawson K. Distinguishing medical practice and research: the special case of UVT. Bioethics 1989; 3(4): 
301-19. (NB. Probably should read IVF but IVT used in title. ) 
115 Rawlins MD. P harm acovigi lance: paradise lost, regained, or postponed? The William Withering Lecture 1994. J 
R Coll Phys Lond 1995; 29: 41-9. 
116 Chalmers 1, Silverman WA. Professional and public double standards on clinical expenmentation. Cont Clin 
Trials 1987; 8: 388-91 at 389. 
117 Ridgway PF, Darzi AW. Placebos and stanclardising new surgical techniques. BMJ 2002; 325; 560. 
118 Macintyre IMC, Wilson RG. Laparoscopic cholecystectomy. Br J Surg 1993; 80: 552-9. 
119 Ridgway PF, Darzi AW. Placebos and standardising new surgical techniques. BMJ 2002*, 325; 560. 
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aspects of experimental work. Likewise the employment of a familiar drug on a new patient for the first time constitutes an experiment in the precise determination of the proper dose, and there is an inevitable 
period of uncertainty about unusual reactions that the patient may 
exhibit. 120 
Occasionally, in an effort to bypass the requirement for formal ethical 
commiftee approval for a research project, it is claimed that a study is merely 
a form of therapy. In 1988 a paper was published suggesting that treatment 
with buserelin, an agonist of luteinising hormone releasing hormone, and human menopausal gonadotrophin was more effective than conventional treatment in stimulating oocyte production and achieving pregnancy in women 
undergoing in vitro fertilisation . 
121 The patients were not randomly assigned to the two treatment groups and the authors suggested that because all they 
were reporting was an extension of the drug's regular use formal ethical 
approval for the study was not required. Furthermore, because the study was 
not a randomised trial, it was suggested that no formal ethical approval was 
required. However, Chalmers and Silverman have argued that these double 
standards are inexcusable and those who suggest that 'the interests of 
patients involved in poorly controlled, casual experiments are less in need of 
formal protection [than those involved in research] must be called to 
account. 122 Indeed, it could be argued that these patients need more 
protection rather than less. At least something good might come out of a well- 
designed randomised controlled study. Poorly conducted experimental 
innovation, where the results may not be interpretable and therefore of no use 
to the medical scientific community, is unethical. 
On the other hand, it was only fortuitous that the introduction of the Charnley 
hip replacement (a new surgical implant) into the United States came to be 
under the review of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This was due to 
the use of m ethyl meth ac rylate, a high-density polyethylene, in the acetabular 
cup inserted into the patient. A casual inquiry as to the FDA's possible interest 
in the use of methylmethacrylate elicited the prompt institution of the FDA's 
regulations as for any new investigational drug, including a requirement to 
submit full particulars of proposed research protocols, before orthopaedic 
surgeons were allowed to proceed with the new operation. 123 This allowed a 
large database to be set up from the outset, making the surveillance of these 
new joints relatively straightforward. In the UK, it is only recently that the 
120 Moore FD. Therapeutic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical trials of new drugs and surgical 
procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970,358-78 at 
p358-9. 
121 Rutherford AJ, Subak-Sharpe RJ, Dawson KJ, Margara RA, Franks S, Winston RML. Improvement of in vitro 
fertilisation after treatment with buserelin, an agonist of luteinising hormone releasing hormone. BMJ 1988: 296: 1765- 
1768. 
122 Chalmers 1, Silverman WA. Professional and public double standards on clinical experimentation. Control Clin 
Trials 1987; 8: 388-91 at 391. 
123 Bunker JP, Hinkley D, McDermott WV. Surgical Innovation and Its Evaluation. Science 1978: 200: 93741. 
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government has announced the creation of a registry, the National Joint 
Registry for Hip and Knee Replacements. 124 
A problem that also merits further discussion is the use of drugs outside their licensed indications. The Medicines Act 1968 regulates activities of 
pharmaceutical companies and others involved in the supply of medicines but 
under section 9 it specifically preserves the clinical freedom of the medical 
profession. 125 This allows doctors to prescribe as they see fit, prescribing 
unlicensed drugs or drugs outwith the terms of their product licence on a 
'named patient basis'. For example, a quarter of all prescriptions in palliative 
medicine are for licensed drugs that are used for unlicensed indications or are 
given by an unlicensed route. 126 
CONCLUSION: 
The concept of innovation as a separate entity from research and therapy has 
been introduced. Innovation may take two forms. One form is experimental 
innovation, in which a completely untried new technique is attempted. The 
second is personal innovation in which the technique has already been 
developed elsewhere and the doctor is now in the process of learning it for 
him/her self. The predominant intent here is therapeutic as opposed to the 
intent of research, even of the therapeutic kind, where the primary intention is 
the acquisition of new knowledge. 
This distinction between therapy, personal innovation, experimental 
innovation and research has been largely unrecognised. However, this 
evaluation is important because it allows analysis of the ethical and legal 
requirements for each and is essential in determining on whom and in what 
circumstances a procedure may be used. Issues of consent and negligence 
can be more clearly discussed. 
Furthermore, a continuum has been described ranging from routine medical 
treatment, through innovation (encompassing both experimental and personal 
innovation) through to research. The primary aim of a procedure in terms of 
therapy or acquisition of knowledge helps to determine where along the 
continuum that procedure lies. In addition, mortality rates, patient selection 
criteria, how many centres and surgeons are undertaking it, media coverage 
and political and economic considerations aid in defining the status of the 
procedure. In addition it should be remembered that initial enthusiasm leads 
to doctors tending to overestimate how far along the continuum towards the 
therapy end of the spectrum a particular innovative procedure lies. 
The development of organ transplantation is an example of experimental 
innovation. The early heart transplants 'attracted a degree of interest ... 
seldom equalled by any new development in medicine ... this interest taking 
the form of a continuing debate and discussion as to the medical, ethical, 
124 Anon. Details of joint replacements registry. Hospital Doctor, 26/9/02 at p7. 
125 Medicines Act 1968, s9. 
126 Pavis H, Wilcock A. Prescribing of drugs for use outside their licence in palliative care: survey of specialists in the 
United Kingdom. BMJ 2001; 323: 484-5. 
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moral and legal aspects of [this innovation]. 127 They will serve as an excellent 
example of the issues relevant to the undertaking of a completely untded new technique. This is especially so when considering the attempted insertion of the first artificial heart into a patient. The following statement highlights these 
problems: 
Some experiments upon human subjects must also be carried out not 
only in an attempt to provide therapy but to provide clues that may help 
other patients. The primary justification for organ transplant surgery as 
experiment is that new knowledge will come from the study that may 
benefit others. 128 
It could be argued that to require virtually any innovation to undergo peer 
review and ethical and legal assessment would be a significant burden and 
seriously curtail any advances, to the detriment of current and future patients. 
On the other hand, there may be an argument that, when viewed from the 
standpoint of patient autonomy and issues of consent, a different conclusion 
may be reached. 
The other form of innovation, personal innovation, where the doctor is himself 
learning how to undertake a recognised technique, is exemplified by the 
'Bristol' case, 129 which concerned the higher than expected rates of mortality 
in children undergoing heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary. 
Here 
the most serious charge levelled against [the] doctors [concerned] was 
not that individuals betrayed patients' trust but that too little was done 
by doctors to identify and remedy other doctors' failings. 130 
Examination of what went wrong at Bristol will illustrate the role of 
performance tables, guidelines and regulatory bodies such as the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence and the Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection. 
A discussion of the regulation of innovation also requires a review of how 
doctors are currently guided and regulated through both internal and external 
controls. Professional ethics and self-regulation thus need to be discussed. 
The external controls available to regulate the medical profession, including 
the role of the law, will also be examined, especially in terms of consent 
issues and safeguarding the interests of patients. If current controls have not 
been successful in regulating innovation then some other model of regulation 
needs to be proposed and examined. 
127 American Medical Association. House of Delegate's statement on heart transplantation. JAMA 1968; 206: 2631. 
128 Leinward G. Transplants: Today's Medical Miracles. New York: Franklin watts, 2nd ed. 1992 at p50. 
129 Horton R. How should doctors respond to the GIVIC's judgements on Bristol? Lancet 1998; 351: 1900-1. 
130 Brazier M. Medicine, Pabents and the Law. 3rd ed. London: Penguin 2003, p5. 
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CHAPTER 2: FAILURES OF REGULATION 
In the previous chapter, Dickens was reported as arguing that if no orthodox 
treatment was available novel treatment, such as the first human heart or 
kidney transplant, was to be considered a form of therapy. 131 If accepted, this 
implies that doctors would be free to try any new treatment they wish on a 
patient under the guise of therapy, using ethical and legal codes of conduct 
designed for ordinary treatment. This chapter will examine the consequences 
of such reasoning by reviewing two forms of novel or innovative treatment, the 
introduction of organ transplantation, an example of experimental innovation, 
and the circumstances surrounding the 'Bristol' affair, illustrating personal 
innovation. 
It is important to reiterate key concepts that have been established in the 
previous chapter. Innovation is a separate entity from research and routine 
therapy. In turn, it may be divided into experimental innovation, where a 
completely new technique is attempted for the first time, and personal 
innovation, where the doctor is learning how to undertake an already proven 
procedure. 
EXPERIMENTAL INNOVATION -TRANSPLANTATION: 
Transplantation is the transfer of tissues from one individual to another and 
often involves therapeutic innovations. 132 These have ranged from the first 
human to human and animal to human heart transplants to the implantation of 
temporary and permanent artificial heart devices. All generated considerable 
controversy and led to the charge that the patients involved were no more 
than human guinea pigs undergoing treatment for the benefit of society. 133 In 
other words these patients were experimented upon. 
Transplantation and implant surgery such as hip and knee replacements, 
stand as symbols of what modern, high technology medicine can achieve. 
Fifty years ago, however, transplantation surgery seemed impossible. It was 
only in 1954 that a team of doctors in Boston successfully transplanted a 
kidney into a patient from his twin brother. Fifty years from now, today's 
standard procedures will appear primitive. 134 
The early organ transplants were largely experimental and today's expertise 
and successful results would not have been achieved without this 
experimentation. Early popular accounts of liver and heart transplants 
accentuated the heroism of the patient, who may have had no alternative but 
death, and the skills and daring of the surgeons, while obscuring the 
experimental nature of the procedure and sometimes guarded prognosis 
despite so called 'successful' surgery. 135 
131 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975; 113: 635-9. 
132 Furrow B, Johnson S, Jost T, Schwartz R. Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems. St Paul: West Publishing 
Co; 1987 at 130. 
133 Price P. Legal and ethical aspects of organ transplantation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2000; 418. 
134 Leinwand G. Transplants: Today's Medical Miracles. New York: Franklin Wafts, 2nd ed. 1992. 
135 Leinwand G. Transplants: Today's Medical Miracles. New York: Franklin Watts, 2nd ed. 1992, at pl 1. 
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Liver Transplantation: 
The first human liver transplant was attempted in March 1963. The patient unfortunately bled to death on the operating table. It was clear from this that 
surgeons at the time had little idea how to control the severe defective blood 
clotting that characterised severe liver disease. 136 
A few more transplants were undertaken but again the patients suffered a 
similar fate. They, however, had little choice. For example, although it was 
explained to one patient dying of advanced liver cancer that no one had ever lived for more than twenty days following a liver transplant, he grabbed at a 
second chance of life. 137 Ten days later the patient was dead. 
These first clinical liver transplants were undertaken by Starzl, one of the 
pioneers of liver transplantation. Despite such dismal results, 138 other 
surgeons, such as Calne in Cambridge, felt it was time for them also to 
embark on a clinical program . 
139His colleagues, however, were unanimous in 
advising him against liver transplantation. Only one, a visiting professor from 
Harvard, Dr Francis Moore, felt it should be undertaken. Although the first UK 
liver transplant was technically successful the patient died six weeks later. 140 
Starzl has stated that 'between the 60s and 80s was the time for those 
thousands of details to be clarified which had been skipped in the rush to the 141 finish line' 
, implying a certain haste in commencing these experiments. More worryingly, when commenting on the early failures in liver 
heterotransplantation, he stated: 
Although I reported them, I may have tried subconsciously to hide the 
experience by stashing the reports in obscure corners and funny 
places. ... 
Much to my amazement (possibly even chagrin), 
Auchincloss ha[s] discovered all of these cases ... 
There were many 
dumb things that were done ... 
We made another foolish mistake at 
operation when we actually heparinized the child after the liver was put 
in. the child bled to death. 142 
136 StarzI TE. The Puzzle People: Memoirs of a Transplant Surgeon. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1992: 100. 
137 Leinward G. Transplants: Today's Medical Miracles. New York: Franklin Watts, 2nd ed. 1992, at 25. 
138 Starzl TE, Marchioro TL, VonKaulla KN, et al. Hornotransplantation of the liver in humans. Surg Gynecol Obstet 
1963; 117: 659. 
139 Caine R. Recollections from the laboratory to the clinic. in: History of Transplantation: Thirty-Five Recollections. 
Terasaki PI (ed). Los Angeles: UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991.227-243 at 235. 
140 Caine R. Recollections from the laboratory to the clinic. in: History of Transplantation: Thirty-Five Recollections. 
Terasaki PI (ed). Los Angeles: UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991.227-243 at 235 
141 Starzl TE. My Thirty-five year view of organ transplantation. in: History of Transplantation: Thirty-Five 
Recollections. Terasaki PI (ed). Los Angeles: UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991.145-182 at 169. 
142 Starzl TE. Baboon renal and chimpanzee liver heterotransplantation. In Xenograft 25. Hardy MA (ed. ) 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1989.17-28 at 25. 
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In many respects these early liver transplants were futile efforts to push back the boundaries of medical knowledge, attempted by experimenting on 
patients. This was mirrored when heart transplantation started. 
Heart transplants: 
Heart transplantation started slightly later. In the late Fifties and eady Sixties a 
number of heart surgeons, but most notably Norman Shurnway in California, 
had been working on the technique of heart transplantation using animal 
models. 143 He had spent ten years perfecting the technique and by the mid 
sixties it was widely expected that he would perform the wodd's first human 
heart transplant. However, the course of medical history was changed when 
Christian Barnard, a relatively unknown South African surgeon, visited 
Shurnway for two months in 1967. Two months later Barnard performed the 
first human heart transplant on Louis Washkansky at the Groote Schuur 
Hospital, Cape Town, South Africa, on the 3rd December 1967. In the entire 
history of transplantation, this was the event that most attracted the attention 
of the general public. 
The operation was a technical success. The media elevated Barnard to the 
status of international superstar and hailed his achievement as one of the 
major medical advances. 144 The medical community however expressed 
surprise because, as already mentioned, it was expected that the first such 
operation would be undertaken in America. 'He jumped the gun to get ahead 
of the front runners in the field', it was said. 145 
The reason the first such operation was not done in the US was not due to 
lack of technical expertise but because each surgeon was waiting for another 
to overcome the last moral scruples and attempt the operation. The most 
importantmestion at the time was the legality of killing a patient by removing 
the heart. 6A further problem was the issue of rejection. Just before the first 
operation, Donald Ross, one of the surgical team that undertook the first UK 
heart transplant, had remarked that the technical problems of transplantation 
had been resolved but those surrounding rýjection had not and it would 
probably take a decade before they were. 141 Shumway was of the same 
opinion. 'Not until each of [three crucial] problems w[ere solved could human 
application be suggested even for the sickest patient. 14) In other words, most 
believed that it was not yet time to embark on human heart transplantation. 
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Barnard, however, had no such scruples. Furthermore, opinion in South Africa 
was more permissive. Fewer questions would have been asked and there 
would have been less accountability had the operation failed. 149 Indeed, a 
special issue of the South African Medical Journal celebrating the event never 
mentioned or discussed the ethical and legal issues surrounding the removal 
of the heart from the donor. 150 
Barnard needed success and he had the audacity and the determination to be 
the first. He was egocentric, ambitious, brash and arrogant, functioning on the 
principle that anything others could do he could do at least as well. 15' He 
persuaded his colleagues to refer patients for transplantation by stating that 
there was no risk to these patients if they only had a few days or hours to live. 
He believed any such patient would beg for a chance to live. 152 
Ross stated: 
He had the courage to do it, but the background knowledge belongs to 
the Shumway group... We were just following like sheep in the 
background. We all did the operation because they showed us the way, 
and Barnard had the courage to do it first. 153 
Although technically the operation was a success, the patient died 18 days 
later from a chest infection. Clearly when complications set in the doctors had 
no idea what to do next, illustrating that the operation was experimental in the 
extreme. They had no idea how to combat rejection. This picture of great 
uncertainty on how to treat the deteriorating patient was repeated throughout 
the world when other surgeons started undertaking heart transplants. 
To illustrate the prevailing naivete in respect of the problem of rejection, 
Shumway ridiculously reasoned that the heart would be less antigenic than 
the kidney because 
[the heart] is a far less complex tissue than either skin or kidney and 
perhaps therefore less antigenic. ... teleologically, perhaps 
the animal 
would be reluctant to shed such a vital foreign tissue! 154 
However, by early 1971, assessment of the first 170 heart transplants 
established that the heart was not a privileged organ as regards rejection. 155 
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In the first such operation, despite the majority opinion of the doctors involved, Barnard believed the problem was one of rejection, although cleady the cause of the deterioration was infection. When it was obvious the patient was dying Barnard, in an act of desperation, wanted to put him back onto the heart lung 
machine, thereby prolonging the patient's agony, because he himself could not give Up. 156 
Paradoxically, despite all the problems, the world media still believed that all was well. The reasons were that the world wanted to believe that such 
operations were possible. 157 For example, it was said that: 
The early round of heart transplants should be considered a success in that they have provoked the kind of concentrated effort that ... 
is sure to bring valuable progress. 158 
Indeed, the early era of transplantation was described as being a time of 'tremendous euphoria. 159 Public opinion in countries around the world virtually forced doctors into attempting heart transplants. In May 1968 a team from the 
United Kingdom undertook the world's 1 Oth heart transplant. By the end of the 
year a further 95 had been performed worldwide by 64 surgical teams in 24 
countries. 160 
One reason why so many surgeons jumped onto the bandwagon was 
because very few had even heard of Barnard. They reasoned that if an 
obscure surgeon in South Africa could undertake a heart transplant, then it 
could not be too difficult to undertake. 161 
Other factors that led to the explosion in heart transplants around the world 
were not only medical or surgical. All over the world, in various 'advanced' 
countries, it was felt that a transplant had to be attempted. There was 'a very 
nationalistic dimension to it., 162 The UK team that undertook the first such 
operation was photographed with a Union Jack and a poster stating 'We're 
backing Britain. 163 Furthermore there was a powerful symbolism in heart 
transplants that contributed to the boom. 
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Other doctors, however, believed that much damage was done to the image of heart transplantation by this unseemly scramble, with many operations undertaken by ill trained surgeons without proper back up and with poor matching of donor and recipient, no proper aftercare and little appreciation of the management of rejection. 1640ne heart surgeon named Harken felt that the risks of the operation heavily outweighed any benefits. 165 
It must be noted that while the early operations were purely expedmental, these later operations also involved an element of personal innovation. As the 
operation became established, later surgeons were undertaking a recognised intervention for the first time. Furthermore, the results of these personal 
166 innovators were worse than those achieved by the early experimenters. For 
example, despite much of the criticism being directed at Barnard, his results 
were very good. Three of his first five patients survived more than eighteen 
months, one dying twelve and a half years after surgery. 167 Thus although Barnard was an experimenter, after a few cases it was becoming an accepted technique in his hands. Unfortunately for many of the later surgeons the 
results were very poor and resulted in patients suffering harm and dying 
unnecessarily. This serves to highlight that patients needed as much if not 
more protection from personal innovators as they did from the early 
experimenters. 
The UK's first heart transplant: 
The first heart transplant in the UK was undertaken on 3 May 1968. A leading 
article in the British Medical Journal stated that: 
On the third of May the tenth heart transplant in the world was 
successfully accomplished at the National Heart Hospital, London. Mr 
Donald Ross, Mr JK Ross and Mr Donald Longmore and their team 
deserve the congratulations of their colleagues on the success of their 
first human transplant. 168 
The first UK donor was a man called Patrick Ryan. The top of his head had 
been cut off in a building accident. He had a beating heart but essentially no 
brain. It must be remembered that at that time there were no brain stem death 
criteria. 169 It appears that the surgeons waited for the heart to stop before 
taking it out. They switched the ventilator off, waited till all the various 
recordings were flat and then the ventilator was restarted and external cardiac 
massage given. A similar occurrence had occurred in South Africa where 
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Barnard first disconnected the donors ventilator and then waited for the heart to stop beating. 170 
The difficult medico-legal issues at the time are illustrated by the fact that 
some anaesthetists in the United States had been warned by the local district 
attorney that involvement in heart transplants could lead to them being 
indicted for murder. 171 
Others, however, offered helpful advice. One friendly district attorney was 
quoted as saying 
it would appear to me that due to the uniqueness of such operational 
procedures and the lack of the ability of the law to anticipate problems 
until they arise that this entire matter requires the utmost co-operation 
and understanding by all concerned. 172 
The heart transplantation operations thus initiated philosophical, ethical and legal inquiry about concepts of death, culminating in October 1976 when the 
criteria for the diagnosis of brain-stem death were published. 173 From an 
ethico-legal standpoint this was a great advance. 
Interestingly in Japan, Juro Wada, who performed the world's 32 nd heart 
transplant in 1968, was indicted for murder, although he was not prosecuted 
because of lack of evidence. 174 The next transplant undertaken in Japan was 
over 30 years later, in 1999, following the introduction of a law permitting the 
use of organs from brain-dead patients. 175 
In the early days in the US some believed that the lawyers should have set 
guidelines to protect the surgeons and anaesthesiologists in advance. The 
lawyers responded that'... medicine ha[d] to establish [its] procedures and we 
will try to determine how to legalize them afterwards. 
176 
A heart surgeon in Houston, Texas, called Denton Cooley, mirrored the 
arrogance displayed by Barnard. His competitiveness with a senior colleague, 
Michael DeBakey, culminated in the premature use of the first artificial heart. 
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Debakey's view was that the assessment of the risks of heart transplants was still not complete. 
Since the physician can never afford to delay medical treatment until knowledge is complete and dsk is entirely removed, he must apply 
current knowledge cautiously and judiciously, weighing the benefits 
against the hazards, in his efforts to relieve suffedng and cure disease. Continued clinical trials [of transplants] are therefore necessary, but 
only after the most sober deliberation and most prudent consideration 
of all present evidence of their potential usefulness and limited scope. The indications for transplantation of the human heart must therefore 
be carefully delineated. The competing risks must be thoroughly 177 
assessed .... 
It is also well reported that Cooley at first was not keen on undertaking 
transplants. 178 However, at a meeting in South America, which was also 
attended by Barnard who had just performed the first human heart transplant, 
he claimed sorrowfully: 
I went there as a surgeon with the largest cardiac series in the history 
of medicine, and nobody even knew my name. 179 
It therefore appears that the reasons Cooley started undertaking heart 
transplants were purely personal, with the aim of achieving recognition 
through scientific ambition. Thus, in May 1968, in less than three weeks, he 
undertook 4 transplants. 
Prior to his first transplant, Cooley had done only one practice operation, on a 
cadaver. Since he had undertaken more heart surgery than anyone else had 
he felt he was prepared. There are thus elements of both experimentation (he 
started undertaking the operations soon after Barnard's first attempt) and 
personal innovation in these first operations. 
His first patient had come to hospital expecting to receive new heart valves. 
Cooley explained that it might not be possible to do so and if that were the 
case the patient would die. Only a heart transplant could save him. One 
surgeon present in the operating room that day said there was no doubt that 
the heart needed replacing. But 'it goes without saying that it would have been 
considerably anticlimactic to call everything off at that point and just put in 
three valves. 180 
Cooley's arrogance can be best demonstrated by his attitude to cooling the 
heart prior to transplantation. Surgeons believed, and still do, that it was 
necessary to cool the donor heart immediately once it was removed from the 
donor. Cooley, however, decreed this was not necessary and that a heart 
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could remain in transplantable condition for up to an hour at room temperature, 181 despite there being no evidence to support this. 
A statement he made to a visiting psychiatrist following his foray into heart 
transplantation epitomized his ego: 
... I as a personality was vaulted into some sort of orbit where they thought I was some kind of super-surgeon. .. - It was fantastic! 
082 
Rochelle, one of the immunologists in Houston at the time of the first 
transplants, believed Cooley was prepared to transplant everybody. Out of the 
first nine, three were almost dead before they went into surgery and never 
stood a chance. 
Denton took (th)em on anyway - to hell with statistics! To the surgeon, 
it was almost akin to really being god. It was a feeling of rare ecstasy 
that enveloped Denton. He was given the power to grant life! 183 
Not everything went according to plan. Bizarrely, when a donor heart could 
not be found for a dying patient, Cooley tried implanting a ram's heart. When 
this immediately rejected on the operating table he requested a large pig be 
brought down to theatre. However, it became very difficult to anaesthetise this 
pig and eventually the patient succumbed before the pig's heart could be 
implanted. 184 
Cooley's inability to let his prize patient, Everett Thomas, die was remarkably 
similar to Barnard's inability to give up on Washkansky and Blaiberg (his 
second patient). When the transplanted heart started failing both surgeons 
considered the option of implanting a second new heart. Indeed Cooley did 
precisely that in November 1968. This heart lasted only a few hours. At the 
same time Shumway at Stanford, in a similar act of desperation, had also 
implanted a second heart into a patient whose first transplanted heart only 
lasted a few hours. 
... 
Shurnway immediately repeated the experiment... because a donor 
happened to be available. 185 
Within a few months the euphoria surrounding heart transplants disappeared 
once it was realised that the majority of the operations both in the United 
States and around the world had failed. After three years, 166 heart 
transplants had been undertaken world-wide but only 23 patients were still 
alive, an overall mortality rate of 85 percent. Ten of the twenty three however 
had survived for more than two years. 186 Cooley's poor success rate was 
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described as an impressively macabre series. 187 Surprisingly, he still believed that heart transplants could be undertaken with very low risk, with mortality of 5 percent, and become a routine operation within a decade. 188 
In the UK many doctors disapproved of heart transplantation and believed that 
those who had undertaken them should be disciplined 
. 
189 There was similar 
disapproval in the US. 190 The press also took a different view from previously. 
At first it reported that heart transplantation was 'a wonderful operation' but 
this was soon followed by'how dreadful it all was'. 191 
However, it was not only the failure rate that was coming under scrutiny but 
also the consent process and where on the research /experimental innovation 
/therapy continuum transplantation belonged. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, many of the surgeons considered the operation to be therapeutic. 
These issues were brought into greater focus when Cooley implanted an 
artificial heart into Haskell Karp in April 1969, marking the first time such an 
event had occurred in medicine. 192 
The first artificial heart: 
Cooley's surgical first of using a complete mechanical substitute for the heart 
attracted worldwide publicity. This was undertaken in April 1969 and 
implanted into a patient called Haskell Karp. The patient's widow sued, raising 
questions of consent and the experimental nature of the procedure. The legal 
aspects of this case will be reviewed later. 
Karp was a forty seven year old man who had been incapacitated by a series 
of heart attacks. When he arrived in Houston, Karp did not want a heart 
transplant and merely wanted his own heart repaired. Cooley attempted to 
persuade Karp that a heart transplant was essential. He believed Karp was 
'disinclined to accept what was necessary for him... ' conveniently forgetting 
that the vast majority of his recipients had died. 193 
At first Karp had no idea that Cooley had plans to insert an artificial heart into 
him. Cooley explained that he would try to repair the heart but if that failed the 
patient would die on the table unless other steps were taken. If no donor heart 
were available then Cooley would have to use an artificial device' 94 as a stop 
gap until a donor could be found. Karp reluctantly signed a consent form to 
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that effect. He was convinced, however, that Cooley would succeed in 
repairing his heart. 
During the operation Cooley did as he had promised and for an hour tded to 
repair the damaged heart. It soon became obvious however that this would be 
unsuccessful and because no donor heart was immediately available the implantation of the artificial heart had to be attempted to allow the patient to be taken off the heart-lung machine. Cooley maintains that the intention all 
along was to perform heart muscle repair and only when it became obvious 
this would not be successful did he resort to the artificial pump in a desperate 
attempt to save the patient's life. 195 
The artificial heart kept Karp alive for 64 hours. During this time it became 
increasingly obvious that serious complications were setting in. It was then 
removed and replaced by a human donor heart. Unfortunately by then the 
damage had been done and the patient died 32 hours later. 
Following the operation the medical community was deeply divided as to its 
merits. One group believed that it was a brilliant scientific breakthrough. 
Others believed it was an act of betrayal and a severe breach of ethics. It was 
a reckless attempt, which was undertaken solely in the interests of ambition 
and would bring discredit to the whole artificial heart project. 196 Yet again, 
many members of the medical community were surprised at the news, 
believing firstly, that the clinical use of an artificial heart was many years away 
and, secondly, that Cooley was not associated with work in this area. 197 This 
situation is analogous to when Barnard unexpectedly undertook the first heart 
transplant. 
The primary motivation and the degree to which it was premeditated warrant 
further examination. It is clear that Cooley had not followed carefully laid out 
guidelines pertaining to surgery of an experimental nature. He had not 
discussed it with DeBakey, the senior investigator and the man who had 
actually developed the artificial heart, and he had not asked for permission to 
perform the surgery from the Baylor Committee on Research Involving Human 
Beings. Cooley did not ask because he knew he would be turned down. 1 98 He 
also explained that'we had to try it sometime and here was the ideal 
patient. "99 
In the background to the whole affair were the ambitions and jealousies of the 
two surgeons, Cooley and DeBakey. 200 In Houston at the time there was 
major conflict between the two. DeBakey was the more senior and Cooley 
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wanted to get out of his shadow. There was very much a conflict and 
competition between the two to be first. Cooley's feat of implanting the 
artificial heart was the very one DeBakey had been investigating and planning for years. Following the decline in heart transplantation, Cooley wanted to be the first to implant an artificial heart and forestall DeBakey. '... Cooley had an 
emotional vested interest in replacing Mr. Karp's heart with a cardiac 
prosthesis. 201 His strong drive for achievement, success, and fame was a 
motive to which he unashamedly testified. 202 
Cooley has always claimed that his use of the artificial pump in Mr Karp had 
only come about because the patient was dying on the operating table and no 
human donor heart was available. However, it was clear that he had planned 
to use the artificial heart because he arranged for all the technicians and 
equipment to be in place in the operating theatre prior to starting Karp's 
operation. 
It is also apparent that Cooley 'stole' the artificial heart developed by 
DeBakey. One of DeBakey's engineers, Liotta, who had been heavily involved 
in the implant's development, unknown to DeBakey, started working for 
Cooley because he believed DeBakey was not ready to take the next step 
and implant it into a human being. 'if you don't have a man who will go ahead 
and take the risk then my work is valueless. 203 Cooley made some very minor 
changes to DeBakey's design and passed it off as his own. 204 
A different stance was taken by the first engineer approached to look after the 
equipment that allowed the artificial heart to work. He had previously worked 
with DeBakey and refused to be involved as soon as he realised that an 
experiment on a human being was being attempted. 205 
The National Heart Institute also raised concerns and requested data on the 
testing and evaluation of the device in animals prior to its use in humans. 
Furthermore, it requested information on whether the clinical application had 
been reviewed by the local committee for human investigation. 206 
In the meantime DeBakey joined in the chorus of disapproval. He found it 
inconceivable that Cooley could use the pump in a patient knowing of its prior 
very poor performance in animals. 
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Application of an unproved device ... into a human being for pdmary experimentation before its safety and effectiveness have been proved 
scientifically in animal experiments is a breach of scientific eth ICS. 207 
Cooley argued that the pump would keep a dying patient alive for long enough 208 until a human heart donor could be found . It is not clear, however, on what evidence he based this. He had undertaken virtually no animal research in 
artificial heart transplants and had apparently only tested the pump in seven 
calves. Though all died, one lived for 44 hours. Remarkably, Cooley felt this 
was enough experimentation to allow him to proceed to the next stage (i. e. 
human trial) and was convinced it would function longer in humans . 
209 Again, 
there was little evidence to support this. Indeed, there appears to be little 
evidence that he had in fact undertaken any animal studies and those which 
he did quote (ie the seven calves) appear to have been undertaken by 
DeBakey's team, who had published their results. 210 Whatever, Cooley knew 
of the technical and medical problems that had occurred in these experiments 
but despite this, decided to proceed. 
He believed that, based on his experience he was qualified to judge what was 
right and proper for his patients. 
The permission I receive to do what I do, I receive from my patients. It 
is not received from a government agency or from one of my seniors. 211 
However, Moore stated: 
There is simply no evidence to suggest that [the artificial heart] would 
be helpful. It raises false hopes for the patient and his family, it calls 
into discredit all of biomedical science, and it gives the impression that 
physicians and surgeons are adventurers rather than circumspect 
persons seeking to help the suffering and dying by the use of hopeful 
measures. 212 
Despite criticism in the US, other countries feted Cooley like a king, awarding 
him countless national honours. For example, Spain bestowed the Grand 
Cross of Alfonso X on Cooley and Liotta in honour of 'meritorious service to 
medicine. The implantation of the artificial heart was a moment in history. 
213 
Thirteen years later, in December 1982, an artificial heart designed by Jarvik 
was transplanted into a retired dentist, Barney Clark. The patient died a few 
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weeks later but it was claimed that'a great deal was learned about the 
potential and limitations of this procedure. 9214 
Again there was great debate about whether this was acceptable. Yet again a 
patient was experimented upon and this was justified by the knowledge this 
would generate. As has been said: 
One can argue that his story is grotesque, an ugly assault on a gullible, 
desperate, vulnerable, and ill-chosen patient. One can argue that it is a 
story with great dramatic appeal, and hence with substantial literary 
merit. Or one can argue that it is a beautiful example of a stage in the 
process of scientific progress. 215 
These words, written when discussing the merits of implanting the Jarvik 
artificial heart into Barney Clark, are equally applicable to a discussion on the 
Karp case or even the first human heart transplant by Barnard. 
There is little doubt that scientific progress did occur. However this appears to 
have been at the expense of patients, who were subjected to an experimental 
procedure in the interests of society and for the personal benefit (in terms of 
personal fame) of arrogant surgeons. Thus experimental innovation cannot be 
justified by reference to normal ethical codes of conduct applicable to therapy. 
PERSONAL INNOVATION- THE BRISTOL AFFAIR 216 217 
On May 29 1998 the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) of the United 
Kingdom's General Medical Council announced that there was sufficient 
factual evidence to find three Bristol doctors guilty of serious professional 
miscond UCt. 218 The investigation lasted eight months and centred on charges 
that between 1988 and 1995, surgeons James Wisheart and Janardan 
Dhasmana continued to undertake paediatric cardiac procedures, despite 
colleagues' concerns about excess mortality. In addition, the then Chief 
Executive of the United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust, John Roylance, was 
accused of not intervening when this was brought to his attention. Wisheart 
and Roylance were erased from the Medical Register. Dhasmana was 
banned from undertaking paediatric procedures for three years. 
The PCC investigated the cases of 53 children; 29 died and four were left with 
some form of brain damage. Wisheart, who at the time was also the Medical 
Director of the Trust, was investigated over the correction of 15 
atrioventricular septal defects (AVSD) performed between April 1990 and 
214 Leinward G. Transplants: Today's Medical Miracles. New York: Franklin Watts, 2nd ed. 1992, at p24. 
215 Gorovitz S. The Artificial Heart: Questions to Ask, and Not to Ask. Hasbngs Center Report, 1984*, 14(5): 15-17 at 
p17. 
216 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
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217 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
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August 1994; nine children died. Evidence was taken on 38 arterial switch 
operations for transposition of the great arteries that Dhasmana undertook between February 1988 and January 1995; 20 of these patients died. 219 
The Bristol programme of arterial switch operations for transposition of the 
great arteries had been started in 1988. Dhasmana started performing 
switches' on babies and toddlers in February of that year and on neonates in 1992. Between 1988 and 1990 he had operated on nine patients, of whom five died. He excused the level of mortality and morbidity as being due to his 
learning curve, blaming 'beginner's bad luck'for some of the deaths. 220 He 
argued that every surgeon experiences a learning curve when he or she starts to undertake a new procedure and that he had sought advice on how to 
improve his technique 
. 
221 Indeed, he claimed no-one had tried to dissuade him 
from moving on to neonatal switches. 
Dhasmana therefore is a clear example of the 'personal innovator' described 
in the last chapter. He was trying to learn an established technique, the 
arterial switch operation for transposition of the great arteries. The switch had 
presented a particular dilemma for surgeons in balancing risk and benefit. It 
had replaced well-established but only palliative operations (devised by 
Senning and Mustard). During the 1980s more and more surgeons turned to 
the technically exacting, but in the long-term more satisfactory, arterial switch 
operation with the objective of restoring normal expectation of life and 
function. The transition, however, entailed the possibility of an increase in the 
operative mortality for this condition (of transposition) when surgeons first 
started performing this operation. The operation eventually became the 
standard of care, but precise pre-operative assessment, impeccable surgical 
technique and skilled peri-operative care are needed for consistently good 
results. 222 
The GIVIC's Findings: 
The GIVIC's Conduct Committee's statement began with an affirmation that 
trust lay at the centre of any doctor/patient encounter. Action would be taken 
when it appeared that a doctor had betrayed that trust. Any inquiry into an 
alleged breach of trust would be governed by objectivity and fairness without 
recourse to emotion, the benefit of hindsight, or judgement made mercilessly 
according to the highest achievable performance. 223 
The PCC was satisfied that there was evidence to prove that Wisheart was 
made aware on several occasions, starting in 1990, of the concern of 
professional colleagues about the level of mortality and morbidity in paediatric 
cardiac surgery at the hospital. Despite this concern, and despite the fact that 
Wisheart's previous 12 AVSD corrections had resulted in six deaths, he 
operated on further patients who subsequently died. The PCC concluded that 
219 Ramsay, S. Evidence against "Bristol-case" doctors found proven. Lancet 1998; 351: 1707 
220 Dyer C. Surgeon blamed beginner's bad luck for cardiac deaths. BMJ 1998; 316: 1114 
221 Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GIVIC's findings. BMJ 1998; 316: 1691 
222 Treasure T. Lessons from the Bristol case. BMJ 1998; 316: 1685-6 
223 Ramsay, S. Evidence against "Bristol-case" doctors found proven. Lancet 1998; 351: 1707 
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Wisheart had undertaken operations without seeking and obtaining adequate retraining, assistance or advice; and without paying sufficient regard to the 
safety and best interests of the patients concerned when deciding whether to operate. There was no available reason to explain why his results were worse than those of his colleagues. 
In addition, the PCC concluded that Wisheart had mislead two sets of parents 
when he had said that the risks of mortality were 20-25%, a figure that did not 
accurately reflect his own experience as a surgeon. He had denied the 
parents the facts they needed in order to make informed decisions about their 
child's treatment. Indeed, the prosecution claimed that all parents had been 
given an exaggerated estimate of the chance of a successful operation at the Bristol Royal Infirmary. 
It also found that Wisheart, in his capacity as Dhasmana's senior colleague, 
had failed to heed advice in 1992 regarding the continuation of Dhasmana's 
arterial switch programme. Having agreed with Roylance that there should be 
an external review of the operations that were causing concern, Wisheart 
withheld this information from Dhasmana and other clinical colleagues at a 
critical time. 
Dhasmana in turn knew that he was less successful than his peers in the UK 
at arterial switch procedures for transposition of the great arteries. He 
discussed his results with others and he visited another specialist centre to 
improve his surgical skills. The Committee agreed that he displayed concern 
but concluded that his efforts were insufficient. The PCC found that in 1993, 
despite undertaking 32 arterial switch procedures in which 16 neonates died, 
Dhasmana went on to perform two more procedures; one child subsequently 
died. Thus, despite being unable to find a cause for his inferior results apart 
from his belief that he needed more experience Dhasmana continued to 
operate, which was a serious departure from safe and proper practice. As with 
Wisheart, the PCC found that Dhasmana had failed to do sufficient self-audit, 
had not sought or obtained retraining and had not sufficiently considered the 
best interest of the patients when deciding whether to operate. The PCC was 
also satisfied that Dhasmana was made aware of concerns about his work at 
a meeting in late 1994. 
The PCC found that Dhasmana proceeded with an operation on Joshua 
Loveday in the face of colleagues' concerns. Wisheart, as Medical Director, 
gave permission for the operation to go ahead despite concerns expressed by 
professional colleagues at meetings and in writing, and despite the fact that 
he ought to have known that the operation was not in the child's best 
interests. Joshua Loveday died. The internal self-regulatory mechanisms 
failed. 
The PCC found proven that, in addition to receiving letters from a consultant 
anaesthetist, Stephen Bolsin, Roylance was alerted several times about the 
high mortality rate of paediatric cardiac surgery at the hospital. Despite this he 
failed to act, especially by not bringing in external assessment by other 
clinicians or the Department of Health. Roylance was found to have ignored 
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the concern expressed by the Professor of Adult Cardiac Surgery at the hospital and by the Department of Health that the operation was to go 224 
ahead . Again, although there was a possibility of some form of regulation through external assessment, it did not occur and, it could be argued, at the time, there was no requirement for it. 
Interestingly the General Medical Council also warned several consultant 225 colleagues that their conduct might also be open to question. Furthermore, 
the evidence presented showed failings in pre-operative diagnosis, such that 
the surgeons often went into operations with an incomplete picture of the 
heart defect they were meant to repair. 226 
Compensation claims totaling at least f-10 million pounds are expected to 
follow. United Bristol Healthcare Trust have publicly admitted liability for 
injuries to a child brain damaged during heart surgery. A spokesman for the 
Trust said it had admitted breaching its duty to Ian Stewart in that it failed to 
provide accurate information to his parents. 227 
Keylssues: 
Several key issues emerged from the GIVIC's judgement. First, in the case of 
the two surgeons James Wisheart and Janardan Dhasmana, there was a 
conspicuous lack both of self-audit and of willingness to seek and obtain 
retraining, indirectly denying the presence of learning curves. New techniques 
had been introduced which had not been available during their pre-consultant 
training period. They had never, therefore, been properly trained to undertake 
these procedures. Second, in the case of Chief Executive John Roylance, 
there was an unwillingness to use the power of his managerial position to 
intervene in clinical activities. Third, all three clinicians, at some point, ignored 
the concerns about excessive mortality expressed to them by professional 
colleagues. Furthermore, professional bodies outside Bristol, such as the 
Royal College of Surgeons and the Department of Health, were aware of the 
poor success rates in paediatric cardiac surgery at Bristol, yet either failed to 
act or did not use their position of authority to apply consistent pressure to 
force a change in practice. Formal action was taken only after an anaesthetist 
228 blew the whistle on his colleagues . 
The determination ended by raising a number of issues that arose during the 
course of the inquiry concerning the practice of surgery and of medicine 
generally. In the view of the Committee, these matters needed to be 
addressed urgently by the profession and others. Troubling deficiencies were 
identified in professional accountability, honesty and integrity, and the 
maintenance of standards of good medical practice. 
229 
224 Ramsay, S. Evidence against "Bristol-case" doctors found proven. Lancet 1998; 351: 1707 
225 Delamothe A. Who killed Cock Robin? BMJ 1998; 316: 1757 
226 Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GIVIC's findings. BMJ 1998; 316: 1691 
227 Dyer C. Bristol trust admits liability in baby heart surgery case. BMJ 1999; 319: 213 
228 Anon. First lessons from the "Bristol case. " Lancet 1998; 351: 1669 
229 Horton R. How should doctors respond to the CIVIC's judgments on Bristol? Lancet 1998; 351: 1900 
56 
Some of the wider issues identified by the GIVIC that particulady apply to this thesis are: 
A How clinical competence and technical expertise are assessed 
and evaluated. 
B The training of doctors in advanced procedures. 
C How to approach the so-called learning curve of doctors 
undertaking established procedures. 
D The reliability and validity of the data used to monitor doctors' 
personal performance. 
E The use of medical and clinical audit. 
F How doctors explain risks to patients. 
Of perhaps greater significance, but not specifically addressed by the 
committee, is the question of self-regulation by the medical profession. 230 
Many of the above issues will be examined in later chapters. 
After the GIVIC's decision came the recriminations, followed by the questions 
that won't go away. Firstly why weren't the surgeons stopped from operating 
on young children once their poor results became widely known? Immediate 
colleagues, their employer, the Royal College of Surgeons and the 
Department of Health all knew or had been told how badly they had been 
doing. The United Kingdom Cardiac Surgery Register, to whom cardiac 
surgeons voluntarily submit their annual figures, has been run by the Society 
of Cardio-thoracic Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland since 1977.231 It has 
provided a useful benchmark against which to discuss variations in the 
provision of services and for individual surgeons to monitor their own mortality 
figures against a national average. At the time it was set up there was an 
assumption that the patients and surgeons in the dataset were anonymous 
and would remain so. Furthermore the use of that benchmark to assess one's 
own practice was a matter of honour and personal reflection. 232 This register, 
to which Bristol contributed data, was available for comparison throughout this 
time. Furthermore, the surgery undertaken in Bristol, which was the subject of 
the General Medical Council's disciplinary case, was within the realms of 
routine practice, for which there were known and well established standards. 
Thus Bristol was not a form of 'experimental innovation' as described in the 
last chapter and illustrated earlier in this chapter by the introduction of organ 
transplantation and the first artificial heart. The Bristol case exemplifies 
personal innovation on the part of the surgeons concerned and, once again, 
points to a failure of regulation. 
Following the GIVIC's decision, the Health Secretary announced a Public 
Inquiry. At the time it was felt that one likely outcome of this would be a 
system of performance indicators for surgeons. 233 The inquiry also looked at 
the wider issues that the saga has thrown up for the Health Service as a 
whole, such as the determination of performance and professional and 
230 Anon. First lessons from the "Bristol case. " Lancet 1998; 351: 1669 
231 English TAH, Bailey AR, Dark JF, Williams WC. The UK cardiac surgical register 1977-82. BMJ 1984; 289: 1205-8 
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managerial culture. The inquiry has now published its findingS234 and the Government has issued its response. 235 The report stated that in the pedod from 1991 to 1995, between 30 and 35 more children under the age of 1 died 
after open-heart surgery in the Bristol Unit than might be expected had the Unit been typical of other Paediatric Care Surgical units in England at the time. This mortality rate was probably double the rate in England at the time 
and was even higher for children under 30 days. Issues raised were the 
competence of the healthcare professionals, standards of care, monitoring of 
performance and the gaining of consent for surgery. Recommendations made 
will be reviewed when assessing how self-regulation, the use of performance 
tables and guidelines, learning curves and issues of consent can be used to 
regulate innovation. 
CONCLUSION: 
In cardiac surgery there are high expectations of good results for tens of 
thousands of patients each year. As Treasure stateS236' it is easy to recall the 
surgeons who performed the first heart operations, used cardio-pulmonary 
bypass while it was still in its infancy, or who first started transplantation, all of 
which were undertaken with a high initial mortality. They worked on in the face 
of doubt, scepticism and often widely publicised criticism. They are now 
remembered with respect, having had the courage to fail. Many others, 
equally determined, did fail and are not remembered. 
Some of that determination in the face of possible failure is necessary in every 
surgeon. This, however, may be at the expense of patients. Indeed, although 
these innovators are, as Treasure stateS237 , remembered with respect, few 
remember the early patients who suffered so that later generations may gain. 
Similarly patients operated upon by surgeons in the early part of their learning 
curve also may suffer so that later patients may gain when the surgeon 
becomes more accomplished. 
These patients, whether experimented upon or suffering at the hands of 
personal innovators, deserved protection. Clearly this chapter illustrates that 
they did not receive this. This is the consequence of a failure to regulate 
innovation. 
Dr Simon Joseph, who was the Resident Surgical Officer in the Intensive 
Therapy Unit at the time of the first UK heart transplant in 1968 stated in 
1999: 
The thing that strikes me now, looking back on it, was the relative 
freedom that everybody had to do it. If one was making a world- 
shaking advance now, one would probably have to apply to statutory 
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bodies for permission, acquire the funds and get it approved by many 
committees. I imagine that it would be much more difficult today. 
238 
If such a structure exists it needs to ensure that the interests of patients, 
either those subjected to experimentation or exposed to personal innovators. 
are safeguarded. Three structures exist: self regulation by the medical 
profession, governmental control through regulatory bodies and the legal 
system. The next chapter will consider whether regulation through the medical 
profession itself has the ability to provide such protection. 
238 Joseph S. in Wellcome Witnesses to 
Twentieth Century Medicine vol 3: Early Heart Transplant Surgery in the 
UK. Tansey EM, Reynolds LA (Eds). 
Welcome Trust 1999 at p13 
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Chapter 3: The Professions and Self-Regulation: 
The law plays a vital role in regulating the practice of medicine, with many regulatory schemes, both statutory and non-statutory, involved. The definition 
of law used in this thesis is that employed by MontgomerY239, whereby the idea of law connotes rules that govern practice, and thereby covers those 
principles which people are bound to follow. A law is therefore an instruction 
given by a legitimate authority and as such there may be different types of 'law'. 
THREE FORMS OF LAW: 
With reference to the authorities which make the law: 
Law in the strict sense is made by the courts or Parliament, is binding 
on all citizens, and usually enforced in the courts. Professional law on 
the other hand is made and policed by regulatory bodies, set up by 
statute but left largely to their own devices. This type of law binds only 
the members of the profession but is backed up by significant 
sanctions. The third type of law..., quasi-law, describes rules which 
may be made without explicit legal authority and which are most 
important for the guidance they offer rather than the sanctions which 
follow if they are disregarded. 240 
Professionals are more concerned with 'professional lawand doing what is 
right than avoiding punishment . 
241 This form of law, that of self-regulation, will 
be reviewed in this chapter. Indeed, one of the central issues of the Bristol 
Inquiry was the question of self-regulation by the medical profession. 242 
Society has used the concept of the profession to organise and deliver many 
of the complex services it requires, with the rationale that the expertise 
necessary to the practice of certain vocations is not easily comprehensible to 
the ordinary citizen. 243 Traditional professionalism came to apply to 
knowledge-based activities requiring long periods of education and training 
and entailing service for the common good. 
According to Rosenthal, occupations attaining the status of a 'profession' 
have the following characteristics. They possess a systematic body of highly 
developed technical knowledge that is widely valued. There are strong 
standards of autonomy that emphasise self-regulation and altruism that 
submerge self-interest and emphasise service. There is a need for authority 
over clients, a distinct occupational culture and collegial etiquette and finally, 
there is recognition of this professional status by political, social and economic 
239 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p5 
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241 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p5. 
242 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001. 
243 Cruess RL, Cruess SR, Johnston SE. Professionalism: an ideal to be sustained. Lancet 2000: 356: 156-9. 
61 
leadersh ip. 244They also publish formal codes of ethics and practice, and registers of their members are available to the publ iC. 245 An ethical Ideal of service, monopoly over important knowledge and skills, and high social regard coalesce to establish high degrees of autonomy over work. 
The past President of the General Medical Council (GMC) has stated that 
professionalism is at the heart of doctors' relationships with patients and the public. People normally associate professionalism with quality. It suggests 
expertise and reliable, consistent performance. 246 
It appears clear, therefore, that self-regulation is essential to the concept of being a profession. As Freidson stated: 
As I noted in my analysis of medicine as a profession, autonomy is the 
test of that status. Professional people have the special privilege of freedom from the control of outsiders. Their privilege is justified by 
three claims. First, the claim is that there is such an unusual degree of 
skill and knowledge involved in professional work that non- 
professionals are not equipped to evaluate or regulate it. Second, it is 
claimed that professionals are responsible - that they may be trusted to work conscientiously without supervision. Third, the claim is that the 
profession itself may be trusted to undertake the proper regulatory 
action on those rare occasions when an individual does not perform his 
work competently or ethically. The profession is the sole source of 
competence to recognise deviant performance and to regulate itself in 
general. Its autonomy is justified and tested by self-regulation. 247 
The last two claims, those of professional responsibility and the enactment of 
proper regulatory mechanisms, will be examined to determine if self- 
regulation can oversee the introduction of innovation, whether of the 
experimental or personal variety described in previous chapters, and result in 
acceptable patient protection. 
THE INTRODUCTION OF SELF-REGULATION: 
Patients are rightly entitled to good standards of practice and care when being 
treated by their doctors. Essential elements are professional competence, 
good relationships with patients and colleagues and observance of 248 
professional ethical obligations . These standards can 
be traced back to the 
4 th century BC, in the form of the Hippocratic Oath, which set out an ideal by 
which doctors promised to practise, although today it looks inappropriately 
doctor centred . 
249 Self-regulation in the United Kingdom began in the 16th 
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century with the foundation of the Royal College of Physicians. This 
functioned both as a setter of standards and as a closed shop. Leaming at the 2M time was based on a few medical schools and an apprenticeship system . 
Following this, a number of independent bodies, such as the other Royal Colleges and the British Medical Association, emerged to represent S ecific 
areas of practice and these continue to play an important role today. 2 
P1 
The statutory regulation of medical practice was then established with the 
creation of the General Medical Council (GMC) by the Medical Act of 1858. 
Throughout this period, standards and quality were implicit rather than explicit, 
with government and society trusting the medical profession to protect the 
public and, as mentioned, granting the profession considerable autonomy in 
the process. 252 Society believes that the professions will place the welfare of 
society above that of the profession. 253 If society perceives that medicine is 
failing to meet its obligations, professional status may be withdrawn or 
modified . 
254 Self-regulation is a vehicle, not the goal or the core of 
professionalism. 255 
It is, however, important that there is inter-dependence of public policy and 
professional self-regulation. Klein has claimed that the aim of public policy is 
to make the medical profession accountable for its performance. 256 The aim 
of professional self-regulation, on the other hand, is to make individual 
practitioners more accountable to their peers. The success of the former 
strategy depends crucially on the latter, on institutionalising self-regulation at 
the local level. 257 
THE GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL: 
The GIVIC is the governing body of the medical profession. It is therefore 
essential that its role in regulating doctors be examined. 
The GIVIC sets standards of care, competence and conduct so that the doctor 
patient relationship is maintained. In this respect, it has a statutory 
responsibility to issue guidance on medical ethics. 258 It also has an extremely 
important role in medical education and ensures that only those who are 
suitably qualified can be registered. 259 One of its main functions is the 
250 Ham C, Alberti KGMM. The medical profession, the public, and the government. BMJ 2002; 324: 838-42. 
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maintenance of this register . 
260 The Medical Act 1983 gives the GIVIC the legal authority to prohibit or suspend doctors from practising. It must be remembered, however, that the GIVIC is 
not ordinarily concerned with errors in diagnosis or treatment, or with the kind of matters which give rise to action in the civil courts for 
negligence unless the doctor's conduct in the case has involved such a disregard of his professional responsibility to his patients or such a 
neglect of his professional duties as to raise a question of serious 
professional miscond UCt. 261 
It is only when the doctor's action or inaction brings the profession into 
disrepute that he or she will have to face charges before the GIVIC. Indeed 
one of its most important functions is to fill the gap in constraining actions that 
are not legally actionable yet would not be expected of the ethical 
practitioner. 262 
In the past, the GIVIC was heavily criticised because it could only discipline a doctor if he or she was found guilty of 'serious professional misconduct' or had been convicted of a criminal offence. 263 The Medical (Professional 
Performance) Act 1995, however, has given the GIVIC new powers, extending 
its jurisdiction to enable it to investigate cases where there is evidence that a 
doctor's general performance is seriously deficient. 
On the other hand, it has been claimed that regulation in whatever form can 
never substitute for a doctor's personal professionalism . 
264 As previously 
mentioned, professionals are more concerned with doing what is right than 
avoiding punishment. 265 
Professionally led regulation is predicated on the fact that the practice 
of medicine still involves a considerable degree of judgement in the 
fundamental functions of diagnosis about treatment. Consequently 
patients, in the privacy of the consulting room, are still critically 
dependent on their doctors' getting it right first time, knowing the limits 
of their competence and their honesty and integrity. Doctors practising 
within a regulatory framework of professional values and standards - 
professional conscience - are more likely to give of their best for their 
patients than doctors who are not, because there is peer pressure to 
do So. 266 
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It is therefore prudent at this point to review whether self-regulation in the form 
of 'professional conscience' and 'peer pressure' descdbed above protected 
patients in the two innovative clinical scenados descdbed in the last chapter, 
namely the early heart transplant years representing experimentation and the 
events in 'Bristol' illustrating personal innovation. 
THE EXPERIMENT OF HEART TRANSPLANTATION: 
Did self-regulation protect the first few patients undergoing organ 
transplantation? The answer is in the main no, although there were some 
encouraging signs. As one of the eminent surgeons of the time wrote 
There can be little question that personal ambition, usually for career 
advancement or public acclaim, underlies much intense motivation in 
research work and the trial of new ideas, drugs, operations, or 
treatment. 
... 
But ambition, no matter how praiseworthy, can certainly 
lead individuals astray. 267 
There is little doubt that, given the events described in the last chapter, the 
ambitions of many of the surgeons involved in the first heart transplants and 
artificial pump operations led to the interests of the patients being overridden. 
Self-regulation, clearly, was not successful in protecting these patients. The 
fact that Barnard undertook the first heart transplant, rather than Shumway 
who had undertaken most of the research, was because of his ego and 
desperation to be first. There was even evidence that the time was not yet 
right to commence transplantation because rejection problems had not yet 
268 been resolved and it would probably be a further decade before they were. 
Shurnway himself felt that it was not yet the time to try this on humans, even 
for the sickest patients . 
269There were also problems surrounding legal issues 
regarding death. No brain stem death criteria had been established. There 
was therefore the potential that doctors involved in heart transplants could 
have been charged with murder. 270 271 272 
The failure of self-regulation can also be demonstrated by events in Houston 
where the competitiveness of the two renowned heart surgeons there led to 
patients being used as a means to an end. Cooley started performing heart 
transplants for personal reasons, with the aim of achieving recognition, 
despite having only practised on one cadaver. His later rush to use the first 
artificial heart in Haskell Karp also attracted severe criticism. The medical 
community was not expecting its use for some time. Furthermore it did not 
267 Moore FID. Ethical Boundaries in Initial Clinical Trials. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. 
New York: George Braziller. 1970.358-378 at 375-6. 
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p739. 
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expect Cooley to undertake it as others in the field had more experience and had performed most of the research and animal trials. Once again, it appears that his ego and need to be first clouded his judgement. 
Questions of consent and the experimental nature of the procedure were 
raised. Many in the medical community believed it was an act of betrayal and 
a severe breach of ethics. It was a reckless attempt, which was undertaken 
solely in the interests of ambition. 273 Carefully laid out guidelines had not been followed. The surgeon had not asked for permission to perform the surgery from the Baylor Committee on Research Involving Human Beings because he 
knew he would be turned down. 274 
He also appears to have 'stolen' the pump from his senior colleague, 
DeBakey, who in turn also claimed the application of an unproved device was 
a breach of scientific ethics. 275 His view was that assessment of the risks was 
still not complete. 276 
A confounding factor at the start of the transplantation era was the reaction of 
the media. The world wanted to believe that such operations were possible 
and public opinion in countries around the world virtually forced doctors into 
attempting heart transplants. Furthermore, the media gave the involved 
surgeons public recognition and support, and in some instances catapulted 
them to fame, 277 thereby encouraging other surgeons to attempt the 
operation. 
Within a few months the euphoria surrounding these heart operations 
disappeared once it was realised that the majority had failed. It is only at this 
point that a limited form of self-regulation, spurred on by the media, started to 
have an impact. Many doctors advocated caution. 278 Even Cooley's 
colleagues in Houston were suggesting a halt in the transplantation 
programme. 279 
Many doctors in the UK disapproved of heart transplantation and believed 
those who had undertaken them should be disciplined . 
280 There was similar 
disapproval in the US. 281 The pressure to stop came from the physicians 
themselves, from colleagues in various ways, such as through face to face 
interaction or through what was published in medical journals, from the 
273 Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 at p4l 1. 
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institutions in which they worked or from patients and their families . 
282 Thus 
Cooley stopped doing transplants because his stream of donors dried up. Colleagues were not referring any more patients, and patients and their families were becoming less enthusiastic about the procedure. 283 
The moratorium: 
The first moratorium called was by the Montreal Heart Institute. The doctors 
there decided to suspend cardiac transplantation when the poor results being 
achieved were reviewed. This therefore was the first time during the heart 
transplantation era when a form of self-regulation was undertaken. Others, 
however, were critical of this decision, including Cooley284 and Barnard, who 
thought it was professionally unethical. 285 
In the United Kingdom a moratorium on heart transplantation was similarly 
prompted by concerns from the surgeons who undertook the first two 
transplants. However the moratorium was seen as the development of 
consensus and not central dictation. 286 Ross believed the moratorium was 
self-imposed. 
... the surgeons did have a sense of responsibilit ... doctors should be 
I 
given some credit for a sense of responsibility ... 
2 
Interestingly, the opinions of lay members of organisations concerned with the 
conduct of research and the growing authority of a professional community of 
bioethicists were also felt to be significant in the demand for a moratori UM. 288 
Eventually the Board of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences in the 
US further restricted cardiac transplantation to those institutions where the 
surgical expertise and a thorough understanding of the biological processes 
leading to rejection and its control were present . 
289Thus Stanford became the 
only place to still undertake heart transplants, mainly because its performance 
was superior to everywhere else . 
290 The use of performance tables will be 
reviewed later in this chapter. 
A similar self-imposed moratorium had occurred in the early 1960s when the 
first human liver transplants were attempted with very poor results. No further 
282 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at 108. 
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liver transplants were undertaken for more than three years. 291 This 
moratorium had also been described as a form of self-regulation, limiting 292 further harm being brought to patients . It had been imposed by the transplant surgeons themselves, without a need for consultant or hospital 
boards: 
... [the] project ... was held in abeyance until the fundamentally ethical 
nature of science itself indicated that it was time again to move 
ahead. 
293 
However, once again, it was only following poor results that a form of self- 
regulation was utilised, protecting later patients but notable by its absence 
when a few maverick surgeons decided their egos needed boosting. These 
surgeons were not solely responsible, however. The press, patients and 
public expectations also had a part to play. The role of the press can be 
illustrated by the misinformation it presented to the general public with respect 
to Blaiberg, Barnard's second patient. A syndicated photograph appeared to 
show him lying in the sea happily splashing in the waves as testimony to his 
remarkable recovery. In fact he was carried into the water, the entourage 
stepped back, cameras flashed and he was hauled out before drowning. 294 
PERSONAL INNOVATION- BRISTOL: 
In 1998 the General Medical Council found three Bristol doctors guilty of 
serious professional misconduct. Events have been described in the previous 
chapter. Did self-regulation successfully protect the patients concerned? In 
this case the answer must be a resounding no. Indeed, Bristol has been 
described as a 'landmark in the history of self-regulation. 295 
One of the surgeons had been made aware on several occasions of the 
concern of professional colleagues about the level of mortality and morbidity 
in paediatric cardiac surgery at the hospital. He failed to pay sufficient regard 
to the safety and best interests of the patients concerned and furthermore 
mislead two sets of parents when discussing risks. The other surgeon, again 
despite colleagues' concerns, 296 performed a further two operations, one of 
which resulted in the death of a child. 
The GIVIC identified troubling deficiencies in professional accountability, 
honesty and integrity, and the maintenance of standards of good medical 
practice. 297 Although it could be argued that the GIVIC decision could be seen 
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to have illustrated that self-regulation 'works' professional self-regulation 
cannot be left entirely to the disciplinary function of the General Medical 
Council as by then it will often be too late. 298 Indeed, the whole episode could have been avoided if /oca/'informal' self-regulation through peer pressure had 
materialised and concerns acted upon. Immediate colleagues, their employer, 
and Professional bodies outside Bristol, such as the Royal College of Surgeons and the Department of Health, although aware of the poor success 
rate, either failed to act or did not use their position of authodty to force a 
change in practice. 299 Clearly, if doctors do not monitor themselves effectively 
there is little doubt that external regulation will be imposed upon theM300 and 
the right to self-regulate will be removed. 
The subsequent public Inquiry has now published its finding S301 and the 
Government has issued its response . 
302 The question of self-regulation was 
repeatedly raised during the Inquiry and one of the central features was the 
frustrating lack of clarity about where responsibility lay once things went 
wrong. 303 The Inquiry stated: 
The clinicians in Bristol had no one to satisfy but themselves that the 
service they provided was of appropriate quality. 
304 
The Inquiry was thus clearly critical of the system of self-regulation. It was 
concerned that in the past there were no explicit standards for the care of 305 
patients . 
It was optimistic, however, that recently introduced Government 
initiatives, such as the development of clinical guidelines through the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and monitoring performance through 
the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) would lead to improved 
standards of care. These imply, and this appears to be endorsed by the 
Inquiry, a moving away from self-regulation towards some form of 
Government backed external regulation. This issue will be further examined in 
the next chapter. 
Other relevant recommendations were that standards and performance 
should be monitored locally and nationalIY306 while recommendation 99 
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299 Anon. First lessons from the "Bristol case. " Lancet 1998; 351: 1669 
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proposed that doctors undertaking procedures for the first time (i. e. personal innovators) need to be properly trained and directly supervised 307 . 
These recommendations have a direct bearing on the regulation of innovation. 
especially when considering personal innovation. Thus further analysis of 
some of the issues highlighted by the Inquiry, especially the problems of learning curves and monitoring performance through performance tables is 
required. 
Learning curves: 
The concept of a learning curve for the development of operative skills has 
always been important in surgical training. 308 The rapid introduction of laparoscopic surgical techniques brought this more sharply into focus than 
ever before. Around the late 1980s surgeons were under pressure from both 
the popular press and their patients to learn these techniques. They found 
themselves in the position of being asked to perform procedures with which they were not yet fully familiar, and the efficacy of which had not yet been 
elucidated. 309 
Formal teaching, however, often only took the form of intensive courses over 
one or two days after which the surgeons then took up the procedure within 
their own practice. Anecdotal evidence at that time suggested a relatively high 
rate of complications in the early period. 310 
It is now becoming clear that the learning period for many laparoscopic 
procedures is relatively long, even for surgeons who have had ample 
experience in the corresponding open procedure. 311 312 Furthermore the 
effects of the learning curve have been shown for a large number of 
laparoscopic procedures performed in general surgery. When laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy was introduced there was an increase in the incidence of 
bile duct injurieS313 314 315 316 thereby offering evidence that the learning curve 
had contributed to a high rate of bile duct injuries. 
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Similar results regarding learning curves have been obtained for other operations such as laparoscopic fundoplication 317 
, where each individual surgeon's complication rate, number of re-operations, and conversion rate are higher in their first 20 cases, and for laparoscopic colon surgery, where the 
318 319 learning curve is overcome after somewhere between 35 and 50 cases 320 
Thus, as laparoscopic techniques have floudshed over the past 10 years, it has become evident that surgeons must pass along a significant learning 
curve to develop these skills. This learning curve is relatively long and cannot be surmounted solely by the attendance at short intensive courses. Additional 
operative experience is required. Although proper training in laparoscopic 
surgery should decrease injuries to patientS321 the presence of experienced 
supervision appears to be a definite advantage during the learning phase. It 
also needs to be noted that during this learning period the outcome achieved 
may not only fall below the standard reported by other surgeons more 
experienced in the laparoscopic technique but also below those undertaking 
the comparative open technique. This is very important from the patient's 
perspective. If the patient is being operated on by a surgeon still learning the 
technique, not only may the result be worse than if undertaken by a more 
experienced surgeon but also worse then if the older technique was 
employed. 
Continuing education with regard to new medical advances and ongoing 
training of surgical skills are expectations of the surgical community. 322 The 
main driving force for this arises from a desire to provide patients with the best 
possible treatment options. However the obligation not to harm patients is 
central to the ethical practice of medicine and must remain to the fore during 
the development of new techniques. Therefore, maximal benefit from a new 
procedure can only occur when it can be performed with minimal 
complications and optimal outcome. 
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The recent General Medical Council inquiry into the Bristol paediatric cardiac 
surgical unit highlighted the problem of learning curves. The Senate of 
Surgery responded that there should be no learning curve as far as patient 
safety was concerned. 323 To learn how to perform a new procedure without 
having a learning curve, however, is a dilemma that is not easily resolved. No 
surgeon would wish to knowingly attempt a procedure that is beyond his or 
her competence. Yet how does he or she learn how to undertake a new 
procedure that will ultimately benefit other patients? 
Furthermore, how many cases does a surgeon need to perform before he or 
she can start to quote an accurate statistical risk? Health professionals 
understand the concept of small sample size and confidence intervals, but 
how is that to be explained to the patient or parent? Should one stratify 
patients by risk and quote different risks for patients undergoing what is 
apparently the same procedure? Even if this is what is required there is not 
sufficient data available to give patients accurate information. Similarly, if the 
surgeon is undertaking the procedure for the first time, and thus has no 
figures to quote, without some basis for confidence patients are unlikely to 
want to be experimented upon and used as a learning tool. Yet every surgeon 
has to perform a particular procedure for the first time. The assessment of any 
new technique therefore needs to elucidate not only the outcomes of the new 
procedure during the learning phase of the surgical community as a whole but 
also at the level of the individual surgeons. 324 
The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry specifically addressed many of the 
concerns regarding how a healthcare professional is to acquire competence in 
a new clinical activity. 325 Skills need to be enhanced while at the same time 
patient interests need to be safeguarded. The Inquiry recognised the problem 
of the 'learning curve' and that competence is acquired gradually with an 
upward gradient of success. It was however critical of the assumption that 
failure was initially inevitable and by that token justifiable. 326 
The Inquiry discussed three circumstances requiring consideration 327: 
a) The procedure was known and already performed in the trust but the 
healthcare professional was undertaking it for the first time (i. e. personal 
innovation) 
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b) The procedure was known but undertaken for the first time in the trust (personal innovation). 
c) The procedure was being done for the first time anywhere (experimentation). 
Scenario V equates with what happened in Bdstol while scenado 'c' is what happened when heart transplants and the mechanical heart were used for the first time. 
From a patient's point of view, there is a paradox. Innovations are desirable 
and should be introduced, but they should be tried out on someone else first! Three guiding principles may offer a way around the paradox. The first is the 
need for supervision; the second is the need for openness and honesty with the patient; the third is the need for an agreed and established system within the hospital for managing innovation. 328 
Supervision: 
A surgeon carrying out a procedure for the first time should be suitably 
trained and be directly supervised by colleagues who have the necessary 
competence and proficiency, until the relevant degree of expertise has been 
acquired; therefore the patient is not exposed to a risk greater than the norm. 
If necessary the surgeon must obtain appropriate training in a place where 
expertise in the procedure is established. The question of adequate 
supervision will be considered further later. 
Openness: 
A further safeguard for patients is the requirement that the surgeon be open 
and honest with them, or, in the case of children, with their parents. Patients 
are entitled to know what experience the surgeon has, how experimental or 
innovative a procedure is, and that this may be the first occasion the surgeon 
has carried out the procedure . 
329Furthermore, it is not acceptable for 
surgeons to say that they would not be able to innovate if the patient always 
had to agree. This would put the surgeon's desire to innovate above the 
patient's right to choose. This issue will be returned to in later chapters. 
A Hospital System: 
Trusts should have a system in place to manage innovation. Such a system 
should recognise the need for training and ensure that it is made available. If 
a procedure is being carried out for the first time anywhere, a distinction should be 
drawn between undertaking a variation of an existing procedure and carrying out a 
genuinely new innovation. These are not polar opposites: any particular procedure 
may lie somewhere along a spectrum. In the Inquiry's view, when any new and 
hitherto untried invasive clinical procedure is attempted, the surgeon concerned 
should inform the trust or the local research ethics committee. The role of the 
328 Department of Health. Leaming from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
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hospital's ethics committee will be examined further later. The lesson of Bristol is that 
when it comes to innovation it may not always be enough to leave the decision to the 
professional. Some system of reflection and accountability is essential. 
Evidence of acceptance of recommendations: 
There is some evidence that some of these recommendations have started 
being taken on board. For example, personal innovators at two paediatric 
cardiac centres recently wished to start undertaking the 'Ross' procedure for 
aortic valve replacement despite having no previous experience of the 
technique . 
330 This procedure is technically demanding with the potential for 
appreciable morbidity and mortality. There is, as would be expected, a 
significant learning curve and a higher mortality in the early stages of surgical 
experience. 331 332 
To overcome this, the surgeons discussed various strategies to reduce the 
steepness of their learning curve. 333 They all undertook a course in aortic root 
surgery, refined the surgical technique through cadaveric dissection, 
undertook the first operation with an expert, and later assisted each other with 
the operation. These strategies limited the mortality and minimised the 
morbidity that would have been associated with such an operation. Only time 
will tell whether similar structured programmes become more universally 
adopted. 
Supervision- revisited: 
The question of educating trainees, however, remains. 
Severe and pressing problems remain when ... new personnel carry 
out standard operations for the first time. This ... problem - that of 
educating and gradually transferring responsibility to young men 
without, at the same time, jeopardizing the patient's safety - is the 
central focus of clinical education. It is most especially pressing and 
obvious in surgery. The young surgeon passes from the status of a 
66 greenhorn" intern at the age of twenty-six to a phase of technical 
perfection at about the age of thirty-two, when, frequently, his sheer 
operative skill is unequalled by an older generation. But he has yet to 
acquire judgment, wisdom, forbearance, and human insight - qualities 
that require the passage of time in any physician's education. 
Nevertheless, during those seven or eight years the young man has 
operated on many patients, and in many instances has carried out an 334 
operation for the first time on some patient . 
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It is hoped that higher surgical trainees will learn complex procedures under the direct tuition and supervision of an established consultant experienced in the particular technique. However, for technically complex operations, 
especially if the consultant performs them infrequently, there will be a natural reluctance to allow even an experienced trainee to undertake these 
procedures. This may be particularly so in the new era of performance tables, 
with surgeons' results possibly available to the public and consultants therefore responsible for the results of their trainees. Trainees may thus not have the opportunity to perform a particular procedure until they have been 
appointed to a consultant post. How therefore do they learn? 
Operative experience and supervision by a consultant must be at the core of 
any surgical training programme. However there is surprisingly little objective data on general surgical training in the United Kingdom. An audit of surgical 
training by the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh concluded that the 
numbers of trainees operating without supervision was unsatisfactory. 335 
Similarly a recent study provided evidence that a high proportion of colorectal 
surgery is still being undertaken by trainees with insufficient consultant 
supervision. 336 A core aim of surgical training is consultant supervision during 
emergency surgery, but again such supervision is lacking. It can no longer be 
acceptable that inadequately supervised trainees care for critically ill patients. 
The national confidential inquiry into post-operative deaths suggests that this 
acknowledged deficiency has still not been adequately addressed. 337 Fortoo 
long the National Health Service has depended on trainees undertaking a 
significant proportion of unsupervised elective surgery and an even greater 
proportion of emergency surgery. 338339 340 
This lack of supervision is a matter of considerable concern. -341 The 
introduction of specialist training arrangements is likely to lead to greater 
problems. Considerable concern exists that the shortened training time, 
combined with the restriction on hours of work, will result in surgical trainees 
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being short of the necessary depth and breadth of experience for independent 
practice at the end of the defined training period. 342 
The present arrangements for patient care are no longer in harmony with the 
quality-first agenda being promoted by the Government343 and are thus 
unsustainable and unacceptable. It is abundantly clear that it is essential to 
give priority to the requirements for training. In particular, the relationship 
between training and a high quality service needs to be recognised and the 
service organised so that it is provided by consultants, trainees are propedy 
supervised, and surgical atients receive the benefit of fully trained expertise 
in their care at all times. 
V4 
However, despite all this, there is still evidence that, even when fully trained, 
doctors still do not achieve the same results. For example, individual 
surgeons may influence the outcome after colorectal cancer surgery. 345 The 
professionalism intrinsic to health care, along with the increasing demands 
from health care policy makers and consumers, has drawn increased 
attention to the study of the outcomes of medical and surgical treatment, 346 
reviewed in the next section. 
Performance Tables: 
Following the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry347 the Government announced 
that the performance of individual cardiothoracic surgeons would be published 
in a drive to create a more open honest and patient-centred NHS, with 
information on consultants and units from other specialties likely to fo 110W. 348 
These 'consumer reports' have been defined as guides on provider 
performance through practice profiles and comparative data. 349 Of Most 
interest is data that pertains to variations in clinical aspects of 
management. 350 
In the United Kingdom, increasing amounts of information on health care 
performance are entering the public domain, designed to keep patients 
informed about their health services. The Department of Health, for example, 
has published league tables for England allowing health professionals and 
342 Bates T. Curricular training and the new deal. Ann R Coil Surg Engl 1996; 78: 61-2 
343 Collins C. Surgical training, supervision, and service. BMJ 1999; 318: 682-3 
344 Collins C. Surgical training, supervision, and service. BIVIJ 1999; 318: 682-3 
345 McArdle CS, Hole D. Impact of variability among surgeons on postoperative morbidity mortality and ultimate 
survival. BMJ; 1991: 302: 1501-5 
346 Topol EJ, Califf RM. Scorecard cardiovascular medicine: its impact and future directions. Ann Intem Med 
1994; 120: 65-70 
347 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001, 
recommendations 148-154. 
348 Vass A. performance of individual surgeons to be published. BMJ 2002; 324: 189. 
349 Land G, Longo DR, Hoskins B, Fraas J. The development of a consumer guide on the quality of obstetrical 
services: the Missouri experience. L Public Health Manage Pract 1995; 1: 35-43 
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their patients to scrutinize hospitals' performance for the first time since the NHS was established. 351 352 These showed wide vadations in death rates. Similar performance indicators for Wales also showed wide variation in the three measures that were included. 353 
The British Government clearly is committed to using league tables of hospital 
outcomeS354 and to publish the performance of individual surgeons . 
355 If such information becomes readily available and easily comparable to that of one's 
peers, it would be possible to utilise it for the purposes of regulating 
innovation. Thus, if a group, be it a hospital or individual doctor, whose 
performance can be monitored and compared, is implementing a new 
technique already in general use then the results of treatment can be 
evaluated and poor performance rectified. This could have been very useful in 
preventing many of the unnecessary deaths that occurred in Bristol. The 
performance of the surgeons in Bristol could have been compared with their 
peers and if significantly worse the programme could have been stopped. 
Indeed, there is much evidence to show that the information was available but 
not acted upon. 
Bristol was awash with data. There was enough information from the 
late 1980s onwards to cause questions about mortality rates to be 
raised both in Bristol and elsewhere had the mindset to do so 
existed. 356 
The problem, as previously mentioned, was that there was confusion 
throughout the NHS as to who was responsible for monitoring the quality of 
care. 357 
However, although there will clearly be variations in surgical practice it is not 
clear whether this is a welcome diversity or a disturbing difference. 358 For 
example, many years ago the UK Cardiac Surgery Register revealed five to 
tenfold variations between regions in the rates for different types of 
operations. 359 Success rates after renal transplantation have also been shown 
to vary widely between different surgical centres. 360 Variations in avoidable 
351 Quality and Performance in the NHS: Clinical Indicators. Prolog, London, 1999 
(www. doh. gov. uk/indic/indicat. htm) 
352 Quality and Performance in the NHS: High Level Performance Indicators. Prolog, London, 1999 
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Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001, p3 
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deaths, complications and adverse long-term results should be highlighted 
and, in turn, concern surgeons as indicators of their performance . 
61 It is 
improbable that patients receiving such widely divergent therapy were all 
getting optimal care. 
In the USA, the most commonly cited reason for the public release of health 
care performance data is that they will enable consumers to select highly 
performing providers and avoid poorly performing ones. 362 The reasoning for 
the release of data in the UK, on the other hand, relates more closely to public 
accountability. There has been disquiet that for too long health care has been 
provided by a closed professional club, with the recipients of care denied 
access to meaningful data that would allow proper public scrutiny. 363 
Thus, a number of questions pertaining to these consumer guides and performance 
tables need to be asked. Firstly, once released, does the data have any impact on 
patient actions and provider behaviour? And secondly, are performance tables 
reliable? 
The impact on consumer actions: 
There is little doubt that improved dissemination of health care information 
amongst the public is in the best interests of the patient and will positively 
affect outcomes of care. 364 365 366 367 Kaplan and Ware, in a summary of 
research in this area, report that patients want more information about their 
care and that an expanded role for patients in the care process substantially 
368 improves the outcome of care . 
However, it is of paramount importance that the information needs to be clear 
and presented in such a way as to help the public make informed choices. A 
recent set of performance Indicators were rushed out with such haste that 
there were even errata in the included errata Slip. 369 One commentator 
described the figures presented as 'impenetrable'. 370 
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The impact on providers: 
There is a significant body of evidence from descriptive and observational 
studies that published data can influence provider behaviour. For example, 
the results reported by Longo et a 1371 confirm that consumer reports are 
associated with changes in the quality of hospital care, especially in areas of 
care identified as possibly out of alignment with care provided by high quality 
performing peers. 
The best evidence in this regard appears to be that produced by the New 
York Department of Health through their cardiac surgery reporting syste M, 372 
developed to collect clinical data on all patients undergoing cardiac surgery in 
New York State. Data on risk adjusted mortality were provided regularly to 
individual hospitals and cardiac suýqery programmes to show their 
comparative level of performance. 373 
This documented a strong inverse relation between a surgeon's volume of 
coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) procedures and the operative 
mortality associated with such surgery. 374 375 'Low volume' surgeons, that is 
those performing fewer that 50 operations per year, had consistently higher 
risk adjusted mortality rates than surgeons with high volumes of CABG 
procedures. In response to this, some hospitals restricted the privileges 
granted to these low volume surgeons. As a result, over four years 27 low 
volume surgeons stopped performing CABG in New York State. 376 Of major 
importance is the fact that the system resulted in a 52% decline in the cardiac 
surgery death rate. 377 
Contrast this with the situation in the United Kingdom. In the UK cardiac 
surgical register, established in 1977,378 all data is anonymous. Since 
inception the presumption has been that access to national information would 
draw each surgeon's attention to his or her own performance and encourage 
local introspection and action. In other words, the UK system relies on self- 
regulation while in the US hospital management has a much greater 
influence. 
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Furthermore the data in the UK's cardiac surgical register relates to individual 
units not individual surgeons . 
379 Hence a unit's figures can easily camouflage 
an errant performer. Furthermore reliable data collection facilities are not available in every unit. The Society of Cardio-thoracic Surgeons has 
recognized the shortcomings of the systeM380 and established a national database in 1994. The database, however, does not collect surgeon identifiers since in 1994 this would have been an insurmountable stumbling block to its launch. 381 
Clearly the UK Society has yet to publish data in the same extensive way as 
now happens in the US. Despite Bristol, it is still not possible for a member of 
the public to scrutinise the mortality rate of his or her cardiac surgeon on the 
society's web-page. 382 
The reliability of league tables: 
There are, however, many pitfalls in the collection of data for use in creating 
performance tables. The time-scale of collection for adverse events could lead 
to errors. If a patient suffers a catastrophic event during surgery yet survives 
for a day past three months that death is not deemed to be a reflection of 
surgical technique. Furthermore, what is called an 'improved' patient is a 
value judgement. Even simple measurements, such as length of stay in 
hospital after an operation, are not necessarily the best indicators of recovery. 
This particular measure is influenced by the health care system and the 
administrative culture in which the patient and physician function, as well as 
by the patient's expectation of hospital stay and the availability of community 
and family postoperative support. 383 
For league tables to be used to compare performance they must discriminate 
reliably and rapidly between hospitals and doctors that perform well and those 
that perform poorly. To act as levers for effective change differences identified 
by league tables must be sufficiently stable or definitive to represent a 
credible argument for change. 
The standard NHS patient management systems, however, are generally not 
sophisticated enough to process this type of data . 
384Furthermore, Davies and 
Crombie believe that the variable, and sometimes highly questionable, nature 
of the validity, reliability, and level of risk adjustment of the published data 
raise concerns about the meaningfulness of the information that is publicly 
disclosed. 385 
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Thus a study that showed an increased mortality at Bdstol, partly due to the 
low volume of surgery undertaken, 386 may be flawed because the data was 
derived from the cardiac surgical register, hospital episode statistics, and the 
Bristol Inquiry. Comparing Bristol with the other cardiac centres is unfairly 
biased against Bristol because its mortality has been so closely scrutinised for 
the period covered by the Inquiry that they are almost certainly accurate. On 
the other hand, there has been no attempt to validate the volunteered 387 information from the other sources. It is known that centrally tracked and 
volunteered 30 day mortalities vary considerably and can be up to 25% higher 
than the reported discharge mortal ity. 388 
There are three further fundamental problems when compiling annual league 
tables of performance. The first is the need to make accurate adjustments for 
differences in case-mix. The second is the uncertainty that occurs, no matter 
how accurate the adjustment for case-mix, when estimates of outcome are 
made for hospitals or doctors that treat relatively small numbers of patients 
each year . 
389 The third problem is the lack of consistency in the apparent 
performance over time. 
For example, a study by Parry et a 1390 showed that individual neonatal 
intensive care units had wide and overlapping confidence intervals when 
ranked by mortality in annual league tables, making it impossible to 
discriminate between them. Variation in ranking from year to year was 
explained by random variation within units rather than systematic differences 
between them. 
Furthermore, even if it is possible to find hospitals that consistently perform 
better than others, it may not be obvious why they perform better. 391 Thusthe 
finely designated rankings that are implied by such annual league tables 
cannot be justified and are likely to encourage doubts over whether optimal 
care has been delivered. The resultin anxiety, stigma and guilt would be 
unnecessary and mostly unfounded. 3 
?2 
Another problem is that auditing performance without proper correction for 
case-mix will subject surgeons to unfair comparisons and ensure that some 
patients, usually the illest, would be denied surgery. 
393 Understandably 
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surgeons may be reluctant to treat riskier patients. Thus, in the US, a survey 
of cardiologists and cardiac surgeons found that 59% of cardiologists reported increased difficulty in finding surgeons willing to perform coronary artery bypass graft surgery in severely ill patients who required it while 63% of the 
cardiac surgeons reported that they were less willing to operate on such 
patients . 
394This latter figure has been confirmed in a later study by other investigators. 395 
Thus, the most disturbing finding is that access to care had decreased for 
severely ill patients who needed coronary artery bypass graft surgery. 
Similarly, a recent study suggested that the movement of severely ill patients 
to an adjacent State had been a measurable effect of New York State's public 
reporting of data on coronary artery bypass graft surgery. 396 
A further complicating factor is that, although operative mortality is always 
attributed to the surgeon, this ignores the subtle but important influences of 
cardiological management and referral, anaesthetic care and intensive care 
resources. 397 Indeed, a recent editorial highlighted the importance of 
anaesthetic management in influencing surgical wound healing, arguably the 
commonest cause of postoperative morbidity, long hospital stays, and 
increased CoStS. 398 These parameters are some of those used to compare 
surgical outcome and yet may be outwith surgical control. In other words, a 
surgeon may be criticised for his postoperative morbidity when compared to 
his colleagues but it may all be the fault of his anaesthetist! 
THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION AND SELF REGULATION: 
The adoption of new operative procedures and the use of certain implants, 
prosthesis and new imaging techniques is often based on uncertain evidence, 
especially in terms of safety. The recent death of a patient undergoing the 
innovative technique of rapid opiate detoxification under general anaesthesia 
highlights many of the problems. Accusations were made in court that, firstly, 
the patient did not give informed permission and secondly that claims that the 
treatment was completely safe were undoubtedly false . 
399 As will be 
discussed in a later chapter the lack of valid consent is a major recurring 
concern when considering innovative techniques. 
The Advisory Group on Health Technology Assessment has recommended 
that research trials should be undertaken to assess recently introduced 
dissemination of clinical outcomes. Circulation 1996; 93: 27-33 
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technologies when their effects are unknown . 
400 This would imply a well regulated strategy for the introduction of innovative techniques so that patient safety is the foremost consideration. 
Criticism: 
Laudable though such a declaration may be, the reality is that in many instances this does not appear to happen. McKinlay has presented a powerful critique of the way in which medical innovations become standard medical practice . 
401 He argues that the popular image, that is that medical innovations become accepted as the standard of care following careful evaluation of their 
usefulness and effectiveness, does not describe the reality. Rather, 'routinisation' of innovations often follows a trajectory that confounds or 
appears to obviate the need for systematic evaluation, as exemplified by the introduction of laparoscopic surgery. 
He outlines several stages in what he calls the career of a new medical technology. First are the promising reports, which usually appear in 
professional journals as anecdotal accounts, but which can give the 
impression that an innovation has tremendous promise. 
The careers of most medical innovations seem to be launched with the 
appearance of an enthusiastic report on some promising performance, 
increasingly in the mass media. 402 
The series of promising reports may lead to a pilot study, the stated intention 
of which is to investigate the innovation's potential. However, McKinlay 
observes that large scale pilot studies may have a paradoxical effect. By 
introducing a sizeable number of practitioners and patients to the new 
technology, the pilot may appear to demonstrate, rather than investigate, the 
usefulness of the innovation. Quickly it comes to seem too valuable to be 
withheld from patients who could benefit from it. The second stage is marked 
by a period of consolidation of support by powerful interest groups, such as 
professional associations, which mobilise enthusiasm for the innovation, and 
institutions, which commit resources to it. Finally, if the state acts to 
implement social policy in support of the innovation, its career can be viewed 
as having passed the point of no return. 403 He further points out that 
consumer enthusiasm for the innovation is generally the very last piece in the 
400 Department of Health: Assessing the Effects of Health Technologies: Principles, Practice, Proposals. Report 
prepared by the Advisory Group on Health Technology Assessment for the Director of Research and Development, 
Department of Health 1992. 
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Cambridge, MA, 1982 
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puzzle and must be constructed by, and receive impetus and direction from, 
professional interests that are already committed to it. 404 
Thus, the large population which will require hip replacements in the future 
may reasonably expect orthopaedic surgeons to choose their prostheses on 405 the basis of valid and reliable information. However, only a handful of the artificial hip joints on the market have been clinically evaluated for quality and efficacy, there being little or no scientific evidence that the newer, more expensive, implants are any better than the established designs. Some will be worse and result in considerable patient suffering and societal cost when they fail and need to be replaced. 406 Though such hip joints have to meet British Safety Standards they only have to be shown to work in the laboratory or in 
animals, not in humans. Indeed, it could be argued that patients who receive a 
new hip joint that has only recently been released on the market are actually being involved in a research project without their knowledge, under the 
pretence of post-marketing surveillance. Adequately informed consent is 
conspicuous by its absence. 
Does self-regulation work? 
So, does self-regulation adequately regulate innovation? Jaffe believed (albeit 
in 1970) that experimenting doctors must and do develop their own 407 
controls . 
These controls include those which the experimenter imposes 
upon himself, including internalised controls of conscience and the 
acceptance of socially required limitations to his conduct. 
The informed conscience of the experimenter is the first and most 
crucial guarantee. Whatever other and later safeguards there may be - 
whether committee scrutiny or lawsuit - the experimenter is the 
strategic center of responsibi I ity. 408 
There are many examples where this has occurred. The stresses that an early 
heart surgeon named Cutler experienced in losing his patients when he first 
attempted heart valve surgery on them impelled him to call a personal halt to 
the operations. 409 Similarly the previously described moratoria introduced 
during the early liver and heart transplant years were in the main demanded 
by the surgeons themselves. 
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There are many others, however, where the interests of patients have been 
secondary to the self-serving interests of the professionals concerned, as exemplified by the early heart operations and 'Býstol'. One particular failure 
concerned the selling of a 'cure for AIDS', despite there being no evidence for this claim. The GIVIC was heavily criticised for failing to act . 
41 0 However a 
problem largely unrecognised by the general public is that the GIVIC can only 
act by way of information received . 
41 1 Frequently the only information 
provided to them is from other doctors. Of more concern in the above case 
was the failure of many doctors who, aware of the unethical experiments, failed to communicate their anxieties and state their views publ iCly. 412 
Campbell believes the GIVIC's rules on doctors not disparaging other doctors 
or face a potential charge of serious professional misconduct may act against 
the public interest. 
The public is ... entitled to conclude that this part of the regulatory 
process scandalously sets aside the welfare of patients. It seems to be 
deliberately intended to silence doctors from disclosing legitimate 
matters of medical concern. 413 
However, Smith believes doctors do not shop their colleagues due to the 
GMC's rules but more because they find it deeply distastefu 1414 and it Is only 
when certain boundaries are breached do they voice their concerns. 
What those limits are is not always entirely clear. For example, Mason et al 
highlight the difficulty of distinguishing courageous from unethical 
experimentation. 'Human nature being what it is the answer often depends on 
the outcome. 415 They illustrate their argument with the case of baby Fae. 
In 1984 Bailey attempted a baboon heart transplant into a fifteen day old baby 
known only as Baby Fae. 416 The recipient survived for 20 days. However the 
operation caused huge controversy. It was felt to be an example of premature 
experimentation which failed the test of a reasonable chance. 417 Clearly, 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour had been breached. 
It could be argued that virtually any innovation should undergo peer review 
and ethical and legal assessment, and this will be considered again later. 
However, such a requirement would be a significant burden and seriously 
curtail any advances, to the detriment of current and future patients. On the 
other hand, there may be an argument that, when viewed from the standpoint 
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of patient autonomy and issues of consent are considered, a different conclusion may be reached. 
Thus Annas alleges that many of the early transplantation procedures were in reality purely non-therapeutic and intended only for the benefit of society. 41,8 However, in the practice of medicine there must always be a first time when a new method of treatment is employed or a new operation is performed. The difficulty is to protect individual patients while at the same time allowing 
medicine to progress, to the benefit of society in general. 
SERNIP: 
Medicine is not always scientific; many advances are made fortuitously or as 
a result of nothing more than intuition. Medical practitioners are expected and 
required to vary their therapeutic practice to take into account the individual 
characteristics and reactions of their patients. Variation is therefore inevitable 
in medical practice. 
However, although it is accepted that routine clinical practice involves a 
degree of uncertainty and a degree of experimental observation, clinicians 
cannot have unlimited liberty to try new techniques. Although many 
professionals would view this as an attempt to restrict clinical freedom, recent 
concerns over the introduction and use of laparoscopic procedures led the 
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges to set up SERNIP, the Safety And 
Efficacy Register of New Interventional Procedures . 
41 9 The aims of the 
register were firstly to monitor the use of novel procedures and protect the 
public from excessive enthusiasm and secondly, to co-ordinate the 
experience of doctors who are currently developing new techniques, thereby 
allowing rapid dissemination of data to those in that particular field - 
It was, however, voluntary and clinically controlled. It was therefore, from the 
innovative doctor's point of view, at best a minor hurdle to be overcome and at 
worst something to be ignored with impunity. There was no requirement for an 
innovator to submit any information or clinical data. Furthermore, it only 
considered experimental procedures and was not concerned with personal 
innovation. Once the safety and efficacy of a technique was established the 
committee would advise that it could be put into general use. This element of 
self-regulation was clearly not working. 
The importance of SERNIP, however, lay in the fact that it suggests that the 
Royal Colleges considered medical innovation to be a separate entity from 
either therapy or research. It also implies that the Royal Colleges were 
concerned about the proliferation of unregulated innovation and were 
prepared to limit clinical freedom. The profile and impact of the register was, 
however, limited 420 and responsibility recently taken over by the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence. 
418 Annas G. Death and the Magic Machine. Western New England Law Review 1987; 9: 89 at 98. 
419 Bower H. A safety net cast over new surgery. Hospital Doctor, 16th May, 1996, p5. 
420 Campbell B, Maddern G. Safety and efficacy of interventional procedures. BMJ 2003; 326: 347-8. 
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RESEARCH: 
It is therefore clear that, in the past, self-regulation did not succeed in regulating innovation and protecting patients. It may be that difficulties have 
arisen because the regulatory system failed to recognise innovation as a separate entity. Research, however, has always been recognised as being distinct from therapy. Indeed, some believe that the importance attached to 
research led to the era of 'modern medicine' and this change in emphasis dictated that medical practice should be subject to central control. 421 It may therefore be appropriate to review whether self-regulation has been 
successful in protecting patients in the recognised and established 
environment of the research setting. If this has been successful, it could be 
argued that similar protection could be afforded to patients subjected to innovation, provided such innovation can be differentiated from both research 
and normal therapeutic practice. 
Regulating research: 
The main impetus for regulating medical research and formalising a set of 
ethical guidelines arose out of the Nazi war crimes trials at Nuremberg, 422 423 resulting in the Nuremberg code . This later led the World Medical Association to draw up the Declaration of Helsinki. 424 The ethical principle of 
respect for the research subject's autonomy underpins research regulation. 
In many respects the regulation of research from a legal perspective typifies 
the third type of law defined by Montgomery. 
The third type of law..., quasi-law, describes rules which may be made 
without explicit legal authority and which are most important for the 
guidance they offer rather than the sanctions which follow if they are 
disregarded. 
... 
Its force is therefore sometimes ethical rather than 
strictly legal. 425 
The most detailed guidance on the proper conduct of research has come from 
the Royal College of Physicians. 426 The Department of Health in turn 
published guidelines instructing health authorities to set up Local and Multi- 
Centre Research Ethics Committees (LRECs and MRECs) which were to be 
reconstituted and conform to its guidelines. 427 428 The Scottish MREC was 
421 Mason A McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. London: Butterworths, 6th ed, 2002,13. 
422 Dictionary of Medical Ethics. Duncan AS, Dunstan GR, Welbourn RB (eds). Darton, Longman and Todd, 
London, 1981 
423 Katz J. Experimentation with human beings. Russell Sage Foundation, 1972, p305-6 
424 The World Medical Association. The Declaration of Helsinki. Recommendations guiding medical doctors in 
biomedical research involving human subjects. 1964 (revised 1975,1983,1989,1996 and 2000). 
425 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p5. 
426 Royal College of Physicians, Research Involving Patients (London: RCP, 1990); Royal College of Physicians, 
Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (London: RCP, 
1990). 
427 Department of Health. Local Research Ethics Committees, London: Department of Health 1991. 
428 Department of Health. Ethics committee review of mulb-centre research. London: Department of Health, 1997. 
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instituted in April 1997 
. 
429AIthough the existence of these RECs is now well 
established, their composition and functions are still very varied and there are 
serious concerns regarding their functioning. They are not audited, they do 
not appear to monitor research and appear to be accountable to nobod Y. 430 More recently, the European Trials Directive 2001/20/EC was developed with the intention of simplifying and harmonising regulation of clinical trials across 
the European Community. The provisions of this directive have been 
translated into United Kingdom regulations through the Medicines for Human 
Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (Sl 2004/1031), which came into force 
on the 1st May 2004. This should lead to tighter control than occurred 
previously, with new responsibilities placed on those managing and 
conducting clinical trials. 
Concerns? 
Despite this, there are still many questions surrounding the use of patients in 
research. The GIVIC clearly states that "if taking part in clinical trials of drugs 
or other research involving patients [the doctor] must make sure that the 
research is not contrary to the patients' interests" . 
431 As previously discussed, 
some forms of therapeutic research and all non-therapeutic research do not 
lead to any gain for the research subject. Similarly, there appear to be 
problems with the use of placebos. This is acceptable if no current active 
treatment exists. However, it is questionable whether it is ethically acceptable 
to allow a patient the possibility of only receiving a placebo when an active 
treatment already exists. Of more concern is the fact that these patients may 
be unaware they are being denied effective forms of treatment merely to 
comply with an administration's (such as the US Federal Drug Administration) 
policies. 432 
Divergent views on many ethical aspects of medical research are held not 
only by individuals and the general public but also by the institutional research 
ethics committees. To ensure that societal values are upheld, even developed 
and clarified, the safety and quality of these committees'judgements need to 
be subject to the audit that the committees demand of their client 
researchers. 433 This leads to further problems. It is now virtually impossible to 
publish a research study in a peer-reviewed journal without it first having been 
passed by the local REC. However, because unethical research is virtually 
never published, the committee that originally approved it cannot easily be 
subject to peer accountability or the potential for societal discussion and 
judgement. 
Commercial research is another area where, because it might not be in the 
interests of the study sponsors, findings may be kept secret, with serious 
429 Scottish Office. NHS MEL (1997) 8 
430 Neuberger J. 1992. Ethics and Health Care. The Role of Research Ethics Committees in the United Kingdom. 
King's Fund Institute. 
431 GMC. Good medical practice: Duties of a doctor, 1995, p13 
432 Savulescu J, Chalmers 1, Blunt J. Are research ethics committees behaving unethically? Some suggestions 
for 
improving performance and accountability. BMJ 1996; 313: 1390-3. 
433 Pearn J. Publication: an ethical imperative. BMJ 1995; 310: 1313-1315. 
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consequences. This failure to publish is usually undertaken in an effort to try to maintain the company's image when research results have not been favourable. Thus, participants may not become aware of any dsks which 
would otherwise have been revealed. Worse still, the study may be repeated 
with more patients suffering harm. It has thus been su ested that registedng 
all clinical trials at inception could avoid this problem. 49g 
The present situation is also difficult to defend in terms of public 
accountability. It has been argued that to maintain the public's confidence in 
those who carry out research the public must believe that research 
investigations are submitted to rigorous ethical scrutiny and professional self- discipline. Furthermore, it is suggested that ethical conduct is the best way to 
protect volunteers and patients. 435 
It has thus been argued that clinical research must be self-regulating if it is to 
be properly regulated. Codes, guidelines, committee review, and legal control 
will not produce a maximum of well conducted research unless they function 
to stimulate ethically informed behaviour from the researchers themselves. 436 
It must be pointed out that very similar arguments have been proposed for the 
self-regulation of therapy and the introduction of innovative treatment, as 
previously discussed. It is debatable, however, whether self-regulation alone 
is sufficient. 
Fraud and misconduct: 
Concern is growing over scientific fraud and misconduct in research. Although 
the possibility of misconduct can be minimised by a hierarchy of 
supervision 437 it unfortunately still occurs. Farthing argues that without 
regulation there is the risk that ineffective or dangerous drugs might be used. 
He has similar concerns surrounding the dishonest reporting of the safety of 
new surgical procedures if there is selective discounting of cases that were 
not so successful. 438 
In New Zealand the Cartwright report published in 1988 followed an inquiry 
into allegations of a research programme undertaken at the National 
Women's Hospital in Auckland 
. 
439The research entailed withholding 
conventional treatment from patients with carcinoma in situ of the cervix to 
study the natural course of the disease. It had been approved by the hospital 
ethics committee. The chairman of the committee stated that the study 
9 merged into general treatment. 9440 Even an internal hospital review following 
434 Chalmers 1. Under-reporting research is scientific misconduct. JAMA 1990; 263: 1405-1408 
435 British Medical Association. The handbook of medical ethics, BMA, 1980, p 25. 
436 Byrne P. A European perspective in regulating clinical research. BMJ 1989; 299: 218. 
437 Pearn J. Publication: an ethical imperative. BIVIJ 1995; 310: 1313-1315. 
438 Farthing MJG. An editor 
.s response to fraudsters. BMJ 1998; 316: 1729-31. 
439 Cartwright SR. The report of the committee of inquiry into allegations concerning the treatment of cervical cancer 
at National Women's Hospital and into other related matters. Auckland Government Printing Office, 1988. 
440 Bonham. Quoted in Paul C. The New Zealand cervical cancer study: Could it happen again? BMJ 1988: 297: 533- 
9 at 533. 
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concerns raised by other members of staff failed to stop the trial. Furthermore, 
despite the study being widely known beyond New Zealand only one 
gynaecologist expressed concern and tried to intervene. 441 There was a failure to put the safety of patients before the reputation of colleagues. One of 
the medical advisors to the inquiry wrote: 
In the past the principle safeguard for the patient has been the integrity 
and good faith of the doctor. When that good faith is brought into 
question at the highest levels in the hospital there must be recourse to 
other mechanisms to protect the patient. 442 
That same year Lock published the results of a personal survey which 
concluded that research misconduct existed in the UK and urgent action was 
needed to prevent the problem by establishing an organisation similar to 
those already in place in the US. 443 
In the US Congress reacted to cases of scientific fraud by setting up 
congressional inquireS444 and an Office of Research Integrity. 445 A 
Commission on Research Integrit Y446 and the National Academy of Sciences 
also reported 447 , refining definitions and suggesting a whistleblower's bill of 
rights. Similar agencies have been set up in Denmark, Norway, Finland and 
Australia. 448 These agencies function independently of academic institutions, 
funding agencies or other professional regulatory bodies. 
It is clear, however, that the UK lags 15 years behind the US in recognising 
the problem and seeking solutionS. 449For many a year many in the medical 
profession did not believe it occurred. 450 
It was only when a leading gynaecologist, Malcolm Pearce, fraudulently 
published two papers that the British medical profession was finally 
441 Paul C. The New Zealand cervical cancer study: Could it happen again? BMJ 1988: 297: 533-9. 
442 Paul C. The New Zealand cervical cancer study: Could it happen again? BMJ 1988: 297: 533-9 at 538. 
443 Lock S. Misconduct in medical research: does it exist in Britain? BMJ 1988; 297: 1531-5. 
444 Rennie D, Gunsalus CK. Scientific misconduct. New definition, procedures, and office - perhaps a new leaf. 
JAMA 1993; 269: 915-7. 
445 Rennie D. An American perspective on research integrity. BIVIJ 1998; 316: 1726-8. 
446 Commission on Research Integrity. Integrity and misconduct in research. Report of the Commission on research 
Integrity to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the House Committee on Commerce and the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Rockville, MD: US Department of Health and 
Human Services, Public 
Health Service, 1995. 
447 National Academy of Sciences. Responsible science. Ensudng the integrity of the research process. 
Vol 11. 
Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1993. 
448 Lock S. Recent misconduct: a resume of recent events. In: Lock S, Wells F, eds. Fraud and misconduct 
in 
medical research. London: BMJ Publishing Group, 1996. 
449 Rennie D, Gunsalus CK Regulations on scientific misconduct: lessons from the US expedence. 
In: Fraud and 
Misconduct in Biomedical Research. Lock S, Wells F, Farthing M (eds). London: BMJ books, 
2001,3rd ed, 13-31. 
450 Lock S. Research misconduct 1974-1990: an imperfect history. In: Fraud and Misconduct 
in Biomedical 
Research. Lock S, Wells F, Farthing M (eds). London: BMJ books, 2001,3rd ed, 51-63. 
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galvanised . 
451 Despite this, the president of the GIVIC as recently as 1999 stated that, compared with the well-established pattern of research misconduct in the USA he had not had strong evidence of such a problem in 452 Britain. 
The bestowal of a medical or scientific degree is not accompanied by a 
guarantee of honesty. 453 Because professionals do not always behave in the 
way expected of them, there must be some higher body to force regulation on them . 
454 'It makes no sense to leave the regulations governing research 
misconduct to be developed by individual research institutions, not least because some central oversight to ensure compliance is wise and 
necessary. 
455 
Farthing argues that the preservation of research integrity is another aspect of 
public health and thus requires an inspectorate bod Y. 456 Such an organisation 
would need to work closely with other professional bodies responsible for 
maintaining standards. 
However, despite a recent agreement that the time had come to act decisively 
on research misconduct and set up a national body to lead the response to 
the probleM457 nothing has happened, prompting a severe rebuke from the 
editors of three of the main UK journals. 458 If the leaders of medicine do not 
act they risk the loss of public confidence in medical research. Once again 
self-regulation appears to be failing. 
CONCLUSION: 
Medical self-regulation is under the microscope. For a decade, there has been 
growing public concern regarding the way the General Medical Council and 
the Royal Colleges have operated professional self-regulation. To many, 
these institutions have reflected more general attitudes in the profession and 
have appeared unduly protective of doctors rather than of patients. They have 
been accused of being inward-looking, self-interested, unaccountable, 
ineffective, and increasingly at odds with public interest. 459460 461 
451 Lock S. Research misconduct 1974-1990: an imperfect history. In: Fraud and Misconduct in Biomedical 
Research. Lock S, Wells F, Farthing M (eds). London: BMJ books, 2001,3rd ed, 51-63. 
452 General Medical Council. Letter from the President, 1 December 1999. Reported in Lock S. Research 
misconduct 1974-1990: an imperfect history. In: Fraud and Misconduct in Biomedical Research. Lock S, Wells F, 
Farthing M (eds). London: BMJ books, 2001,3rd ed, 51-63. 
453 Rennie D. An American perspective on research integrity. BMJ 1998; 316: 1726-8. 
454 Rennie D, Gunsalus CK. Regulations on scientific misconduct: lessons from the US experience. In: Fraud and 
Misconduct in Biomedical Research. Lock S, Wells F, Farthing M (eds). London: BMJ books, 2001,3rd ed, 13-31. 
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457 Misconduct in biomedical research: final consensus statement. In: Nimmo WS, ed. Joint consensus conference 
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458 Farthing M, Horton R, Smith R. UK's failure to act on research misconduct. Lancet 2000; 356: 2030. 
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Licensing bodies have the obligation to discipline unprofessional and incompetent behaviour. These institutions serve an essential function and professionalism can only survive if they function properly, which requires the 462 support and participation of individual doctors 
. There is, however, recognition that there are deep seated flaws in the culture and regulation of the medical profession 463 , as illustrated by the Bristol affair, problems with organ retention at Alder Hey, retention of organs in Scotland 464 
, the murders committed by Dr Shipman and the appalling treatment of patients by the 
gynaecologist Dr Ledward 465 
. These 
cultural flaws show up as excessive paternalism, lack of respect for 
patients and their right to make decisions about their care and secrecy 
and complacency about poor practice. 466 
There is therefore a need to change the basis of professional regulation so that the profession performs as the public and individual patients expect. When colleagues and patients had concerns regarding the care provided by Rodney Ledward they reported being unsure whose responsibility it was to 467 take action. 
The danger that power will be misused is inherent in any system that assigns 
authority to a group of people to police themselves. 468 The recent highly 
publicised events mentioned above have encouraged the view that the 
medical profession fails to meet many of the obligations required to sustain its 
professionalism . 
469A better informed community is asking for accountability, 
transparency, and sound professional standards. 470 
Autonomy is granted by the ultimate source of power in western societies: the 
state. The state grants the profession the legal right to regulate itself. If the 
state believes that a profession is not regulating itself in a manner that is 
appropriate then that right can be removed. 471 Public trust in the medical 
profession is the key to the political arrangement. 
462 Cruess RL, Cruess SR, Johnston SE. Professionalism: an ideal to be sustained. Lancet 2000; 356: 156-9. 
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Events such as Bristol have illustrated the reluctance of doctors to confront 
under-performance in colleagues and to make critical judgements. 472 This 
reluctance is generally grounded in real difficulties, with problems about the 
lack of absolute, valid and reliable clinical guidelines; questions regarding 
what constitutes an acceptable degree of variation in practice and outcomes; 
and the influence of case mix on these outcomes. Consequently reliable and 
consensus evidence for what constitutes best practice tends not to be 
available. However, clear evidence for what constitutes poor practice is far 473 
more certain and widely recognised . 
Thus the Government and National Health Service management are 
introducing their own plans for strengthening institutional responsibility for the 
standard of patient services through external review and clinical 
governance. 
474 475 These measures will be examined in the next chapter. 
472 Treasure T. Lessons from the Bristol case: more openness- on nsks and an 
individual surgeon's performance. 
BIVIJ 1998; 316: 1685-86. 
473 Irvine, D. The performance of doctors; the new professionalism. 
The Lancet 1999,353; 1174-77. 
474 Secretary of State for Health. The new NHS: modem, 
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475 Secretary of State for Health. A first class service: quality 
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CHAPTER 4: REGULATION BY GOVERNMENT 
Regulation is a sustained and focussed control exercised by a public agency 
over activities that are valued by a commun ity. 476 The key features of 
regulation are that it involves a third party, the regulator, in transactions and inter-organisational relationsh ipS. 477 It places responsibility for overseeing 
performance with a single entity, the regulator. The recent rise in NHS 
regulation is part of the growth of the regulatory state 478 or audit society 479 , the result of a shift in how society holds public services to account. Recent NHS 
reforms have seen the transfer of power from health professionals - 
principally doctors - to a new class of employee: the general manager. 480 The 
rationale for putting managers in charge of the NHS was described in the 481 'Griffiths' report . 
Initially, at least, managers were engaged in managing down to the level of 
clinical consultation, but not beyond. The interface between the public and the 
health professional remained out of bounds. Clinical decision-making was left 
largely independent and untouched by direct managerial mechanisms, 
although it was influenced by organisational and resource constraints and, in 
turn, influenced them. However, Chariton believes that since 1983, it has 
been the long-term intention that the primary focus of NHS activity was to be 
the management of the organisation rather than the personal interactions 
between the clinicians and patients. 482 Since that time, what has been 
established is managerial financial control. This encroaches on clinical 
independence by seeking increasing control of decision-making. Over the 
years the managerial agenda has therefore moved towards direct influence of 
decision-making processes in the clinical consultation, and also towards pre- 
determination of the possible outcomes of doctor-patient interactions. 483 
The mess over the introduction of Sildenafil (Viagra) into the NHS, 
484 485 
especially the delay and the botched criteria as to who would get 
it, 486 made it 
clear that a better mechanism for the introduction of new drugs and 
technology into the NHS was needed. There was clearly a lack of capacity at 
476 Selznick P. Focusing organisational research on regulation. In: Noll R, ed. Regulatory policy and the social 
sciences. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985: 363-8. 
477 Walshe K. The rise in regulation in the NHS. BMJ 2002; 324: 967-70. 
478 Majone G. The rise of the regulatory state in Europe. West European Politics 1994; 17(3): 77-101. 
479 Power M The audit society: rituals of verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
480 Charlton BG. Management of science. Lancet 1993; 342: 99-100 
481 Griffiths R. Report of the NHS management inquiry. (1983) DHSS, London. 
482 Charlton BG. The new management of scientific knowledge in medicine: a change of direction with profound 
implications. in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, 
London. 2000.13-31 
483 Charlton BG. The new management of scientific knowledge in medicine: a change of direction with profound 
implications. in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, 
London. 2000.13-31 at 19. 
484 Department of Health. Health Service Circular 1998/158,16 September. 
485 Rv Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Pfizer Ltd 1999. Lloyds Rep Med 289 
486 Chisholm J. Viagra: a botched case for rationing. BMJ 1999; 318: 273-4. 
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national level to appraise healthcare interventions before or even after their introduction into the health service. This had several adverse consequences- 
no guidance was available, local policies varied, and unproven interventions 
entered routine use. 487 
GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS: 
In view of this, the Government thus published a consultation document on 
quality in the National Health Service. 488 Part of the proposals described the 
creation of a National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and a Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) as special health authorities with 
powers intended to influence the clinical practice of doctors. NICE would 
provide national standards of treatment while CHI would ensure that those 
national standards were met. 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CLINICAL EXCELLENCE: 
NICE was established with three broad functions . 
489First it would appraise 
new technologies, effectively vetting those deemed ineffective, or too costly, 
or otherwise inappropriate for use in the NHS. 490 In this respect, it is the first 
national body with power to issue such recommendations covering the full 
range of health technologies . 
491 As mentioned in the last chapter, following 
the Bristol Inquiry re port492 493 , 
NICE took over responsibility for assessing the 
efficacy and safety of new interventions, work previously carried out by 
SERNIP. Second, it would issue 30-50 'evidence-based' clinical guidelines 
per annum for the management of medical conditions. Third, it would be 
responsible for approving models of clinical audit for compulsory use by 
hospital doctors. 
In 1999, the editor of the British Medical Journal, in a leading article, stated 
that the newly introduced NICE should be useful for managing the introduction 
of new technologies. 494 A thesis on the regulation of innovation therefore 
needs to examine the role NICE could play in this regulation. Most of its 
recommendations to date have specified conditions for use for new therapy. 
This in turn requires guidelines covering the full range of treatment options. 
Thus, two of its three functions are closely linked. Firstly it will appraise and 
make recommendations about the introduction of a particular technology and 
then produce guidelines about the use of that technology. 
487 Dent THS, Hawke S. Too soon to market: doctors and patients need more information before drugs enter routine 
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492 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
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The Commission for Health Improvement was responsible for tackling 
variations in the quality of patient care, monitoring the implementation of 
guidelines and investigating clinical problems in the NHS. In response to 
recommendations in the Bristol Inquiry repo rt495 its remit was expanded and 496 given 'more teeth' . 
In April 2002 the government proposed its 
amalgamation with part of the Audit Commission, to be called the Commission 
for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI ). 497 This new body will combine the 
role of the Commission for Health Improvement, the role of the Audit 
Commission in its NHS related work, and the private health sector inspection 
role of the new National Care Standards Commission. The emphasis of this 
new body is inspection 498499and should be in place by April 2004. 
NICE and CHI (or CHAI) apply to the NHS in England. Scotland has her own 
version of NICE but with each of its functions looked after by a separate body, 
the Health Technology Board for Scotland (HTBS) appraising new technology, 
the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN) creating guidelines 
and the Clinical Resource and Audit Group (CRAG) encouraging national 
clinical audit. 
The Scottish equivalent of CHI was the Clinical Standards Board for Scotland. 
This was established as a special health authority in April 1999 following the 
Carter report on acute services, which recommended that there should be a 
single mandatory system of accreditation for hospitals and primary care. 500 
The Board's task was to develop and run a national system of quality 
assurance and accreditation of clinical services, with the aim of promoting 
public confidence in NHSScotland. On January l't, 2003, the CSBS became 
part of a new organisation called NHS Quality Improvement Scotland 
(NHSQIS). 
However, since little has been written about any of the Scottish bodies, NICE 
and CHI will be reviewed and differences from the Scottish equivalents, if any, 
will be highlighted. 
In an article in The Lancet, the chairman of NICE, Professor Sir Michael 
Rawlins described his main concerns relating to treatment in the NHS before 
the introduction of NICE . 
501 He believed that all decisions in the health service 
495 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's 
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Professions Act. London: HMSO, 
2002. 
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should be made on the basis of sound evidence, that 'unexplained' variations in the way patients were treated should be eliminated where possible, and that treatments employed should be cost-effective. Each of his concerns, i. e. lack of evidence, cost effectiveness, and variation in treatment will be 
analysed. 
The second of NICE's three functions, the production of guidelines, and the 
role of CHI/ CHAI will be reviewed shortly. The production of guidelines may 
prove challenging over the long term, given the magnitude of the task and the 
paucity of evidence. 502 This is therefore where to start; reviewing what 
evidence is available to enable guidelines for treatment or innovative 
technology to be generated. 
Evidence-based medicine: 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is the conscious, explicit and judicious use 
of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual 
patientS503' obtained by reviewing the evidence available from randomised 
clinical trials (RCTs) and meta-analysis of current research. NICE's decisions 
are based on this evidence. Meta-analysis refers to the quantitative synthesis 
of the results of primary studies. 504 EBM stresses the examination of evidence 
from clinical research and de-emphasises intuition, unsystematic clinical 
experience and pathophysiological rationale as sufficient grounds for decision 
making. EBM is now highly fashionable, perhaps particularly with those who 
do not actually treat patients themselves. It seems irrefutable that medicine 
should be practised on the basis of the best available evidence of the risks 
and benefits of any intervention. This has always been the aim of medical 
practice, but what is new is a change of attitude to the sort of evidence 
needed for medical practice to be truly evidence based. 
However, views on the value of EBM are literally, poles apart. On the one 
hand there is a belief that 'meta-analysis is clearly superior to the narrative 
approach to reviewing medical research. 505 Others, however, hold a 
diametrically opposite view. The 'knowledgeable, thoughtful, traditional review 
remains the closest thing we have to a gold standard of summarizing 
disparate evidence in medicine 506 
Limitations: 
Kleinert believes that the modern trend to search for precise answers in the 
form of numbers and probabilities can only have a limited role in human 
sciences such as medicine. 507 Similarly, although Feinstein acknowledges 
that randomised clinical trials have provided answers in clinical medicine, he 
502 Raftery J. NICE: faster access to modern treatments? Analysis of guidance on health technologies. BMJ 
2001; 323: 1300-3. 
503 Sackett D, Richardson WS, Rosenberg W, Haynes P. Evidence based medicine. Churchill Livingstone, 
London: 
1996. 
504 Glass G. Primary, secondary, and meta-analysis of research. Educ Res 1976; 10: 3-8. 
505 Davey Smith G, Egger M. Unresolved issues and future developments. Brit Med J 1998; 
316: 221-5 at 224. 
506 Bailar JC 3rd. Meta-analysis and large randomised, controlled trials. N Engl 
J Med 1998; 338: 62 
507 Kleinert S. Rationing of healthcare- how should it be done? Lancet 1998; 
352: 1244. 
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believes these are mainly about therapeutic agents whose average efficacy has been unequivocally shown. 508 
The seduction of EBM is that, statistically, the bigger the database from which the average is constructed, the more confidence there is in what the average is, but this does not make the average applicable to more patients. 509 Indeed, it is precisely the idea of the average efficacy that misleads. Patients differ 
systematically from one another and often these differences are unknown. One of the fundamental flaws of EBM is that it fails to cater for the 510 individual. 
A clinical trial will show how many patients from a group will benefit from 
treatment and how many will suffer an adverse effect, but it can never predict 
the outcome in a particular individual. A doctor may explain to his patients 
that he can do no more than give a probability of success or failure; in 
following evidence the doctor must accept that he is going to treat a whole 
group of patients in the standard way. In short he is going to practice medicine 
by numbers. '511 Furthermore, RCTs seldom focus on safety issues. 512 Adverse 
drug effects are often unanticipated and are predominantly investigated by 
observational studies. 513 Individual RCTs often do not suffice to detect 
adverse effects, especially if the effects are rare and late. 514 
Thus RCTs cannot provide precise and unambiguous guidance for clinical 
practice. 515 516 Most are conducted on unrepresentative populations of 
heterogeneous subjects and employ suboptimal levels of experimental 
control. 517 The conditions of randomised controlled trials are not the 
conditions of clinical practice. Patients in such trials receive greater attention 
from medical and nursing staff. Furthermore, the constraints on the patients 
entered into trials are often very tight, which means that the result of the trial 
may not be applicable to the general population. Patients are frequently 
excluded because they do not meet the eligibility criteria for entry, such as 
being too old or too ill. A recent study advocating aspirin for the prevention of 
cerebral infarction 518 specifically excluded patients at risk of adverse events 
508 Feinstein AR. Clinical judgement revisited: the distraction of quantitative models. Ann Intern Med 1994; 120: 799- 
805. 
509 Goodman NW. NICE and the new command structure: with what competence and with what authority will 
evidence be selected and interpreted for local clinical practice? in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, 
Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, London. 2000.33-50 at 37 
510 Ellis SJ. Some unanswered questions about NICE. JR Soc Med 1999; 92: 538-9 
511 JR Hampton - Evidence based medicine, practice variations and clinical 
freedom. Journal of Evaluation in 
clinical practice 1997; 3(2): 123-131 
512 Cuervo LG, Aronson JK. The road to health care. BMJ 2004; 329: 1-2. 
513 Vandenbroucke JP. Benefits and harms of drug treatments. BMJ 2004; 329: 2-3. 
514 Jick H. The discovery of drug-induced illness. N Engi J Med 1977; 296: 481-5. 
515 Charlton BG. Megatrials are based on a methodological mistake. British J of General Practice 1996; 46: 420, -31. 
516 Goodman NW. Anaesthesia and evidence-based medicine. Anaesthesia 1998; 53: 353-68 
517 Goodman NW-Who will challenge evidence-based medicine? J Royal Coll Phys Lond 1999; 33: 249-51. 
518 Antithrombotic Trialists' Collaboration. Prevention of death, myocardial infarction and stroke by antiplatelet 
therapy in high risk patients. BMJ 2001; 323: 71-86. 
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with aspirin, tending to include younger patients with lower multiple morbidity. It is therefore probable that aspirin is not as safe as suggested. 519 
Similar concerns have arisen regarding the complication rate of surgical treatment for carotid artery stenos iS520 and clinical trials of treatment for 
myocardial infarction where the death rate is consistently lower than in 
hospital practice . 
521 The extent to which trial results can be carded directly 
into routine practice is thus always a matter of some doubt. 
There is ample evidence that many trials are methodologically weak and 
increasing evidence that deficiencies translate into biased finding S. 522 523 For 
example it is well known that the pharmaceutical industry is heavily involved in 
sponsoring medical research, many academic investigators having affiliations 
that could influence research and publication. 524 Such research is likely to 
reach conclusions that are favourable to industry. Doctors are often paid to 
recruit patients to clinical trials sponsored by pharmaceutical companies. 
Such payments are not at present disclosed to potential trial patients. 525 
Even the US regulatory authority, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
has links with the pharmaceutical industry. Concerns have been raised 
following its decisions regarding the marketing of the drug alosetron. 526 527 528 
Critics have alleged that the regulatory agency has become a servant of 
industry, where dissenting voices are intimidated and ostracised and scientific 
debate repressed. 529 Many have therefore called for an end to industry's 
funding of the FDA's drug reviews. 530 
The technique of meta-analysis is also flawed. The statistical averaging of 
different trials performed in different places by different people for different 
purposes merely generates a meaningless statistical artefact. Making matters 
worse is the problem of publication bias where small negative trials either are 
not reported by investigators or are not accepted for publication by editors. To 
519 Cleland JGF. Preventing atherosclerotic events with aspirin. BMJ 2002; 324: 103-5. 
520 Swales J. The National Health Service and the science of evaluation: two anniversaries. Health Trends 
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523 Mayor S. Researchers claim clinical trials are reported with misleading statistics. BMJ 2002; 324: 1353. 
524 Hopkins J. Industry is deeply involved in funding US research. BMJ 2003; 326: 179. 
525 Rao JN, Sant Cassia LJ. Ethics of undisclosed payments to doctors recruiting patients in dinical trials. BMJ 
2002; 325: 36-7. 
526 Lievre M. Alosetron for irritable bowel syndrome. BMJ 2002; 325: 55-. 5-6. 
527 Moyniham R. Alosetron: a case study in regulatory capture, or a victory for patients' rights? BMJ 2002; 325: 592- 
5. 
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put it bluntly, meta-analysis is a logically incoherent technique of zero scientific credib ility. 531 532 
533 There are also difficulties in assessing the quality of trials. An editorial comment5,34 on one description of quality rating535 was that the findings really cast serious doubts on the validity of current clinical research. There are even greater problems with the development and introduction of new diagnostic 
procedures. Their evaluation is much less advanced than that of new treatments. Unlike drugs there are generally no formal requirements for 
adoption of diagnostic tests in routine care. The methodology of diagnostic 
research is poorly defined compared with study designs on treatment 
effectiveness and flaws are common. 536 
For example Dickersin 537 cited media reports that mammography for women 
under 50 'saves lives'. This is true. Of 10,000 40-49-year-olds screened, 30 
will be diagnosed with breast cancer and treated. Some of these women 
would otherwise have died. But these 30 will be from 640 who had abnormal 
mammograms, of whom 150 had biopsies. Will the women eventually 
pronounced clear be reassured? Will they be grateful for the worry they went 
through? How are these factors to be measured when the research merely 
looks at outcomes? Dickersin also points out that some of the 30 women 
diagnosed with cancer would have been treated for an in-situ lesion, the 
natural history of which is unknown. 
More worrying is the dispute that recently erupted following a review that 
stated that there was no reliable evidence to support the screening for breast 
cancer with mammograph Y. 538 It held there was no reliable evidence that it 
reduced mortality but merely led to more aggressive treatment. The editors of 
the Cochrane Breast Cancer Group insisted changes had to be made if the 
review was to be published in the Cochrane Library. The authors disagreed. 
According to the editor of the Lancet, interference by Cochrane editors to 
insert what the authors believed to be invalid analyses eroded the academic 
freedom of the investigators. 539 
Thus, Goodman believes that the closer health service workers are to treating 
patients, the less enthusiastic they are likely to be about evidence based 
medicine as the only, or at least the best, basis for treatment. 540 The basic 
531 Feinstein AR. Meta-analysis: statistical alchemy for the 21st century. J Clin Epidemiol 1995; 48: 71-9 
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535 Moher D, Pham B, Jones A, et al. Does quality of reports of randomised trials affect estimates of intervention 
efficacy reported in meta-analysis? Lancet 1998; 352: 609-13. 
536 Knoftnerus JA, van Weel C, Muris JWM. Evaluation of diagnostic procedures. BMJ 2002; 324: 477-80. 
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concern regarding EBM is that information collected from populations is being applied to individual patients. 
The basic error of EBM is quite simple. It is that epidemiological data do not provide the information necessary to treat individual patients. The error is intractable and intrinsic to the methodological nature of epidemiology, and no amount of statistical jiggery-pokery with huge data sets can make any difference. 541 
NICE, which utilises EBM in its deliberations, must also share in these 
criticisms: 
NICE imposes a'one size fits all' population view. This is undoubtedly 
more comfortable for the Department of Health and other parts of the NHS's management than the potential anarchy (from their point of 
view) that could result from empowering clinicians and patients to make their own decisions. 542 
Evidence alone does not make decisions. Thus an evidence-based decision 
5543 will vary from one patient to another according to individual circumstances. 
Tanenbaum showed that the traditional practice model predominated in 
medical decision-making. 544 In other words, clinical doctors are more likely to 
be influenced in their practice by their own (and close colleagues') experience 
with similar types of patient, and by their own reasoning about treatment logic, 
than by the publication of meta-analyses of large numbers of cases. In 
contrast, the health services research model places clinical observations at 
the bottom of the hierarchy of evidence. 
EBM restricts consideration to the RCT but many questions cannot be 
answered by this technique. 545 If EBM evaluates all available evidence, then it 
is doing no more than any respectable medical journal with its combination of 
review articles, opinion and primary research. The evidence merely supports 
decision-making but the evidence cannot make the decision. The values of 
the patient and the community, including the medical community, must be part 
of any decision. 546 
In scientific practice, rival theories are proposed by the many individuals and 
groups working in a particular field. Despite disagreement, some scientific 
theories are accepted and built upon, while others are either ignored or 
rejected. The ultimate judge of scientific validity is when other scientists use 
evidence be selected and interpreted for local clinical practice? in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, 
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544 Tanenbaum SJ. Knowing ad acting in medical practice: outcomes research. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and 
Law 1994; 19: 27-44. 
545 Ellis SJ, Adams RF The cult of the double-blind placebo-controlled trial. Br J Clin Prac 1997; 51: 36-9. 
546 Smith R. The failings of NICE. Time to start work on version 2. BMJ 2000; 321: 1363-4. 
102 
that theory in their own work. It is this testing by use, by others, in practice and in competition with other theories, which stands at the root of the objectivitý of science. Thus the propositions of valid science have been tested by use. 54 
The failure of RCTs and meta-analysis to deliver objective and authoritative 
guidelines means that NICE recommendations will inevitable suffer from the 
same lack of intellectual credibility that afflicts the many other sources of supposedly definitive guidelines emanating from the DOH-sponsored 
guidelines industry. NICE guidelines will differ from existing sources of 
medical advice only because they will be mandatory and enforced on doctors by sanctions, 548 a point returned to later. 
Rationinq and Cost-effectiveness: 
Any system of rationing has to be ethical, explicit, transparent, fair, flexible, 
consistent and capable of timely response to developments. 549 The 
Government has a number of options available to attempt to meet rising 
demand in health care. Supply-side measures include limiting supply while 
demand-side adjustments are aimed at reducing or containing demand for 
health care. 
Early official documents focused on clinical effectiveness as the underpinning 
principle for NICE. 550 
Patients want to receive effective health care, i. e. care [in respect of 
which] there is a reasonable expectation [ofl a positive impact on their 
health ! 551 
However, more recent documents and comments from NICE's chairman have 
made it clear that matters of cost will also be considered 552 , 
implying a shift to 
cost-effectiveness. Indeed, a recent article co-written by the chairman of NICE 
highlighted the fact that its advice is based on economic evaluation and cost 
must be taken into account. 553 
NICE's decisions are based on an assessment of the technology under 
review, usually prepared by independent researchers commissioned by the 
Health Technology Assessment programme, and submissions from patient 
547 Charlton BG. The new management of scientific knowledge in medicine: a change of direction with profound 
implications. in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, 
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and professional groups. These are considered by the appraisals committee, 
which then advises the institute on what the guidance to the NHS should be. 554 
In August 1999, NICE issued interim guidance 555 for manufacturers on how 
assessments would take place. The guidance stated that all the clinical benefits of an intervention would be assessed, including effects on quality of life as well as effects on mortality, and these would be set against estimates 
of the associated costs. In reaching its judgement, NICE would have regard to 
the Secretary of State's clinical priorities; the degree of clinical need of 
patients with a particular condition; the broad balance of benefits and costs; 
and the effective use of available resources. The guidance also states that 
NICE would be 'sympathetic'to the longer-term interest of the NHS in 
encouraging innovations provided they are 'of good value to patients. 
It seems very likely that this will be how NICE will evaluate new technology 
following its taking over of the functions of SERNIP. As the regulatory process 
has so far focused upon proof of efficacy invariably using placebo-controlled 
clinical trials, the lack of 'head-to-head' data, where the comparator is the 
current standard therapy, may prove unhelpful to manufacturers. In this 
respect, it is unclear how NICE will evaluate new interventional procedures 
since these are mainly surgical in nature and thus extremely difficult for them 
to be subjected to placebo-controlled trials. Surgery by its nature does not 
lend itself readily to these trials as sham operations engender invasive 
procedures with the possibility of non-trivial morbid ity. 556 Furthermore, there 
may be instances where a completely new intervention is proposed with no 
possibility of comparison, as for example, the first heart transplants. 
A further problem is that Rawlins typically equates the 'excellence' of a 
particular technology not only with its clinical but also with its cost- 
effectiveness. 'NICE will sometimes be forced to reject a particular 
technology' despite its effectiveness in a clinical context 'in the interests of the 
service as a whole'. 557 In such a case, NICE would have to make a judgement 
that the benefits purchased for some patients would be outweighed by the 
sacrifices borne by others, given the financial cost of the technology and the 
limitations on NHS funding. 
In this respect it is interesting to note that when the moratorium on heart 
transplantation in the UK was introduced the letter from the Chief Medical 
Officer cited resource reasons as being partly responsible. 
--- 
diversion of resources from other hospital work is a matter which 
involves the Board. --. Special resources should not at present 
be 
554 Dent THS, Sadler M. From guidance to practice: Why NICE is not enough. BMJ 2002; 324: 842-5. 
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made available in Britain for cardiac transplantation in man (still 
considered to be largely experimental) at this stage. 558 
The defensibility of cost-effectiveness as a rationing criterion follows from two further considerations. First, given the rate of medical technical innovation and of public knowledge about it, there is every possibility that a single criterion of 
effectiveness would fail to rule out sufficient interventions to allow the NHS to 
operate within any conceivably realistic budget allocation. Second, a criterion 
of cost-effectiveness helps to minimise opportunity costs - the possibility that substantial resources will be devoted to 'hopeless cases', while effective interventions are denied to patients with a substantial prospect of benefit. 559 
Indeed, some believe that NICE is not doing enough and should become a 
national healthcare rationing agency. 560 Rationing of new technologies is 
essential for political as well as economic reasons. Without politically 
acceptable ways of doing this, technology will continue to fuel the widening 
gap between public expectations and public willingness to pay for the NHS. 561 
Limitations: 
This argument, however, has a number of weaknesses. Earlier it was 
mentioned that NICE would have to make value judgements on what would 
be accepted and rejected. The 'value' component to this calculation, however, 
is riddled with the sort of controversies which preoccupy those who are 
prepared to honestly debate rationing. Smith believes that transparency is 
vital in an issue as difficult as rationing healthcare. Deciding where cost 
effectiveness ends is not a technical but an ethical judgement. 562 In deciding 
which treatments are worth funding, it is unclear what concept of value the 
decision-makers of NICE are employing. The first NICE decision to disallow 
the anti-flu drug Relenza (zanamivir) used criteria manufactured ad hoc for 
the purpose of rationalising a politically motivated decision. It then reversed its 
decision following widespread criticis M563 including from the Consumers' 
Association, which, in a submission to the Health Select Committee, stated: 
[we] have identified serious shortcomings in NICE appraisals of health 
technologies that raise questions about the institute's role, the 
credibility of its guidance and how useful the guidance is to healthcare 
professionals and patients. The institute has also appeared reluctant to 
respond to concerns raised about its guidance. 564 
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Ellis believes that there are serious flaws in the use of cost-effectiveness as a basis of rationing. Any cost saving is usually from a social budget and therefore is not recoverable. Thus, cost-effectiveness comparisons can inform debate but cannot direct it. 565 Cynically he noted that the most cost-effective 
patient was a dead patient. 
Two key issues lie at the heart of rationing or setting priorities for healthcare. 
The first is legitimacy; that is, under what conditions is authority over rationing 
placed in the hands of a particular organisation. The second is fairness; under 
what conditions do patients or doctors accept a particular decision. 566 Does 
NICE have the right to pronounce authoritatively on what is equitable? Who 
should make rationing decisions, according to what implicit or explicit criteria, 
and by what mechanisms should these decisions be implemented? The 
answers are beyond the scope of this thesis but question whether NICE has a 
monopoly on value judgements. The House of Commons health select 
committee criticised NICE, stating the institute's decision making process 
needed to be more transparent. 567 
In the context of the health service, the need to be cost-effective quite 
obviously places limits on the pursuit of 'clinical excellence'. Even then, the 
single criterion of effectiveness is not straightforward in practice. It is not 
uncommon to find disputes about who is authorised to determine at what level 
of probability (or at what 'numbers-needed-to-treat') an intervention is counted 
as sufficiently effective for NHS provision. 
For example, when considering the use of drugs called statins to lower 
cholesterol, setting limits could reduce the potentially enormous costs of 
treating all patients who might potentially benefit. 568 The problem is to decide 
what level of risk justifies the expense of long-term statin therapy. Treating the 
highest risk group not only gives the greatest benefit but costs least, for there 
are fewer such people in the population. At least for primary prevention, the 
cost of statin therapy for all possible patients would be difficult to justify in 
comparison with other therapies, such as hip replacements. It therefore is 
necessary to define a level of risk below which statin therapy will not be 
available on the NHS. In short, the decision as to how to use statins is 
political and financial, not medical. More important, however, is the 
recognition that a limit on the introduction of an innovative practice or 
treatment has been set. 
A further problem is that the criteria of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
are not the only ones which surface in discussions about appropriate rationing 
criteria. One alternative is the rule of rescue, which gives priority to persons in 
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acute or life-threatening conditions, and locates moral content in trying, rather than in succeeding. Thus the patient who has no other hope is surely entitled to grasp an outside chance and the doctor is entitled and perhaps even ought to provide it. 569 Such arguments could have been made for the introduction of the first transplants and the use of the first artificial heart. People see themselves as having rights to treatment irrespective of calculations of effectiveness. This has led to legal cases, such as the 'Child B' case 570 , where patients have challenged the refusal of health authorities to provide access to many of the newer and more expensive treatments. The courts, however, 
appear reluctant to intervene. 
In the Child B case Cambridge Health Authority refused to underwrite 
expensive experimental treatment for a child with leukaemia, when those 
5 
treating the child thought the intervention had a limited chance of success and 
could not be justified. 51 Indeed, the health authority's solicitor argued that the 
only basis on which the treatment could be justified was for experimental or 
research purposeS572, thereby suggesting that the two were different entities. 
... 
To describe the treatment, which the health authority declined to 
fund, as 'experimental' was not inappropriate, since it was not one that 
had a well tried track record of success and was at the frontier of 
medical science. 573 
The media, however, paid little attention to the clinical considerations and 
presented the case as an example of rationing based on financial 
considerations. 574 In turn, the trial judges stated that difficult and agonising 
judgements had to be made on how a limited budget was allocated to the 
maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients and the court could 
not make such a judgement. The courts were not arbiters as to the merits of 
cases of this kind. Their sole function was to rule on the lawfulness of 
decisions made and could not substitute their own judgment for that of the 
authority, which was legally charged with making it. The health authority had 
not acted in a way which exceeded its powers or which was unreasonable. 
Rationing is thus a practical necessity for the NHS. The aim of NICE is to 
provide a mechanism and specific criteria for rationing, concentrated in 
practice on the introduction of new therapies and technologies. However, it is 
not necessarily the case that there is a public and political consensus about 
the criteria of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and in any case the 
criterion of effectiveness is in practice as political as it is technical. As has 
already been mentioned, despite the apparent ascendancy of the view that 
9 good' evidence in respect of medical care interventions consists primarily of 
evidence drawn from RCTs, it does not follow that most clinicians accept this. 
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Furthermore, even if they do, they do not regard its conclusions as being more or less uniformly applicable to the patients in their care. 575 This will be considered further when discussing clinical freedom. 
Variation: 
Rawlins believes that 'unexplained' variations in the way patients are treated 
should be eliminated where possible. 576 While he does not aim to rule out 
variation altogether, there is a predisposition against it. The onus is upon those who support a plurality of approaches to any given problem to defend 
this. This is why the word 'variations' is usually preceded by some negative 
qualifying term such as 'inappropriate', 4 unexplained' or 'unacceptable' 577 and the image of a service in which practice is much more standardised than at 
present is presented as something of an utopian ideal. The existence of 
widespread variation in practice is presented as a 'cause for concern ,. 578 
Limitations: 
Earlier it was mentioned that EBM fails to cater for the individual patient. For 
example Ellis showed that if NICE, utilising EBM, undertook a cost-benefit 
analysis of anti-epileptic drugs the logical recommendation would be for the 
use of phenobarbitone. 579 It is, however, inappropriate for most patients. The 
availability of many drugs therefore allows tailoring of treatment to the 
individual. 
Each patient's condition is determined by a unique set of circumstances. 
Given the complex and diverse nature of human subjects, variation in the way 
they are treated is only to be expected. This is because variation in practice is 
often a product of variation in judgement or interpretation of evidence. 
Individual judgement is not infallible, but nor can we do without it: to condemn 
it as 'subjective' in some reprehensible sense is to make scientific reasoning 
impossible. 580 Individual judgement is therefore essential. 
... the processes of science and of 
NICE are profoundly different - one 
is democratic, the other autocratic; one is oriented toward practice, the 
other to policy; one is tested against the natural world, the other 
against political expedienCy. 581 
575 Harrison S, Dowswell G. The selective use by NHS management of NICE-promulgated guidelines: a new and 
effective tool for systematic rationing of new therapies? in NICE, CH I and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, Hampton JR, 
Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, London. 2000; 89-101 at 99 
576 Rawlins M. In pursuit of quality: the National Institute for Clinical Excellence. The Lancet 1999; 353: 1079-82. 
577 Rawlins M. In pursuit of quality: the National Institute for Clinical Excellence. The Lancet 1999; 353: 1079-82. 
578 Loughlin M. 'Quality'and 'excellence': meaning versus rhetoric. in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, 
Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, London. 2000.1-12, p7 
579 Ellis SJ. Some unanswered questions about NICE. JR Soc Med 1999; 92: 538-9 
580 Loughlin AJ. Alienation and value-neutrality. Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot. 1998, pp. 951-121 
581 Charlton BG. The new management of scientific knowledge in medicine: a change of direction with profound 
implications. in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, 
London. 2000.13-31, at 27 
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Although it may seem remarkable that there is still a wide variation in the way apparently identical clinical problems are handled in different counthes, or even in different parts of the same country, there are many reasons for this. Differences in clinical practice may be due to different health care systems and, as mentioned, the availability of resources, to different perceptions by doctors of the relative values of different treatments, and differences in the 
characteristics of patients treated and in their expectations. 582 Differences are frequently cultura 1583 and are not necessarily 'bad' but may be a reaction to local factors and in many cases are due to doing what the patients require 
and request. 
Clinical Guidelines: 
In the 4 th century BC, Plato examined the difference between skills based on 
practical expertise and those based solely on following instructions or obeying 
rules. He speculated that, if the second option were to occur, doctors would 
set up councils to decide how medicine should be practised. These views 
would then be published to dictate the way in which the treatment of the sick 
was to be practised. 584 In essence he was describing the clinical guidelines 
movement of today. 
Clinical guidelines are systematically developed statements designed to help 
practitioners and patients make decisions about appropriate health care for 
specific clinical circumstances. 585 They are intended to present a synthesis of 
current evidence and recommendations undertaken by expert clinicians. 586 
They can therefore approve or reject the use of a particular innovative 
treatment. 
There is, however, increasing attention being paid to the methodology of 
guideline development and the validity of their recommendations. 
Benefits: 
A number of benefits have been claimed. 587 Guidelines promote interventions 
that are of proven benefit and discourage ineffective ones. They reduce 
inconsistencies of care. It is well known that patients with identical clinical 
problems frequently receive different care depending on their clinician, 
hospital, or location. Guidelines may also empower patients to make more 
informed healthcare choices, provided they are familiar with the guidelines 
relevant to their care. They can also influence public policy. Thus, a guideline 
582 JR Hampton - Evidence based medicine, practice variations and clinical freedom. Journal of Evaluation in 
clinical practice 1997; 3(2): 123-131 
583 Clare A. National vadations in medical practice. Culture influences medicine more than science does. Brit Med J 
1989; 298: 1334 
584 Plato. Statesman. Annas J, Waterfield R, eds. Cambridge University Press, 1995,60-1. 
585 Field MJ, Lohr KN, eds. Guidelines for clinical practice. From development to use. Washington DC: Nabonal 
Academy Press, 1992. 
586 "Guidelines for Guidelines" Advisory Committee Guidelines for Guidelines: Principles to guide the evaluation of 
clinical practice guidelines. Auckland: Adis Internabonal; 1996. 
587 Woolf SH, Grol R, Hutchinson A, Eccles M, Grimshaw J. Potential benefits, limitations, and harms of clinical 
guidelines. BMJ 1999; 318: 527-30. 
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may recommend a particular treatment or service that was not available in a 
particular area or hospital. Following the guideline recommendation there 
would be strong pressure to introduce that service. Guidelines may also 
benefit researchers by highlighting gaps in evidence needing further 
investigation. Individual clinicians may use guidelines as an information 
source for continuing professional education. They can be used as 
instruments for self-assessment or peer review and to learn about gaps in 
performance. 588 
Limitations: 
As previously mentioned the main problems with guidelines are that they are 
not very good at recommending treatment for an individual patient, they are 
frequently founded on limited evidence and they can be subjective. 
Furthermore, as highlighted by the Bristol Inquiry, guidelines appear from a 
variety of bodies giving rise to confusion and uncertainty. 589 
The more guidelines can be applied to individual patients, the more useful 
they will be for real life clinical decision-making . 
59 However, the 
recommendations in guidelines are frequently inflexible, leaving insufficient 
room for clinicians to tailor treatment to the individual patient's circumstances 
and medical and social history. Medical knowledge is complex in nature. 
Medical information is also often statistical ('we are 75 per cent certain that 
... 
') and is basically analogue (positive merging into negative) rather than 
digital (yes or no). Guidelines are essentially digital. To round off analogue 
information into digital form is to run the risk that accuracy and honesty are 
sacrificed for the benefit of simplicity. 
Furthermore, clinical knowledge and understanding of the individual patient 
are frequently subjective. In contrast, much of the evidence used to create 
guidelines is not in a form relevant to individual patient care. Dealing with an 
integrated set of problems as if each problem was capable of solution in 
isolation and could be addressed sequentially is not likely to reveal integrated 
solutions. Blanket recommendations fail to permit shared decision-making and 
ignore patients' preferences. 591 
Farmer has also stressed that guidelines should not be developed by 
academics and senior clinicians insulated from the day to day pressures in 
providing medical care, warning that'unless a guideline accurately reflects the 
routine working practices of most doctors it will act only as a gold standard to 
be admired. Y592 
588 Feder G, Eccles M, Grol R, Griffiths C, Grimshaw J. Using clinical guidelines. BMJ 1999; 
318: 728-30. 
589 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry 
into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: 
HIVISO, 2001, pl 7 at 91 
590 Jackson R, Feder G. Guidelines for clinical guidelines. BMJ 1998; 317: 427-8 
591 Woolf SH. Shared decision-making: the case for letbng patients decide which choice 
is best. J Fam Pract 
1997; 45: 205-8. 
592 Farmer A. Medical practice guidelines: lessons from the United States. 
BMJ 1993; 307: 313-7. 
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There could be very good reasons for non-guideline treatments adsing from factors that were not (and could not reasonably be expected to be) covered by the guidelines for treatment of individual conditions. If the management of 
complex patients could simply be reduced to guidelines and be wholly 
algorithmic, then all doctors would need to do is program computers with such 
guidelines. Knowledge of guidelines will compensate for lack of clinical 
experience. 
There is also little doubt that the research used to create evidence based 
clinical guidelines is inadequate. 593 As discussed earlier, it cannot be 
assumed that the results even of a large clinical trial are sufficiently reliable to 
form the evidence base for clinical practice. Meta-analysis can also be 
seriously flawed. 
Because the evidence about what to recommend is frequently lacking, 
misleading or misinterpreted 594 subjective value judgements have to be made 
by the appraisers when benefits are weighed against harms. This may be 
wrong for the individual patient. Patients may have different perspectives on 
health care processes, priorities and outcomes from those of health care 
professionals. Guidelines need to involve patients to reflect their needs and 
concerns. 
The current system of grading recommendations is also misinterpreted by 
many595 and leads to development groups being unable to make high-grade 
recommendations in areas of medical practice where randomised clinical trials 
may not be possible, such as many surgical techniques, or not ethical, as for 
example the use of oxygen in asthmatic attacks where no evidence is 
available. 
Another problem with the lack of evidence is that innovations will suffer by not 
being recommended because there is little evidence about their value, a form 
of catch 22 situation. Surgical innovation, in particular, will suffer because of 
the difficulties that arise in trying to organise a randomised controlled trial. 
This is especially so for placebo controlled trials as the invasive nature of 
surgery could lead to non-trivial morbidity. The learning curve associated with 
the introduction of a new technique described in greater detail earlier, leads to 
another problem in that randomising between a familiar and unfamiliar 
operation will lead to bias against the new operation. 596 Also surgical 
technique usually progresses via small modifications which individually 
produce no detectable benefits but collectively do. For example, during the 
historical progression through hand washing via the use of antiseptics to the 
aseptical surgical environment, the increment with each step was so small 
593 Jackson R, Feder G. Guidelines for clinical guidelines. BMJ 1998; 317: 427-8 
594 Woolf SH, Grol R, Hutchinson A, Eccles M, Grimshaw J. Potential benefits, limitations, and harms of clinical 
guidelines. BMJ 1999; 318: 527-30. 
595 Harbour R, Miller J. A new system for grading recommendations in evidence based guidelines. BIVIJ 
2001; 323: 334-6. 
596 McCulloch P, Taylor 1, Sasako M, Lovett B, Griffin D. Randomised trials in surgery: problems and possible 
solutions. BMJ 2002; 324: 1448-51. 
ill 
that scepticism persisted. 597 Small randomised trials of components of this progression have shown no benefits. 598 
A further problem is that guidelines quickly become outdated. One study found half were out of date in less than six years . 
599 There is also a significant lag time between the evidence appearing and its use in the production of a 
guideline. More worryingly, once the guideline is produced, it would not have 
600 considered the latest information and could be up to four years out of date . 
There are other concerns regarding guidelines. Many covering the same area 
are contradictory or vary considerably in their content and implications for 
clinical decisions and patient benefit. 601 Conflicting guidelines from different 
professional bodies can be confusing. 602 This was highlighted by the Bristol 
Inquiry. 603 The Government, in its response to the Inquiry stated that where 
NICE guidance existed it provided the standard. Indeed, if conflicts existed 
with other advice, such as from professional bodies, it stated that NICE 
guidance would be paramount. 604 
Guidelines also reflect the contrasting agendas of the various interested 
parties. Professional groups may be keen to extend their influence, 
pharmaceutical companies to increase market share, and local and national 
bodies seek to promote public health while restraining public expenditure. 605 
The source of the guideline thus needs to be taken into account when 
interpreting its implications. 
A recent study looking at the relationship between authors of clinical practice 
guidelines and the pharmaceutical industry revealed that eighty-seven percent 
of responding authors had some form of interaction with the pharmaceutical 
industry. 606 Of greater concern was the fact that fifty-nine percent had 
597 Wangensteen OH, Wangensteen SD. The rise of surgery. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1978: 425-31. 
598 Tunevall TG. Postoperative wound infections and surgical face masks: a controlled study. World J Surg 
1991; 15: 383-7. 
599 Shekelle PG, Ortiz E, Rhodes S, Morton SC, Eccles MP, Grimshaw JM, Woolf SH. Validity of the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality Clinical Practice Guidelines. JAMA 2001; 286: 1461-7. 
600 North of England Asthma Guidelines Development Group. North of England evidence based guidelines 
development project: summary version of evidence based guideline for the primary care management of angina. BMJ 
1996; 312: 827-32. 
601 Thomson R, McElroy H, Sudlow M. guidelines on anticoagulant treatment in atrial fibrillation in Great Britain: 
variation in content and implications for treatment. BMJ 1998; 316: 509-13. 
602 Feder G. Management of mild hypertension: which guidelines to follow? BMJ 1994; 308: 470-1. 
603 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001, p17 at 91 
604 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. London: HMSO, 2002, p58 at 
4.11. 
605 Haycox A, Bagust A, Walley T. Clinical guidelines- the hidden costs. BMJ 1999; 318: 391-3. 
606 Choudhry NK, Stelfox HT, Detsky AS. Relationships Between Authors of Clinical Practice Guidelines and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry. JAMA 2002; 287: 612-7. 
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relationships with companies whose products were specifically considered or included in the guideline they authored. This subjective element to the 
recommendations in clinical guidelines makes them particulady vulnerable to 607 bias . For example, one of the criticisms of the NICE decision on laparoscopic herniorraph Y608 to restrict its use was that only one of the 23 members on the appraisal panel was a surgeon. 609 
Inappropriate recommendations against a particular treatment, such as has 
occurred with laparoscopic hernia repair, may lead providers to withdraw funding. Indeed, NICE made it clear that the reasons for its choice had more to do with control of NHS costs than with clinical excellence. However, its 
calculations have been challenged on several grounds . 
61 0 This has led the 
Association of Endoscopic Surgeons to urge its members to ignore NICE 
guidelines discouraging the use of laparoscopic surgery for hernia repair. 611 This implies doctors are disregarding government-backed regulation. 
The opinions, clinical expertise and composition of the guideline development 
group thus influence recommendations. 612 The beliefs to which experts 
subscribe, often in the face of conflicting data, can be based on 
misconceptions and personal recollections that misrepresent population 
norms. 613 Variation in practice is often a product of variation in judgement or 
interpretation of evidence. Rawlins accepts this, acknowledging that even 
clinical guidelines which are 'based on a rigorous and systematic review of all 
the relevant data must necessarily carry an element of judgement in their 
interpretation that may not be universally shared'. 614 However, he does not 
explain how this acknowledgement is consistent with the decision to treat one 
set of judgements as intellectually 'authoritative', simply because the persons 
making those judgements have the backing of the political authorities. 615 
Indeed, the editor of the British Medical Journal suspects that political clout is 
as important as evidence in the final decision. 616 NICE redefines I science' as 
being whatever the outcomes of its deliberations are. Since decisions are in 
the hands of the few, this decision-making process is readily corrupted by 
political expediency, external pressure or self-interest. If the only backing for 
the claim to have 'authority' is the support of the powers that be, then such 
607 Tonks A. Authorsof guidelines have strong links with drugs industry. BMJ 2002; 324: 383. 
608 National Institute for Clinical Excellence. Guidance on the use of laparoscopic surgery for inguinal hernia. 
London: NICE, 2001. 
609 Motson RW. Why does NICE not recommend laparoscopic hemiorraphy? BMJ 2002; 324: 1092-4. 
610 Motson RW. Why does NICE not recommend laparoscopic herniorraphy? BMJ 2002; 324: 1092-4. 
611 Bratby L. Doctors warn NICE is losing its credibility. Hospital Doctor 24th May 2001,1-2. 
612 Woolf SH, Grol R, Hutchinson A, Eccles M, Grimshaw J. Potential benefits, limitations, and harms of clinical 
guidelines. BMJ 1999; 318: 527-30. 
613 Kane RL. Creating practice guidelines: the dangers of over-reliance on expert judgement. J Law Med Ethics 
1995; 23: 62-4. 
614 Rawlins M. In pursuit of quality: the National Institute for Clinical Excellence. The Lancet 1999; 353: 1079-82 at 
1081 
615 Loughlin M. 'Quality'and 'excellence': meaning versus rhetoric. in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, 
Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, London. 2000.1-12, plO 
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organisations represent a serious threat to academic freedom and scientific 
progress. 
The use of guidelines is demanded by government. 617 618 Gover-nments want 
tools to be able to control the allocation of health care resources through 
containment or redirection of costs. Hence the principal reason for clinical 
guidelines' current popularity is econom iC. 61 9 Guidelines are essentially 
clinical laws. Once expertise no longer resides in the clinician but in 
guidelines, corruption of or deviation from such guidelines would result in 
medical treatments being based on personal whim or quackery. 620 There may 
thus be implications from a legal point of view. This aspect will be analysed in 
the next chapter. 
THE COMMISSION FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT: 
The Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) was responsible for tackling 
variations in the quality of patient care and monitoring the implementation of 
guidelines produced by NICE. More recently, it was amalgamated with part of 
the Audit Commission to create a new independent inspectorate, the 
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI), following the 
Government's announcement in the Department of Health paper, Delivering 
the NHS Plan . 
621 This new body became fully operational in April 2004. 
However, all of its functions relevant to this thesis were present in the former 
body and much of the literature still refers to CHI. This thesis will therefore 
continue referring to CHI rather than CHAI, unless there is a specific 
requirement not to. 
NICE and CHI (or CHAI) have two important roles. On the one hand, they act 
on behalf of, and in the name of, patients. On the other hand, they are also 
instruments of the political process. In this respect, like other audit and 
inspection organisations, they function as 'buffers' between the health care 
system and the political system. From a functional standpoint, the Prime 
Minister envisaged the development of CHI into 
a standards watchdog that will go round every hospital and Primary 
Care Group in the country promoting good practice and high standards 
and rooting out the bad ... 
[it] will check that the best treatments as 
recommended by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence are 
being used. 622 
The Scottish equivalent of CHI was the Clinical Standards Board for Scotland 
(CSBS). The two had very similar functions. The CSBS was a statutory body, 
established as a special health board in April 1999 following the Acute 
617 Secretary of state for Health. The new NHS. London: Stationery office, 1997. (Cm 3807). 
618 Department of Health. A first class service: quality in the NHS. London: Department of 
Health, 1998. 
619 Woolf SH, Grol R, Hutchinson A, Eccles M, Grimshaw J. Potenfial benefits, limitations, and harms of clinical 
guidelines. BMJ 1999; 318: 527-30. 
620 Plato. Statesman. Annas J, Waterfield R, eds. Cambridge University press, 1995,60-1. 
621 www. doh. gov. uk 
622 McSmith A. Prime Minister launches NHS Inspectorate. BMJ 1999; 319: 1217. 
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Services Review report published in July 1998.623 Its role was to promote public confidence that the services provided by the NHS in Scotland were safe and that they met nationally agreed standards and to demonstrate that, 
within the resources available, the NHS was delivering the highest possible standards of care. As previously mentioned, this body has now been replaced by NHS Quality Improvement Scotland. 
The CSBS's system of assuring quality and accreditation was designed to 
complement the duty that had been laid upon the board of each NHS body by the Health Act 1999 to monitor and improve the quality of health care which it 
provided to individuals. The CSBS specifically claimed not to be an inspectorate, although it published reports on the performance of the NHS. Following the publication in March 2001 of its first set of clinical standards, the CSBS set about reviewing NHS Trusts 9 performance against these standards, 
publishing reports which give both a national overview and information on the 
performance of each Trust. The accreditation process involves a number of 
stages. Once the standards have been finalised, each relevant Trust is asked 
to undertake a self-assessment exercise of their service against the 
standards. A review team then visits the Trust on behalf of the Board and 
follows up this self-assessment exercise with an external peer review of 
performance in relation to the standards. The Board reports the findings for 
that Trust, based on the self-assessment exercise and the external peer 
review. Furthermore, targets of achievement are ratcheted up as performance 
improves. This function has now been undertaken by NHS QIS- 
Interestingly, the CSBS, in its publication 'Clinical Standard S, 624 claimed that 
the standards it produced would be based upon and be consistent with other 
recognised standards, quoting for example the guidelines produced by SIGN. 
This implies that it believed the guidelines produced by SIGN were actually 
standards. Furthermore it warned that the standards were 'mandatory' in that 
no profession could Opt OUt. 625 The statement on standards explained the 
level of performance to be achieved and divided the document into numbered 
criteria 'making [it] easier ... 
for the assessment process. 626 The legal 
implications of the production of guidelines and standards will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
A particularly important issue for CHI and the NHS QIS is the fact that, like 
any audit or inspection function, its role is highly dependent on the quality of 
clinical guidelines issued by the relevant body, such as NICE or SIGN. In its 
response to the Bristol Inquiry the Government reiterated that NICE was the 
foremost body charged with providing authoritative guidance to the NHS 
through guidelines and technology appraisals. 627 Furthermore, NICE 
623 Scottish Office. Acute Services Review Report, July 1998. 
624 Clinical Standards: Generic. Clinical Standards Board for Scotland. Edinburgh; CSBS: 2001. 
625 Clinical Standards: Generic. Clinical Standards Board for Scotland. Edinburgh; CSBS: 2001 at pl 0. 
626 Clinical Standards: Generic. Clinical Standards Board for Scotland. Edinburgh; CSBS: 2001 at pl 1. 
627 Department of Health. Leaming from Bristol: The Departrnent of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. London: HMSO, 2002, p57 at 
4.7 
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guidance, if present, provided the standard and if there was conflict NICE guidance would be paramount. 628 In the future clinical governance is likely to ensure that local information systems are sufficiently developed to detect such variations more sensitively, and this internal information will thus become 
available for external inspection by CHI/NHS QIS or the newer bodies such as CHAL In some cases, such divergences will be perfectly justified on clinical grounds. In others, they will be judged to be clinically unjustifiable. 
Limitations: 
One of the first problems to be considered is that it is not clear how local or national mechanisms of monitoring and inspection will judge between good decision skills and sub-optimal care. CHI and NHS QIS squads will have a distinct advantage because they will have the luxury of making judgements in retrospect. Guidelines thus allow narrow interest groups to impose their 
priorities on the health service, representing the exercise of power without 
responsibi I ity. 629Furthermore, auditors and managers may unfairly judge the 
quality of care that is based on criteria from invalid guidelines . 
630 The main 
problem when CHAI comes into being however will be the 'misguided 
emphasiS'631 on inspection, which is not in keeping with a more 
developmental and holistic approach to improvement. 632 
It is therefore envisaged that clinicians under review (or appraisal) will alter 
their practice, possibly leading to defensive and risk-averse strategies as 
illustrated by the cardiac surgery experience in New York. There the 
publication of performance report resulted in surgeons being reluctant to 
operate on higher risk patients. 633 634 
Thus it is unclear whether CHI or indeed the NHS QIS are a genuine 
experiment in quality control, which will be sensitive to local operating 
conditions, or a tool of a central government ideologically committed to central 
control of professional groups. Guidelines generate systematic and 
635 paternalistic pressure for the many to conform to the views of the few. 
There is some confusion regarding the proposed new commission's purpose. 
CHAI's four roles, setting standards, audit, inspection and enforcement create 
tensions with the claim that the new commission will act as 'lawmaker, 
628 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. London: HMSO, 2002, p58 at 
4.11. 
629 Haycox A, Bagust A, Walley T. Clinical guidelines- the hidden costs. BMJ 1999; 318: 391-3. 
630 Woolf SH, Grol R, Hutchinson A, Eccles M, Grimshaw J. Potenfial benefits, limitations, and harms of clinical 
guidelines. BMJ 1999; 318: 527-30. 
631 Dewar S, Finlayson B. The I in the new CHAL BMJ 2002; 325: 848-50 at 849. 
632 Calman K, Hunter D, May A. Make or break time? A commentary on Labour's health policy two years into the 
NHS Plan. Durham: University of Durham School for Health, 2002. 
633 Green J, Wintfeld N. Report cards on cardiac surgeons. N Engl J Med 1995; 332: 1229-32. 
634 Schneider EC, Epstein AM. Influence of cardiac surgery performance reports on referral practices and access to 
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prosecutor, judge, jury and probation officer. 636 Furthermore this new system is not as protective of patients' interests as might be expected. The Government refused to fully endorse recommendations by the Bristol Inquiry 
when it recommended 
Trusts which do not meet the necessary standards to ensure the safety 
of patients and a good quality of care should not be permitted to offer, 
or continue to offer, the relevant service. 637 
The Government rejected this. 
Giving CHI the role of withdrawing an NHS Trust's validation and 
effectively requiring it to stop offering some or all of its services, without 
consideration of alternative service provision, could have a major and 
detrimental impact on the delivery of services to sectors of the 
population. It could lead to a loss of NHS capacity at a time when the 
Government is seeking to expand it in order to offer more patients 
more high quality treatment more quickly. 638 
This implies that the Government is more concerned with volume of service 
and service provision than with the actual quality. It implies that if CHI had 
been able to find problems in the paediatric cardiac services in Bristol it would 
not have been allowed to close the unit down. 
REGULATING INNOVATION: 
One of the stated aims of NICE was to improve standards of patient care and 
to reduce inequities in access to innovative treatment . 
639The original 
discussion paper noted the need to avoid 'placing disproportionate burdens 
on those who are developing clinical innovations for use in the NHS or risking 
delay in the effective introduction of those innovations offering worldwide 
benefits to patients'. 640 
However, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) has 
expressed grave reservations about the potential impact upon innovation and 
the attractions of the UK market as a place to research and to plan to launch 
innovative new products. 
Realistic health economic evaluation cannot be made until the product 
has been in widespread use for a number of years, and further 
636 Dewar S, Finlayson B. The I in the new CHAL BMJ 2002; 325: 848-50 at 849. 
637 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001, 
recommendation 141. 
638 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. London: HMSO, 
2002, p62 at 
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639 NHS Executive. Faster access to modem treatment: how NICE appraisal will work. Leeds: February 1999. 
640 NHS Executive. Faster access to modern treatment: how NICE appraisal will work. Leeds: 1999, para 7. 
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delaying entry into the NHS would have a negative impact on health care services and be a disservice to patients. 641 
Thus, some fear that NICE will in practice merely regularise reduced access to the more expensive and innovative medicineS642 and techniques. The 
process at present potentially discriminates against innovation by allowing insufficient time to make a proper assessment of the risks and benefits of that 643 innovation. Small advances embodied in the pharmacological properties of what at first looks like a 'me-too' drug can, in time, prove very useful and 
stimulate further research. For example, the newer calcium blockers, HMG 
co-A reductase inhibitors and newer neuroleptics all belong to classes of drugs where small differences in pharmacology have eventually turned out to have significant therapeutic benefit. Surgical innovation, which frequently 
occurs in small steps, is likely to suffer for the same reason. 
It would be a serious matter if measures at policy level designed to 'Improve 
the quality, availability and cost-effectiveness of patient care inhibited 
scientific and therapeutic innovation. No one at present can predict what 
impact NICE and CHI will have on scientific and therapeutic innovation. 
However, the NHS has not explicitly used its commissioning processes to 
encourage innovation, and indeed has tended to resist the introduction of new 
interventions until they have been adequately evaluated. 644 A Department of 
Health report recommended that unevaluated new forms of health care should 
be provided by the NHS but only within the context of properly designed 
research to assess their effects. 645 While this is eminently sensible, it is 
presently clear that NICE does not have sufficient capacity to deal with all new 
chemical compounds coming to the market, never mind extensions of use or 
surgical procedures. 646 
It thus seems likely that, following the adoption of its new role, NICE will slow 
down the introduction of new procedures. This is already happening with 
regard to new drugs. For example, Temozolomide was licensed in Europe for 
treatment of certain brain tumours in February 1999 but did not get NICE 
approval until mid 2001.647 Unlike the previous voluntary nature of SERNIP 
registration of new procedures through NICE is now mandatory. Furthermore 
clinicians will have to inform the institute when they plan to use a procedure 648 they have no experience with or have only used outside the NHS. They will 
also need their hospital's approval and to tell patients they are unsure about 
641 The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry. NICE and medicines. ABPI 1999; BSC/6/99/4K 
642 Ellis SJ. Some unanswered questions about NICE. JR Soc Med 1998; 91: 538-9. 
643 Dodds-Smith 1. NICE and the ultimate decision makers: the legal framework for prescription and reimbursement 
of medicines. in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, 
London. 2000; 103-125 
644 Dent THS, Sadler M. From guidance to practice: Why NICE is not enough. BMJ 2002; 324: 842-5. 
645 Department of Health. Assessing the effects of health technologies. London: DOH, 1991. 
646 Ellis SJ. Some unanswered questions about NICE. JR Soc Med 1999; 92: 538-9 
647 Newlands E. reported in Smy J. Can NICE get away from its pantomime image? Hospital Doctor 21 st March 
2002; 14-17. 
648 Kmietowicz Z. NICE to start assessing diagnostic and treatment procedures. BMJ 2003; 326: 412. 
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the procedure's safety and efficacy. Guidance will be issued after expert opinion has been sought, usually within 18 months of registration. 
One problem is that the whole process is time consuming and thus not likely to encourage innovation. It could of course be argued that this is no bad thing. With respect to the introduction of heart transplants it seems likely that the 
new system would not have allowed the new operation to take place in the UK in the early years and furthermore there would not have been the time to 
evaluate it. One aspect of innovation is the rapidity with which it spreads throughout a community if unregulated, as evidenced by the introduction of heart transplants. Thus, under this new system Cooley would not have been 
allowed to experiment with the artificial heart. Prior to its proposed 
introduction registration with NICE would have been mandatory, he would 
have needed approval from the hospital and he would have had to discuss the 
uncertainty of the success of the operation with the patient. 
Bristol, on the other hand, would almost certainly still have occurred, thereby 
showing there are still flaws in this system. It would doubtless have accepted 
the need for the introduction of the 'switch' operation. The problem, however, 
was not its introduction but the fact that certain centres adopted it when the 
surgeons there were not capable of undertaking it safely. The question 
therefore is whether the hospitals concerned would have refused their 
surgeons, some of whom were quite high ranking, the chance to undertake 
the operation. It is unlikely the Chief Executive of the Bristol Trust would have 
refused Wisheart, its medical director, the opportunity to undertake these 
procedures.. The fact that the unit was a Supra Regional Centre for Heart 
Surgery makes refusal even more unlikely. After all Supra Regional Centres 
undertake the most difficult and complex cases, referred from other, 'less 
specialised' units. It would have been embarrassing for the trust if it did not 
allow its Supra Regional Centre to undertake an operation available in other 
centres. 
Other problems include not having systems currently in place to assess and 
evaluate these new procedures at the hospital level and a lack of clarity about 
what needs to be registered. An editorial co-authored by the new Chairman of 
NICE's advisory committee on interventional procedures stated: 
What precisely is a new procedure? If an existing procedure is modified, how 
much modification makes it new? If new technology is used for an established 
procedure, is that new? Should doctors be restricted in undertaking new 
procedures? How can compliance with submission data and guidance be 
achieved? What data should be publicly available and what should be done if 
outcomes vary between doctors? '649 
Clearly many questions still remain. Until they are answered it is unlikely that 
the system will be much use in offering patients protection from 
experimentation. Indeed, the growth of evidence based medicine will lead to a 
limitation to a doctor's freedom to practice. This is to be added to the ever 
649 Campbell B, Maddern G. Safety and efficacy of interventional procedures. BMJ 2003; 326: 347-8 at 348. 
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increasing list of limitations that already includes training and licensing, peer pressure, audit, the risk of litigation and so on. 
Thus, the role of the recently introduced National Clinical Assessment 
Authority (NCAA) is to work with doctors and employers to address 
underperformance and incompetence, incorporating a system for preventing, recognising and dealing with the poor clinical performance of doctors . 
650 Thus from April 2001 employers have been able to refer doctors to the NCAA. On the basis of clinical data, discussion with the doctor and other staff, and a visit, the assessment authority's team of medical and lay assessors will make a judgement about the doctor's performance and recommend a course of 
action. The most serious cases will be referred to the GIVIC. The NCAA should boost local accountability at the employer level but will also require co- 
ordination of clinical governance initiatives, revalidation through the GIVIC and the work of the royal colleges and the Commission for Health Improvement 
(now known as the Commission for Health Audit and Improvement). 651 
Similarly the recently proposed Council for the Regulation of Healthcare 
Professionals is an attempt to increase the accountability of the medical 
profession. 652 It will have the power to direct the GIVIC and the other nine 
regulatory authorities for the other health professionals. In other words it will 
dictate their policies. 653 Supervisory regulation of the 'regulators' is moving out 
of the administrative sphere and into that of clinical health care. 654 
The government also intends to re-organise postgraduate medical education 
by proposing the setting up of a Medical Education Standards Board 
(MESB ). 655 This will replace the Joint Committee on Postgraduate Training for 
General Practice and the Specialist Training Authority. Half of its members will 
be lay and as a single body will oversee curricula, standards and the 
registration of all medical trainees. Originally the Bristol Inquiry recommended 656 that the MESB, should be part of and answerable to the GIVIC . This was 
rejected by the Government who stated that postgraduate training needed to 657 take account of the service requirements. This essentially proposes a state 
takeover of postgraduate medical education and training . 
658 Self-regulation is 
slowly being extinguished. Indeed, legislation designed to protect the 
650 Department of Health. Assuring the quality of medical practice: implementing supporting doctors protecting 
patients. London: Department of Health, 2001. 
651 Dewar S, Finlayson B. Dealing with poor clinical performance. BMJ 2001; 322: 66. 
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653 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. London: Butterworths, 6th ed, 2002,1.37. 
654 Walshe K. The rise of regulation in the NHS. BMJ 2002; 324: 967-70. 
655 Department of Health. Postgraduate medical education and training. The Medical Education Standards Board. 
London: DoH, 2001. 
656 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001, 
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657 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. London: HMSO, 2002, p153 
658 Pereira Gray D. Deprofessionalising doctors? BMJ 2002; 324: 627-8. 
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independence and integrity of the medical profession is conspicuous in its 
absence. 659 
From the Government's perspective, the quasi-independent status of 
regulatory agencies distances politicians from difficult issues or unpleasant decisions, especially with regards to resources and rationing. It moves the blame for unavailability from politicians to those on the committee. However, 
although the responsibility for problems is shifted to the re2ulator, the reach 
and scope of government is retained, or even increased. 66 This is because 
these regulators are essentially agents of the government, accountable to the 
Department of Health and their boards are appointed by the Secretary of State. 
Government regulation will not, however, solve all the problems. Charlton 
states 
the implementers of the Griffiths report seem not to have appreciated that an 
organisation depending on the skills of autonomous health professionals will 
not function properly if it has imposed on it a hierarchical, line-managed, 
heavily regulated structure imported from businesses based on simpler and 
more routine activities, and lacking the necessary personal relationship 
between providers and clients which characterises medicine. 661 
Similarly, in New Zealand, which suffered one of the worst failures of good 
medical practice 662 , external controls were proposed as solutions. However an 
article written by one of the advisors to the original report concludes that 
external controls are blunt instruments for finding solutions and require a 
functioning internal mora I ity. 663 
The external controls, designed as if they had the whole task of regulating the 
moral conduct of doctors, have been clumsy and unsatisfactory... [with] little 
room for interpretation, and the dangers of dogmatic interpretation are being 
felt. 
... 
Complex regulations can disempower those forced to observe them. If 
they accept they cannot be trusted there is a risk they will become less 
trustworthy and obey the letter of the law only. ... Distaste 
for the self serving 
nature of some professional activity should not blind us to instances where 
internal morality has worked in the interests of patients. 664 
659 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. London: Butterworths, 6th ed, 2002,1.39. 
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661 Chariton BG. The new management of scientific knowledge in medicine: a change of direction with profound 
implications. in NICE, CHI and the NHS reforms. Ed Miles A, Hampton JR, Hurwitz B. Aesculapius Medical Press, 
London. 2000.13-31 at p20. 
662 Cartwright SR. The report of the committee of inquiry into allegations concerning the treatment of cervical cancer 
at National Women's Hospital and into other related matters. Auckland 
Government Prinbng Office, 1988. 
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In other words, external control is unlikely to be successful on its own and as 
has been shown in this chapter is unlikely to lead to patient protection from 
the effects of innovation. 
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CHAPTER 5: LEGAL REGULATION. 
The previous two chapters have argued that professional self-regulation and 
regulation by government or similar official bodies, two of the three different 
laws described by MontgomerY665 
, have failed, or would fail, to protect patients when they are subjected to innovative treatment, whether of the 
experimental type or as a result of personal innovation. It is therefore 
appropriate to examine the third form of law described. 
Law in the strict sense is made by the courts or Parliament, is binding 
on all citizens, and usually enforced in the courts. 666 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: 
The most important laws relevant to this discussion concern medical 
malpractice. Most claims in respect of medical injury are brought in tort, that 
is, on the basis of a non-contractual civil wrong. 667 
Malpractice litigation has numerous functions. It provides an incentive to 
practitioners to maintain a high standard of care and allows injured parties to 
bring an action as a way of gaining retribution against health professionals, 
who they believe need to be punished for harming them. Finally, malpractice 
law is concerned with compensation. 668 
An act of medical malpractice may give rise to two common law actions in 
court. The first is that of trespass to the person, or battery. The second, that 
of negligence, forms the basis of most malpractice claims and is the 
foundation of the modern law determining a medical practitioner's liability to a 
patient . 
669At this point it is appropriate to state that, since the vast majority of 
litigation is found in English law or in jurisdictions derived from English law, 
English terms will be used. Scottish terms will be used when discussing 
Scottish cases. 
Battery: 
A battery (or assault in Scotland) is an intentional or reckless unlawful 
application of force to another person and is a crime as well as a tort at 
common law . 
670 Theoretically many procedures undertaken by a doctor might 
be considered batteries, such as injections, surgery or manipulations, if 
performed without the consent of the patient. The touching of a person in this 
manner without consent violates an individual's right of self-determination and 
constitutes an act of trespass to the person. 
The attraction for litigants in suing in battery is that proof of damage is not an 
essential part of the cause of action. Thus liability can be established even in 
665 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p5. 
666 Montgomery I Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p5. 
667 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 
9.9 
668 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p165 
669 Nelson-Jones R, Burton F. Medical Negligence Case Law. Fourmat Publishing, 
London, 1990, p3 
670 Lewis CJ. Medical Negligence: a practical guide. 4th ed. Butterworths: 
London, 1998,281. 
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cases where a patient either suffers no physical harm or suffers harm that is 
not a direct result of the tort, thereby circumventing some of the difficulties of 
establishing negligence, as will be discussed below. For example, a woman 
may consent to relatively minor gynaecological surgery but duhng the course 
of the operation the surgeon may find a disease or complication that requires 
major surgery and where sterilisation would be beneficial. The subsequent 
sterilisation may in fact result in the woman regaining health. She would however be able to sue for battery if she could demonstrate that she gave no 
consent for the sterilisation to be undertaken at that time. Such a situation 
occurred in Devi v. W Midlands RHA 671 in which a surgeon, performing an 
abdominal operation to repair a perforation of a patient's uterus, decided it 
was also in her interests to be sterilised. While from the medical perspective it 
may in fact have been in her interests to be sterilised, consent had not been 
given. The patient sued in battery and the defendants admitted liability. 
Although there had been agreement for an operation to repair the uterus, 
there was no consent for the sterilisation to be performed as well. The law of 
consent will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. 
Negligence: 
On the other hand, to win a negligence case the plaintiff is required to prove 
three things. Firstly the plaintiff must prove that a duty of care existed, that is, 
the professionals sued were responsible for the victim's care at the time of the 
mishap. The second is to show that the professionals failed to reach the 
standard of care that is required by law. Finally victims have to show that the 
injuries they suffered were caused by the failure to practice properly. 672 If the 
patients win their case, they are entitled to damages; an amount of money to 
compensate them for their injuries. 
Duty of care: 
Establishing a duty of care is not usually a problem when patients are in 
hospital. Similarly, where health professionals could have foreseen that what 
they did would affect other people then they may have a duty of care towards 
them. 673 However, there are also limits to duty of care. For example, in 
general, professionals who pass a road traffic accident have no legal 
obligation to stop and assist anybody who has been injured 
674 
, although 
they 
may have a professional ethical obligation to do SO. 
675 
Standard of care: 
In most cases of medical negligence the key question is whether the 
professional has reached the standard of care required of them by the law. 
That standard was established in different cases north and south of the 
border. 
671 Devi v. W. Midlands Regional Health Authority [1981 ] CA Transcript 
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In Scotland the standard was established in the case of Hunter v. Hanley. 676 In this case the Lord President (Clyde) stated: 
In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for 
genuine difference of opinion and one clearly is not negligent merely because his conclusion differs from that of other professional men, nor because he has displayed less skill and knowledge than others would have shown. The true test in establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of the doctor is whether he has been proved to be 
guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if 
acting with ordinary care. 
Two years later, the issue was examined further in the English case of Bolam 
v. Friern Hospital Management Committee. 677 In this case the plaintiff suffered 
fractures during a course of electro-convulsive therapy. At the time there were 
different views regarding the use of relaxant drugs. However one school of 
thought was that relaxant drugs only increased the risk of treatment. The court 
held that a doctor was not guilty of negligence if he acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in 
that particular art. 678 This has become known as the'Bolam test'. Although the 
case was decided in 1957 it did not become the cardinal test for medical 
negligence until adopted by the House of Lords in Whitehouse v. Jordan in 
1981 . 
679A child had suffered brain damage at birth and it was alleged that this 
was due to the doctor's use of forceps. The House of Lords held that the 
proper test for establishing whether reasonable care had been used was the 
Bolam test. 
It is to be noted that there may be a subtle difference between Bolam and 
Hunter. The former speaks of '... a responsible body of medical opinion. ' By 
contrast, Lord President Clyde gave his third criterion defining medical 
negligence as a practice which would be adopted 'by no (my italics) doctor of 
ordinary skill ... acting with ordinary care. 
' However, McNair J suggested in 
Bolam that any difference was just a question of expression. 680 
Whatever any possible subtle differences, both tests of negligence state that 
professionals are to be judged against the standards of their peers. Therefore, 
if experts from the defendant's profession who are called to give evidence are 
prepared to accept that the actions were proper, the negligence claim will fail. 
Thus the experts merely have to regard the defendants' actions as being 
within the range of acceptable practice. This, in turn, means a minimal level of 
acceptable practice, not what the expert would have liked to see happen. 
681 
676 Hunter v. Hanley [1955] SC 200, SLT 213 at 217. 
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678 Bolam v Friern HIVIC [1957] 2 All ER 118,121 
679 Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981 ]1 All ER 267, [198111 WLR 246, HL 
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Standard medical practice must also be judged by the standard of a reasonable person with the knowledge prevailing at the time of the incident. In Roe v. Minister of Health 682 a patient suffered paralysis following a spinal 
anaesthetic. This anaesthetic had been kept in glass vials stored in disinfectant. This disinfectant leaked into the anaesthetic through microscopic 
cracks in the glass. This was impossible to detect and had not been known at the time. Thus the defendant was found not guilty of negligence. 
In Maynard v. WMidlands RHA 683 the House of Lords stated that it would not 
choose between different bodies of medical opinion, implying that there could be no judicial intervention to declare standard medical practice to be 
negligent. 
For in the realms of diagnosis and treatment, negligence is not 
established by preferring one respectable body of professional opinion 
to another. Failure to exercise the ordinary skill of a doctor (in the 
appropriate speciality, if he be a specialist) is necessary. 684 
This is not unreasonable. Non-experts cannot presume to know, where 
different opinions on technical matters are competently held, or scientifically 
justified, which school of thought is the appropriate or correct one. 685 As 
previously mentioned, professionals possess highly developed technical 
knowledge that is widely valued. 686 The unusual degree of skill and 
knowledge involved in professional work suggests that non-professionals are 
unable to evaluate or regulate it. The profession is thus held to be the sole 
source of competence to recognise deviant performance. 687 This epitomises 
the professional standard test which maintains that the determination of the 
legal duty is left to the judgement of doctors following the Bolam test, 
irrespective of whether the defendant is dealing with diagnosis, treatment or, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter, disclosure of information during the 
consent process. It is clear therefore that the courts are extremely reluctant to 
interfere with the standards of medical practice. Doctors themselves set the 
standard of care required of them and all that the laws of negligence appear 
to do is reinforce existing professional standards. 688 
This appears to run against the normal principles of negligence, which require 
the judiciary to scrutinise standard practice to see whether it is reasonable. 
Usually where judges find that professional practice is unacceptable they can 
hold the defendants to be negligent even though their professional colleagues 
believe they acted appropriately, as shall be discussed in the next chapter. 
However in medicine they tend to rely on accepted professional practice far 
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more than would usually be the case in relation to other professionals. 689 It would appear, therefore, that the position in negligence cases seems to be rather more favourable to the medical profession than to other profession S- 690 Bolam and Hunter permit medical experts to establish the standard of care and not the courts, with determination of a legal duty being left to the judgement of doctors. 
Some cases, such as S' idaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospitaf9l, Bolitho v. Hackney HA 692 and Pearce 
v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS TruSf 93 appear to qualify this to a certain degree and will be discussed later. However, for the moment we will hold that the fundamental principle is that medical negligence is to be judged against the standards of the medical profession (i. e.: Hunter v. Hanley or the Bolam Test), as stated quite categorically by Lord Scarman 
... 
the law imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a 
matter of medical judgment. 694 
Causation: 
The third step in proving a negligence claim is to show that the failure to 
provide a satisfactory standard of care caused the injuries that the victim 
suffered. Unless this can be proved the claim will fail even if the defendants 
were clearly at fault. Where the injury is caused by the care a health 
professional gives, such as when a nerve is damaged during the course of an 
operation, it is relatively easy to show that the professional's actions caused 
the injury. 
In many cases, however, proving that the defendant caused the injury is very 
difficult, especially if the underlying disease or condition can itself lead to the 
injury suffered. Any uncertainty will operate in favour of the defendant. Often it 
cannot be proved that the patient's injuries were not a result of natural 
causes, such as the underlying medical problems or an unavoidable accident. 
For example, in Kay v. Ayrshire and Arran Health Board695 the plaintiff 
received a massive overdose of penicillin as treatment for his meningitis and 
later developed deafness. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the weight of medical 
evidence was that the deafness was caused by the meningitis and not by the 
overdose of penicillin, and the case was lost. The patient therefore failed to 
establish that, on the balance of probabilities, his or her injuries were caused, 
or were materially contributed to, by the fault of the health professional. The 
claim failed. 
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Criminal Law: 
In most circumstances malpractice is only the concern of the civil law. However, in extreme cases there may also be criminal implications. For 
example, where a mistake causes the death of a patient, it is possible that the health professional could be prosecuted for manslaughter. For this to 
proceed, there must have been not merely negligence, but gross negligence. In R v. Bateman 696 it was held that the accused had to show such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment. The legal test of gross negligence has 
recently been considered by the House of Lord S. 697 Doctor Adomako was an anaesthetist who, for over four minutes, failed to notice that an endotracheal tube passed into the patient's windpipe had become disconnected during an operation under general anaesthetic. An alarm sounded but the connection of the tube was not checked until the patient had suffered a cardiac arrest. One 
expert prosecution witness stated that a competent anaesthetist should have 
spotted the problem within fifteen seconds. The defendant accepted that he had been negligent, but denied that he was grossly negligent so as to be 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The House of Lords held that the question 
of whether the degree of culpability was such that the anaesthetist should be liable to criminal sanctions was a matter for the jury. Lord Mackay accepted 
that this was essentially a circular proposition: that criminal negligence is 
when a jury thinks the negligence was criminal. 698 The House of Lords 
however declined to offer a more precise definition. It did, however, approve 
tests from earlier cases that adopted a suggestion that gross negligence 
describes cases where the defendant has shown such disregard for the life 
and safety of others as to deserve punishment. While this remains a circular 
definition, it does focus attention on the recklessness of the professional's 
behaviour; that is, the failure to concentrate on the patient's interests. 
There are a number of situations indicative of the sort of case that might 
constitute manslaughter due to criminal negligence. The first of these is 
where health professionals have shown an obvious indifference to the risks to 
the patient. The second is where they were aware of the risk but decided to 
run it. The third is where their attempts to avoid a known risk were so grossly 
negligent that the jury believed that they deserved to be punished. The fourth 
is where there was inattention or a failure to advert to a serious risk that went 
beyond mere inadvertence . 
699The vast majority of negligence cases, 
however, are settled under civil law. The question is therefore how, from a 
clinical negligence point of view, the law would consider cases of innovation. 
INNOVATION: 
Preceding chapters have established innovation as a distinct entity from 
normal treatment and research. Furthermore, this innovation can be of two 
varieties: experimentation and personal innovation. The early heart transplant 
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era has been used as an example of the former while the events in Bristol 
illustrate the latter. 
Historically the law has regarded failed innovation as a form of negligence, 700 
the physician's obligation being to attempt to cure only by application of 
orthodox techniques. The early case of Slater v. Baker in 1797 701 turned 
upon this. A noted English surgeon had agreed to treat and straighten the 
plaintiffs broken leg. The accepted method was to apply compression until 
the broken bone knitted together, but Baker used a device he had recently 
developed to extend the leg. When the bone failed to heal properly the 
plaintiff sued for breach of contract and succeeded; the physician, who by 
implication, had agreed to use proper skill and methods, was held to have 
acted ignorantly and unskilfully, contrary to the known rule and usage of 
surgeons. Proper practice of medicine required knowledge and application of 
accepted methods of treatment. The later case of Carpenter v. Blake 702 held 
that if there was an approved practice it must be used. 
In neither case did the doctor defend his conduct in terms of deliberate 
experimentation. Furthermore some believe that the innovative doctor cannot 
rely on Bolarn since no supportive body of medical opinion is available. 
The pioneer is alone in more senses than one. 703 
However, it is important for innovation to occur so that medical knowledge 
improves and society benefits. In certain cases it may be warranted. Even the 
recently revised Declaration of Helsinki, which concerns itself with the 
regulation of research, stated: 
In the treatment of a patient, where proven prophylactic, diagnostic and 
therapeutic methods do not exist or have been ineffective, the physician, with 
informed consent from the patient, must be free to use unproven or new 
prophylactic, diagnostic and therapeutic measures, if in the physician's 
judgement it offers hope of saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating 
suffering. 704 
In chapter 1 it has already been argued that innovation is distinct from 
research and the above brief discussion of innovative treatment by the 
Declaration of Helsinki does not refute this. Resort to an innovative technique 
therefore may be appropriate in certain cases but must be made with 
caution. 705 
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704 Declaration of Helsinki (2000): World Medical association. Bulletin of 
Medical Ethics 2000; 162: 8-11 at paragraph 
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Indeed, some discretion to develop medical practice is allowed by the courts. In the Scottish case of McHardy v. Dundee General Hospitals'Board of Management. Lord Cameron stated: 
I think it is well that the search for further knowledge and experience 
should not be inhibited by undue apprehension of charges of 
negligence for the consequences to a patient of treatment or diagnosis 
where such may diverge from the normal.... Medicine is not an exact 
science and the solutions of its problems are not susceptible of 
mathematical calculation, while the frontiers of medical knowledge are 
always moving and advance may often be achieved only at the cost of 
what in retrospect appear to be errors and divergences from the correct 
path as that is ultimately mapped OUt. 706 
Similarly, Lord Diplock in Sidaway v. Board of Govemors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital stated that: 
Those members of the public who seek medical or surgical aid would 
be badly served by the adoption of any legal principle that would 
confine the doctor to some long-established, well tried method of 
treatment only, although its past record of success might be small, if he 
wanted to be confident that he would not run the risk of being held 
liable in negligence simply because he tried some more modern 
treatment, and by some unavoidable mischance it failed to heal but did 
some harm to the patient. This would encourage 'defensive medicine' 
with a vengeance. 707 
More recently, the English High Court (later endorsed by the High Court in 
Belfast) has permitted the injection of an unlicensed experimental treatment 
into the brains of two teenagers suffering from variant Creutzfeld Jacob 
disease (vCJD) 
. 
708 709 Both patients were in the advanced stages of the 
disease. There was no cure and no recognised effective drugs capable of 
prolonging life or arresting the continuing neurological deterioration. The 
proposed treatment, identified abroad, was untested on humans, and its 
efficacy and risks therefore unknown. The research that had been 
undertaken, although submitted for peer review, was at the time unpublished. 
Thus no validation of the experimental work was available. The patients' 
parents, however, wanted their children to receive it. The hospital's solicitors 
expressed concerns and requested a declaration as to the lawfulness of its 
administration. 
At trial the judge stated: 
The 'Bolarn test'ought not to be allowed to inhibit medical progress. 
And it is clear that if one waited for the 'Bolam test' to be complied with 
706 McHardy v Dundee General Hospitals' Board of Management. (1960) SLT (Notes) 19 
707 Siclaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643, HL at 657. 
708 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All ER 669 
709 Dyer 0. Family finds hospital willing to give experimental CJD treatment. BMJ 2003; 326: 8. 
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to its fullest extent, no innovative work such as the use of penicillin or 
performing heart transplant surgery would ever be attempted. ... 
I do 
however have evidence from responsible medical opinion which does 
not reject the research. 710 
It was held that where there was no alternative treatment available and the disease was progressive and fatal, it was reasonable, therefore, to consider 
experimental treatment with unknown benefits and risks. Furthermore, 
the proposed treatment complied with the requirement for a doctor to 
act at all times in accordance with a responsible and competent body 
of relevant medical opinion (the professional standard test). "' 
One of the doctors concerned had stated; 
... animal testing models will only take us so far; ultimately, the only 
proper place for the study of CJD is in CJD patients. Whilst it would be 
a very considerable leap to a new disease and a new species if the 
PIPS treatment was carried out on humans, such a leap had to be 
made at some time. 712 
The experts advising the court concluded that there was a rational basis for 
believing the new treatment could have a positive effect. There was, however, 
no scientific proof. Although the treatment was risky, the experts could not see 
grounds for denying the patients treatment, especially considering the strong 
views of the patients' families. Indeed, there were concerns about the effect 
on the families if treatment was withheld. 
The judge concluded that: 
... 
there was a responsible body of relevant professional opinion which 
supports this innovative treatment. That is, in my view, subject to the 
seriousness of the risks involved and the degree of benefit that might 
be achieved. 713 
The Official Solicitor also supported the proposals for treatment. However, it 
was recognised that even if the court gave its approval, approval was still 
needed from the hospital's Clinical Governance Committee and the Drugs and 
Therapeutic Committee. The judge criticised this. While accepting that the 
committees must exercise their own discretion in the applications made to 
them, she hoped that in the future the hospital trust would have an opportunity 
to form its own conclusions before the court made its decision. 
Unfortunately, advice to the Department of Health from its CJD therapy 
Advisory Group and from the Committee on Safety of Medicines was that 
neither recommended the proposed treatment. The hospital's two committees 
710 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All ER 669,680-1. 
711 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All ER at 669 
712 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [200311 All ER 669,675-6. 
713 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All ER 669,681. 
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also were unable to approve the treatment so that it could take place in their hospital. Eventually, the family found a different hospital willing to administer the experimental treatment. 714 
It is clear, therefore, that the courts do sanction experimental therapy. To 
allow such experimental treatment to be administered the court would need to 
consider evidence of any previous trials of the treatment and would take into 
consideration any dangers it entailed. It is possible that a court would decline to endorse the use of an untried procedure if the patient was thereby exposed to considerable risk of damage. Other factors which might be taken into 
account would be the previous response of the patient to more conventional 
treatment, the seriousness of the patient's condition and the attitude of the 
patient himself towards the novelty and risk. Pivotal to any decision would be 
the views of experts witnesses, so called 'responsible medical opinion'. In the 
above case of experimental treatment for vCJD expert court witnesses were 
largely in agreement about the potential risks and benefits of the treatment 
and believed the treatment should proceed. 715 The court endorsed this view. 
It is not clear what decision would have been taken had the court known of 
the contrary view taken by the hospital trust's two committees, the 
Department of Health's CJD Therapy Advisory Committee and the Committee 
on Safety of Medicines. However, the judge criticised the fact that further 
approval was needed from the hospital's two committees. Furthermore, she 
could have given permission for the treatment to go ahead, subject to 
approval of these committees, but didn't. She gave approval for the treatment 
to be administered in the knowledge that there may well have been dissenting 
opinion. Indeed, the same judge (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss) recently gave 
permission for another vCJD patient to receive the same experimental 
treatment. 716 It therefore appears that the judge was prepared to accept 
expert medical opinion on the acceptability of experimental treatment. 
Analysis of Liability: 
Whether a health carer is held liable in negligence if he departs from accepted 
practice will be determined as a question of faCt. 717 The previously mentioned 
Scottish case of Hunter v. Hanlel 18 illustrates the approach the law takes 
regarding experimental treatment. Indeed it is one of the few cases 
specifically to address this issue. The case involved an injection by a doctor 
into a patient during which the hypodermic needle being used broke and part 
of it remained inside the patient's body. The plaintiff claimed that the 
defendant used a needle that was the wrong size and hence unsuitable for 
the intended purpose. 
It has already been stated that the court held that 
714 Dyer 0. Family finds hospital willing to give experimental CJD treatment. BMJ 2003; 326: 8. 
715 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All ER 669. 
716 Dyer C. Second vCJD patient to receive experimental treatment. BMJ 2003; 327: 886. 
717 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002, at p171. 
718 Hunter v. Hanley 1955, SC200 
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in the realm of diagnosis and treatment there was ample scope for genuine difference of opinion and one man clearly was not negligent merely because his conclusion differed from that of other professional men ... 
719 
In this case the doctor departed from standard acceptable practice. Lord President Clyde continued that, 
... in regard to allegations of deviation from ordinary professional 
practice ... such a deviation is not necessarily evidence of negligence. Indeed it would be disastrous if this were so, for all inducement to 
progress in medical science would then be destroyed. Even a 
substantial deviation from normal practice may be warranted by the 
particular circumstances. To establish liability by a doctor where deviation from normal practice was alleged, three facts required to be 
established. First of all it must be proved that there is a usual and 
normal practice; secondly it must be proved that the defender has not 
adopted that practice; and thirdly (and this is of crucial importance) it 
must be established that the course the doctor adopted is one which no 
professional man of ordinary skill would have taken if he had been 
acting with ordinary care. ... If this is the test, then it matters nothing how far or how little he deviates from the ordinary practice. For the 
extent of deviation is not the test. The deviation must be of a kind 
which satisfies the third of the requirements just stated. 720 
So, for a negligence allegation to be established, it must be shown that no 
C ordinary' doctor would have undertaken the experimental treatment. The 
court also implied that progress in medical science was something to be 
safeguarded, a sentiment reiterated in McHardy v. Dundee General Hospitals' 
Board of Management. 721 
There has also been support for experimental treatment in the US courts. 
Therapeutic innovation has long been recognised as permissible to 
avoid serious consequences. The everyday practice of medicine 
involves constant judgmental decisions by physicians as they move 
from one patient to another in the conscious institution of procedures, 
special tests, trials and observations recognised generally by their 
profession as effective in treating the patient or providing a diagnosis of 
a diseased condition. Each patient presents a slightly different problem 
to the doctor. A physician is presumed to have the knowledge and skill 
necessary to use some innovation to fit the peculiar circumstances of 
each case. 722 
719 Hunter v. Hanley 1955, SC200 at 204 
720 Hunter v. Hanley 1955, SC200 at 206 
721 McHardy v. Dundee General Hospitals' Board of Management. (1960) SLT (Notes) 19. 
722 Brook v. St John's Hickey Memorial Hospital 380 NE 2d 72 (1978) (Supreme Court of Indiana) 
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A more recent case concerned a patient, diagnosed with an aggressive form 
of breast cancer, who requested her health insurance company to pay for high-dose chemotherapy (HDCT). 723 The company initially refused payment. The importance of the case, however, lay in raising the cr%itical issue of what 
was meant by experimental drug therapy. Indeed the distinction between 
research and experimental therapy was particularly important because on it 
turned the decision of who should ultimately pay for the treatment. 
The principle on which to base this decision is that those who benefit from an 
undertaking should be the ones who pay for that undertaking. 724 With respect 
to drug research, the primary beneficiaries are the people who will (or may) 
use these drugs in the future. Thus, the cost of such research should be paid 
by future users. This goal can be achieved in several ways, the easiest of 
which requires that the sponsor of a clinical drug trial pays for all costs 
associated with the trial and then passes on these costs to future drug users 
as a portion of the price of the drug. 
If, on the other hand, the drug is being administered in an experimental 
manner, the primary beneficiaries are the specific patients who receive the 
novel medication. This implies that the patient should bear the financial 
burden of this therapy. If the patient has an insurance plan from an insurance 
company that has agreed to pay the patient's necessary medical expenses, 
then that insurance company should meet the costs of the innovative 
treatment. 
If the trial of HDCT undertaken in this case were done primarily to acquire 
new knowledge for the benefit of future users of the treatment, this should be 
considered to be research. It then would be unjust to require that a single 
individual subject, or that person's health insurance company, bear the costs 
associated with such research. All those who stood to benefit from such an 
undertaking ought to bear its costs, that is, any future users and thus the drug 
company should pay for its use. However the court considered that the use of 
HIDCT was experimental treatment primarily for the benefit of the individual 
patient. Thus the court held that the health insurance company had to pay for 
the costs associated with the use of this experimental treatment. 
725 
In a similar case a patient tried to force her insurance company to pay for 
autologous bone marrow transplantation for treating breast cancer. Once 
again, an insurance company refused coverage stating that the procedure 
was still experimental. A federal judge ruled in her favour: 
To require that the plaintiff or other plan members wait until somebody 
chooses to present statistical proof ... that would satisfy all 
the experts 
723 Henderson v. Bodine Aluminium, Inc., 70F. 3d 958 (8th Cir 1995) 
724 Brushwood DB. Challenging denial of coverage for innovative therapy. Am J Health-Syst 
Pharm. 1997; 54: 
572-4 
725 Henderson v. Bodine Aluminium, Inc., 70F. 3d 958 (8th Cir 1995) 
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means that plan members would be doomed to receive medical 
procedures that are state of the art. 726 
Thus US courts appear to be supportive of the concept of expedmental treatment and that patients be given such treatment. These cases have 
shown that the law may be required to determine what is within the realms of 
standard treatment, what is experimental and what is research. The law 
approaches the existence or absence of a standard treatment or treatments 
for a given condition as a matter of evidence. The test is objective rather than 
subjective, accepting an identifiable body of contemporary medical 
knowledge. It must be presupposed that some professional consensus exists 
on how given conditions may properly be managed. 727 A responsible body of 
medical opinion could then decide what is accepted practice. However, there 
may also be another body of medical opinion (and equally 'responsible') 
claiming that a certain form of treatment was not standard. Within a 
hierarchical organisation such as the medical profession, differences over 
validation may be difficult to separate from the status of the disputing groups. 
For example, in the early stages of the introduction of laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy there is little doubt that a responsible body of medical 
opinion (the so-called early adopterS728 ) believed that this had become the 
standard treatment. Others (the early majority, late majority and laggard S729) 
believed it was too early to claim it was standard treatment. It is unclear what 
a court of law would have held. Hunter v. Hanlel 30 and Bolam v. Friem 
Hospital Management Committee 731 both accepted that if a doctor acted in 
accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion he was not guilty of 
negligence. 
Indeed, some believe that 
Bolam provides some protection for the innovative or minority opinion. 
If this protection is removed, then the opinion which the cautious 
practitioner will wish to follow will be that which involves least risk. This 
may have an inhibiting effect on medical progress: after all, many 
advances in medicine have been made by those who have pursued an 
unconventional line of therapy. Such doctors may quite easily be 
regarded as negligent by a judge given to favouring conventional 
medical opinion. 732 
Dickens, however, believes that courts would probably recognise the 
distinction between negligent treatment, whether in departure from orthodox 
management or otherwise, and deliberate use of a new procedure, giving the 
726 Howe R. Patient wins coverage for treatment. Washington Post 1990; 19Apr: C: 1. 
727 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975; 113: 635-9 
728 Rogers EM. Diffusion of Innovations. 3rd ed. Free Press: New York. p246 
729 Rogers EM. Diffusion of Innovations. 3rd ed. Free Press: New York. p246 
730 Hunter v. Hanley 1955, SC200 
731 Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All 
ER 118, [1957] 1 WLR 582 
732 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. 
Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.30. 
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patient or subject full information and taking all possible safeguards against adverse reactions, including for instance conducting prior testing on animals when appropriate. 733 
Innovation is not [research] when orthodox medicine provides no adequate treatment for a given condition, so the pursuit of a new treatment when none exists is not impaired by the most demanding degree of informed consent... When, however, a patient can be given 
orthodox therapy any variation or withholding of that therapy is proper 
only with his fully informed consent. Thus an acceptable social balance is struck between the needs of medical progress by innovation 
and [research], and the patient's right not unknowingly to be exposed 
734 to risk in diagnosis or treatment in advancing medical knowledge . 
The courts appear to agree. In Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority Mustill 
LJ stated: 
In the first place, there is the situation where the doctor embarks on a 
form of treatment which is still comparatively untried, which techniques 
and safeguards which are still in the course of development, or where 
the treatment is of a particular technical difficulty. In such a case, if the 
decision to embark on the treatment at all was justifiable and was taken 
with the informed consent of the patient, the court should, in my 
judgment, be particularly careful not to impute negligence simply 
because something has gone wrong. 735 
Justifying the experiment: 
It could thus be argued that the experimenting doctor will need to justify his 
experimental treatment, some commentators claiming that whether or not the 
use of an innovative technique could amount to negligence depends on to 
what extent its use could be justified in the case in question. 736 Professionals 
will be called upon to justify novel therapies or procedures and, provided that 
they are done properly, this should not lead to an allegation of negligence 
being accepted by the courts. 737 
A doctor might not be negligent if he tried a new technique but if he did 
he must justify it before the court. If his novel or exceptional treatment 
had failed disastrously he could not complain if it was held that he went 
beyond the bounds of due care and skill as recognised general ly. 738 
Thus in a recent unreported Scottish case the pursuer was prescribed 
chloramphenicol by her doctor as a result of which she developed aplastic 
733 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975; 113: 635-9 
734 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975; 113: 635-9 at 639 
735 Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All ER 801,812. 
736 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.38. 
737 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p170 
738 Landau v. Werner (1961) 105 Sol Jo 1008, CA 
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anaernia requiring a bone marrow transplant . 
739The judge was not prepared 
to hold as negligent a decision that had been arrived at after great thought 
and weighing up of all possibilities. 
Within the framework of a balanced judgment, I consider the decision 
... can be rationally and responsibly supported. ... within the options 740 reasonably available to him ... it was a reasonable course to adopt . 
In other words, the doctor justified his experimental treatment before the 
court. 
'Recognised risk avoidance': 
A similar approach was taken by the court in Clark v. McLennan. 741 In this 
case the claimant suffered from stress incontinence following childbirth. The 
defendant operated six weeks after the birth but the operation failed. The 
accepted practice at the time was for surgery to be delayed for at least three 
months. Indeed, none of the witnesses knew of a case where the operation 
had taken place earlier than three months. It was held that the defendant was 
negligent in failing to take a precaution, resulting in damage. The defendant 
had tried something innovative. However, the most controversial aspect of this 
case was the implication that the burden of proof had been reversed. 
Where ... there is 
but one orthodox course of treatment and the doctor 
chooses to depart from that, his position is different. It is not enough for 
him to say as to his decision simply that it was based on his clinical 
judgment. One has to inquire whether he took all proper facts into 
account which he knew or should have known, and whether his 
departure from the orthodox course can be justified on the basis of 
these factors. ... 
Must the medical practitioner justify his departure from the usual 
practice?... 
It seems to me that it follows from McGhee that where there is a 
situation in which a general duty of care arises and there is a failure to 
take a precaution, and that very damage occurs against which the 
precaution is designed to be a protection, then the burden lies on the 
defendant to show that he was not in breach of duty as well as to show 
that the damage did not result from his breach of d Uty. 
742 
In the Scottish case mentioned, McGhee v. National Coal Board743' it was 
held that liability will be imposed if it can be established that the negligence of 
739 Duffy v. Lanarkshire Health Board (1998, unreported). 
740 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 
9.39-40. 
741 Clark v. McLennan [1983] 1 All ER 416. 
742 Clark v. McLennan [198311 All ER 416,427. 
743 McGhee v. National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1. 
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the defender materially increased the risk of the plaintiff being damaged in the 
way in question. 744 
Furthermore, Lord Wilberforce stated: 
And if one asks which of the parties, the workman or the employers, 
should suffer from this inherent evidential difficulty, the answer as a 
matter of policy or justice should be that it is the creator of the risk who, 
ex hypothesi, must be taken to have foreseen the possibility of damage, who should bear its consequences. 745 
The 'recognised risk avoidance' concept746 illustrated by Clark would be very 
useful in negligence cases concerning innovation. Thus a plaintiff could argue 
that it is for the defendant to justify the use of the innovative therapy; there 
was a standard way of performing the operation, the defendant departed from 
it and introduced an innovative treatment. So it was for the defendant to justify 
its use. 
This concept is very similar to that of res ipsa loquitur. What this doctrine does 
is give rise to an inference of negligence on the defendant's part 747 , as in the case of Cassidy v. Ministry of Health. 748 Here the judge believed the plaintiff 
was entitled to say: 
I went into hospital to be cured of two stiff fingers. I have come out with 
four stiff fingers and my hand is useless. That should not have 
happened if due care had been used. Explain it if you can. 749 
Similarly, in the original trial in Wilsher v. Essex Area Health AUthorit Y 750 (of 
which more shortly) the judge held that since negligence had been proved, 
the burden of disproving that that negligence had caused the child's injuries 
moved to the defendants. It was up to the defendants to prove that the 
resulting condition was due to other possible causes. 
However, it must be pointed out that, attractive as it may be for a plaintiff to 
utilise the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the courts have shown general 
antipathy towards it. 751 752 In Wilshel-753 the House of Lords condemned such 
an approach. They held that the burden of proving causation rested on the 
claimant alone and did not move to the defendants, even though negligence 
744 McGhee v. National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, at 4. 
745 McGhee v. National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, at 6 
746 Mason A McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.70 
747 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.61. 
748 Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343, [1951 ]1 All ER 574, CA. 
749 Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343 at 365, [1951] 1 All ER 574 at 588, CA. 
750 Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All ER 801. 
751 Ratcliffe v. Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority (1998) 42 BMLR 64, [1998] Lloyd's Rep Med 162, CA. 
752 Gray v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Health Authority (2000) 57 BMLR 148. 
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had been proved or admitted . 
754They held that the coincidence of a breach of duty and injury could not, of itself, give rise to a presumption that the injury 
was so caused. 
Whether we like it or not, the law ... requires proof of fault causing damage as the basis of liability in tort. 755 
Legal limitations: 
The problem with the Law's approach is that rules created for assessing 
negligence in the normal therapeutic setting, i. e. what is the standard of care 
and has the duty to provide this been breached, are being used for assessing 
the acceptability of innovative practice. The risk avoidance concept mentioned 
earlier, in which the defendant would have to justify the use of the innovative 
treatment, despite support from legal commentatorS756 757 , appears, at first, not to be acceptable to the courts. The belief that the courts refuse to accept 
the risk avoidance concept, however, follows the determination in Wilsher, 
which did not concern innovative treatment but a simple misplacement of a 
catheter into the wrong vessel. There was no suggestion that this 
misplacement constituted a new approach to treatment. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the recognised risk avoidance 
concept concerns the standard of care while the House of Lords in Wilsher 
refused to accept the shifting of the burden of proof with respect to causation. 
In other words, the risk avoidance concept could still be used for assessing 
innovative treatment and this would still be compatible with the judgement in 
Wilsher. The justification for this is that when innovative treatment is 
attempted, it stands to reason that there may be a greater risk to the patient, 
simply because the doctor is attempting something unknown or that he 
himself hasn't attempted before. The courts must, in some way, take this extra 
risk to the patient into consideration. This could be achieved by the doctor 
having to justify his use of innovative treatment before the court. It may, for 
example, be that there was no extra risk when attempting a particular 
innovative intervention or the potential benefit was so great that the extra risk 
was justified. The important point is that it is for the doctor to justify what he 
has done. 
As mentioned, this would still be compatible with the decision in Wilsher that 
the coincidence of a breach of duty and injury could not, of itself, give rise to a 
presumption that the injury was so caused . 
75" Even though the doctor may not 
be able to justify the innovative treatment, it would still be for the plaintiff to 
prove causation arising out of the unjustified treatment. Thus 
it may be more accurate to speak in terms of evidential presumptions: 
the fact, if it is established, that the defendant failed to act in 
754 Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871,882-3, H L. 
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accordance with accepted practice supports a prima facie inference of 
negligence, which it is then up to the defendant to reb Ut. 759 
As has been argued throughout this thesis, the medical act is not homogenous. It does not slot conveniently into either therapy or research. There is a continuum, depending on the varying balance between the extent 
of treatment for the particular individual patient and how much new knowledge 
will be acquired. The law fails to recognise this and is thus unable to examine 
the subtleties of each individual medical act. 
The test requiring support from a responsible body of opinion was created for 
normal therapeutic interactions. Indeed, following SiMMS760, the judge allowed 
further treatment to go ahead, despite opposition from two hospital 
committees, the Department of Health's CJD Advisory Committee and the 
Committee on Safety of Medicines. It could almost be argued that, since there 
was a responsible body of medical opinion that believed the treatment to be 
reasonable, the judge accepted it in the same way she would have used 
Maynard 761 in a negligence case. That is, provided there was a responsible 
body of opinion accepting the treatment, it didn't matter that there was an 
equally responsible body rejecting it. It could even be argued that the central 
issue in Simms was whether the innovative treatment proposed was justified, 
virtually using the risk avoidance concept described earlier. Since the risks 
were great, the doctors needed to justify its use before the court by 
emphasising the potential benefits. Since they were able to do so, it was held 
to be acceptable treatment. However, it must be pointed out that this was not 
a negligence case. Had it been, different rules of engagement would have 
been utilised, with the plaintiff having to prove negligence on behalf of the 
pioneering doctors. 
This problem of utilising normal rules of negligence can be further illustrated 
// 
. 
762 The defendant had by the case of DeFreitas v. O'Brien and Conne Y 
claimed that it was clinically justified to undertake a particularly delicate 
operation while the plaintiffs argued that the average orthopaedic surgeon 
would not have operated in the circumstances. It was held that embarking on 
an inherently difficult procedure might be negligent if done by a generalist, but 
acceptable if undertaken by an experienced special iSt. 763 Thus the super- 
specialist can undertake procedures that others might regard as being 
inappropriate or too risky. In the Court of Appeal it was held that a small 
number of medical practitioners could constitute a 'responsible body of 
medical opinion' against which the practices of a doctor could be 
measured. 764 The body of spinal surgeons did not have to be substantial. It 
was sufficient that the court was satisfied that it was a responsible body. This 
approach has been criticised. 
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764 DeFreitas v. O'Brien and Connelly [1995] 6 Med LR 108,115, CA. 
1q1 
In determining whether or not a practice is responsible, the first thing that the court should do is to see who has adopted the practice and 
count heads. It follows that the greater the number adopting a practice, the more likely it is that the practice is both accepted and responsible. What is not being advocated is that the matter can be determined 
solely by counting heads; before anything else the court should 
examine the risk in relation to the precautions adopted, if any. DeFreitas sets a worrying precedent in that perhaps now a small fringe 
group practising experimental techniques can legitimately constitute a 
responsible body despite being contrary to the norm. 765 
What the court in DeFreitas should have done was ask: The treatment you 
undertook was not done routinely by the vast majority of your colleagues. The 
innovative treatment was risky. Can you justify its use? Unfortunately, the 
court simply utilised the normal rules for assessing negligence and once a 
responsible body of opinion endorsing the treatment was found the court 
appeared to have no further part to play. In essence, DeFreitas licenses the 
taking of risks. 766 
It appears to be only in extreme cases that the courts are prepared to protect 
the patient from reckless experimentation and require justification of the 
technique attempted. In the case of Hepworth v. Kerr an anaesthetist was 
found negligent for reducing a patient's blood pressure to a level lower than 
what was accepted as normal. 767 Despite the defendant's claim that he had 
utilised the technique in 1500 patients, the court did not accept that the 
technique had been properly validated. He had failed to follow up any of these 
patients, there was no expert support or endorsement of his work, it was not 
known how many of the previous patients had suffered similarly to the 
claimant and there was no safety margin for error. 
The defendant, as he accepted, was to begin with ... plainly 
experimenting. ... 
I simply cannot, and do not, accept that the defendant was justified in 
doing what he did without proper scientific validation of his 
technique. 768 
Indeed, since Bolam would have provided protection if there was external 
expert SUpport769 for the technique, the case was only lost bý the defendant 
because this was not forthcoming. As occurred in DeFreitaS 70, if a small 
fringe group practising the same experimental technique had come forward, 
the case may very well have been lost by the plaintiff. The question that the 
765 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002, p 166 
766 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterwortfis 2002,6th ed, 9.31. 
767 Hepworth v. Kerr [1995] 6 Med LR 139. 
768 Hepworth v. Kerr [1995] 6 Med LR 139,164. 
769 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.30. 
770 DeFreitas v. O'Brien and Connelly [1993] 4 Med LR 281, [1995] 6 Med LR 108, CA. 
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court should therefore address is whether the defendant could justify the 
technique in the light of possible risks. Clearly the court would need expert 
opinion on the acceptability of the technique in light of its benefits and risks. 
The court's problem is that it would then be constrained by Bolam or Hunter 
and cases such as Maynard v. WMidlands RHA771 into having to accept the 
view of a responsible body of opinion if this thought the technique was 
acceptable. In other words, the court would appear to have no discretion to 
refuse this opinion if it felt the risks were too great. The profession is thus held 
to be the sole source of competence to assess the acceptability of a particular 
treatment, whether standard or experimental. The position in innovative 
practice seems to be excessively favourable to the medical profession. 
Bolam, Hunter and Maynard permit medical experts to establish the standard 
of care in innovative treatment and not the courts. 
... 
the law imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a 
matter of medical judgment. 772 
Although cases such as Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital and the Maudsley Hospita F73' Bolitho v. Hackney HA 774 and Pearce 
v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS TruSt775 , all appear to qualify this to a certain degree (and will be reviewed in the next chapter), they concern issues of 
information disclosure. With respect to the acceptability of a particular medical 
treatment, the fundamental principle still remains that this is to be judged 
against the standards of the medical profession. 
While it is clear that the courts are extremely reluctant to interfere with the 
standards of medical practice this should only, if at all, occur in the normal 
therapeutic setting. If the courts accept that innovation is a separate entity, as 
has been argued throughout this thesis, this should allow them some 
discretion to scrutinise a particular innovative practice to see whether it is 
reasonable. 
Karp v. Cooleji"6 : 
Arguably one of the more reckless experiments undertaken was the 
implantation of an innovative device, a mechanical heart, into a patient. The 
patient died and his widow subsequently sued the surgeon. In an earlier 
chapter it was stated that the mechanical heart was stolen from a colleague 
and little animal experimentation had been undertaken to assess its suitability 
for implantation into humans. The operation was planned in advance as 
Cooley was desperate for recognition. 777 This is one of the major problems 
with innovation. 
771 Maynard v. W. Midlands RHA [1985] 1 All ER 635 
772 Siclaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 at 881. 
773 Siclaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1984] 1 All ER 1018, [1985] AC 871, [1985] 1 All 
ER 643, HL. 
774 Bolitho v. Hackney HA [199314 MLR 381 
775 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998) 48 BMLR 118, CA. 
776 Karp v. Cooley 493 F 2d 408 (1974) (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit) 
777 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to fail: a social view of organ transplants and dialysis. Chicago: University of 
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When it becomes technically possible to perform a "ground breaking" 
surgical procedure, an important moral problem arises. In view of the strong incentive for surgeons to be the first to perform a novel operation, their judgments about whether such an intervention is 778 justified may well be clouded . 
It has been argued in the previous section that it is this justification that needs to be examined by the courts. 
Mrs Karp claimed that her husband had been the unfortunate victim of experimentation. The defendant had failed to inform him (or her) about the 
experimental nature of the device and had fraudulently obtained his consent. The device had only been approved for animal experimentation and furthermore had not been tested adequately in animals. 
The case revolved around this latter point, that is, whether the prosthesis had been adequately tested in animals before its use in Karp. Many members of the medical profession had been surprised at the news that Cooley had 
implanted the artificial heart as he was not associated with work in this area. They also believed the first clinical use of such a device was years away and 
that it was too soon to be used on man. 779 
Despite this, few appeared for the plaintiff. The only evidence available 
regarding its prior trial in animals was a paper published by deBakey and 
colleagues reporting its use in seven calves, only one of which lived for any 
significant time. 780 In it deBakey had claimed: 
Human experimentation must await unequivocal evidence of the safety 
and effectiveness of such a device in humans. 781 
His evidence was therefore crucial to the case. Surprisingly the judge 
confined the interrogation of Dr deBakey to his chambers. Records of the 
investigation by Baylor College of Medicine into the affair were also ordered 
sealed during the trial. 
Questions about the quality of consent obtained were also raised. The court 
held that physicians and surgeons had a duty to make reasonable disclosure 
to a patient of risks that were relevant to medical diagnosis and treatment. At 
the time the standard in Texan law against which the doctor's disclosure was 
Chicago Press, 1984. The Case of the Artificial Heart, 135-197. 
778 Benatar D, Hudson DA. A tale of two novel transplants not done: the ethics of limb allografts. BMJ 2002; 324: 971 - 
3. 
779 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to fail: a social view of organ transplants and dialysis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. The Case of the Artificial Heart, 135-197 at 139. 
780 DeBakey M, Hall CW, et al. Orthotopic cardiac prosthesis: Preliminary experiments in animals with biventricular 
artificial heart. Cardiovasc Res Cent Bull 1969; 7: 127-42. 
781 DeBakey M, Hall CW, et al. Orthotopic cardiac prosthesis: Preliminary experiments in animals with biventricular 
artificial heart. Cardiovasc Res Cent Bull 1969; 7: 127-42 at 142. 
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to be tested was a medical one, based on expert medical evidence of what a reasonable practitioner would have advised the patient under similar circumstances, i. e. the professional standard previously described. The court gave great import to the fact that Karp had signed a consent form in which each step of the three-stage operation had been set out. Furthermore, because the court decided that the use of the innovation was therapeutic, the 
action had to be measured by traditional malpractice evidentiary standards. In 
other words, innovation was to be tested under negligence rules in the same way as medical diagnosis and treatment. As has previously been argued, the 
rules created to assess negligence should not be used to assess the 
acceptability of an innovative technique. The law needs to be more sensitive 
and be able to distinguish between the two. 
The defendant in this case was found not to have been negligent. Despite the 
court's findings, the case raises serious questions about the appropriateness 
and adequacy of the regulatory mechanisms to ensure ethical practice in 
undertaking new procedures. Formal peer group review was bypassed, no 
sanctions were taken against the surgeons concerned and the law clearly did 
not protect the patient. 782 This is especially so regarding the information that 
needed to be disclosed as the experimental operation was held to be 
therapeutic and thus the standard of care was assessed by medical opinion 
utilising standards established for normal therapy. 
The main importance of this case, although occurring many years ago, is that 
it shows that the medical and legal professions, and the larger society to 
which they belong, have not satisfactorily dealt with the social, moral, and 
783 legal issues involved in therapeutic experimentation with human subjects. 
As mentioned, the law used was inappropriate in that, despite the treatment 
clearly being experimental, the law of negligence applicable to standard 
treatment was used. The law failed to make a distinction. If the law had used 
the recognised risk avoidance concept and asked the surgeon to justify the 
use of a technology that was previously untried in humans, the court's 
conclusion may have been different. 
It is interesting to note that a very similar scenario is currently unfolding in the 
US. 784 A patient who received an artificial heart in November 2001 lived to 
regret his decision to undergo the experimental therapy and died a few 
months later following a stroke. His wife has started legal proceedings against 
the maker of the implantable device, the hospital and a patient advocate 
alleging fraud, negligence and intentional assault and battery. Interestingly, 
the company had tried to ensure that patients gave fully informed consent by 
appointing a panel of independent patient advocates. The claim is that the 
patient and his wife were not aware just how experimental the artificial heart 
was. They were led to believe that the heart was a therapeutic device. Indeed, 
782 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to fail: a social view of organ transplants and dialysis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. The Case of the Artificial Heart, 135-197. 
783 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to fail: a social view of organ transplants and dialysis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. The Case of the Artificial Heart, 135-197. 
784 Anon. Widow sues artificial heart-maker. Bull Med Eth 2002; 181: 24. 
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their lawyer claims that they should have been told that the goal of the experiment was not to make the first recipients well but to test a new technology for future patients. In other words, the lawyer claims that the operation was actually research as the aim was the generation of information and knowledge to benefit future patients. 
This claim is similar to one made many years ago by Annas. He alleged that many early transplantation procedures were in reality purely non-therapeutic 
and intended only for the benefit of society. 785 
Despite this, it has already been argued that all these cases represent innovative treatment rather than research because there was a possibility of benefit for the individual patient, as well as the generation of knowledge for the benefit of society. It may well be that the innovators can justify the use of 
such experimental treatment. However, the question of what information was disclosed to the patients also needs to be assessed, a point returned to in the 
next chapter. 
THE LAW REGARDING GUIDELINES: 
The above discussion regarding experimental therapy highlights a further 
problem. It has been suggested that to protect patients further from unwittingly being given experimental therapy it may be necessary to set up a formal 
accreditation process. 786 For example, in some hospitals adoption of new 
procedures may be formalised through ethics or practice committees. Indeed, 
the use of ethics committees to review and sanction any new interventional 
procedures, whether of the 'experimental' or of the 'personal innovation' type, 
was advocated by the Bristol Inquiry report. 787 
Similarly, Government schemes regulating the use of public funding for drugs 
provide an avenue for formal acceptance of drug therapies. 788 Concerns over 
the introduction and use of laparoscopic procedures led the Academy of 
Medical Royal Colleges to set up SERNIP, the Safety And Efficacy Register of 
New Interventional Procedures 
. 
789This register has now been taken over by 
the National Institute of Clinical Excellence, as previously discussed. 
The price of formalising accreditation of new procedures, however, may be to 
reduce the flexibility of medical and therapeutic innovation . 
790 The creation of 
NICE, with its dual role of supplying special warranty to clinical guidelines and 
activating an extensive programme of implementation, is likely to result in 
785 Annas G. Death and the Magic Machine. Western New England Law Review 1987; 9: 89 at 98. 
786 Gaze E, Dawson K. Distinguishing medical practice and research: the special case of IVT. Bioethics 1989; 3: 301- 
319 
787 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001, p36, rec 
101. 
788 Rawlins M. In pursuit of quality: the National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness. Lancet 1999; 353: 1079-82 
789 Bower H. A safety net cast over new surgery. Hospital Doctor, 16th May, 1996, p5. 
790 Gaze E, Dawson K. Disbnguishing medical practice and research: the special case of IVT. Bioethics 1989; 3: 301- 
319 
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NICE-approved guidelines being credited with greater prominence from a legal point of view. These guidelines, as argued in the previous chapter, may become mandatory. Failure to implement them or heed their advice, such as 
the recommendation not to use laparoscopic herniorraphy for economic 
reasons, could be deemed negligent and ultimately lead to a stifling of 
innovative practice. 
In the previous chapter it was stated that guidelines can be used to regulate 
experimental treatment. The question of their legal status was also raised and 
it is appropriate at this point to assess this further. Early in the lifetime of 
guidelines, the government published its approach to their development, 
appraisal and application . 
791 The authors advised against the term 'protocol' 
and reinforced the status of guidelines as guidance rather than instructions or 
commands. They were seen as aids to, not substitutes for, clinical judgement. 
The NHS Executive stated that when endorsed by prestigious professional 
bodies, 
clinical guidelines can still only assist the practitioner; they cannot be 
used to mandate, authorise or outlaw treatment options. Regardless of 
the strength of the evidence, it will remain the responsibility of the 
practising clinicians to interpret their application ... 
It would be wholly 
inappropriate for clinical guidelines to be used as a means of coercion 
of the individual clinician. 792 
The Department of Health's view was simila 
ý793: 
Guidance for clinicians does not override their professional 
responsibility to make the appropriate decision in the circumstances of 
the individual patient, in consultation with the patient or guardian/carer 
and in the light of any locally agreed policies. 
Furthermore, at the time the NHS Executive believed that the task of 
developing national guidelines was specifically the responsibility of the 
professional Royal Colleges. 794 
There were still many concerns, however, regarding their use. In particular, 
they were believed to erode clinical abilities, diminish clinical judgement and 
reduce medical practice to cookbook medicine. 
795 These concerns were 
enhanced when NICE was created. Professor Sir Michael Rawlins, its 
chairman, wrote that NICE would provide a single, authoritative source of 
advice to health professionals and their managers. While this advice would 
not be mandatory, there was an expectation that its recommendations on 
791 Mann T. Clinical guidelines: using clinical guidelines to improve patient care within the 
NHS. Leeds: NHS 
Executive, 1996. 
792 NHS Executive. Clinical guidelines. NHS Executive, Leeds: 1996 at p10 
793 Department of Health. Memorandum of understanding on appraisal of health 
interventions. Department of 
Health, London, 13 August 1999, p4 
794 West E, Newton J. Clinical guidelines. BMJ 1997; 315: 324. 
795 Ellwood PM. Outcomes management, a technology of patient experience. 
N Engl J Med 1988; 318: 1549-56. 
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technologies would be universally accepted, and he warned that health 
professionals would be wise to record their reasons for non-compliance with NICE guidelines in patients' medical records. 796 
Later the Government, in its response to the Bristol Inquiry stated that where NICE guidance existed it provided the standard. Indeed, if conflicts existed with other advice, such as from professional bodies, NICE guidance would be 797 paramount . 
It therefore appears that such guidelines now present the doctor with an 
explicit threshold for treatment, whereas previously he or she relied upon 
professional discretion drawn from accumulated experience. 798 Thus, as 
guidelines receive increasing acceptance, health service lawyers have argued that acting in accordance with them could come to be viewed as acceptable 
medical practice per se and conversely, failure to apply a guideline could be 
seen as prima facie evidence of a case to answer. 799 
Codes of practice applicable to a given professional activity are in 
substance no more than formalised accepted practice and it is 
therefore not sur rising that conduct which departs from the code may 
lead to liability. 80P 
Thus, the way guidelines are beginning to be regarded is causing even 
greater concern . 
801 They have always been a basis for action. The problem is 
that they are tending to become prescriptions for action. Indeed, the Clinical 
Standards Board for Scotland, now known as NHS Quality Improvement 
Scotland, has referred to the guidelines produced by SIGN as 'standard S, . 
802 It 
may therefore be appropriate, at this point, to define the terms guidelines, 
protocols and standards because, although they are sometimes used 
interchangeably, they do have different meanings and thus implications. 
Guidelines are systematically developed statements, which assist in decision- 
making about appropriate healthcare for specific clinical conditions. 803 The 
World Health Organisation believes that 
guidelines should not be seen as rigid constraints on a practising 
doctor's decisions. Guidelines should provide extensive, critical, and 
well balanced information on benefits and limitations of the various 
796 Rawlins M. In pursuit of quality: the National Institute for Clinical Excellence. The Lancet 1999; 353: 1079-82. 
797 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. London: HMSO, 2002, p58 at 
4.11. 
798 Haycox A, Bagust A, Walley T. Clinical guidelines- the hidden costs. BMJ 1999; 318: 391-3. 
799 Harpwood V. NHS reform, audit, protocols and standards of care. Med Law Int 1994; 1: 241-59. 
800 Dugdale AM, Stanton KM. Professional Negligence. Bufterworths, 3rd ed, 1998, at 15.23. 
801 Haycox A, Bagust A, Walley T. Clinical guidelines- the hidden costs. BMJ 1999; 318: 391-3. 
802 Clinical Standards: Generic. Clinical Standards Board for Scotland. Edinburgh: CSBS: 2001 at p 10. 
803 Clinical Standards: Generic. Clinical Standards Board for Scotland. Edinburgh; CSBS: 2001 at p4O 
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diagnostic and therapeutic interventions so that the physician may exert the most careful judgement in individual cases. 804 
A protocol, on the other hand, is a policy or strategy that defines appropriate 
action. It also covers the adoption, by all staff, of national or local guidelines to 
meet local requirements in a specified way. 805 
Standards, in turn, have been defined as an overall statement of desired 
performance 806 or as an accepted or approved example of something against 
which others are judged or measured. 807 It is unclear, however, who has 
accepted or approved these standards. There is also an element of 
subjectivity when judging. Ideally a suitable unit of measurement and a robust 
measuring tool will enable objective assessment. Certain standards are quite 
clear and explicit. The Recommended Minimum Standards for Obstetric 
Anaesthetic Services, published by the Obstetrics Association of 
AnaesthetiStS808 (a respected body within anaesthetic circles) clearly sets out 
minimum standards in terms of staffing levels and care that should be 
available in all units. This is the accepted level of care and failure to comply 
and thus fall below the minimum standard implies negligence. 
These definitions imply that standards and protocols allow little scope for 
deviation whereas guidelines allow a far greater degree of freedom. On the 
other hand guidelines are 'recommendations that can be accepted, rejected or 
modified to fit the circumstances of the case at issue' . 
809 There is therefore a 
clear distinction between guidelines and standards (or protocols). 
Despite this, clinical guidelines now appear to form the basis of protocols and, 
as-previously mentioned, the CSBS considered the SIGN guidelines to be 
recognised standards. This offers an indication of the stand a rd-setting 
potential or the regulatory role now accorded to clinical guidelines. Similarly, 
at first Rawlins wrote that NICE's output would not be mandatory, suggesting 
he was describing guidelines. However he also wrote that'health 
professionals would be wise to record their reasons for non-compliance in 
patients' medical records', 810 which strongly suggests standards. An article by 
Radford and Rawlins had a diagram showing NICE producing 'standards'of 
clear service, with CHI (among others) monitoring these standards . 
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Department of Health has also stated that NICE is the pre-eminent authority in 
setting clinical standards. 812 
The proliferation of clinical guidelines therefore appears to have increased the 
risk that patients and their lawyers will use them to show that a doctors 
practice has fallen below acceptable levels. This may tempt doctors to 
abandon their own clinical judgement if this is not in keeping with a particular 
guideline. 
Indeed, in the case of R v. North Derbyshire Health Authority, ex p Fisher, "', 
which concerned the failure of the health authority to fund the drug beta 
interferon, the judge held that it had failed to take a reasoned decision after 
consideration of all the relevant factors, especially ignoring a circular from the 
Department of Health advising that serious consideration be given to 
providing the drug to certain categories of patients with multiple sclerosis. 
As mentioned, in discussions on medical technical matters the law has always 
relied on medical expertise to guide it. However, guidelines, which are 
essentially standards of care created by experts, could remove the need for 
the courts to rely on expert testimony. All the court would need is access to 
the relevant guideline. Since the guideline has been written by experts it could 
be argued that it would have the expertise to guide the court. 
The problem is that guidelines, as discussed, are not applicable to each and 
every medical situation. Doctors are expected to use appropriate clinical 
discretion. In the meantime the courts continue to place the testimony of 
witnesses about what constitutes reasonable practice above the 
recommendations of prestigious works of reference 814 in contrast to the 
hierarchy used for generating guidelines, where systemic reviews and meta- 
analyses are deemed the most important and expert opinion the least. 815 
The courts therefore believe that doctors must be prepared to deal with each 
patient on an individual basis. Clinical judgements often go beyond explicit 
input information, adding considerations of feeling, attitude, and value to the 
output. Differences in patients' choices and expectations may also underpin 
such variation. 816 Applying guidelines to individual care is always likely to 
require judgement, even when recommendations are properly linked to 
irrefutable evidence. 817 
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It is thus unlikely that the 'Bolam test' will be superseded by a legal standard entirely determined without reference to a responsible body of medical 
practitioners. 818 This is because clinical guidelines currently have a 
subservient role to that of the expert witness in court proceedings. 
Although doctors fear that the proliferation and influence of guidelines will increase their legal exposure 819 , 
in practice this does not appear to be so. For 
example, in the US where the guideline movement is more advanced, they 
only played a relevant or pivotal role in the proof of negligence in less than 7% 
of malpractice actions. 820 
Thus, appropriate interpretation and application of a clinical guideline is likely 
to generate better clinical care and a safer medico-legal strategy than either 
uncritical disregard or unthinking compliance . 
821 Doctors cannot claim that 
merely following a guideline is an acceptable defence to negligence. 822 
Clinical judgement should not be corrupted by guidelines. Divergence from 
national guidelines may come to be commonplace as good clinicians seek to 
tailor care to individual patients, as for example the advice given by the 
Association of Endoscopic Surgeons urging its members to ignore NICE 
823 guidelines discouraging the use of laparoscopic surgery for hernia repair. 
So far, UK legal cases have not tended to credit guidelines with a special 
'self-evident' status as regards their legal value, and have not adopted 
standards of care advocated by guidelines, without first evaluating their 
authority, applicability and the extent to which they represent customary 
practice. In the case of Loveday v. Renton and Wellcome Foundation Ltd, a 
case that concerned the possibility of brain damage caused by the pertussis 
vaccine, the judge stated that: 
Medical and expert opinion is deeply divided on the issue. The 
question has to be determined on all the evidence in the case, which is 
primarily the oral evidence of the witnesses tested in cross 
examination. The court cannot simply accept the opinion or belief of a 
witness, however eminent, that such is or is not the case. The basis for 
the opinion must be examined, tested against other evidence, for 
consistency and logic and the validity of the reasoning. 824 
818 Stern K. Clinical guidelines and negligence liability. In: Deighan M, Hitch S, eds. Clinical effecbveness: from 
guidelines to cost effective practice. Brentwood: Earlybrave, 1995: 127-35. 
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823 Bratby L. Doctors warn NICE is losing its credibility. Hospital Doctor 24th May 2001,1-2. 
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Similarly, in Vemon v. Bloomsbury HA the court found the defendant not guilty of negligence despite administering a drug in excess of the manufacturer's 825 
guidelines . The court applied a risk/benefit approach in that the claimant was suffering from a serious disease and experts confirmed that doses higher than recommended by the manufacturer had been given on other occasions. In other words, the court did not rely solely on guidelines. Whether the 
defendant was in breach would be a question of fact. 
This case implies that the court accepted the use of experimental treatment 
because there was a responsible body of opinion to support its use. In other 
words, whether experimental treatment was acceptable was a professional judgement. As previously argued, what the court should have asked was 
whether the treatment could be justified. 
PERSONAL INNOVATION: 
The other type of innovation described in this thesis is personal innovation. 
This is where a doctor personally attempts an already established standard 
technique for the first time. The issue of learning curves is inextricably linked 
to this form of innovation. 
Dickens believes that when a procedure is applied to train personnel rather 
than to test the procedure itself, its use may be described as educational 
rather than experimental. 826 It is usual, of course, for such training to be 
combined with a therapeutic purpose, the trainee acting under the direction of 
an experienced supervisor who is at hand in case of emergency. However, 
this is essentially an identical concept to personal innovation and thus merely 
a difference in terminology. In keeping with the distinction entertained in this 
thesis, Dickens has separated innovation into its two components, 
experimentation on the one hand and personal innovation, his so called 
educational model, on the other. 
How would the law behave if it were faced with a problem arising when a 
doctor is trying to learn a new technique? 
Under the laws of negligence already discussed, the standard a doctor has to 
achieve is that of the ordinary skilled doctor. By holding himself out as 
possessing the special skills of his profession, the doctor is under a duty to 
conform to the ordinary standards of that profession. 827 He should have a 
reasonably sound grasp of medical techniques and be as informed of new 
medical developments as the average competent doctor would expect to 
be. 828 The custom test, i. e. the test whereby a defendant's conduct is tested 
against the normal usage of his profession, is one that is applied in all areas 
of negligence law. 829This was endorsed by Hunter. 
830 
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Nettleship v. Weston: 
This means that the law in the UK appears to make no allowance for personal innovation. Indeed, it is well established that inexperience is no defence to a claim of negligence. In the case of Nettleship v. Weston the same standard of care was expected of a learner driver as of an experienced one. 831 In the original case (unreported) the judge had dismissed the claim against the learner-driver, saying that the only duty owed by Mrs Weston (the driver) to Mr Nettleship (a friend helping her learn) was that she should do her best, and that she did not fail in that duty. This was appealed, In the Appeal Court Lord Denning stated: 
In the criminal law it is no defence for a driver to say: 'I was a leamer- driver under instruction. I was doing my best and could not help it. ' Such a plea may go to mitigation of sentence, but it does not go to 
exculpation of guilt. The criminal law insists that every person driving a 
car must attain an objective standard measured by the standard of a 
skilled, experienced and careful driver. 832 
Similarly, when considering civil law he stated: 
It is no answer for him to say: 'I was a learner-driver under instruction. I 
was doing my best and could not help it. 'The civil law permits no such 
excuse. It requires of him the same standard of care as any other 
driver. 833 
One of the other judges stated: 
... 
if this doctrine of varying standards were to be accepted as part of 
the law on these facts, it could not logically be confined to the duty of 
care owed by lea rne r-d rivers. There is no reason, in logic, why it should 
not operate in a much wider sphere. The disadvantages of the resulting 
unpredictability, uncertainty and, indeed, impossibility of arriving at fair 
and consistent decisions outweigh the advantages. The certainty of a 
general standard is preferable to the vagaries of a fluctuating 
standard. 834 
I for my part ... 
do not think that our legal process could successfully or 
satisfactorily cope with the task of fairly assessing, or applying to the 
facts of a particular case, such varying standards, depending on such 
complex and elusive factors, including the assessment by the court, not 
merely of a particular person's actual skill or expedence, but also of 
another person's knowledge or assessment of that skill or experience 
at a particular moment in time. 835 
831 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581. 
832 Nettleship v. Weston [197113 All ER 581,585d. 
833 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,586a. 
834 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,592h/j. 
835 Nettleship v. Weston [197113 All ER 581,593h. 
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Thus the learner driver could not use her inexpedence as a defence because the law requires the same standard of care to be demonstrated as with any 
other driver. Her incompetent best was not enough. This is an understandably 
pragmatic approach as the courts do not want to apply a sliding scale of 
standards of care depending on the subjective attributes of the particular defendant. 836 
The implications of this decision can be summarised thus: 
The Court of Appeal is saying, in essence, that as a mafter of public 
policy the law must set a standard for the benefit of all below which 
everyone engaging in risk-creating behaviour may not fall. Thus, a 
junior doctor would be held to that minimum level of competence 
necessary for the safety and proper treatment of a patient regardless of 
his actual level of competence or experience. 837 
In medical negligence in the UK, the leading authority is the previously 
mentioned case of Wilsher v. Essex Area Health AUthorit Y. 838 In this case the 
plaintiff had been born prematurely and been admitted to a specialist neonatal 
intensive care unit. It was alleged the plaintiff suffered blindness from too 
much oxygen being administered due to incorrect placement of a measuring 
catheter by a junior doctor. The catheter had been placed into a vein when it 
should have been placed in the adjacent artery. The incorrect placement was 
not in itself negligent. Negligence was alleged upon failure to spot the error 
when the catheter's position was checked on the x-ray. 
In court the defendants argued that the standard of care expected of the junior 
doctor was not the same as that of an experienced colleague. A junior doctor 
had to learn on the job, otherwise it would be impossible for medicine to 
develop and function and ultimately patients would suffer. Therefore 
unavoidable mistakes would be made. One of the judges accepted this 
argument. Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson QC stated: 
... a 
doctor 
... should only 
be held liable for acts and omissions which a 
careful doctor with his qualifications and experience would have done 
or ornitted. 839 
The majority view, however, dismissed this argument. Glidewell LJ held: 
... the 
law requires the trainee or learner to 
standard as his more experienced colleagues. 
would frequently be urged as a defence to 
negligence-840 
be judged by the same 
If it did not, inexperience 
i action for professional 
836 Stauch M, Wheat K, Tingle J. Sourcebook on Medical Law. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish, 2002, p3l 1. 
837 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law, 3rd ed. Butterworths 2000, p420. 
838 Wilsher v. Essex AHA [1987] QB 730, [1986] 3 All ER 801, CA; revsd [1988] AC 1074, [198811 All 
ER 871, HL. 
839 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1986] 3 All ER 801,834. 
840 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1986] 3 All ER 801,831. 
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while Lord Mustill stated: 
... this notion of a duty tailored to the actor, rather than to the act which he elects to perform has no place in the law of tort. 84' 
He further commented: 
Doctors are not the only people who gain their experience, not only from lectures or from watching others perform, but from tackling live 
clients or customers, and no case was cited to us which suggested that 
any such variable duty of care was imposed on others in a similar 
position. To my mind, it would be a false step to subordinate the 
legitimate expectation of the patient that he will receive from each 
person concerned with his care a degree of skill appropriate to the task 
which he undertakes, to an understandable wish to minimise the 
psychological and financial pressures on hard-pressed young 
doctors. 842 
These statements reaffirm findings in earlier cases that inexperience was no 
excuse. 843 This eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the 
idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question. 844 
Furthermore, in Wilsher the court found that a member of a specialist unit 
would be expected to display greater skill than an equivalent person on a 
general ward. 845 Junior staff may meet the standards required by 
acknowledging their inexperience. Clearly doctors should not undertake 
procedures that are beyond their capaCity846 and if they attempt to do 
something they were not qualified to do, the failure to refer to someone 
properly skilled may well itself be negligent. 847 Thus, if the health carer either 
unwittingly or knowingly attempted something beyond his experience then that 
would constitute a breach of the standard of care. 848 Whether a doctor was 
sufficiently competent and experienced to carry out an operation 
unsupervised would be a question of fact based on the evidence. For 
example, in Burgess v. Newcastle HA it was held that the unsupervised 
defendant was competent to undertake the operation on his own. 849 There 
was evidence of the defendant's great experience and impressive list of 
research projects. 
841 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1986] 3 All ER 801,813. 
842 Wilsher v Essex AHA [198613 All ER 801,813. 
843 Jones v Manchester Corporation [1952] 2 QB 852, [1952] 2 All ER 125, CA. 
844 Glasgow Corpn- v. Muir [1943] AC 448,457 per Lord Macmillan. 
845 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,813. 
846 Mason JK, McCall Smith. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 1994,4th ed, p202 
847 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,833. 
848 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002, at 159 
849 Burgess v Newcasde HA [1992] 3 Med LR 224. 
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From the legal perspective, reasonable conduct, therefore, does not vary according to a defendant's level of experience and once a health carer performs a task the patient can assume he has the competence to perform it with skill and care . 
850 Furthermore, once a doctor holds himself out as being more experienced than he actually is, he must reach that standard. 851 On the 
other hand, the more skilled a person is, the more care that is expected of him. 852 The standard of care will be met, however, if a junior doctor seeks 
advice from more experienced colleagues when appropriate. 
The problem with this is that it may be difficult for a doctor to know when to 
refer to a more senior or experienced colleague. 853 Often the doctor does not 
realise that the task at hand is beyond his capabilities and therefore does not 
seek help. In the Canadian case of Fraser v. Vancouver General Hospital the 
court held that an intern must have an appreciation of his own limitations. 854 
The junior doctors were found negligent for failing to consult a specialist. 
However, this in itself is problematic. 
It is all very well saying that a doctor must appreciate his own 
capabilities, but in most situations the junior doctor is already acting 
under the firm belief that this is in fact what he is already doing. 855 
The problem, therefore, with these decisions is how to reconcile two entirely 
different requirements. On the one hand doctors need to learn on the job and 
obtain the necessary experience. This is unavoidable and in the interests of 
society as it benefits future patients. On the other hand, the patient under the 
doctor's care, who is being practised on, needs to be protected from potential 
harm or, at least, to have the risk of harm minimised. 
It must be appreciated that it is difficult for the law to accommodate both 
approaches. However, rather than trying to find a solution to enable it to do 
so, the law focuses all its attention on the protection of the particular patient 
while making no allowance for the unavoidable requirement for doctors to 
learn. 
Once again, the law appears unable, or perhaps unwilling, to appreciate the 
subtleties of the medical act. Because of this, the standard it uses is 
inappropriate. Strict application of the Bolam principle would lead the courts to 
expect that a doctor should show the degree of skill of the reasonably 
competent doctor, irrespective of his own level of experience. No allowance is 
made for inexperience. 
However, in the previously mentioned Scottish case of McHardy v. Dundee 
General Hospitals'Board of Management, Lord Cameron stated: 
850 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002, at pl 59. 
851 R v. Bateman (1925) 94 LJKB 791 (CCA) 
852 Ashcroft v. Mersey RHA [1983] 2 All ER 245. 
853 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,833. 
854 Fraser v. Vancouver General Hospital (1951) 3 WWR 337 
855 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002, at p 159. 
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I think it is well that the search for further knowledge and experience (my italics) should not be inhibited by undue apprehension of charges 
of negligence for the consequences to a patient of treatment or diagnosis where such may diverge from the normal. 856 
This implies that, unless the law offers some understanding of the need for doctors to gain experience, then the threat of legal action may very well inhibit the search for experience, which would be contrary to the interests of future 
patients. The law of negligence, as currently applied to personal innovation, 
appears to be too harsh because it takes no account of reality. How can it be that a junior doctor will be judged as if he were a consultant, as Nettleship 
implies. 
Reconciling different requirements: 
How therefore can the law take account of the unavoidable fact that doctors 
need to learn while at the same time ensuring patients are protected and have 
recourse to the courts? 
One option is for the law to change and show some understanding of the 
subtleties of the medical act. This is not a homogenous entity but rather can 
be extremely variable. As has been argued, this variability arises because of 
its various components and their presence to a greater or lesser degree. The 
medical act therefore can range from a simple therapeutic intervention to non- 
therapeutic research. Indeed, in the case of doctors acting as an impartial 
medical examiner on behalf of, for example, an insurance company, the 
doctor's duty of care is towards the company and not the patient. Any tests 
are carried out are not done primarily for the purposes of the health care of 
the patient but for the insurance company. This specific issue was not 
examined in this thesis but is merely mentioned here to further highlight the 
extreme variability of the medical act. Adding to this variability is the problem 
of inexperience of the operator. In many instances, and indeed, it is how the 
National Health Service functions, treatment of patients is undertaken by 
junior medical staff striving to gain more experience. 
Change the law: 
Can the law change? It may be appropriate briefly to examine how the 
problem has been considered by other jurisdictions. Given the same facts, it is 
well recognised that different jurisdictions may reach different conclusions. 
For example, let us first review, once again, the English case of Nettleship v. 
Weston. 857 As previously mentioned, it was held that inexperience was no 
excuse and the same standard of care was expected of a learner driver as of 
an experienced one. 
The High Court of Australia, however, refused to follow this decision. 858 
856 McHardy v Dundee General Hospitals' Board of Management. (1960) SLT (Notes) 19 
857 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581. 
858 Cook v Cook [1987] 61 ALJR 25. 
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It would be contrary to common sense and the concept of what is reasonable in the circumstances (considerations which are basic to the 859 common law of negligence)... 
The Court held that, although the standard of care was objective, it could be adjusted to fit the special relationship under which it arises. 
In Donoghue v. Stevenson it was held that the neighbour to whom a duty to take reasonable care is owed is the person to whom injury might foreseeably be caused by the careless doing of the act, the test of reasonable foreseeability depending on the closeness and directness of the effect of the 
act on the person or persons affected by it. 860 
Reasonable care is, thus, not susceptible of abstract definition; it must be 
related to particular circumstances . 
861 The known incompetence and inexperience of the driver controlled the relationship of proximity between the 
parties and took it out of the ordinary relationship, such that the standard of 
the duty of care arising was that of an unqualified and inexperienced driver. 
Such an argument had been accepted in the case of The Insurance 
Commissioner v. Joyce. 862 
It is because that relation may vary that the standard of duty or of care 
is not necessarily the same in every case. 863 
In Cook it was held that 
(It) is not ... to say that ... the relationship between a driver and a 
passenger is, for the purposes of the law of negligence, a completely 
standardised one or that the content of the duty of care where that 
general relationship exists is necessarily immutable. ... 
... special and exceptional facts may so transform the relationship between driver and passenger that it would be unreal to regard the 
relevant relationship as being simply the ordinary one of driver and 
passenger and unreasonable to measure the standard of skill and care 
required of the driver by reference to the skill and care that are 
reasonabl to W be expected of an experienced and competent 
driver ... 
8 
It was the very absence of skill that lay at the heart of the special relationship. 
... the standard of care which arises 
from the relationship of pupil and 
instructor is that which is reasonably to be expected of an unqualified 
859 Cook v Cook [1987161 ALJR 25,28. 
860 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
861 Cook v Cook P 987] 61 ALJR 25,31. 
862 Insur Comm v. Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39. 
863 Insur Comm v. Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39,56 per Dixon J. 
864 Cook v Cook [ 1987161 ALJ R 25,27. 
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and inexperienced driver in the circumstances in which the pupil is placed. The standard of care remains an objective one. It is, however, 
adjusted to fit the special relationship under which it arýises- 865 
Actions resulting from inexperience, rather than carelessness, did not of themselves constitute a breach of duty. However, the court held that, when the driver accelerated just before the accident, this act was deliberate and 
careless and therefore actionable. Thus, the court held that what resulted out 
of inexperience was not actionable but the additional element of carelessness 
was. 
... (there was) an element of carelessness over and above what could be attributed merely to inexperience. 866 
Fundamentally, however, Cook held that: 
As a duty of care is owed to individuals, the circumstances to which 
regard must be had in deciding what is required to discharge the duty 
in a particular case are the circumstances out of which the duty to the 
injured plaintiff arises. 
To follow the Nettleship approach is to deny the relevance of the 
circumstances which gave rise to the relationship out of which the duty 
of care arose ... . It would be artificial to exclude those circumstances from consideration 
in determining what is reasonable care. 867 
Different views have also arisen when considering whether a passenger is 
owed a duty of care when accepting a lift from a drunk driver. 
If he knowingly accepts the voluntary services of a driver affected by 
drink, he cannot complain of improper driving caused by his condition, 
because it involves no breach of d Uty. 868 
This view was accepted in Australia 869 but not in Canada. 870 In the UK, Lord 
Denning, when considering Nettleship, felt that confusion would arise if this 
view was upheld. 
If the driver were to be excused according to the knowleorge of the 
passenger, it would result in endless confusion and injustice. 871 
865 Cook v Cook [ 1987] 61 ALJ R 25,28. 
866 Cook v Cook [1987] 61 AUR 25,30. 
867 Cook v Cook [1987] 61 AUR 25,32. 
868 Insurance Comr v. Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39 at 56,57. 
869 Walker v. Turton-Sainsbury [1952] SASR 159 
870 Carr and General Insurance Corpn Ltd v. Seymour and Maloney [1956] 2 DLR 369 at 375. 
871 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,587a. 
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This was especially so, he felt, if there were a number of passengers in the care. Megaw similarly believed there would be difficulties arising from 'this doctrine of varying standards. 872 
However, these problem of multiple passengers would not arise in medicine because each act would be specific to one patient. There would not therefore be the conflict envisaged by Lord Denning as there is only one patient in each doctor patient relationship. 
Furthermore, as argued in Cook 
... it seems to us that ... fears of practical disadvantages - "resulting unpredictability, uncertainty and, indeed, impossibility of arriving at fair 
and consistent decisions" - resulted from (a) mistaken impression that Dixon J. in Joyce was advocating some wholesale abandonment of the 
ordinary objective duty of care to be expected of a driver. (it) involved 
no abandonment of the objective nature of the standard provided by the reasonable person of the law of negligence. It merely involved the 
recognition that exceptional circumstances could take the relationship 
of proximity between a driver and a passenger into a special category 
in which what could reasonably be expected of the hypothetical 
reasonable person must necessarily be governed by the nature of the 
relationships constituting that category. 873 
This was also agreed by Salmon U in Nettleship. 
The duty of care springs from relationship. The special relationship 
which the passenger has created by accepting a lift in the 
circumstances postulated surely cannot entitle him to expect the driver 
to discharge a duty of care or skill which ex hypothesi the passenger 
knows the driver is incapable of discharging. 874 
Indeed, UK law, at times, does recognise that the circumstances in which a 
doctor treats his patient will be taken into account. Thus a doctor working in 
an emergency will not be expected to achieve the same results as a doctor 
working in ideal conditions. Errors of judgment are more excusable in such an 
emergenCy. 875 Allowance should be made for'battle conditions' . 
876 
The findings in Wilsher are also not entirely clear cut. Sir Nicholas Browne- 
Wilkinson V-C dissented as he could not accept that an individual doctor 
holding a post in a hospital was an objective standard to be determined 
irrespective of his experience or the reason why he was occupying the post in 
question. 
872 Nettleship v. Weston [197113 All ER 581,597. 
873 Cook v Cook [11987] 61 AU R 25,29. 
874 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 2 QB 691,704. 
875 The Metagama (1927) 138 LT 369 at 370. 
876 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,812. 
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In my judgment, so long as English law rests liability on personal fault, a doctor who has properly accepted a post in a hospital in order to gain necessary experience should only be held liable for acts or omissions which a careful doctor with his qualifications and expedence would not have done or omitted. 877 
Also, while Mustill LJ rejected the notion of a duty tailored to the actor, he 
arguably muddied the waters by proposing that one could ascertain the 
standard of care by reference to the 'post' that the doctor held: 
For my part, I prefer ... the proposition ... which relates the duty of care, not to the individual, but to the post which he occupies. I would differentiate 'post' from 'rank' or'status'. In a case such as the present, the standard is not just that of the averagely competent and well- informed junior houseman (or whatever the position of the doctor) but 
of such a person who fills a post in a unit offering a highly specialised 
service. But even so, it must be recognised that different posts make different demands. If it is borne in mind that the structure of hospital 
medicine envisages that the lower ranks will be occupied by those of 
whom it would be wrong to expect too much, the risk of abuse by 
litigious patients can be mitigated, if not entirely eliminated. 878 
It is contended that there does not appear to be any significant difference 
between this proposition and a requirement for the inexperience of a junior 
doctor to be taken into consideration, which, as we have seen, the UK courts 
have refused to do. 
The answer may therefore seem to lie in describing a minimum standard to be 
applicable to each post below which a doctor in the post cannot fall. If a doctor 
acts in a careless way then this would be actionable. This at least goes some 
way to recognising the inevitability of doctors gaining experience 'on the job'. 
Thus in Djemal v. Bexley Health Authority, the standard of care to be applied 
was that of a reasonably competent senior houseman acting as a casualty 879 
officer without reference to the length of experience . 
Even in Nettleship there appears to be a dissenting argument, as per Salmon 
LJ: 
... there might 
be special facts creating a special relationship which 
displaces this standard or even negatives any duty, although the onus 
would certainly be on the driver to establish such facts. 880 
Indeed, he agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of Sir Owen Dixon in 
Insurance Comr v. Joyce. 881 
877 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,833. 
878 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,813. 
879 Djernal v. Bexley Health Authority [1995] Med LR 269,271. 
880 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,589f. 
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Quite apart from being negligent, a passenger who accepts a lift (from a driver known to be drink) 
... clearly cannot expect the ddver to drive other than dangerously. 882 
He argued that in most cases involving a learner-ddver and instructor, the instructor knew that the driver had practically no ddving experience or skill and that he would therefore almost certainly make mistakes which could well cause the instructor injury; accordingly, in Salmon's eyes, 
The relationship is ... such that the beginner does not owe the instructor a duty to drive with the skill and competence of an 
experienced driver. 883 
Could it really be said that in order to give this contract (between learner-driver and instructor) ordinary business efficacy, it is necessary to imply a term that the learner owed the instructor a duty to drive with the degree of skill and competence which both parties know that he 
does not possess? If the law were to imply such a term ... it would ... only make both itself and the contract look absurd. 884 
He believed this would apply even if there were no contract. 
I do not think that the learner is usually liable to his instructor if an 
accident occurs as a result of some mistake which any prudent 
beginner doing his best can be expected to make. I recognise that, on 
this view, cases in which a driving instructor is injured whilst his pupil is 
driving may raise difficult questions of fact and degree. Equally difficult 
questions of fact and degree are, however, being assessed and 
decided in our courts every day. The law lays down principles but not a 
rule of thumb for deciding issues arising out of any special relationship 
between the parties. A rule of thumb, if it existed, might no doubt 
remove difficulties, but could hardly produce justice either in practice or 
in theory. 885 
Salmon accepted that the instructor, Mr Nettleship, deserved compensation 
because he had specifically asked about the insurance coverage in the event 
of an accident and was assured of compensation. Mrs Weston therefore had 
accepted responsibility for any injury which Mr Nettleship might suffer as a 
result of any failure on her part to exercise the ordinary driver's standards of 
reasonable care and skill. In other words, this assurance altered the nature of 
the relationship between the two parties. 
881 1 nsur Comm v. Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39. 
882 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,589h. 
883 Nettleship v. Weston [197113 All ER 581,590e/f. 
884 Nettleship v. Weston [197113 All ER 581,590g/h. 
885 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,591 b/c. 
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Thus, in both Nettleship and Wilsher there were reasonable dissenting 
arguments. Furthermore, one of the fundamental prýinciples established by Donoghue was that no case law rule or prýinciple is ever settled for all tlme. ý8r' 
In summary, it is unavoidable that doctors need to learn on the job. UK 1a,. " appears not to take this into consideration and merely applies standard laws 
of negligence in which the standard of care expected is that of an experienced doctor. Other jurisdictions, however, have accepted that special 
circumstances could adjust the standard of care. Furthermore, in both Nettleship and Wilsher there were persuasive dissenting arguments. Even UK 
law does, on occasion, accept that the circumstances of treatment would be taken into account, as in the emergency situation. It was even argued in Wilsher that allowance should be made for the post held by the doctor when 
considering whether there was a breach of the duty of care. 
Supervision: 
At the same time it is important also to accept that it would not be appropriate, 
whenever a patient suffers harm when treated by an inexperienced doctor, for 
the defence merely to be the inexperience of that doctor. The answer may 
therefore lie in closer supervision by more senior colleagues, as considered in 
chapter 3. 
Professionals generally are responsible only for their own mistakes and not 
for those of other members of the team. 887 However, a more senior doctor 
may be negligent in failing adequately to supervise a more junior doctor 888 
while a consultant would be negligent for delegating to a junior in the 
knowledge that the junior was not capable of performing his duties properly. 889 
Even being supervised, however, does not necessarily absolve the trainee of 
responsibility. In Bouchta v. Swindon HA 890 the junior operating surgeon was 
under the direct supervision of a senior surgeon. The judge was impressed 
with the supervising surgeon, Mr Bond, who: 
I was faced with the particular difficulty of recalling an operation where 
his main role was a supervisory one. Had he been carrying out the 
operation himself rather than supervising as far as he could ... I would 
have had great difficulty in making the findings I do. But there came a 
time when, despite that supervision, and it may be something that Mr 
Bond could not have prevented, Dr Habiba, a normally careful surgeon, 
failed to exercise the high standards of his profession. 891 
The court held that the junior failed to exercise reasonable care when the 
patient's ureter was damaged. Despite being under supervision the junior was 
886 Farrar JH, Dugdale AM. Eds. Introduction to Legal Method, 2nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, p84. 
887 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p178 
888 Wilsher v. Essex AHA [1997] QB 730 at 774. 
889 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.54. 
890 Bouchta v. Swindon HA [1996] 7 Med LR 62. 
891 Bouchta v. Swindon HA [1996] 7 Med LR 62,69. 
163 
still liable. Interestingly, Puxon M, QC, commented that a feature of the case, 
which might have been further explored, was the relationship between the 
supervisory status of the senior surgeon and the responsibility of the junior, 
operating surgeon. 892 
If we accept the argument that gaining experience in unavoidable and 
supervision by more senior colleagues may diminish the risk to patients. how 
do we resolve the problem of the Bristol doctors? Being consultants and thus 
practising without supervision, they could simply state that their results were 
unavoidable as they were merely learning a new technique. Indeed, one of 
the surgeons excused the level of mortality and morbidity in his practice as 
being due to his learning curve 893 , blaming 'beginner's bad luck'for some of the deaths. 
The answer to this might lie in firstly, stating that culpability arose when the 
doctors concerned ignored their own poor results. Secondly, it is well 
recognised that the system of regulation, which included immediate 
colleagues, the employer, the Royal College of Surgeons and the Department 
of Health, also failed. This was discussed earlier in chapter 3. 
Hospital liability? 
Another option may be for patients to sue the hospitals who employ 
inexperienced staff. 
In Nettleship Lord Denning stated: 
We are beginning to apply the test: 'On whom should the risk fallT 
morally the learner-driver is not at fault; but legally she is liable to be 
because she is insured and the risk should fall on her. 894 
In other words, he recognised that morally the learner-driver was not at fault 
but, in order that an injured person was not left to bear the loss on his own, he 
should be compensated out of the driver's insurance fund. As the injured 
person would only be able to recover if the driver was liable in law, then 
legally she, the learner-driver, was liable. 895 
Clearly, this appears to imply that the reason she was held to be liable was 
because she carried insurance and thus the injured party could be 
compensated. 
Denning's other alternative was to hold neither the driver nor instructor to be 
at fault. 
The only alternative is to hold that the accident is the fault of neither, so 
that the injured person gets no compensation from anyone. To my 
892 Bouchta v. Swindon HA [1996] 7 Med LR 62,70. 
893 Dyer C. Surgeon blamed beginner's bad luck for cardiac deaths. BMJ 1998; 316: 1114 
894 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,586d/e. 
895 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,586c/d. 
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mind, that is not an acceptable solution, at any rate in these days of compulsory insurance. 896 
Yet again, it appears that the case was argued in such a way that the end 
result would leave the injured party in a position to receive compensation. If for example, there was a central fund set up by Government to compensate 
any road accident victim, then the case may have never needed to come before the courts but even if it did, it may very well have been reasoned differently. 
Therefore, an avenue to explore if wishing to give some allowance for 
inexperience while still allowing patients recourse to the law if harmed, is to 
find another way of compensating victims. There was no other way in 
Nettleship to do so but there are other possibilities in medicine. 
For example, the patient may sue the hospital and obtain compensation that 
way. This is because employers are liable for any negligent acts committed by 
their employees under the doctrine of vicarious liabi I ity. 897 However, this does 
not absolve the employee of liability. There may also be a direct liability of 
provider units for failures in their services. Thus a hospital may owe a duty of 
care towards its patients. In Wilsher Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: 
... a 
health authority which so conducts its hospital that it fails to provide 
doctors of sufficient skill and experience to give the treatment on offer 
... may 
be directly liable in negligence to the patient ... 
I can see no 
reason why, in principle, the health authority should not be [directly] 
liable if its organisation is at fa U It. 898 
In the same case, Glidewell U stated: 
There seems to be no reason in principle why, in a suitable case ... a 
hospital management committee should not be held directly liable ... 
for failing to provide sufficient qualified and competent staff. 899 
In Jones v. Manchester Corporation" a junior doctor had been left with little 
supervision, in accordance with common practice. This was no defence. Lord 
Denning stated: 
It would be in the highest degree unjust that the hospital board, by 
getting inexperienced doctors to perform their duties for them, without 
adequate supervision, should be able to throw all the responsibility on 
to those doctors as if they were fully experienced practitioners. 
901 
896 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,589b. 
897 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p178 
898 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. (1986] 3 All ER 801 at 833, as per Browne Wilkinson. 
899 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801 at 831, per Glidewell LJ. 
900 Jones v Manchester Corporation [1952] 2 QB 852, [1952] 2 All ER 125, 
CA. 
901 Jones v Manchester Corporation (1952] 2 QB 852 at 871, [1952] 2 All ER 125 at 
133, CA. 
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In this case the Court of Appeal found that the cause of an anaesthetic 
accident was primarily the inadequacy of the support and supervision 
provided for a junior doctor. Thus the hospital was held to be responsible for 
80 per cent of the damages payable, and the doctor for only 20 per cent. 
Similarly in Bull v. Devon AHA 902 the Court of Appeal examined a hospital's 
system for providing obstetric support for women in labour and found their 
system of cover had produced a real risk of danger to their patients. The 
Court accepted that the Health Authority owed the plaintiffs a duty of care 
directly. The health authority had been negligent in implementing a system 
that was 'unreliable and essentially unsatisfactory'. 903 While it was accepted 
that the overall staffing levels were in line with current professional practice, 
the administrative systems were judged against judicial conceptions of what 
was acceptable. 904 
Thus, a solution may lie in a hospital accepting direct legal responsibility on 
behalf of its inexperienced doctors. In such a case, the courts, knowing that 
the patient has a source of reimbursement for the injury caused, may either 
hold the inexperience of the doctor as only partially responsible, as in Jones v. 
Manchester Corporation 905 , or hold that no negligence was proven because the doctor's unavoidable inexperience could be used as a defence. Legal 
liability would then fall entirely on the employing hospital. 
Another option is to consider aspects of information disclosure and patient 
consent. Thus, the patient could accept a lower standard of care if told that 
that care is to be provided by a more junior doctor. For example, in Nettleship 
it was held that the special factor in the case was that the plaintiff was not a 
mere passenger in the car but the instructor. Thus 
He may, of course, be guilty of contributory negligence ... but, apart 
(from this), he is not excluded (from claiming damages) unless it be 
that he had voluntarily agreed to incur the risk. 906 
Even in Cook it was stated that 
... a basic 
ingredient of the relationship between the particular driver 
and the particular passenger is their mutual knowledge that the driver 
is unqualified and lacks ... skill. 
907 
In medicine the patient would not know the doctor treating her was less 
experienced unless this was specifically disclosed. This point of patients being 
informed that they were being treated by inexperienced doctors and thereby 
accepting a greater risk will be returned to in the next chapter. 
902 Bull and Another v. Devon AHA [1993] 4 Med LR 117 (CA). 
903 Bull and Another v. Devon AHA[1993] 4 Med LR 117,138 (CA). 
904 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p183. 
905 Jones v Manchester Corporabon [1952] 2 QB 852, [1952] 2 All ER 125, 
CA. 
906 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,587f/g. 
907 Cook v Cook [ 1987] 61 ALJ R 25,26. 
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CONCLUSION: 
The problem is thus that the law uses principles established in the context of a normal therapeutic doctor patient relationship when determining negligence in 
cases of innovation. In experimental practice, mainly because medicine is 
seen as needing to progress and thus benefiting society, the law treats 
experimentation as if it were normal therapy and makes no distinction. The law is thus too benevolent towards innovators. As the Lord President Clyde 
stated: 
... a 
deviation (from ordinary professional practice) is not necessarily 
evidence of negligence. Indeed it would be disastrous if this were so, 
for all inducement to progress in medical science would then be 
destroyed. 908 
Similar sentiments were uttered by Lord Diplock in Sidaway as otherwise it 
would encourage 'defensive medicine'with a vengeance. 909 
Thus the courts currently accept the use of experimental treatment merely on 
the grounds that a responsible body of medical opinion supported its use. As 
previously mentioned 
Bolam provides some protection for the innovative or minority opinion. 
If this protection is removed, then the opinion which the cautious 
practitioner will wish to follow will be that which involves least risk. This 
may have an inhibiting effect on medical progress: after all, many 
advances in medicine have been made by those who have pursued an 
unconventional line of therapy. Such doctors may quite easily be 
regarded as negligent by a judge given to favouring conventional 
medical opinion. 910 
Indeed, not even Bolam may be needed according to Butler Sloss in her 
judgement in Simms. At trial the judge stated: 
The 'Bolarn test' ought not to be allowed to inhibit medical progress. 
And it is clear that if one waited for the 'Bolam test' to be complied with 
to its fullest extent, no innovative work such as the use of penicillin or 
performing heart transplant surgery would ever be aftempted. 911 
However, it is argued that the law should change to require the experimenters 
to justify their actions (or potential actions as occurred in Simms). Annas has 
alleged that many early transplantation procedures were in reality purely non- 
therapeutic and intended only for the benefit of society. 
912 It may be that the 
908 Hunter v. Hanley 1955, SC200 at 206 
909 Siclaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1984] 1 All ER 1018, [1985] 
AC 871, [1985) 1 All 
ER 643, HL. 
910 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.30. 
911 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All ER 669,680-1. 
912 Annas G. Death and the Magic Machine. Western New England Law Review 1987; 9: 89 at 98. 
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innovators can justify the use of such experimental treatment on these 
grounds but a further question then needs to be asked. Was this information 
disclosed to the patients? This point will be returned to in the next chapter. 
On the other hand, with respect to personal innovation and leaming new 
techniques, the law of negligence is too harsh, taking no account of the need 
for doctors to learn and develop their skills, in the interests of future patients. 
Some arguments have been proposed to counteract this. 
In summary, two important issues have been raised. Firstly, the context in 
which the innovative treatment, whether of the experimental or personal 
innovation variety, was administered needs to be taken into consideration by 
the courts. Standard laws of negligence, based on principles created in the 
normal doctor-patient relationship, do not take this into account. Secondly, the 
question of what information is disclosed to the patient regarding this 
innovation also needs to be considered. Thus, the doctor could inform the 
patient, either that the treatment proposed was experimental, or that he or she 
was inexperienced in the particular technique proposed. This issue will be 
analysed next. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONSE_NT 
All medical and research codes of ethics hold that physicians and research investigators must obtain the informed consent of patients and subjects before 
undertaking any procedure. A feature of our present society is the emphasis 
placed on the value and dignity of the individual. Respect for patients and their rights lies at the heart of the issue of consent. The introduction of the European Convention on Human Rights into United Kingdom law913 is likely to 
touch virtually every aspect of the law. Consent is a human ýghts issue, in 
that respect for bodily integrity and privacy are values that are central to any 
theory of consent and are central values in the Convention. 914 Each person 
who is competent should decide what happens to his or her bod Y. 915 
Although it may appear self-evident that the obligations or duties of physicians 
and the rights or claims of patients are interdependent, many issues have 
been little considered before the present century. For example, although in 
the Hippocratic corpus (especially in the Oath) one finds descriptions of both 
physician and patient 'rights', there is little which concerns the concept of 
consent, or even truth telling. Here the main concerns for physicians relate 
firstly to the profession, not the patient, in requiring loyalty and respect for 
their teachers (and their offspring). There are also duties to teach, though only 
to a chosen few; a duty to sick patients in terms of benefit is implied and, at 
most, an effort to avoid treatment which might be deleterious is required. 
Indeed, it is expected that 'the patient must co-operate with the physician in 
combating the disease'. 916 This paternalistic emphasis persisted well into the 
nineteenth century and in many areas persists today. 
Even in modern times there are still disagreements regarding when consent 
should be obtained. For example, a recent debate in the British Medical 
Journal on whether consent was needed to undertake research on stored 
body samples drew different and diametrically opposite responses. One 
reviewer claimed that self determination was not an overriding principle in the 
case of material that would otherwise be thrown away917 while, on the 
contrary, Savulescu believed consent should be obtained because it was 
important to respect autono MY. 918 
It is therefore important to examine the question of what consent is and the 
ethical reasons why it is an essential requirement prior to commencing 
treatment, innovative therapy or undertaking research. 
913 Human Rights Act 1998. London: Stationery Office, 1998. 
914 McCall Smith RA. Obtaining consent for examination and treatment. BMJ 2001; 322: 810-1. 
915 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMJ Publishing Group. 2004,71. 
916 Beck P. Informed consent. In 'Why should we Gare? ' Evans D (ed). London: MacMillan 
Press, 1990: 107. 
917 Van Diest PJ. No consent should be needed for using leftover body material for scientific purposes. 
BMJ 
2002; 325: 648-9. 
918 Savulescu J. No consent should be needed for using leftover body material for scientific purposes: against. 
BMJ 
2002; 325: 649-51. 
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INFORMED CONSENT and AUTONOMY: 
Commentators such as Katz9'9 have -reduced the concept of informed consent to shared decision making between doctor and patient, so that informed 
consent and mutual decision making are identical ideas. Similarly, the British 
Medical Association states that the relationship between doctor and patient is based on the concept of partnership and collaborative effort. It claims that, 
ideally, decisions are made through frank discussion, in which the doctors 
clinical expertise and the patient's individual needs and preferences are 
shared, to select the best treatment option. The patient's consent to be 
examined and to receive treatment is the trigger that allows the interchange to 
take place. The basic premise is that treatment is undertaken as a result of 
patients being actively involved in deciding what is to be done to them. 920 
However, informed consent is not restricted to clinical medicine and is used 
no less frequently in research contexts, where a model of shared decision- 
making may be inappropriate. Even in the clinical setting the information 
exchange through which patients elect to undergo medical interventions 
should be distinguished from their act of permitting or approving the 
intervention. 921 
Physicians and other health-care professionals and researchers do not have a 
right to do anything to patients or subjects without their consent because the 
right to consent or refuse is grounded in the ethical principle of respect for 
autonomy. It is, however, doubtful whether autonomy can be viewed as a 
single concept and is so imprecise in its ordinary meaning that further 
examination is required before it can be used in moral theory. 922 
Some writers maintain that autonomy is a matter of having the capacity 
to reflectively control and identify with one's basic ... 
desires or 
preferences through higher-level ... 
desires or preferences. ... 
[S]erious problems confront this theory. Acceptance or repudiation of a 
desire can be motivated by an overriding desire that is simply stronger, 
not more rational or autonomous. [There must be] a way for ordinary 
persons to qualify as deserving respect for their autonomy, even when 
they have not reflected on their preferences at a higher level. Few 
choosers, and also few choices, would be autonomous if held to the 
standards of higher-order reflection in this theory, which in effect 
presents an aspirational ideal of autonomy. No theory of autonomy is 
acceptable if it presents an ideal beyond the reach of normal 
choosers. 923 
919 Katz J. The silent world of doctor and patient. New York: Free Press, 1984: 86-7. 
920 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMJ Publishing Group. 2004,71. 
921 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001: 78. 
922 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001: 57- 
8. 
923 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001: 58- 
9. 
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An ideal theory of this sort therefore reaches beyond the criteria needed for a theory of autonomous actions. 
An agent's autonomous actions can be analysed in terms of acting intentionally, with understanding, and without controlling influences that determine the action taken. The first condition, that of intention, requires planning on the agent's part and is not a matter of degree: an act is either intentional, therefore potentially autonomous, or non-intentional, and therefore 
not autonomous. In contrast, the other two conditions, of understanding and absence of controlling influences, can both be satisfied to a greater or lesser 
extent. Actions can therefore be autonomous by degrees, depending on to 
what degree the latter two conditions are satisfied. Thus, the conditions of 
understanding and non-control are analysed in terms of a broad continuum, from being fully present to wholly absent. 924 
For an action to be autonomous ... it needs only a substantial degree of understanding and freedom from constraint, not a full understanding 
or a complete absence of influence. To restrict adequate decision- 
making by patients and research subjects to the ideal of fully or 
completely autonomous decision-making strips their acts of any 
meaningful place in the practical world, where people's actions are 
rarely, if ever, fully autonomous. 925 
The problem then lies in defining substantial because the line between what is 
substantial and what is not substantial seems arbitrary. However, thresholds 
marking substantially autonomous decisions can be reasoned in light of 
specific goals and objectives. 
Patients and research subjects can achieve substantial autonomy in 
their decisions, ust as substantially autonomous choice occurs in other 
areas of life ... 
J6 
Therefore, the criteria of substantiality and substantial autonomy must be 
related to a particular context and situation, rather than being viewed through 
a general theory of what is a substantial amount. The more serious the harm 
done to the person, as when bodily privacy is invaded, the greater the degree 
of information and absence of controlling influences required. 
The viability of autonomy in the medical context can be questioned because 
of the dependent condition of the patient and the authoritative position of the 
medical professional. It is sometimes doubtful whether authority and 
autonomy are compatible. This doubt does not arise because the two 
concepts are intrinsically incompatible but because in the context under 927 
consideration authority has not been properly delegated or accepted. In 
turn, it is possible for individuals to exercise their autonomy by choosing to 
924 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 59. 
925 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 59. 
926 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 60. 
927 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 60. 
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submit to the authoritative demands of an institution or tradition. 928 When a 
patient accepts a doctor's advice, it does not mean a rejection of autonomy. Autonomy is a concept that is properly linked to reflective individual choice but 
should not be thought to require a rejection of authority, tradition, or social 
moral ity. 929The autonomous person thus acts in accordance with a freely self- 
chosen and informed plan. A person of diminished autonomy, by contrast, Is 
to some extent either controlled by others or incapable of deliberating or 
acting on the basis of his or her desires or plans. "O Personal autonomy, at the 
very least, allows self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by 
others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent 931 meaningful choice . 
However, being autonomous and choosing autonomously is not the same as 
being respected as an autonomous agent. To respect an autonomous agent 
means recognising that person's capabilities and perspective, including his or 
her right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on 
personal values and beliefs. Furthermore, it involves treating agents so as to 
enable them to act autonomously. That is, true respect includes acting to 
respect, not the mere adoption of a certain attitude. Kant has argued that 
respect for autonomy flows from the recognition that all persons have 
unconditional worth, each having the capacity to determine his or her own 
destiny. 932 To violate a person's autonomy is to treat that person merely as a 
means, to treat that person in accordance with one's own goals and without 
regard to that person's goals. To reject that person's goals and considered 
judgements or to restrict his or her freedom to act on those goals and 
judgements is to fail to respect their autonomy. 933 
The principle can be stated in its negative form as follows: autonomous 
actions are not to be subjected to controlling constraints by others. This 
principle provides the justification for the right to make autonomous decisions, 
which in turn takes the form of specific auto nomy-related rights, such as 
liberty and privacy. However, the principle should only be treated as a broad 
abstract principle because like all moral principles, it has only prima facie 
standing and can sometimes be overridden by competing moral 
considerations. 
If our choices endanger the public health, potentially harm others, or 
require a scarce resource for which no funds are available, others can 
justifiably restrict our exercises of autonomy-934 
928 Beauchamp TIL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001: 60. 
929 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF- Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001: 60- 
1. 
930 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001: 58. 
931 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: oxford University 
Press, 2001: 58 
932 Kant 1. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans Paton HJ. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1964. 
933 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001.64. 
934 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001: 65. 
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If restriction is justified, the justification must rest on some competing moral principle such as beneficence or justice. The principle of respect for 
autonomy, however, has clear positive implications when applied to certain relationships. For example, in medicine, either in research, innovative therapy 
or routine health care, it engenders a positive or affirmative obligation of 
respectful treatment in disclosing information and fostering autonomous 935 decision making . 
Paternalism, on the other hand, is interference with a person's liberty of action 
or freedom of information, where the alleged justification for that interference 
is that it is good for the person whose liberty has been restricted. 936 This 
justification is based on the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. 
However, autonomy deserves protection even if a person's choice would not 
maximise individual or social welfare. 937 A criticism of evidence based 
medicine was that it robbed patients of their personal choices in reaching a 
decision about their care . 
938 939Evidence does not make decisions, people 
do. 940 Patients are entitled to make irrational choices. Indeed, doctors should 
not assume that decisions are made on a rational basis. 941 Patients may 
behave in ways that are at odds with prevailing medical opinion, an 
increasingly recognised consequence of patient centred care. 942 
The elements of consent: 
From the patient's perspective, for consent to be a valid authorisation for the 
professional to proceed, it must be based on understanding and must be 
voluntary. Informed consent thus can be further defined by specifying the 
elements that make up the concept, in particular the elements of the 
information component and the consent component. 
Because of the unequal distribution of knowledge between professionals on 
the one hand and patients or subjects on the other, the principle of respect for 
autonomy entails that professionals have a prima facie obligation to disclose 
information, to ensure understanding and voluntariness, and to foster 
adequate decision making. Thus, the information component can be said to 
consist of adequate disclosure of information followed by the understanding 
and comprehension of what is disclosed. The consent component, in turn, 
refers to a voluntary decision making process which is followed by 
authorisation. 
935 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 64. 
936 Buchanan A. Medical Paternalism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1978; 7(4): 370-390 at 371-2. 
937 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 57- 
112. 
938 DaCruz D. You have a choice, dear patient. BMJ 2002; 324: 674. 
939 Kerridge 1, Lowe M, Henry D. Ethics and evidence based medicine. BMJ 1998; 316: 1151-3. 
940 Haynes RB, Devereaux PJ. Physicians'and patients' choices in evidence based practice. BMJ 
2002; 324: 1350. 
941 Dowding K, Hindmoor A. The usual suspects: rational choice, socialism and political theory. New 
Political 
Economy 1997; 2: 451-63. 
942 Smith R. The discomfort Of patient power. BMJ 2002; 324: 497-8. 
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In other words, the function of the whole process is to facilitate decision making, offering plausible options to allow a choice to be made. This is conceptually different from consent Per se. 
In a previous edition, Beauchamp and Childress analysed informed consent in terms of the following elementS943: 
1: Threshold Element 
a: Competence 
2: Information Elements 
b: Disclosure of Information 
c: Understanding of Information 
3: Consent Elements 
d: Voluntariness 
e: Authorisation 
This five element definition is vastly superior to the one element definition in 
terms of disclosure that medical convention and malpractice law have 944 
proposed .A more recent edition of their textbook has added a further two 
elements to the above five, 945 firstly that of recommendation (of the planned 
action) by the doctor and secondly, the decision in favour of, or refusal of, the 
recommended plan. 
If a recommendation [to enter a research project] is made, it may be 
quite different from recommendations in clinical medicine. 946 
However, in essence, neither of these two elements makes a substantial 
difference to the following discussion and will therefore be ignored. 
Competence: 
Competence is a precondition of being able to authorise autonomously. It is 
closely tied to autonomy. A person is generally competent to authorise or 
refuse to authorise an intervention if that person is autonomous. 947 Whereas 
in a normal discussion of consent it is of primary importance, from the point of 
view of this thesis it will be assumed that competence has been established 
when discussing the regulation of innovation. 
Disclosure: 
The requirement to inform the patient regarding the material risks of a 
procedure or other intervention and of obtaining consent from that patient 
derive from the principle of autonomy. 948 Information disclosure is the only 
943 Beauchamp TIL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994: 78- 
9. 
944 Beauchamp TIL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 79. 
945 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 80. 
946 Beauchamp TIL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 80. 
947 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 70- 
77. 
948 Cotler M, Katz R. Consent. In Ethical Issues in Anaesthesia, ed Scott WE, Vickers MD, Draper H. Butterworth- 
Heinemann, Oxford, 1994, p34 
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mechanism available to redress the imbalance of Power between the patient and the doctor. 949The patient is not confined to accept or refuse treatment that is offered; he or she should be allowed to choose the type and scope of treatment and to base this choice on adequate information as to success 
rates, risks, and the like. 950 Patients cannot express informed preferences 
unless they are given sufficient and appropriate information. Unfortunately, 
many patients report considerable difficulties in obtaining relevant 
information. 951 
There are many reasons for these problems, including health professionals 
underestimating the patients' desire and ability to cope with information, 
limited consultation times and lack of information regarding treatment options 
and their effects by the health professionals themselves. 952 Mishler has 
argued that doctors and patients talk to each other with different voices. 953 
It is increasingly recognised that decisions may vary from circumstance to 
circumstance, and from patient to patient in the same circumstances. 9 A 
Studies have shown that doctors often fail to understand patients' 
preferenceS955 but improving the quality of this communication is related to 
positive health outcomes. Being well informed about treatment options, 
especially regarding potential benefits and risks, leads to patients being more 
likely to adhere to treatment and result in a better outcome. 957 They are also 
less likely to accept risky procedures. 958 A recent editorial on laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy ended by stating: 
Surgeons are responsible for informing their patients as completely as 
possible about the risks and benefits of a procedure, and that must 
include the new scientific data now available. The patient may then 
make the choice between a larger scar or a slightly increased risk of 
bile duct surgery. 959 
949 McLean SAM. A patient's right to know. Dartmouth: Medico-Legal Series, 1989. 
950 Mason JK Consent to Treatment and Research in the ICU. in Ethics and the Law in intensive care. Pace N, 
McLean SAM (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996,29-46 at p38- 
951 Audit Commission. What seems to be the matter: communication between hospitals and patients. 
London: HMSO, 1993. 
952 Coulter A, Entwistle V, Gilbert D. Sharing decisions with patents: is the information good enough? BMJ 
1999; 318: 318-22. 
953 Mishler EG. The discourse of medicine, dialects of medical interviews. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing 
Corporation, 1984. 
954 Haynes RB, Devereaux PJ. Physicians'and patients' choices in evidence based practice. BMJ 2002: 324: 1350. 
955 Cocburn J, Pit S. Prescribing behaviour in clinical practice: patients' expectations and doctors' perceptions of 
patients' expectations. BMJ 1997; 315: 520-3. 
956 Di Blasi Z, Harkness E, Ernst E, Georgiou A, Kleijnen J. Influence of context effects on heath outcomes: a 
systematic review. Lancet 2001; 357: 757-62. 
957 Mullen PD. Compliance becomes concordance. BMJ 1997; 314: 691. 
958 Volk RJ, Cass AR, Spann SJ. A randomized controlled trial of shared decision making 
for prostate cancer 
screening. Arch Fam Med 1999; 8: 333-40. 
959 Terpstra OT. Laparoscopic cholecystectomy: the other side of the coin. Br Med J 1996: 
312: 1375-6 at 1376. 
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It is necessary to examine further what type of information is needed in order to obtain valid consent. It is clearly impossible for a health professional to 
convey to the patient a summary of all available information. It is not the doctor's role just to provide a list of alternatives from which patients select 
options, according to their need and desires. In general, patients look for the 
doctor's advice about which procedure is likely to be the most effective or 
appropriate for them from a clinical perspective. Failing to give this advice can be as unhelpful as failing to offer any information about possible alternatives 
to the proposed treatment. 960 It is therefore important that the doctor attempts 
to recognise what the patient wants. 
In such a case, the doctor should inform the patient about any risks inherent 
in the treatment, which might be particularly important to that patient, as well 
as explaining the risks and benefits of alternatives and of non-treatment . 
96 ' 
Without an adequate transfer of information from doctor to patient there will be 
insufficient information for decision making. Frequently, the professional's own 
perspective, opinions, and recommendations may be more important than 
disclosure of information and may be essential for the patient's or subject's 
deliberation. 962 
However, if this leads to the doctor making calculations about the materiality 
of risk, it is unsatisfactory for the vindication of patient autonomy. 963 
... the doctor may 
decide that his or her knowledge of the patient is 
sufficient for a decision to be made that only certain risks matter. This 
is open to objection on the very obvious ground that the doctor can 
never know the full facts of the patient's life, nor what values the patient 
places on certain aspects of that life. This kind of assessment, 
therefore, amounts to little more than guesswork, and is unacceptable 
to those who have knowledgeable decision making as a goal. 964 
Evidence suggests that in medical practice a risk of death of one per million is 
neglected by doctors and the public. Risks of the order of 10 per million, 
however, whether of death or of severe non-fatal consequences, are not in 
general ignored by non-medical people, although they may be neglected by 
doctors. It appears that the borderline of negligibility for doctors probably lies 
at about 50 per million, although larger risks are effectivelý ignored when the 
patient's condition already puts him at high risk of death. 
95 Although there are 
objective measures for risk, subjective perception is also important. 
Individuals evaluate risk not merely on statistical numbers but also on 
subjective qualitative aspects. Furthermore, psychologists have 
found that, in 
general, people are more afraid of risks of very low probability and great 
960 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMJ Publishing 
Group. 2004,77. 
961 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMJ Publishing 
Group. 2004,77-8. 
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1989 at 10. 
965 Nicholson RH. Medical research with Children: Ethics, Law, and Practice. 
Oxford University Press, 1986, p89. 
177 
severity than they are of risks that are more likely but less severe. %6 There is 
also a natural tendency to overestimate rare risks and underestimate common ones. 967 However, the most important aspect of risk assessment, which is 
essential in the health care setting, is that it is performed by the person 
exposed to it. 
968 
Because of the problems inherent in risk assessment, it is difficult to exclude 
value judgements entirely. Although it is the perception of risk by the patient that is of overriding importance, these perceptions will, in practice, depend on the information given by the doctor. There is therefore a considerable onus on the doctor to be able to distinguish what is known objectively about a risk from 
his own perception of it. 
Risk communication is thus an open two-way exchange of information and 
opinion about risk, leading to better understanding and better decisions about 
clinical management. 969 Partnership models should replace models of 
traditional soft paternalism with strong autonomy models of informed request 
and contract and participatory forms of risk and benefit sharing. 970 
The more actively patients are involved in risk recognition and allowed and 
encouraged to establish their own risk-reward balances, the better. It is thus 
not acceptable for information, including risk, merely to be passed from doctor 
to patient and in return the patient signals his or her acceptance of that risk. 
There must be a two way exchange of information and opinion which is 
important if decisions about treatment are to reflect the attitudes to risk of the 
people who will live with the outcomes. 971 
If information disclosure is undertaken to protect patient autonomy, then all 
relevant information needs to be disclosed. 972 Thus, risks that may be 
relevant, but rarely if ever discussed, are those inherent to the doctor. Dollery 
believes that concerns such as unwise enthusiasts, poorly trained staff and 
inadequate facilities may also need to be considered 973 and although he listed 
these when discussing the risks involved in research, they also are relevant to 
treatment and the undertaking of innovative procedures. To these must be 
added the problem of learning curves. Thus, from the patient's perspective, 
there is not only a requirement to have risks disclosed that are relevant to 
966 Broadbent DE. Psychology of risk. In: Cooper MG ed. Risk. Man-made Hazards to Man. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985. 
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themselves but also to be told of risks and other information that are particular to the doctor. This point will be returned to later. 
Understanding: 
Physicians rarely assess the patient's understanding of the information disclosed. 974 Increasingly, however, the ethical focus has changed from the physician's or researcher's obligation to disclose information to the quality of a patient's or subject's understanding and consent. 975 
It has become progressively clear that the focus of statutory law, case law and regulatory guidelines has been on disclosure and that this focus is misguided. Problems about the quality and adequacy of consent probably cannot be resolved unless conventional disclosure 
requirements are abandoned and a shift occurs towards uality of understanding in the subject, patient and representative. 916 
Finding a way to evaluate and ensure patient understanding is difficult, 
although the duty to disclose, based on the patient's right to be informed, can be analysed independently of patient understanding. 97 The doctor fulfils his 
or her obligation by making the disclosure in a reasonable way that will allow the average person to understand what is being discussed. Furthermore, what 
needs to be understood are human rather than technical matters. Ordinarily, 
the doctor has only limited insight into the distinct values, fears, hopes, and informational needs of the patient. Asking questions, eliciting the concerns 
and interests of the patient, and establishing a climate that encourages the 
patient to ask questions it thus more important to the person's understanding 
than a vast amount of disclosed information. The key to effective 
communication, understanding and decision making is therefore participation 
by patients or subjects in an exchange of information. 
However, it is not essential that patients have a precise understanding of 
prognosis or what a particular choice will entail. In cancer care it is quite 
possible both to maintain patient hope and to provide sufficient prognostic 
information so that patients would be able to make treatment decisions 
consistent with their underlying values. 978 It is possible that the same 
personality traits or coping strategies that lead certain individuals to cling to 
overly optimistic views of their prognoses may also lead those patients to opt 
for life-extending therapieS979against the recommendations of their doctors. 
The most important aspect of this is that it is the patient's choice. 
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The importance of patient choice is illustrated by two recent developments. Firstly, a large multicentre trial in hormone replacement therapy in 
postmenopausal women was stopped early because women taking 
continuous combined oestrogen-progestogen had an increased ýsk of developing breast cancer. 980 The results projected that for every 10000 
women taking the treatment there will be in each year (compared with women on no treatment) eight extra cases of invasive breast cancer, seven heart 
attacks, eight strokes and eight pulmonary embolisms. There will also be six fewer bowel cancers and five fewer hip fractures. Overall mortality is not affected. An editorial on the problem stated: 
Researchers can try to unravel the consequences of different treatment 
regimens. Doctors can offer advice. But ultimately only the woman herself can decide. 981 
On a similar note the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United 
States has recently decided to reinstate the drug alosetron, used for irritable 
bowel syndrome, onto the market after it was voluntarily withdrawn by its 
sponsor, GlaxoSmithKline. 982 The reasons given included lobbying from both 
patient action groups and the pharmaceutical company itself. However, 
a third reason may be a shift in the FDA - from being traditional and 
paternalistic to holding a more republican view of health. The agency 
would now rather provide the best information for patients and doctors 
to make their own decisions than to make the decisions in their 
name. 
983 
Despite significant risks associated with the drug, patients testified to an FDA 
advisory committee that they were prepared to take those risks. 984 However, if 
a misconception occurs regarding a particular risk, which is material to 
decision making, it implies that adequate understanding was not achieved and 
thus an autonomous authorisation was not given. There are similar problems 
with the amount of information that can meaningfully be processed. 
Information overload may be as likely to lead to uninformed decisions as 
failure to disclose. For such reasons, in the research setting, research ethics 
committees request research information sheets to be as short as possible 
and written in layman's terms. 
The difficulty is that the standard of full disclosure and full understanding 
cannot possibly be attained. Furthermore the doctor does not and cannot 
have a duty to make sure that those to whom he conveys it understand all the 
information disclosed. His duty is to make a reasonable effort to be 
980 Writing group for the Women's Health Initiative Investigators. Risks and benefits of estrogen plus progestin in 
healthy postmenopausal women. JAMA 2002; 288: 321-33. 
981 Anon. Big trials and human stories. BMJ 2002; 325: 111. 
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325: 561. 
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understood. 985 As previously discussed, just because actions are never fully informed, voluntary or autonomous, it does not follow that these actions are never adequately informed, free, or autonomous. 986 It is clear that 
understanding does not need to be full or complete, because a substantial 
grasp of central facts and other descriptions will often be sufficient. 987 
Voluntariness: 
Voluntary decision making means that the patient is independent of 
manipulative and coercive influences exerted by others in order to control that 
person. However, there are degrees of influence and three primary categones have been described: coercion, manipulation, and persuasion. 9813 
Coercion occurs when one person intentionally uses a credible and severe 
threat of harm or force to control another. This entirely compromises 
autonomy. At the other end of the spectrum lie weak forms of influence such 
as rational persuasion. Here a person is convinced to agree to something by 
the merit of reasons advanced by another person. Such situations probably 
arise frequently in the doctor-patient relationship. Manipulation, in turn, means 
getting people to do what the manipulator wants by means other than 
coercion or persuasion. For the purposes of decision-making in health care, 
the most important form of manipulation is informational manipulation. This is 
the deliberate act of managing information to successfully influence a person, 
thus altering the person's understanding of a situation and thereby motivating 
the person to do what the agent of influence intends. Some forms of 
informational manipulation are incompatible with informed consent. For 
example, deception that involves lying, withholding information, true 
assertions that omit a vital qualification, and misleading exaggerations in 
order to lead patients to believe what is false, are all inconsistent with 
autonomous choice . 
989There is also a possibility that clinicians will utilise the 
therapeutic privilege to withhold information, not because of the principle of 
non-maleficence, but to manipulate patients into agreeing to their 
recommendations. 
It is, however, easy to inflate the threat of control by influence beyond its 
proper significance. Virtually all decisions in life are made in the context of 
competing influences, such as wants, needs, familial interests, legal 
obligations and persuasive arguments. Patients may be influenced by their 
family and friends, memories, the media, and hospital staff, who all make up a 
complex jigsaw of knowledge. 990 Although significant, these influences may 
not be controlling to any substantial degree. 
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From the perspective of decision-making by patients and subjects. we need only establish general criteria for the point at which autonomous choice is imperilled, while recognizing that in many cases no sharp boundary separates controlling and noncontrolling influences. 991 
Beauchamp and Childress, however, believe that, from a clinician's point of view, while it may be claimed that there is an obligation to abstain from 
controlling influences, there can be occasions when doctors will be blameworthy if they don't attempt to persuade resistant patients to pursue treatments that are medically essential. Thus, reasoned argument may be 
vital to ensuring understanding and should never be considered an unjustified form of influence. 992 
In summary, respect for patient autonomy is generally regarded as one of the 
central ethical principles in medical practice. 993 Many would claim a moral 
imperative of respecting human autonomy in almost all circumstances and to 
fail to respect the autonomy of competent people is to inflict harm on them 
that is just as morally unacceptable as direct physical or mental harm. 994 
Doctors who fail to provide full and balanced information about risks and the 
uncertainties of treatment can create unrealistic expectations. 995 Patients are 
often given a biased and highly optimistic picture of the benefits of medical 
care. 996 This 'misplaced paternalism', trying to protect patients from bad news, 
merely fuels false hope. 997 
On the contrary, patient autonomy is only protected when there is a possibility 
of meaningful choice being made by the patient. 998 This choice is made on the 
basis of adequate information regarding risks and benefits, including the 
operator specific risks, and alternatives of treatment. Such disclosure protects 
not only the patient but the doctor as well. It is clear that patients undergoing 
the first heart transplants or who were operated on in Bristol would have been 
better protected if doctors had followed the ethical principles described here. 
Whether the law follows such ethical principles, however, needs to be 
discussed. 
THE LAW: 
The previous chapter discussed how an act of medical malpractice may give 
rise to two common law actions in court; those of trespass to the person 
(assault) and of negligence. Malpractice litigation also applies when dealing 
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with issues of consent. It is the consent of the patient that legalises the whole 
of medical examination and treatment and that is why it is such an important 
issue. 999 Significant case law has arisen due to doctors failing to communicate 
adequately with their patients, either because there had been no proper 
consultation prior to treatment or because the medical practitioner failed to 
disclose the risks inherent in the proposed treatment. 
The patient-physician relationship is founded on trust and confidence and the 
physician is necessarily a trustee for the patient's medical welfare. 1000 Any 
professional person such as a physician, lawyer, priest or other who enters 
into a relationship of trust and confidence with another has a positive 
obligation to disclose all relevant facts. Since the essence of a professional 
relationship is that the professional knows more about his subject than the 
person who seeks his help there is an affirmative duty of disclosure. 1001 
As argued earlier in this chapter, patients thus need to be given a clear 
explanation of any treatment proposed, including any risks and alternatives, 
before they decide whether they will agree to the treatment. Consent, 
expressed or implied, must be given in most cases before treatment is lawful. 
Without such consent health professionals would commit the crime of battery 
(assault in Scotland) and a tort (trespass to the person) when they touch their 
patient. 
Bat 
The tort of battery has already briefly been mentioned in the previous chapter. 
It is committed where any non-consensual contact takes place. 1002 
Furthermore, an intention to injure is not essential. It is the act that violates 
the bodily integrity, i. e. it is the contact that must be intentional. 1003 
Respect for bodily integrity and privacy are values that are central to any 
theory of consent and are central values in the European Convention of 
Human Rights, now incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 
1998.1004 
These rights, however, are not new. In the 1914 case of Schloendorf v. 
Society of New York Hospital Cardozo J stated: 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his body. 1005 
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The common law has thus long recognised the principle that every person has 
the right to have his bodily integrity protected against invasion by others. The 
seriousness with which the law views any invasion of physical integrity is 
based on the strong moral conviction that everyone has the right to self- 
determination with regard to his body. 1006 
The existence of the patient's right to make his own decisions.... may 
be seen as a basic human right protected by the common law. 1007 
Indeed, the rules regarding consent are designed to perform this function; that 
is, to permit the patient the continued exercise of self-determination. 1008 
Furthermore, 
There is nothing especially 'medical' about the requirement that a 
doctor must obtain a patient's consent ... These requirements are imposed not in the interests of the patient's health, but in the interests 
of individual liberty. 1009 
The question of what constitutes consent has thus been inextricably 
connected with the tort of battery. Lawyers acting on behalf of patients have 
previously argued that, if the patient's consent for an operation or a mode of 
treatment was given on the basis of inadequate information, either of the risks 
of the treatment or of the extent of the treatment, then the case should be 
heard in battery and the patient should have a right to compensation under 
the laws of battery. 
However, it should be pointed out that there is no actual law of consent per 
se. Consent is merely a defence to the tort of battery. 1010 The principle 
importance of battery lies in its role in emphasising that patients are entitled to 
veto the care provided by health professionals: in other words, a right to 
refuse treatment. 
Thus recently in England it was stated that: 
it is in general terms a criminal and tortious assault to perform physical 
invasive treatment without a patient's consent. 1011 
Similarly, in the case of an adult who was 34 weeks pregnant: 
1006 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. 6th ed. London: Butterworths, 2002, at 10.4. 
1007 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and others. 
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An adult patient ... 
has an absolute right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than another 
of the treatments being offered. 1012 
This absolute right applies even if the patient were to die if the proposed treatment was refused. In the above case, in the Appeal Court, Lord 
Donaldson MR stated: 
The patient's interest consists of his right to self-determination - his right to live his own life how he wishes ... society's interest is in upholding the concept that all human life is sacred and that it should be 
preserved if at all possible. It is well established that in the ultimate the 
right of the individual is paramount. 1013 
Thus, failure to obtain any consent could lead to a doctor being charged with 
battery, as in the previously mentioned case of Devi v West Midlands 
RHA. 1014 Recently a gynaecologist who sterilised patients against their wishes 
was struck off the medical register by the General Medical Council. 1015 There 
are, however, relatively few cases in English law where the patient has 
successfully sued his or her doctor for battery on the ground that no consent 
was given. This does not mean that the tort of battery is unimportant. Its 
significance lies in the fact that it represents a statement by the law that a 
patient is entitled to decide what is to be done to his or her own body. 
As previously discussed, the distinction between an action based on battery 
and one based on negligence is important for a number of reasons. Battery, 
which is a non-consensual touching, is itself a legal wrong, whether or not any 
specific damage can be shown to result. Thus a patient may bring a 
successful action for battery even when the procedure carried out without 
consent was clearly for his or her benefit. In negligence, however, in addition 
to showing that the professional fell below the required standard, the patient 
must prove that some damage resulted. This means that a patient will lose 
their case where the procedure benefited them or where the carelessness or 
negligence of the professional did not cause the damage. The most common 
example of the latter situation in the consent context would be where, even if 
the patient had been told of the risks which were not mentioned, she or he 
would have been prepared to take them. The professional may have withheld 
information that should have been disclosed but it would have made no 
difference had he or she acted properly. 1016 
It has however been argued in cases such as Chatterton v Gerson 1017 that if a 
patient gave consent but did not know all the facts necessary to take an 
autonomous decision, then, by implication, that consent was invalid. Thus, the 
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failure of a doctor to disclose either risks inherent in a procedure or other 
alternatives available (which the patient might have preferred) can invalidate the consent given and could lead to a charge of battery being brought against the doctor. In this case the patient had been treated by a pain specialist for 
chronic pain around a hernia scar. Unfortunately the treatment rendered her 
right leg completely numb and hence impaired her mobility. The plaintiff 
alleged that her consent was vitiated because she had not been informed of the risk of numbness and thus the defendant was liable in battery. The trial 
judge dismissed the claim. 
I think justice requires that in order to vitiate the reality of consent there 
must be a greater failure of communication between doctor and patient 
than that involved in a breach of duty if the claim is based on 
negligence. ... 
In my judgement once a patient is informed in broad 
terms of the nature of the procedure which is intended, and gives her 
consent, that consent is real, and the cause of action on which to base 
a claim for failure to go into risks and implications is negligence, not 
trespass. Of course, if information is withheld in bad faith, the consent 
will be vitiated by fraud. ... in my judgement it would be very much 
against the interests of justice if actions which are really based on a 
failure by the doctor to perform his duty adequately to inform were 
pleaded in trespass. 1018 
This state of affairs was reiterated when the case of Sidaway v. Board of 
Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and others 
reached the Court of Appeal. Sir John Donaldson stated that it was only if the 
consent was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation of the nature of what was 
to be done that it could be said the apparent consent was not a true consent. 
Dunn LJ agreed. 
The 
... argument was 
that unless the patient's consent to the operation 
was a fully informed consent the performance of the operation would 
constitute a battery on the patient by the surgeon. This is not the law of 
England. If there is consent to the nature of the act, then there is no 
trespass to the person. 1019 
In the same case heard later in the House of Lords, Lord Scarman held that'it 
would be deplorable to base the law in medical cases of this kind on the torts 
of assault and battery. 1020 
Similarly in Freeman v Home Office it was held that: 
if there was real consent to the treatment, it mattered not whether the 
doctor was in breach of his duty to give the patient the appropriate 
information before that consent was given. Real consent provides a 
complete defence to a claim based on the tort of trespass to the 
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person. Consent would not be real if procured by fraud or 
misrepresentation but, subject to this and subject to the patient having 
been informed in broad terms of the nature of the treatment, consent in 
fact amounts to consent in law. ' 021 
Thus the argument that battery may also lie where consent is given in 
ignorance of relevant material facts seems to have no place in English law. 1022 
The law considers what the duty of the doctor to his patient is, rather than the 
validity of consent. However, the notion that it would be wrong to find a doctor 
liable in battery because of the implication that he intended to harm his patient 
1023 is misplaced . 
Motive is not a defence and furthermore, as previously 
mentioned, although battery is an intentional tort, the intention relates to the 
act and not to the harm suffered. An intention to cause harm is therefore not 
necessary. 1024 
There may also be other valid arguments why the proper course of action 
should lie in battery. One issue in a battery case is whether the patient 
understood the nature and purpose of the procedure. Furthermore, the courts 
can manipulate the content of this 'nature and purpose' test in order to expand 
or contract the scope of battery. 1025 For example, the Bristol Inquiry 
recommended that patients are always entitled to be know the extent to which 
a procedure which they are about to undergo is innovative or experimental. 
Recommendation 102 also stated that they are entitled to be informed about 
the experience of the clinician who is to carry out the procedure. 1026 
Thus if a patient is not told that the procedure they are about to undergo is 
innovative, especially if it concerns a case similar to those of implanting 
artificial hearts described in previous chapters, it is not unreasonable for them 
to claim that the consent they gave was obtained by deception, as per the 
Master of the Rolls in Sidaway. 
... 
if the consent is obtained by a fraud or by a misrepresentation of the 
nature of what is to be done ... 
it can be said that an apparent consent 
is not a true consent. 1027 
This was confirmed in the case of Appleton v. Garrett. 
1028 In this case a 
dentist deceived patients as to their need for treatment over a number of 
years. The consent given was vitiated by the fraudulent misrepresentation of 
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heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: 
HMSO, 2001 
1027 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital and others. [1984] 2 WLR 
at 790a/b 
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the dentist. The defendant had acted in bad faith throughout and this made an action in battery appropriate. 
Similarly, it is proposed that fraudulent representation were made in respect of 
certain innovative treatments. The purpose of such treatments, as in Karp v Cooley' 029 or the pending US case of a patient who received an artificial heart 
in November 2001 1030 
, was not to make the first recipients well from a health 
perspective but rather to test a new technology for future patients. These 
procedures were non-therapeutic and of no benefit to the patient and thus 
only for the benefit of society. 1031 The consent the patients gave therefore 
appears not to be valid. It has also been claimed that some risks are so 
significant that they may well change the nature of the proposed procedure if 
they are not disclosed, thereby vitiating consent and leading to a claim and 
liability in battery-' 032 
The UK courts, however, have been intolerant of any attempt to have these 
cases heard under the laws of battery. Any such attempt has been seen as a 
device to side step difficulties in sustaining an action for negligence based on 
failures to communicate proper information, 1033 and the courts have been 
consistent in holding that actions for battery should play a very limited role in 
health care law. 
As mentioned, in Chatterton v. Gerson consent was judged to be real so long 
as the patient was informed 'in broad terms' of the nature of the intended 
procedure and no action for trespass to the person would lie. 1034 Similarly in 
Hills v. Potteý 035 the plaintiff sued in negligence and in battery following the 
failure of an operation to relieve symptoms caused by a deformity of her neck 
known as spasmodic torticollis. The operation, although performed with skill 
and competence, resulted in a severe deterioration so that the plaintiff 
became paralysed from the neck downwards. The plaintiff alleged that she 
had not been properly informed about the risks inherent in the surgery and 
that her consent was therefore vitiated by the lack of information that paralysis 
could result. Hirst J found in relation to the action in battery: 
As to the claim for assault and battery the plaintiffs undoubted consent 
to the operation which was in fact performed negatives any possibility 
of liability under this head, see Chatterton v. Gerson. I should add that 
I respectfully agree with Bristow J in deploring reliance on these torts in 
medical cases of this kind; the proper course of action, if any, is 
negligence. 1036 
1029 Karp v. Cooley 493 F 2d 408 (1974) (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit) 
1030 Anon. Widow sues artificial heart-maker. Bull Med Eth 2002; 181: 24. 
1031 Annas G. Death and the Magic Machine. Western New England Law Review 1987; 9: 89 at 98. 
1032 Tan Keng Feng. 'Failure of Medical Advice: Trespass or Negligence? ' (1987) 7 LS 149-68 
1033 Nelson-Jones R, Burton F. Medical Negligence Case Law. Fourmat Publishing, London, 1990, p3-4 
1034 Chatterton v. Gerson [1980] 3WLR 1003. 
1035 Hills v. Potter [1983] 3 All ER 716, [1984] 1 WLR 641 
1036 Hills v. Potter [1983] 3 All ER 716, (1984] 1 WLR 641 at 653 d/e 
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The Master of the Rolls in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and others adopted a similar position when he expressed the view: 
I am wholly satisfied that as a matter of English law a consent is not vitiated by a failure on the part of a doctor to give a patient sufficient information before the consent is given. 1037 
Although this position has been criticised 1038 1039 it seems highly likely that it 
will not be altered in the foreseeable future. As a result, battery can normally be successfully alleged only when there was no consent to the procedure 
actually carried out. This usually occurs when there has been a blatant error 
by health care staff, such as when the wrong leg is amputated, or when no 
consent was obtained at all. Liability in such cases is virtually always admitted 
and usually settled out of court. The crime of battery does not reflect reality in 
the medical context where in the main there is absence of fraud or malice. 
Negligence: 
On the other hand, it is clear that if professionals fail to counsel patients in a 
way recognised by their peers as appropriate they may be negligent. Thus 
patients who allege that they have been given insufficient information must 
argue that the professionals have been negligent in carrying out their duty to 
advise them about the decision. Much of the debate regarding consent has 
focussed on the appropriate standard of disclosure. 1040 When considering the 
extent and quality of information that should be provided, this depends on 
whether the standard is based on what the profession believes should have 
been disclosed, the professional standard, or on the patient's own 
expectations, that is a patient-based standard. 
The professional standard test., 
The professional standard test has already been described in the previous 
chapter. With respect to consent and information disclosure, the test is based 
on what the profession believes the patient should be told. In keeping with the 
arguments and cases described in the previous chapter, a doctor would not 
be guilty of negligence if he acted in accordance with a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of medical opinion skilled in that particular 
art. 1041 Thus, a doctor would not be found guilty of negligence if a responsible 
body of medical opinion would not have disclosed what the defendant did not 
disclose. Thus, even a significant minority of doctors in agreement with the 
defendant may leave the plaintiff in difficulties. In DeFreitas v. O'Brien and 
Connolly the Court of Appeal ruled that a small number of medical 
practitioners could constitute a 'responsible body of medical opinion against 
1037 Siclaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and others. 
[ 1984] 2 WLR 
at 790a/b 
1038 Tan Keng Feng. 'Failure of Medical Advice: Trespass or Negligence? ' (1987) 7 LS 149-68 
1039 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 
1040 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 at 104. 
1041 Bolarn v Friem HIVIC [1957] 2 All ER 118,121. 
189 
, 1042 which the practices of a doctor could be measured. The standard is therefore professionally based, in that the Profession decides what is 
acceptable. Consent is thus governed by the same rules and principles that 
apply to ordinary malpractice cases 1043 , as described in the previous chapter. 
The main problem therefore is that the Bolam test has been allowed to 
encroach into information disclosure. It has been used to abdicate the courts' 
responsibility for defining and enforcing patients' dghts. 1044 Most disturbingly, 
it has been allowed to become the litmus test, not just of clinical practice, but 
also of medical ethics. 1045 As will be seen, however, other more recent cases 
may appear to have qualified the professional standard test. 
The patient centred standard: 
The patient centred standard can be subdivided into two, a particular patient 
standard and a prudent patient standard, corresponding to subjective or 
objective tests. 
The particular patient (subjective) test, in terms of duty of care and breach of 
that duty, defines what information the actual plaintiff would have wanted 
disclosed to them. This test suffers from the use of hindsight and since the 
relevant facts only exist in the mind of the individual an accusation of 
incomplete disclosure is very hard to refute. It is, however, a desirable 
standard in so far as it embodies personal factors, including many that are 
non-medical, which might affect a particular person's decision. It is also the 
standard that most forcefully establishes the right to self-determination, 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
The prudent patient test requires the plaintiff to establish what a reasonable 
person would have wanted to know. This suffers from the impossibility of 
defining what a reasonable person is, specific to each case. However, some 
believe it to be fair to both sides in that a reasonable doctor and a reasonable 
patient are meeting on comparable terms. 1046 
Causation: 
When a claim for non-disclosure is brought in negligence and the claimant 
has overcome the Bolam test with respect to the breach of that duty of 
disclosure of information, the plaintiff must further prove causation. This 
means that the breach of duty caused the damage concerned. In the context 
of consent and information disclosure, the plaintiff must show that, had the 
appropriate information been disclosed, he or she would not have consented 
to the relevant treatment and thus the risk which materialised would have 
been avoided. In other words, if he had been warned about the inherent risk in 
the procedure he would not have accepted the treatment. In many ways this 
1042 DeFreitas v. O'Brien and Connolly [1995] 6M LR 108,115, CA. 
1043 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p227 
1044 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? Med L Rev 2000; 8: 85 at 85. 
1045 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? Med L Rev 2000; 8: 85,90. 
1046 Mason JK. Consent to treatment and research in the ICU. Chapter in: Pace NA, McLean SAM eds. 
Ethics and 
the law in intensive care. Oxford University Press, 1996, p38. 
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makes much of the preceding argument pertaining to the duty to disclose less important because the plaintiff still has to prove that he would have refused treatment if all the facts regarding risks and alternatives had been available to him. 
In law, the question is whether the test of causation is objective and based on the 'prudent' or'reasonable' patient or whether the test is subjective and 
considers what the 'particular patient would have wished. 
In the English case of Chatterton v Gerson a subjective test appears to have 
been utilised. 
When the claim is based on negligence the plaintiff must prove not only 
the breach of duty to inform but had the duty been broken she would 
not have chosen to have the operation. 1047 
The plaintiff lost the case because the judge determined she would still have 
consented because she was desperate for pain relief. 
In Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood HA, 1048 the patient suffered 
permanent quadriplegia following a second operation due to a brain cyst. It 
was accepted that the neurosurgeon had not fully disclosed the risks inherent 
in the operation. Thus the main issue was whether the plaintiff, had she been 
given proper advice, would have refused the operation. The judge stated that, 
as a matter of principle, the decision should be subjectively based: 
If this plaintiff had been given the advice that she should have been 
given, would she have decided to undergo the operation or not. 1049 
However, the judge pointed out the problems with this approach. How could 
the plaintiff, already knowing what the adverse outcome will be, give reliable 
answers to what she would have done? One's reaction had to be influenced 
by what had transpired and in his view an objective assessment also had to 
be made. But the less confidently the trial judge could ascertain what the 
reasonable person would have done, the more important subjective elements 
would become. 1050 Thus, there was a blending of the objective and subjective 
approaches. One consequence of this decision is that, had the operation not 
been urgent and possibly not needed, then the plaintiff would have been more 
believable and the subjective approach utilised . 
1051 Therefore, English courts 
appear to apply a subjective test with an element of objectivity regarding 
reasonableness. 
Similarly in South Africa, the Supreme Court employed the reasonable patient 
test to set an initial standard which was then modified by a subjective 
1047 Chatterton v Gerson [1981 ] QB 432 at RE F 
1048 Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood HA [1994] 5 Med LR 285 (QBD) 
1049 Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood HA [1994] 5 Med LR 285 (QBD) at 
288. 
1050 Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood HA [1994] 5 Med LR 285 (QBD) at 
289. 
1051 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p732 
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standard; that is, what additional informational needs of the patient were or should reasonably have been known by the doctor? 1052 
In other jurisdictions such as Canada, however, an objective test is 
applied. 1053 Here the question is whether a reasonable person, in the 
claimant's situation and knowing the risks involved, would have declined the 
proposed treatment. In most cases where an objective test is applied, 
causation becomes even more burdensome to the claimant and tends to 
obscure what the real issue is; namely, what would the claimant have done 
had he possessed all of the relevant information? '054 
Indeed one commentator has stated that 
This is not, strictly, a test of causation but a filter for excluding plaintiffs 
who do not conform to the 'norm' in their willingness to accept certain 
types of risk. Of course, it also functions as a crude catch-all device for 
denying recovery to plaintiffs who are deemed essentially to be 
untruthful because they are viewing the situation with hindsight. English 
law at least permits the plaintiff to attempt to persuade the court that 
she would have refused treatment if the risks had been disclosed. 1055 
Furthermore, it has been established that, following ReibI v Hughes, a case 
utilising an objective test, 56% of plaintiffs in Canada failed to meet the test for 
causation despite having shown a breach of duty of disclosure by the 
doctor. 1056SO, in this respect, and possibly offering some hope for the future 
with respect to the standard of care to be achieved, the greater utilisation of 
the subjective test in the English Courts appears to be granting greater 
respect to personal autonomy and self-determination. 
However, although there is a difference between the two tests, in practice the 
claimant must still convince the court that he would not have had the 
treatment had the risks been disclosed. The court will therefore examine the 
claimant's evidence and its credibility by reference to the reasonable man. 
An assessment, thus, still needs to be made in terms of reasonableness. In 
the Canadian case of Reibl v. Hughes Laskin CJC stated: 
In saying that the test is based on the decision of the reasonable 
person in the patient's position would have made, I should make it 
clear that the patient's particular concerns must also be reasonably 
based otherwise there would be more subjectivity than would be 
warranted under an objective test ... 
In short, although account must 
be taken of a patient's particular position, a position which will vary with 
1052 Castell v De Greef (1994) (4) SA 408 
1053 Arndt v Smith [1997] 2 SCR 539 (Can SC) 
1054 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. Cavendish Publishing: London, 2nd ed. 2002, p211 
1055 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. IVILR 1999; 7: 103-134, at 119-120. 
1056 Robertson G. Informed Consent 10 Years Later: The Impact of Reibl v Hughes. (1991) 70 Canadian 
Bar 
Review 423 at 428. 
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the patient, it must be objectively assessed in terms of 
reasonableness. ' 057 
However, Giesen argues that a standard determined by reference to objective 
criteria alone will not in all cases suffice to vindicate the patient's right to self determination which should be the starting point and indeed shape the 
boundaries of the duty of disclosure. 1058 Furthermore, he argues that to use 
an objective test to measure an individual's informational needs is blunt 
paternalism that is no less excusable when exercised by the courts than by 
the medical profession. 1059He does concede however that the 'reasonable 
patient' test is an acceptable starting point to assess the average patient's 
minimum informational needs. ' 060 
Beyond Bolam: 
If the Bolam test, illustrating the professional standard test, is assumed for the 
moment to be representative of the current law, the doctor would have to warn 
of all risks of which a responsible body of medical opinion considers the 
patient should be warned, as opposed to every possible risk. The British 
Medical Association (BMA), in an earlier edition of its book Medical Ethics 
Today, claims that how much or how little information regarding risks is 
considered to be adequate will vary with each patient. 
It must also be a matter of clinical judgement and the standards set by 
other doctors. From an ethical viewpoint, the criteria should be as 
much information as the patient needs or desires. It is interesting to 
note that in the Bolam case, the law set the level at the standard 
adopted by the medical profession and a doctor who gives as much 
detail as a recognised body of medical opinion considers appropriate 
would be unlikely to be held liable in law. 1061 
It must be pointed out that the BIVIA considered it unlikely that doctors would 
be held liable in law if they did what other professionals would have done. The 
reason for this is that Bolam appears to have been softened by various 
statements made in cases such as Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital 
Govemors' 062 and more recently Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA. 
1063 Indeed, 
in the latest edition of the above book, the Sidaway case has been given 
greater prominence. 1064 
Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Govemors: 
The attitude of deference to the medical professional's view, via the 
professional standard test, appears to have been qualified by the case of 
1057 Reibl v. Hughes (1980) 114 IDLR (3d) 1 
1058 Giesen D. International Medical Malpractice Law. J CB Mohr: Tubigen, 1988, at par 576 
1059 Giesen D. International Medical Malpractice Law. J CB Mohr: Tubigen, 1988, at par 580 
1060 Giesen D. International Medical Malpractice Law. J CB Mohr: Tubigen, 1988, at par 590 
1061 BMA, Medical ethics today: Its practice and philosophy, p1O 
1062 Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
1063 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1993] 4 Med LR 381, [199714 All 
ER 771. 
1064 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMJ Publishing 
Group. 2004,78-9. 
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Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Govemors, where the court reserved the 
right to decide that even standard practice may be negligent. ' 065 The claimant 
underwent an operation on her spine to relieve pressure on one of the nerve 
roots in her neck. Unfortunately during the operation her spinal cord was 
damaged, leaving her severely disabled. The neurosurgeon had told her 
about the risk of damage to the nerve root, estimated at 2%, but had not told 
her about the risk to the spinal cord, a risk of less than 1 %. There was no 
evidence that the operation had been carried out negligently. The claimant, 
however, argued that the defendant had been negligent in not informing her of 
the risk to the spinal cord. Other neurosurgeons testified that it was not their 
practice to inform patients of the risk of damage to the spinal cord. The trial 
judge therefore dismissed the claim. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's view that the law in relation to 
failures in diagnosis and treatment also applied to failures in the realm of 
advice. Lord Donaldson, the Master of the Rolls, reviewed the leading 
transatlantic cases giving rise to the prudent patient test in the doctrine of 
informed consent, but declined to incorporate those principles: 
... what information should be disclosed and how and when it should be disclosed is very much a matter for medical judgement, to be exercised 
in the context of the doctor's relationship with a particular patient in 
particular circumstances. It is for this reason that I would reject the 
American formulation of the duty by reference to a 'prudent patient 
test ,. 1066 
He also did not view the adoption of the medical standard implicit in Bolam as 
abdicating responsibility to the medical profession. The practice held by the 
body of responsible practitioners had to be one that was rightly and properly 
held, and the court would not: 
stand idly by if the profession by an excess of paternalism denies their 
patients real choice. In a word, the law will not permit the medical 
profession to play God. ... I think that, 
in an appropriate case, a judge 
would be entitled to reject a unanimous medical view if he were 
satisfied that it was manifestly wrong and that the doctors must have 
been misdirecting themselves as to their duty in law-' 067 
However, Lord Browne-Wilkinson formulated a proposition that a doctor was 
under a duty to disclose to the patient information relevant to the decision the 
patient would have to take. This would include the benefits and risks but 
would be subject to the emotional state of the patient as well as the degree of 
risk concerned. He further stated: 
... I 
have been very conscious of the need to ensure that the duty of 
care imposed by the law is not such as to inhibit the proper function of 
1065 Siclaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors (11984] 1 All ER 1018 
1066 Siclaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1984] 2 WLR at 790-91 
1067 Siclaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1984] QB 493 at 513, [1984] 1 All 
ER 1018 at 1028, CA 
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the medical profession in caring for the sick in exposing doctors to the 
threat of legal proceedings in which their actions will be judged by 
hindsight, not by reference to the standards of those skilled in the art, but by judge and jury. It is for this reason that I am not prepared to 
adopt the much stricter rules as to disclosure laid down in the 
transatlantic cases which involve an objective judgement both as to the 
materiality of the risk and the adequacy of disclosure. 1068 
The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal's reasoning that the Bolam 
test was applicable in deciding whether a practitioner was negligent in failing 
to disclose inherent risks in treatment. 1069However one of the Lords, Lord 
Scarman, believed this was not acceptable. The standard for the amount of 
information to be given was not what the medical profession thought 
appropriate but ideally what the individual patient required, and failing that, 
what the average "prudent patient" would want to know. 
If one considers the scope of the doctor's duty by beginning with the 
right of the patient to make his own decision whether he will or will not 
undergo the treatment proposed, the right to be informed of significant 
risk and the doctor's corresponding duty are easy to understand: for 
the proper implementation of the right requires that the doctor be under 
a duty to inform his patient of the material risks inherent in the 
treatment. 
Ideally, the court should ask itself whether in the particular 
circumstances the risk was such that this particular patient would think 
it significant if he was told it existed. I would think that, as a matter of 
ethics, this is the test of the doctor's duty. The law, however, operates 
not in Utopia but in the world as it is: and as such an inquiry would 
prove in practice to be frustrated by the subjectivity of its aim and 
purpose. The law can, however, do the next best thing, and require the 
court to answer the question, what would a reasonably prudent patient 
think significant if in the situation of this patient. The "prudent patient" 
cannot, however, always provide the answer for the obvious reason 
that he is a norm, not a real person: and certainly not the patient 
himself. 1070 
Elsewhere Lord Scarman has stated that, although he would permit medical 
experts to establish the standard of care in relation to diagnosis and 
treatment' 071 , 
he found it unacceptable in relation to informed consent. He has 
attacked the law's reliance on medical expertise in matters of consent and risk 
disclosure. It is a totally medical proposition erected into a working rule of 
law. 1072 
1068 Sidaway v. Bethlern Royal Hospital Governors [1984] 2WLR at 801 
1069 Sidaway v. Bethlern Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643 
1070 Sidaway v. Bethlern Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643, at 654-5. 
1071 Maynard v. W. Midlands RHA [1985] 1 All ER 643,649 
1072 L. Scarman. Law and Medical Practice. in: P. Byrne (ed. ), Medicine in Contemporary Society. London: King 
Edward's Hospital Fund for London, 1987,131-139 at 134. 
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His view in Sidaway, however, was in the minority and as such if a doctor can show that his advice reached a standard of care which was accepted by a respectable and responsible body of medical opinion as adequate he cannot be liable in damages if anything goes wrong. 
Similarly, in the Scottish case of Moyes v Lothian Health Board, Lord Caplan 
stated: 
In my view ... the appropriate tests to apply in medical negligence cases 
are to be found in Hunter v Hanley and Bolam ... As I see it, the law in both Scotland and England has come down firmly against the view that 
the doctor's duty to the patient involves at all costs obtaining the 
informed consent of the patient to specific medical treatments ... I can read nothing in the majority view in Sidaway which suggests that the 
extent and quality of warning to be given by a doctor to his patient 
should not in the last resort be governed by medical criteria. 1073 
It is therefore clear that the courts and medical literature in the United 
Kingdom allow medical authority and physician responsibility to take 
precedence over patient autonomy when the patient gives consent. Many 
believe this is to be an acceptable position. 
In other jurisdictions, including Australia, a different and possibly higher 
standard has been adopted. ... 
I believe our courts achieve a more 
balanced approach by leaving it to medical men themselves to set the 
standards. I regard this as the preferable approach even though it 
involves transferring to the expert doctors who are called before the 
courts the task of providing the often hotly disputed evidence of what 
the profession would or would not accept. 1074 
Similarly, McCall Smith has argued that: 
the medical profession should be left some areas where it can safely 
rely on its own collective judgment and wisdom. 1075 
However, comments in Sidaway do imply a slight shifting in the deferential 
attitude of the courts towards medical practitioners. In the House of Lords, the 
previously mentioned minority view of Lord Scarman was that the standard for 
the amount of information to be given was not simply what the medical 
profession thought appropriate. 1076 
Also, Lord Bridge stated that the courts might depart from the standards set 
by the profession where 
1073 Moyes v. Lothian Health Board [1990] SLT 444 at 449. 
1074 Lord Woolf. Self regulation - dentists, discipline and defence. BDentJ 1997; 182(12): 473-477 at 475. 
1075 McCall Smith A. Obtaining consent for examination and treatment. BMJ 2001; 322: 810-811 at 811. 
1076 Siclaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Govemors [1985] 1 All ER 643, at 654-5. 
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disclosure of a risk was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make itl 077 
while Lord Templeman declared that 
... the court must decide whether the information afforded to the patient 
was sufficient to alert the patient to the possibility of serious harm of the kind in fact suffered. 1078 
This case, therefore, appears to set the precedent for the consideration of a A prudent professional test', where the professional view would be scrutinised for acceptability by the courts. Thus, even standard practice may be 
negligent. 
1079 
Similarly in Hills v. Potter' 080 Hirst J stated: 
In every case the court must be satisfied that the standard contended 
for on their behalf accords with that upheld by a substantial body of 
medical opinion, and that this body of medical opinion is both 
respectable and responsible, and experienced in this particular field of 
medicine. 
Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA: 
The more recent case of Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA1 081 also indicated 
that judges are becoming less reluctant to set standards for doctors. In this 
case the defendant Is employee failed to attend to a child who had been 
admitted to hospital with breathing difficulties. The court, however, could not 
say whether such an omission had caused the claimant's injuries because it 
was not apparent what the doctor would have done had she responded. The 
defendant argued that, even if she had attended, she would not have 
intubated the child. The court accepted this but went on to consider whether a 
failure to intubate would have been negligent as 'contrary to accepted practice 
in the profession'. 1082 The claimant's solicitors contended that the child should 
have been intubated while the defendant argued that she should not. Both 
sides were supported by experts. As the claimant could, therefore, not prove 
that the failure to intubate was contrary to medical practice (i. e. utilising the 
Bolam test) the claim failed. This was endorsed when the case reached the 
House of Lords. 1083 The burden was on the claimant to demonstrate that by 
not acting the defendant had fallen below the standard of acceptable medical 
practice. 
1077 Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643,663 
1078 Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643,665 
1079 Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 AC 871, 
[1985] 2 WLR 840, [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
1080 Hills v Potter [1984] 1 WLR 641,653 
1081 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1993] 4 Med LR 381, [1997] 4 All ER 771. 
1082 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [19981 AC 232, at 237, HL. 
1083 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1998] AC 232, HL. 
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Earlier, in the court of appeal, Farquaharson U had noted the possibility of an accepted medical practice being held to be negligent because it put the patient unnecessarily at risk. 
It is not enough for a defendant to call a number of doctors to say that what he had done or not was in accord with accepted clinical practice. It is necessary for the judge to consider that evidence and decide 
whether that clinical practice puts the patient unnecessarily at risk. '084 
He did not, however, regard this as being an issue in Bolitho and gave no 
examples of when it might arise. 
This view was qualified by Dillon who warned: 
In my judgement, the court could only ... reject medical opinion on the ground that the reasons of one group of doctors do not really stand up to analysis, if the court, fully conscious of its own lack of medical 
knowledge and clinical experience, was nonetheless clearly satisfied 
that the views of that group of doctors were ... such as no reasonable body of doctors could have held. 1085 
Later, when the case reached the House of Lords it was said by Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson that: 
The use of these adjectives - responsible, reasonable and respectable 
- all show that the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the 
body of opinion relied on can demonstrate that such opinion has logical 
basis. In particular, in cases involving ... 
the weighing of risks against 
benefits, the judge before accepting a body of opinion as being 
responsible, reasonable or respectable, will need to be satisfied that, in 
forming their views, the experts have directed their minds to the 
question of comparative risk and benefits and have reached a 
defensible conclusion on the matter. 1086 
This essentially appears to give the courts the jurisdiction to declare accepted 
medical practice as lacking a logical foundation. His Lordship's argument 
retains the court's right to analyse critically expert witness evidence to ensure 
it is reasonable. Although some commentators have suggested that Bolitho 
has 'reinterpreted Bolam" 087 and handed back to the courts the ultimate 
power of deciding whether a particular medical practice is acceptable or 
not' 088 , even if medical experts 
found it acceptable, it is respectfully submitted 
1084 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1993] 13 BMLR 111 (CA) at 119 
1085 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA (1993] 13 BMLR 111 (CA) at 132 
1086 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1997] 4 All ER 771,778 
1087 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p441. 
1088 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002. 
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that this case merely reaffirms statements made in Sidaway' 089 that accepted 
medical practice may no longer always find favour with the courts. 
Some academics have claimed that Bolitho restores Bolam to its proper and 
original limits. 1090 Thus, 
Bolitho has set in train a process whereby judges scrutinise medical 
evidence, using the same mixture of common sense and logical 
analysis that they use to scrutinise other expert evidence in negliqence 
claims against professionals such as architects and accountants. T091 
More controversially, 
information disclosure and the supremacy of the 'reasonable doctor 
test' may be the first Bolitho casualty. 1092 
However, a recent analysis of appropriate post-Bolitho cases showed a 
significant number still relied on Bolam. 1093 Furthermore, Bolitho appears to 
have been used most commonly as a test of credibility rather than as a 
standard per se. The author concluded: 
The judiciary appears to be more prepared to assess expert evidence, 
but only in relation to credibility rather than undertaking an assessment 
of the proffered standard which would be necessary if the test is to 
have an appropriate normative force. 
1094 
Thus, although Bolitho, may be a step in the right direction, it does not travel 
far enough down the road of judicial scrutiny. ' 095 The plaintiff still faces a 
steep uphill climb to overcome the barrier of accepted professional 
practice. 1096 
In keeping with this, it is not clear how far the courts are prepared to refuse to 
accept medical evidence. This is illustrated by their Lordships' differing 
opinion on how to proceed if the patient made a specific enquiry. While in 
Sidaway, Lord Scarman rejected the Bolam test, with respect to consent, 
because it left the determination of the legal duty to doctors, ' 097 
Lord Bridge did not accept that applying Bolam handed the whole question of 
the scope of duty of care to the medical profession. According to him, 
1089 Siclaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the 
Maudsley Hospital [1985] IIAC 871, 
[1985] 2 WLR 840, [198511 All ER 643. 
1090 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? MLR 2000; 8: 85. 
1091 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? MLR 2000; 8: 85 at 103. 
1092 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? MLR 2000; 8: 85, at 
108-9. 
1093 Maclean A. Beyond Bolam and Bolitho. ML Int 2002; 5: 205-30. 
1094 Maclean A. Beyond Bolam and Bolitho. ML Int 2002; 5: 205-30,224. 
1095 Keown J. Reining in the Bolam test. CLJ 1998; 57: 248,249. 
1096 Maclean A. Beyond Bolam and Bolitho. ML Int 2002; 5: 205-30,222. 
1097 Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 
All ER 643, at 654-5. 
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When questioned specifically by a patient of apparently sound mind about risks involved in a particular treatment proposed, the doctor's 
duty must ... 
be to answer both truthfully and as fully as the questioner 
requires. ' 098 
However, the example he gave of judicial intervention was one of failure to disclose a 10 per cent risk of stroke, which in any event is unlikely to be 
withheld by any reasonably prudent medical man. Furthermore, even such a 
risk could be withheld if there was a clinical reason for doing so. Thus, during the therapeutic process the physician should have the discretion to withhold 
certain information from his patient if he believes disclosure of it would prove harmful. He may need to protect his patient from more serious adverse 
reaction if the patient were to learn the details of his condition or the full risks 
of its proposed treatment. 1099 This right to withhold certain information is 
commonly described as the physician's therapeutic privile e. Indeed, the 
0 
Ya 
decision not to invoke it may itself constitute malpractice. ' 0 
Some believe that even the most dedicated advocates for patient autonomy 
will allow the doctor the 'therapeutic privilege'to withhold information which 
would merely serve to distress or confuse the patient. 1101 Thus Lord Scarman 
in Sidaway stated: 
It is plainly right that a doctor may avoid liability for failure to warn of a 
material risk if he can show that he reasonably believed that 
communication to the patient of the existence of the risk would be 
detrimental to the health (including, of course, the mental health) of his 
patient. ' 102 
The issue of 'therapeutic privilege' will be considered further later but for the 
moment it appears to justify less than full disclosure of information. 
This was reiterated in the case of Blyth v. Bloomsbury AHA where the Appeal 
Court appeared to take the view that the doctor need only adhere to the 
Bolam standard. ' 103 In this case Mrs Blyth alleged that her doctor was 
negligent in not informing her of the potential side effects of the contraceptive 
drug Depo-Provera. She had repeatedly and specifically questioned the 
doctor about the risk associated with the drug. The court ruled that the 
defendant had complied with accepted practice; there was no obligation to 
pass on to the patient all the information available to the hospital. Kerr LJ 
held: 
1098 Sidaway v. Bethlern Royal Hospital Governors [198511 AC 871,898 
1099 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc J. 1975; 113: 635-9 
1100 Male v. Hopmans, 2 OR 457,465 (Ont CA) 1967 
1101 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. 6th Ed. Butterworths: London 2002, at 
10.105. 
1102 Siclaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Govemors [1985] 1 All ER 643, at 654 
1103 Blyth v. Bloomsbury AHA [1993] 4 MLR 151. 
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The question of what a plaintiff should be told in answer to a general 
enquiry cannot be divorced from the Bolam test, any more that when 
no such enquiry is made. In both cases, the answer must depend upon 
the circumstances, the nature of the enquiry, the nature of the 
information which is available, its reliability, relevance, the condition of 
the patient and so forth-' 104 
From these arguments it would appear that a distinction could be made 
between a general enquiry, where the Bolam test will apply, and a specific 
enquiry, where the question must be answered truthfully. However, even a 
specific enquiry need not lead to a full disclosure. In the same case of Blyth v 
Bloomsbury HA, Balcombe U believed there was no rule of law that, if a 
patient has doubts or asks questions, the doctor must disclose all the 
information he possesses on the subject. 
I do not understand that [in] the decision of the House of Lords in 
Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 ... 
either Lord Diplock or Lord Bridge were laying down any rule of law to 
the effect that where questions are asked of a patient, or doubts are 
expressed, a doctor is under an obligation to put the patient in 
possession of all information on the subject ... The amount of information to be given must depend on the circumstances, and as a 
general proposition it is governed by what is called the Bolam test. ' 105 
Furthermore, Kerr LJ was not convinced that 
the Bolam test is irrelevant even in relation to what answers are 1106 
properly to be given to specific enquiries ... 
and 
there will always be grey areas, with differences of opinion, as to what 
are the proper answers to be given to any enquiry, even a specific 
one. 1107 
Even in Bolitho Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that: 
These decisions ... 
demonstrate that in cases of diagnosis and 
treatment there are cases where, despite a body of professional 
opinion sanctioning the defendant's conduct, the defendant can 
properly be held liable in negligence (I am not here considering 
questions of risk). In my judgment that is because, in some cases, 
it 
cannot be demonstrated to the judge's satisfaction that the body of 
opinion relied on is reasonable or responsible. In the vast majority of 
cases the fact that distinguished experts ... are of a particular opinion 
1104 Blyth v. Bloomsbury HA [1993] 4 Med LR 151,157. 
1105 Blyth v. Bloomsbury HA [1993] 4 Med LR 151,160. 
1106 Blyth v. Bloomsbury HA [1993] 4 Med LR 151,157. 
1107 Blyth v. Bloomsbury HA [1993] 4 Med LR 
151,157. 
201 
will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion ... 
But if in a rare 
case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not 
capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold 
that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible. I emphasise 
that 
... 
it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion 
that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are 
unreasonable. ' 108 
Thus, as clearly explained by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in the vast majority of 
cases the fact that distinguished experts in the field are of a particular opinion 
will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion. This implies that the 
status of the witness will go a long way to satisfying any test of 
reasonableness-' 109 In particular, where there are questions of assessment of 
relative risk and benefits of adopting a particular practice, a reasonable view 
necessarily presupposes that the relative risks and benefits have been 
weighed by the experts in forming their opinions. Nonetheless, the case made 
it clear that medical decisions will be subject to review, reaffirming the courts' 
role. 
Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust: 
The recent case of Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust" 10 has also 
indicated that the courts will depart from the medical professional approach if 
they see fit, the ultimate test being what the court itself thinks was a 
reasonable amount of information to give the patient. "" The court held that a 
doctor had a duty to disclose significant risks. 
... 
if there is a significant risk which would affect the judgement of a 
reasonable patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a 
doctor to inform the patient of that significant risk, if the information is 
needed so that the patient can determine for him or herself as to what 
course he or she should adopt. ' 112 
This is very similar to the meaning of 'material risks' that needed to be 
disclosed per the Australian High Court case of Rogers v Whittaker' 113 
Although the UK Court of Appeal located the standard in the 'reasonable 
professional' test, in essence it is advocating a more patient friendly test, 
similar to the Australian High Court. In asking the question 'what would a 
reasonable doctor disclose' both courts answer'what a reasonable patient 
would consider significant. " 114 The Australian High Court did go further and 
required disclosure of risks which the doctor ought reasonably to know would 
be significant to the 'particular patient. ' 
1108 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1993] 4 Med LR 381, [1997] 4 All ER 771,779. 
1109 Maclean A. Beyond Bolam and Bolitho. MILInt 2002; 5: 205-30,208. 
1110 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998) 48 BMLR 118, CA. 
1111 McCall Smith A. Obtaining consent for examination and treatment. BMJ 2001; 322: 810-1. 
1112 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998)48 BMLR 118,124. 
CA. 
1113 Rogers v Whittaker [1993] 4 Med LR 79; [1992] 3 Med LR 331; (1992) 109 
ALR 625. 
1114 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p709 
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However, although the court in Pearce appeared supportive of the individual 
patient approach, it concluded that in this case it would not be proper for the 
courts to interfere with the clinical opinion of the expert medical men 
responsible. ' 
115 
Thus it seems clear that judges are prepared to accept that it would, in the 
vast majority of cases, be acceptable to them, and hence lawful, for doctors to 
withhold information from a patient who asked questions if a responsible body 
of professional opinion supported such an action. ' 116 
The evidence of medical experts should be examined carefully to ensure that 
it is honest and objective. Medical expertise is to be overridden, it will appear, 
when the medical experts hold views that the judges believe no reasonable 
doctor could hold. This, however, is tantamount to suggesting that the doctors 
must be either dishonest or lacking in the necessary objectivity. It would 
appear therefore that once their credibility is established, their evidence will in 
fact be accepted without further questioning. ' 117 
Similarly, the previously mentioned Scottish case of Moyes v. Lothian Health 
Board' f18 considered that the extent and quality of warning to be given by a 
doctor to his patient should in the last resort be governed by medical criteria. 
Deference: 
Why do the UK courts give such weight to the opinion of medical experts, 
even in cases concerning non-disclosure of risk? The problem is that the 
courts are presented with facts and views of technical complexity outwith their 
area of expertise, - hence their reliance on 'experts'. Because there is 
frequently conflicting evidence, they try to untangle all the evidence and 
determine the quality of what was done. However what they should be doing 
is determining what ought to have been done. 
Finding it difficult to determine what is done and hearing evidence of 
what is done tends to depend on particular facts of each case, the 
court has tended to elide the distinct issue of what ought to be done 
with its decision of what is done. 1119 
Determining what ought to have been done is a value judgement and not a 
technical medical issue at all. Thus there appears to be an unreasonable 
reliance on medical experts when considering issues of disclosure of 
information. 
1115 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998) 48 BMLR 118, CA. 
1116 The Court of Appeal in Blyth decided that the claimant had not in fact asked any questions and thus the 
comments on the duty to answer questions are not technically binding on subsequent courts. 
1117 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pl 75 
1118 Moyes v Lothian Health Board [199011 Med LR 463,469 
1119 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p430 
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Another reason for showing deference was the desire to avoid the 'American disease of defensive medicine. ' In the Court of Appeal in Whitehouse v Jordan Lord Denning stated: 
Take heed of what has happened in the United States. 'Medical 
malpractice' cases there are very worrying, especially as they are thed by juries who have sympathy for the patient and none for the doctor, 
who is insured. The damages are colossal. The doctors insure but the 
premiums are very high: and these have to be passed on in fees to the 
patients. Experienced practitioners are known to have refused to treat 
patients for fear of being accused of negligence. Young men are even 
deterred from entering the profession because of the risks involved. In 
the interests of all, we must avoid such consequences in England. ' 120 
However, if the law requires doctors to do what other doctors deem 
reasonable, where is the need for defensive medicine? ' 121 Further, there is a 
distinction to be made between pure factual matters, such as in diagnosis and 
treatment (as for example, is this the correct drug for this disease) and 
matters of judgement, as in risk disclosure, especially as this is fundamental 
to the principle of respect for autonomy. 
Montgomery asks whether the unusual deference shown to medical expertise 
is a matter of law or practice. ' 122 Earlier cases such as Maynard v. 
WMidlands RHA1 123 implied that there could be no judicial intervention to 
declare standard accepted medical practice to be negligent. However, more 
recent cases such as Sidaway and Bolitho suggest that the reality is that 
judges are entitled to intervene but have chosen not to. Thus, it is not a 
question of law but merely of practice, judges choosing to defer to the advice 
of fellow professionals. However, no profession is above the law' 124 and 
medical professionals fall into no special category' 125 which singles them out 
for privileged treatment. ' 126 Other professionals are not treated with the same 
'hands off attitude. The Bolam principle was not applied to negligence cases 
concerning employee claims' 127 1128 or, more importantly, other professional 
negligence actions such as those brought against lawyers. ' 129Even if, in 
these cases, the Bolam test was consulted, it was not determinative. In the 
latter case' 130 , although 
the body of professional opinion was almost 
universally held, the court decided it was not a reasonable or responsible 
opinion. 
1120 Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650 at 658, CA 
1121 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p 430 
1122 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p170 
1123 Maynard v. W. Midlands RHA [1985] 1 All ER 635 
1124 Hajgato v. London Health Assn (1982) 36 OR2d 669,693a 
1125 Whitehouse v Jordan (1981 ]1 All ER 267, HL at 276 
1126 Giesen D. International Medical Malpractice Law. JCB Mohr: Tubigen, 1988, at para 129. 
1127 Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1960] AC 145 
1128 Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers; (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405 
1129 Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd v Johnson Stokes & Masters (1984] AC 296, [1984] 2 WLR 1. 
1130 Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd v Johnson Stokes & Masters [1984] AC 296, [1984] 2 WLR 1. 
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By thus deferring to a standard set by the medical profession itself in place of its own usual standard of reasonable care, the law in effect confers a special privilege on the medical profession which it denies to accountants, lawyers and others practising special skills. Its rationale is the layman's ignorance of medical science, coupled with an apprehension of exposing physicians to the vagaries of jury sympathy for victims. The deferential standard is applied in England not only to 
matters of diagnosis and treatment, but also to information and 1131 counselling ... 
The practice adopted with respect to the medical profession could therefore be easily changed. The crux of the matter is whether negligence is a 
normative doctrine, setting standards for the profession, or a descriptive 
doctrine, merely reflecting reality. ' 132 
The standard for establishing negligence in all aspects of law relates to 'the 
reasonable man' or the 'prudent and reasonable man'. ' 133 This does not 
mean, however, that if one does what an ordinary person would have done, 
one is exonerated. Thus Montrose criticises McNair in Bolam for failing to 
recognise that the ordinary man in the street does not always act and show 
the care of the reasonably prudent man required in the circumstances. " 34 The 
question of establishing negligence is 'what ought to be done' in the 
circumstances. Thus, 
in so far as negligence is concerned with what ought to be done, it may 
be called an ethical concept: in so far as it is concerned with what is 
done, with practice, it may be said to be a sociological concept. ' 135 
The ethical interpretation is to apply the normative requirement of 
I reasonableness' to the practice accepted as proper by a respectable body of 
practitioners; the sociological interpretation is to argue that, once the body of 
professionals is accepted as a 'responsible body'then any act that body 
approves cannot incur negligence liability. If Bolam is applied as a sociological 
test then the profession effectively sets the standard. ' 136 
In turn, Jones has described a number of weaknesses with respect to the law 
of consent. ' 137 Primarily, he believes the notion that it would be wrong to find 
a doctor liable in battery because the implication would be that he intended to 
harm his patient is misplaced. Motive is not a defence and the intention 
relates to the act and not the harm suffered. An intention to cause harm is not 
1131 Fleming. The Law of Torts (9th ed, 1998). The Law Book Co Ltd, at 121. 
1132 Montrose JL. Is negligence an Ethical or a Sociological Concept? 1958; 21 MLR 259-64 
1133 Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Exch 781 
1134 Montrose JL. Is negligence an Ethical or a Sociological Concept? 1958; 21 MLR 259-64. 
1135 Montrose JL. Is negligence an Ethical or a Sociological Concept? 1958; 21 MLR 259-64 at 259. 
1136 Maclean A. Beyond Bolam and Bolitho. MI-Int 2002; 5: 205-30. 
1137 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 at 105-8. 
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necessary. ' 138 Furthermore, case law cannot ever be a comprehensive 
framework and cannot cover all eventualities. Because the law is not widely known and is poorly understood by doctors, it would be better to have 
guidance provided by doctors which can be more specific and more likely to 
be read and acted upon by doctors. ' 139Therefore, Jones believes the law 
does not serve as a template for what ought to happen, does not have a 
positive effect and does not influence doctors' behaviour. ' 140 
From the courts' perspective the standard of disclosure is tied to the doctor's 
duty rather the patient's need for information to allow a choice to be made. 
Thus it appears to require doctors to fulfil their obligations rather than enabling 
patients to participate in a therapeutic alliance of good medical practice. ' 141 
Jones also believes that the law does not work in terms of being a remedy for 
breach of the duty of information disclosure because it fails to protect patients' 
rights. It gives doctors significant discretion to determine the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour regarding what needs to be disclosed, contrary to the 
ethical principle of respect for autonomy. Furthermore, the need to prove 
causation, that is that the disclosure of the risk that was not mentioned would 
have led to a refusal of consent, makes it even more difficult. On the other 
hand, legal liability is not an objective in itself. 'The law is meant to be 
purposive, to achieve a specific social goal. P1 142 That goal should be the 
achieving of respect for patient autonomy and not merely a legal requirement. 
The law's paternalistic treatment of the doctrine of informed consent 
undoubtedly provides a foundation for the medical profession's 
perception of it. There seems to be a failure on the part of doctors to 
take a step back in order to try to understand the meaning of informed 
consent. Instead the tendency is to perceive informed consent mainly 
as a medico-legal concept centred on the requirement to get a 
signature on a form. ' 143 
CONSENT and INNOVATION in the UK: 
Following from this discussion, it is unclear how UK law will deal with a case 
of innovation, either of experimental treatment or at the personal level of 
learning on the job. The following clinical example will highlight some of the 
problems a court could face. 
Fibreoptic intubation is a technique used in anaesthesia, sometimes in an 
emergency, to put a tube into the patient's trachea. This is undertaken while 
the patient is still awake. This can sometimes be lifesaving and, fortunately, is 
rarely required. However to be able to undertake it in an emergency doctors 
1138 Wilson v. Pringle [1986] 2 All ER 440,445. 
1139 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 at 106. 
1140 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134,105-109. 
1141 Teff H. Consent to Medical Procedures: Paternalism, Self-d eterm i nation or Therapeutic Alliance? 
(1985) 101 
LQR 432. 
1142 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 at 108. 
1143 Kessel AS. On failing to understand informed consent. Br J Hosp Med 1994; 52: 
235 at 237. 
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need to practice it fairly regularly. In other words the skill needs to be both learned and more importantly maintained. There are not enough patients 
requiring fibreoptic intubation 'in extremis' to allow the technique to be learned 
and the skill maintained. So doctors tend to justify its use in other situations. Thus the clinical scenarios in which such intubations are deemed acceptable to the operator vary according to that operator. One doctor may only use this form of intubation in extreme conditions but because he rarely practices it may 
not be very good at it, to the detriment of a subsequent patient who requires 
the use of the technique. Another doctor, using less stringent criteria, uses it 
in such conditions as a loose tooth or slightly enlarged tongue (where many 
colleagues believe it is not warranted). However he does becomes proficient 
at it and, more importantly, is much more likely to save the life of the patient 
who really needs it because he has practised it more often. 
The patients of this second doctor do actually consent and authorise the use 
of the technique. There are no risks, apart from the fact that it is quite 
uncomfortable and takes longer than the normal method of intubating the 
trachea. Furthermore in very rare and unexpected cases it may actually be 
safer. What they are not told is that most other doctors would not undertake a 
fibreoptic intubation on them in their condition. From a legal viewpoint there 
may well be a responsible body of opinion from like-minded doctors that 
would support the use of the technique in these situations. Ethically, however, 
it appears unacceptable that the patient is undergoing a procedure that many 
would deem unnecessary and mainly in the interests of maintaining the skills 
of a practitioner, which may benefit other patients. 
Since no legal cases have been heard in this regard, no definite conclusions 
can be reached. However it may be deduced how a court would resolve such 
a problem. It would start by defining what the standard of care was and 
whether it was breached. Medical opinion would be sought and the opinion 
from a responsible body of medical men who tend to be experts in the field of 
fibreoptic intubation would have a heavy bearing on the court, despite the fact 
that the majority of medical professionals may not find its use in the 
circumstances acceptable. Any argument for its use to allow skills to be 
maintained would be overshadowed by discussions about whether the 
technique was clinically indicated. It would only be at the limits of these 
indications where few, if any, colleagues would be supportive that the courts 
may find the doctor negligent. Thus while its use in, for example, a stiff neck 
might find favour, its use in a patient with a loose tooth may very well not. The 
final decision, of course, would rest with the courts. However, credible 
experts, as per Bolitho, may well sway the court into accepting the technique 
and the circumstances in which it is used. 
Similar difficulties arise when examining how issues of consent in UK law 
would apply to the early heart transplants and the situation which arose in 
Bristol. 
Heart transplants revisited: 
There can be little doubt that in many instances during the early heart 
transplant operations patients were given little and sometimes misleading 
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information. For example, Barnard misled the first heart recipient's wife 
regarding the chance of success. It is also clear that he did not believe in 
patient autonomy but rather that the doctors duty was to provide all available treatment. ' 144 Cooley similarly believed that consent in these patients did not 
appear to be an issue. There was no real problem in convincing a patient who 
was at the end of his tether. ' 145 
However, consent in this experimental form of innovation suffers from 
limitations. Firstly desperate patients were seeking untried therapy. An 
intrinsic feature of consent lies in the presentation of sound alternatives to the 
patient-' 146 Explaining alternatives in these cases was not an option because 
there were none. Experimental treatment by way of a heart transplant was the 
patient's only hope. Even when others had died, new potential recipients still 
wanted to go ahead. It is also not clear whether, if there were alternatives and 
these were not disclosed to the patient, the doctors concerned would have 
been negligent. There are currently no UK legal cases specifically addressing 
the issue of disclosure of alternative treatment. Such a case may well turn on 
whether other doctors, in a similar situation would disclose those alternatives. 
If the judge considered their opinion condoning the failure to disclose, for 
whatever reason, as one that was rightly and properly held, and that they 
were credible in terms of their status, any claim would fail. 
Secondly, the very fact that the procedure had not previously been carried out 
meant that the doctors themselves lacked the critical information to disclose to 
patients to allow them to make a fully informed choice. There appears to have 
been little information to impart. 
But while the first limitation regarding alternatives is probably true in most 
instances (apart, as shall be seen, from the use of the first artificial heart) the 
second is not necessarily so. Indeed, there can be little doubt that, in some 
cases, doctors could have been found negligent (under UK law). For example, 
the first South American heart transplant recipient was not informed of any of 
the risks involved in his operation. He did not understand its nature or 
seriousness. ' 147 Indeed, it could also be argued that, since the patient was not 
informed in broad terms of the nature of the procedure' 148 , an action 
in battery 
could have been appropriate. 
Regarding the other early recipients, disclosure of information was still critical 
to allow an informed choice to be made. It is unclear, however, whether many 
of the early recipients knew of the relatively poor success rate, especially in 
1144 Barnard C. In Experience with human heart transplantation. Proceedings of the Cape Town Heart 
Transplantation Symposium, 1968. Ed Shapiro HA. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1969, p266-7. 
1145 Cooley D. in Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 at p297. 
1146 Moore FID. Therapeutic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical trials of new drugs and surgical 
procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New 
York: George Braziller. 1970,358-78 at 
p366 
1147 Anon. News in brief: Transplant patient 'didn't know what he was in for'. World Medicine 
1968; 3(2 1): 1. 
1148 Chatterton v Gerson [198013 WLR 1003 
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those countries where it was felt that a transplant had to be attempted. 1149 In these cases it is unclear whether patients were told they would be the first 'to be experimented on' and that their surgeons had never attempted the 
operation before. The option of patients going to other centres (with more 
experienced surgeons and befter facilities) was almost certainly not offered because the surgeons concerned would have wanted to try the operation themselves. 
Such a scenario existed in the UK when the first heart transplant was 
undertaken in May 1968. The surgeons were congratulated in a leading article 
in the British Medical Journal for undertaking the 'successful' operation. " 50 
Furthermore, as previously described, the world wanted to believe that such 
operations were possible. The early era of transplantation was described as 
being a time of 'tremendous euphoria. " 151 Public opinion in countries around 
the world virtually forced doctors into attempting heart transplants. All over the 
world, in various 'advanced' countries, it was felt that a transplant had to be 
attempted. There was 'a very nationalistic dimension to it., 1152 It is therefore 
very unlikely that a claim in negligence would have been upheld. 
Of greater concern, however, was the use of the first artificial heart. There is 
little doubt that the recipient of this technology, Haskell Karp, did not give 
informed consent. He and his wife were unaware of many of the problems 
with the pump, as discussed previously. He also had the option of delaying 
the original operation and avoiding the use of the pump as an emergency 
stopgap, but this was not disclosed. 
Even if he had consented to this innovative treatment, it is not certain that this 
would have absolved the doctor of responsibility. In the non medical case of 
R v. Brown' 153 it was accepted that even if a real consent was given, public 
policy issues may prevent the consent from decriminalising certain behaviour. 
So for example, statutes, such as the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 
1985, limit the impact of consent. There is thus a remote possibility that a 
court may find an innovation so unacceptable that consent does not absolve 
the doctor from responsibility. Once again, the evidence of credible experts 
would be determinative. 
For many of the surgeons, professional and public recognition was a stimulus 
to trying out the new operations. ' 154 For many involved in the transplant 
endeavour, there was the desire to achieve more than ordinary professional 
status and recognition. ' 155 Thus, the presentation of alternatives was coloured 
1149 Fox R. in Wellcome Witnesses to Twentieth Century Medicine vol 3: Early Heart Transplant Surgery in the UK. 
Tansey EM, Reynolds LA (Eds). Welcome Trust 1999 at p50. 
1150 Anon. First British heart transplant. BMJ 1968; ii: 315. 
1151 Rochelle D. Thompson T. Hearts. New York: McCall, 1971 at p 167. 
1152 Fox R. in Wellcome Witnesses to Twentieth Century Medicine vol 3: Early Heart Transplant Surgery in the UK. 
Tansey EM, Reynolds LA (Eds). Welcome Trust 1999 at p50. 
1153 R v. Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75 (HL) 
1154 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at xvii 
1155 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to Fail. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1978 at p102. 
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by subjective factors on the part of the doctors. 1156 This was especially so regarding the treatment of Haskell Karp. ' 157 Operations were undertaken 
without obtaining fully informed consent. Many of the patients had little 
understanding of what the operations entailed, little knowledge of risk and personal mortality figures were undoubtedly not disclosed. 
However, whether the doctors would have been found guilty of malpractice is 
a different matter and it could be argued that it would have been highly 
unlikely. At the time these operations were undertaken the law unreservedly 
accepted medical opinion regarding what was acceptable medical practice. Hunter v. Hanley was heard in 1955 and Bolam was heard in 1957 (although 
only fully accepted and applied by the House of Lords in Whitehouse v. Jordan in 1981). Neither case broke new ground but rather stated and 
reaffirmed the law as it had long been accepted. ' 158 Thus a responsible body 
of opinion would have supported the operations that surgeons such as 
Barnard, Cooley and Ross were undertaking. Although the patients did not 
give informed consent, medical experts would have testified that what was 
disclosed was sufficient and acceptable. 
The question then is whether today's laws, especially following Sidaway and 
Bolitho, would have resulted in a different outcome. Medical opinion now 
needs to have a logical basis and be rightly accepted. Because the operations 
were extreme measures and the patients had little other hope, arguably the 
courts would have accepted the desperate attempt to save lives. Although 
courts today could find fault with the extent of disclosure of risk, there were 
few alternatives to offer apart from the option of travelling to another more 
experienced centre. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the doctors concerned 
would have been found negligent, under present UK law, especially given the 
public opinion, enthusiasm and euphoria present at the time. Furthermore, it 
has already been argued that cases such as Bolitho merely appear to assess 
the credibility of the experts. It is extremely unlikely that if Barnard or Cooley 
appeared as expert witnesses, their testimony would not have been accepted 
in full. 
There has not yet been a case in the UK where failure to disclose personal 
results has led to a finding of negligence. That, of course, may change 
following Bristol, which is re-examined next. 
Bristol revisited: 
Bristol was different from the scenario described for the early heart 
transplants because patients (or parents) did have other options. They were 
also not fully informed and therefore did not make an informed choice. 
156 Moore FID. Therapeutic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical trials of new drugs and surgical 
procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: George Braziller. 
1970,358-78 at 
p366. 
1157 Thompson T. Hearts. New York: McCall, 1971 at p2l 1. 
1158 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Bufterworths: London, 3rd ed. 2000, at 416. 
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One of the surgeons was well aware of the concern of professional colleagues about the level of mortality and morbidity in paediatýc cardiac surgery at the hospital. ' 159 Despite this, he operated on further patients who subsequently died. He did not pay sufficient regard to the safety and best interests of the patients concerned when deciding to continue operating. In addition, he misled two sets of parents when he had said that the risks of mortality were 20-25%, a figure that did not accurately reflect his own experience as a surgeon. He therefore denied the parents the facts they needed in order to make informed decisions about their child's treatment. 
The other surgeon continued to operate despite also knowing his results were 
poor and having been made aware of concerns about his work. This was a 
serious departure from safe and proper practice. Again, accurate information 
was not provided to parents. ' 160 
The public inquiry that followed made 198 recommendations, many urging doctors to include patients as active participants. ' 161 However, they remain 
recommendations. They are not enshrined in law, despite the Government 
accepting many of thern. ' 162 Clearly if the surgeons had followed them Bristol 
would not have occurred. Patients (or parents) would have known of the 
surgeons' and unit Is poor results and would have had the option of taking their 
child elsewhere. With the information provided they would have been able to 
make an informed choice. This is what ought to have happened. The law does 
not necessarily follow ethical principles. The question is therefore whether the 
failure of disclosure or the continuation of treatment would have led to a 
charge of negligence being found proven. 
From a legal viewpoint expert testimony will be crucial. Surprisingly, not all 
testimony would be damaging. Many consider the Bristol doctors to have 
been scapegoated for the failures of a whole system. ' 163 Some have even 
disputed the mortality figures provided. 1164A consultant paediatrician who was 
invited to be a member of the panel on the Bristol Inquiry but was later 
withdrawn after he mentioned at an initial meeting that perhaps a surgeon 
should be included on the panel felt the media coverage was simplistic and 
condemnatory. ' 165 He believed all doctors must have shared the deep 
sympathy he felt for the Bristol doctors. He described the Health Secretary's 
response to the GIVIC findings ('if the GIVIC struck off two of the doctors they 
should have struck off all three')' 166 as 'a Pavlovian political response to any 
1159 Ramsay, S. Evidence against "Bristol-case" doctors found proven. Lancet 1998; 351: 1707 
1160 Dyer C. Bristol trust admits liability in baby heart surgery case. BMJ 1999; 319: 213 
1161 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001 
1162 Department of Health. Leaming from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. London: HMSO, 2002 
1163 Smith R. One Bristol, but there could have been many. BMJ 2001; 323: 179-80. 
1164 Gibbs JL, Cunningham D. Volunteered mortality data may be unreliable. BMJ 2002; 324: 1096. 
1165 Barnes N. (Very) short service on the Bristol inquiry. BMJ 1998; 317: 1577-9. 
1166 Warden J. Dobson criticises GMC. BMJ 1998; 316: 1925. 
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situation in which there is serious public anger. " 167 Many senior doctors 
raised serious questions about the GIVIC findings and believed the doctors 
had been tried by the media. ' 168 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, personal performance figures are not 
(and at the time of Bristol certainly were not) currently divulged when 
obtaining consent. Indeed, there are no legal cases in the UK where this has 
been an issue. Thus, this failure to disclose personal mortality figures does 
not necessarily mean that the doctors concerned would have been found 
guilty of negligence on the basis of a failure to inform. 
On the other hand, despite being aware of their poor results, they persisted in 
performing these operations, hoping their results would improve, thereby 
disregarding their immediate patients' interests. Also, most experts would 
have been concerned by the poor mortality rate. Once a health carer performs 
a task, the patient can assume that he has the competence to perform that 
task with skill and care. If the health carer, either knowingly or not, attempts 
something beyond his experience then that will constitute a breach of the 
standard of care. ' 169Furthermore, in the converse situation where the doctor 
holds himself out to be more experienced than he actually is and claims to 
possess the degree of skill and knowledge required, then he must reach that 
standard. ' 170 A similar argument can be made if the doctor holds himself out 
as achieving more successful results than he actually does. It is therefore 
probable that a successful negligence claim could be made. It would be highly 
unlikely for experts to support the continuation of surgery when the results 
had been so poor. Even if some experts could be found in support of the 
defendants' actions, it would still be up to the court to decide if the experts 
were credible and their views were logical and right. 
The problem of learning new techniques also needs to be discussed in the 
light of what happened in Bristol. One of the surgeons blamed 'beginner's bad 
luck' for some of the deaths. Two deaths were explained as part of his 
learning curve. ' 171 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the courts have held that inexperience 
is no defence to a charge of negligence. In Nettleship v. Weston it was held 
that the same standard of care was expected of a learner driver as of an 
experienced driver. ' 172 In medicine, the case of Wilsher v Essex AHA1 
173 also 
established this principle otherwise 'inexperience would frequently be urged 
as a defence to an action for professional negligence. 
" 174 
1167 Barnes N. (Very) short service on the Bristol inquiry. BMJ 1998; 317: 1577-9 at 1577. 
1168 Dunn PM. The Wisheart affair: paediatric cardiological services in Bristol, 1990-5. BMJ 
1998; 317: 1144-5. 
1169 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. Cavendish Publishing: London, 2nd ed. 
2002, p159 
1170 Rv Bateman (1925) LKJB 791. 
1171 Dyer C. Surgeon blamed beginner's bad luck for cardiac deaths. BMJ 1998; 316: 1114. 
1172 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691. 
1173 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1986] 3 All ER 801. 
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It therefore appears clear that, disclosure apart, the doctors at the centre of the Bristol controversy could have been found guilty of negligence for their 
conduct. As argued in the previous chapter, however, it is not the inexperience per se that should lead to a finding of negligence but the lack of 
supervision. 
The failure to disclose their own experience and that they were still learning the technique, on the other hand, may not have been negligent if other doctors in a similar position would not have disclosed such facts. This is an issue that therefore needs to be considered. Because of this, the Bristol 
Inquiry recommended that consent was a process (recommendation 24) and 
as part of that process sufficient information was to be given about the risks, 
uncertainties, alternatives and like outcome to enable an informed choice to 
be made (recommendation 26). 1 17 
VPatients 
were also entitled to be informed 
about the experience of the clinician undertaking the procedure 
(recommendation 102) and the performance of the consultant 
(recommendation 27 
recommendations. ' 1?, 
The Government accepted all of these 
The existence of the patient's right to make his own decisions.... may 
be seen as a basic human right protected by the common law. ' 177 
If the law truly believes this, then it needs to change. A decision cannot be 
made on less than adequate information. It is not in keeping with the meaning 
of informed consent, which, as discussed, is better analysed in terms of 
autonomous authorisation. 1 178 
TWO MEANINGS OF CONSENT: 
As previously mentioned, there are different meanings to 'informed consent' 
with at least two entrenched views, based on different concepts. ' 179 In the first 
sense, informed consent can be analysed in terms of autonomous choice by 
patients: an informed consent is an autonomous authorisation of a medical 
intervention by individual persons. This first sense of informed consent 
requires that a patient does more than express agreement with, yield to, or 
comply with an arrangement or proposal. He or she must actively authorise 
the proposal in the act of consent. A person does not authorise in this sense if 
he or she merely assents to a treatment plan by submission to a doctor's 
authoritative order; nor is there autonomous authorisation if the treatment plan 
is not specific about what is authorised. An informed consent thus occurs if a 
1175 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HIVISO, 2001 
1176 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. London: HMSO, 2002 
1177 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and others. 1 BIVILR 132 
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1178 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001: p78 
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patient with substantial understanding and in substantial absence of control by 
others intentionally authorises the doctor to do something. 
In the second sense, informed consent is analysable in terms of the social 
rules of informed consent in those institutional contexts in which it is 
necessary to obtain legally valid consent from potential patients before 
proceeding. Reduction of risk and avoidance of unfairness and exploitation 
still function as the primary justifications for many professional, regulatory, 
and institutional controls. ' 180 Such requirements appear to be at the heart of 
the signing of the consent form prior to an operation. It is an institutional 
requirement, although it has been claimed that the so-called authority is so 
ambiguous as to be almost completely worthless. ' 181 Furthermore it frequently 
involves a hasty discussion between a patient and junior doctor, whose sole 
aim is to get a signature on a form. Options and alternatives are rarely 
discussed-' 182 
Apart from the dubious usual practice of allowing the most inexperienced 
member of the surgical team to explain the operation to the patient and 'get 
consent', in one study up to 44% of post-operative patients who signed 
consent forms were unaware of the exact nature of the procedure they had 
undergone. ' 183 Similarly, 'consenting' the patient suggests that consent is 
something that is done to the patient, usually for the purposes of avoiding 
legal liability, rather than a process that the patient participates in or 
controls. ' 184 
Informed consent is clearly not always an autonomous act in these settings 
and is not necessarily even a meaningful authorisation. This second sense of 
consent may be understood in terms of institutional rules of consent, because 
informed consent here refers to an institutionally or legally effective 
authorisation from a patient or subject. Such an authorisation is effective if 
obtained through procedures that satisfy the rules that govern specific 
institutional practices of consent. Any consent is therefore claimed to be 
'informed' if it satisfies the operative rules governing the practice. 
The law courts, as has been discussed, appear to have adopted this second 
sense of consent. Institutional rules of informed consent will not, however, 
result in autonomous authorisations. It is clear, therefore, that a physician who 
obtains consent under institutional criteria may fail to meet the rigorous 
standards of the autonomy-based model. 
In turn, Lord Donaldson has stated that consent plays two quite different 
functions in the doctor patient relationship. 1185 One, which he called the legal, 
1180 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 77. 
1181 Rogers v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas Co 119 So 2d 649 (La, 1960). 
1182 Lavelle-Jones C, Byrne DJ, Rice P, Cuschieri A. Factors affecting quality of informed consent. BMJ 
1993; 306: 885-90. 
1183 Byrne DJ, Napier A, Cuschied A. How informed is signed consent? BIVIJ 1988; 296: 839. 
1184 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 at 125. 
1185 Re W [1992] 4 All ER 627,633 
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is to provide a legal justification for care. Without such consent health 
professionals would commit a crime (battery) and a tort (trespass to the 
person) when they touch their patient. The other function, termed 'clinical' by 
Lord Donaldson, is to secure the patient's trust and co-operation. This aspect 
of consent may involve far more extensive counselling on the implications, 
risks and side effects of treatment than the laws of trespass and battery 
require. 
This latter function is more in keeping with the true meaning of informed 
consent, when analysed as an autonomous authorisation. 1 186 Trust and co- 
operation should be at the centre of the doctor patient relationship. The basic 
proposition is that most good relationships, whether professional or personal, 
are built upon truth and integrity, and the trust that this creates. ' 187 However, 
one of the most important reasons that leads to a legal action being brought 
against doctors and hospitals is a quest for an explanation, either to patients 
or relatives, of what went wrong. A survey of 227 litigants who sued 
healthcare providers found that the overwhelming majority were doing so 
because they were dissatisfied with the nature and clarity of the explanations 
they were given and the lack of sympathy displayed by staff after the 
incident. ' 188 
Similarly, the Wilson Report, a review of NHS complaints procedures, found 
that complainants usually want information, an explanation of what happened 
and why, and that failure to provide these often leads to the making of a 
complaint. ' 189 One study showed that where explanations were given, less 
than 15 per cent were considered satisfactory. ' 190 Furthermore there is 
evidence that a patient who feels inadequately informed is more likely to sue if 
there is an adverse event during surgery. ' 191 
While the failure to tell the truth undermines the very foundation of the legal 
process, in the context of the doctor-patient relationship it is often presented 
as an essential part of therapy. ' 192 This is especially so when considering the 
doctor's therapeutic privilege, where the doctor is allowed to exercise 
judgement in deciding what to disclose. As discussed, the information to be 
disclosed, whether volunteered by the doctor or in response to queries from 
the patient, appears to be determined by standards set by the medical 
profession. This undermines the patient's right and ability to make a choice. 
1186 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001: p78 
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While it is clear that the two functions of consent described by Lord 
Donaldson' 193 
,a clinical function and a legal function, correspond to the 
preceding description of the two meanings of informed consent, it must be 
recognised that the rules of consent need not conform to only one of the two 
classes of definitions discussed. They should conform to both. Many rules of 
informed consent in policy contexts reflect a strong and definite reliance on 
informed consent in the first sense, i. e. based on autonomous decision- 
making. This first definition ought to serve as the benchmark for the 
evaluation of the moral adequacy of rules framed for institutional purposes. 
This follows from the understanding that the primary goal of informed consent 
in the medical care setting is to enable potential patients and subjects to make 
autonomous decisions about whether to authorise an intervention. ' 194 
Despite this, as has been argued earlier, the law in England and Scotland 
does not accept this when dealing with the information that needs to be 
disclosed to patients presenting for treatment. The law still relies heavily on 
professional opinion, thereby failing to respect patient autonomy. Even when 
a judge described a particular operation as unusual there still did not appear 
to be a duty for the surgeon to disclose this' 195 because the technique used 
had not been professionally rejected as wrong. ' 196 
DISCLOSURE IN THE RESEARCH SETTING: 
The obligation of full disclosure, however, has been accepted in law when 
considering the consent process for research projects, thereby preventing 
exploitation of vulnerable patients. Although a doctor has the discretion to 
withhold certain information from his patient if he believes it would prove 
harmful if given, the so-called therapeutic privilege, this option is not 
acceptable in the research setting. Thus in the case of Halushka v University 
of Saskatchewan, the judge stated 
there can be no exceptions to the ordinary requirements of disclosure 
in the case of research as there may well be in ordinary medical 
practice. ' 197 
The court here was insistent that the research subject was spared no detail of 
his relevant condition or of his exposure to risk. The case concerned issues of 
consent when recruiting research subjects. The research project involved the 
testing of a new drug to be used for anaesthesia and the subject had been 
reassured that the test was safe. All he was told was that a catheter was to be 
inserted into his vein. There was no mention made of this catheter being 
advanced into his heart nor that the defendants had not yet used the research 
drug in question. The research subject suffered a cardiac arrest during the 
procedure. One of the appeal judges stated: 
1193 Re W [1992] 4 All ER 627,633. 
1194 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF- Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
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The researcher does not have to balance the probable effect of lack of treatment against the risk involved in the treatment itself. The example of risks properly hidden from a patient when it is important that he 
should not worry can have no application in the field of research. The subject of medical [research] is entitled to a full and frank disclosure of all the facts, probabilities and opinions which a reasonable man might be expected to consider before giving his consent. ' 198 
The point of raising the subjective element and higher standards of disclosure 
used by the law when dealing with issues of research is that it highlights that 
the law, when it so wishes, is fully prepared to accept and respect patient 
autonomy. Furthermore, it also illustrates that the law does accept that the doctor patient relationship is not uniform and circumstances may be present 
which require different rules to be followed. The requirements to satisfy the legal obligations for information disclosure are thus much greater in the 
research setting than in the normal therapeutic doctor patient relationship. 
It must be pointed out, however, that Halushka is a Canadian case and is only 
being reviewed because there is a paucity of UK case law in this respect. 
Though the ethics of many [research trials] have been challenged by 
professional and lay critics, in many of these there has been no 
detectable damage. 
... 
A further reason for the paucity of lawsuits is 
the fact that the subject is normally not aware nor in possession of the 
evidence to demonstrate his interests have not been properly 
protected. 1199 
Until recently, research on human subjects in the United Kingdom remained 
virtually untouched by specific laws, although a significant amount of quasi- 
law existed on which the practice of those involved was based . 
1200 Thus, 
medical research in humans in the UK was regulated through guidelines and 
advice from various professional and governmental authorities. 1201 
More recently, the European Trials Directive 2001/20/EC was developed with 
the intention of simplifying and harmonising regulation of clinical trials across 
the European Community. The provisions of this directive have been 
translated into United Kingdom regulations through the Medicines for Human 
Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (Sl 2004/1031), which came into force 
on the 1st May 2004. This should lead to tighter control than occurred 
previously, with new responsibilities placed on those managing and 
conducting clinical trials. 
1198 Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, 52 WWR 608 (Sask CA), 1966 at 616 
1199 Jaffe LL. Law as a System of Control. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund PA. New York: 
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1200 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p16- 
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The law, however, cannot be more than a fallback position in the control of 
medical research, control lying in the first place in the hands of the medical 
profession through self regulation. In the absence of formal statutory 
regulation, the responsibility for regulating medical research is entrusted 
largely to research ethics committees. 1202 
Furthermore, 
Should the public, and patients in particular, come to believe that there 
is a real likelihood of being involved in a trial unknowingly, or, having 
agreed to participate, discovering that they have been given 
inadequate or inaccurate information, the supply of volunteers for 
research will dry up and patients' confidence in general health care will 
be seriously undermined. 1203 
To reiterate, the importance of the Halushka case lies in the court's 
endorsement of a philosophy of full disclosure in the research setting. This is 
as close as possible to recognising the ethical principle of respect for 
autonomy. Free and full consent is thus central to the propriety and legality of 
clinical research. 1204 
However, while the law appears to accept a different doctor patient 
relationship, and hence different rules, depending on whether one is 
undertaking a normal therapeutic intervention or research, the courts have 
made no allowance for innovation and consider it to be part of treatment. As 
has been argued throughout this thesis, innovation, whether of the 
experimental or personal type, is distinct from both normal therapy and 
research and different rules may need to be applied. 
Furthermore, it is ethically desirable for patients to be as informed as possible 
and while 'it would not be correct to say that every moral obliOation involves a 
legal duty, every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation. , 205 If society and 
the courts do believe in the ethical principle of autonomy and self- 
determination, then a different legal duty of disclosure, one that does not 
merely pay lip service to the ethical principle, must be imposed. As previously 
mentioned, 
The patient's interest consists of his right to self-determination ... 
It is 
well established that in the ultimate the right of the individual is 
paramount. 1206 
1202 Brazier M. Medicine, Patients and the Law. 3rd ed. London: Penguin, 2003, P398- 
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Good practice is not interchangeable with the legal minimum. Lord Scarman's 
comments in Sidaway' 207 , mentioned earlier, while not necessarily indicative 
of all legal opinion, encapsulate this ethical position. 
Autonomy is associated with individual choice and self-determination. It is 
reflects mutual respect. From an institutional point of view, informed consent 
is often understood primarily in terms of the obligation to inform patients. 
Disclosure has traditionally been portrayed as a necessary condition of valid 
informed consent, especially in the courts, which have spoken of disclosure of 
facts as the staple ingredient in informed consent. The legal doctrine of 
consent has been primarily a law of disclosure based on a general obligation 
to exercise reasonable care by giving information. Litigation has erupted over 
the absence of informed consent because of an alleged civil injury to one's 
person or property that is intentionally or negligently inflicted by a physician's 
failure to disclose - an injury that is measured in terms of, and compensated 
by, monetary damages. This focus results from the legal system's need for a 
functional mechanism to assess injury and responsibility. However, although 
disclosure requirements are vitally important in legal and regulatory contexts, 
from the moral point of view, informed consent has less to do with the liability 
of professionals as agents of disclosure and more to do with the autonomous 
choices of patients and subjects. 1208 
Although UK law pays little respect to patient autonomy, other common law 
jurisdictions have long accepted the right to autonomous decision-making and 
this has had an impact on their laws regarding information disclosure. 
FOREIGN LAW- IN BRIEF: 
In Australia, the judge in the case of Ellis v. Wallsend District Hospital' 209 
relied on Lord Scarman's dissenting opinion in Sidaway and the judgement of 
King CJ in F v. R 1210 (reviewed below) to find that a doctor was in breach of 
his duty in failing to warn of the risk of paralysis and of failure to relieve pain, 
despite medical evidence to the contrary in support of non-disclosure. The 
case however failed on causation. 
The seminal case of Rogers v Whiftaker also rejected the Bolam test. 
121 1 The 
claimant, who was almost blind in one eye, consulted an eye surgeon about 
an operation and the possible risks associated with such an operation. The 
defendant made no reference to the slight risks to the good eye. Mason CJ 
stated: 
... 
That standard [of care] is not determined solely or even primarily by 
reference to the practice followed or supported by a responsible body 
of opinion ... in the 
field of non-disclosure of risk and provision of 
advice and information, the Bolam principle has been discarded and 
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instead, the courts have adopted the principle that, while evidence of 
acceptable medical practice is a useful guide for the courts, it is for the 
courts to adjudicate on what is the appropriate standard of care after 
giving weight to the paramount consideration that a person is entitled to 
make his own decisions about his own life . 
1212 
What was important was whether the risk was material. If so then it had to be 
disclosed. 
A risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient's position, if warned of the risk, would 
be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or 
should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the 
risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. 1213 
Further, the court held there was a distinction to be made between cases 
concerning diagnosis and treatment, when professional standards would play 
a large part in determining negligence, and risk disclosure, which was not 
about accepted practice, except possibly when therapeutic privilege was 
involved. What was important was whether the doctor had communicated 
relevant and sufficient information to allow the patient to make an informed 
decision. The patient had expressed concern about the possible danger to her 
good eye and therefore the risk was material. 
1214 Similarly, the Supreme Court of South Australia, in F v. R, held that all 
material risks must be disclosed. In this case, which concerned the failure to 
discuss other options of contraception and a failure to warn of a failure rate of 
less than 1 %, the judge stated: 
Mr Perry's [counsel for the doctor] answer was that the responsible 
body of medical opinion should prevail over the view of the Court. That 
would mean that there was no room for the opinion of the Court on vital 
issues. The Court's function would be limited to ascertaining that there 
was a responsible body of medical opinion and deciding whether the 
surgeon had followed it. But in the end it is the Court which must say 
whether there was a duty owed and a breach of it. The Court will have 
been guided and assisted by the expert evidence. ... 
But the Court 
does not merely follow expert evidence slavishly to a decision. The 
Court considers and weighs up all admissible evidence which it has 
received. If the Court did merely follow the path apparently pointed by 
expert evidence with no critical consideration of it and other evidence, it 
would abdicate its duty to decide, on the evidence, whether in law a 
duty existed and has not been discharged. ... 
I can find nothing in 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee which justifies any 
suggestion that evidence of the practice obtaining in the medical 
profession is automatically decisive of any issue in an action against a 
1212 Rogers v Whittaker [1993] 4 Med LR 79,83 
1213 Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 490. 
1214 FvR (1983) 33 SASR 189. 
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surgeon for damages in negligence. Sometimes that evidence will be decisive, sometimes not. It is least likely to be decisive when the 
allegation is of a failure to warn or heed complaints of pain, ie where no information about the method of procedure or basis of diagnosis is 
required. 
... 
I respectfully think that some of the cases in England have 
concentrated rather too heavily on the practice of the medical 
profession. The ultimate question ... is not whether the defendant's 
conduct accords with the practice of his profession ... 
but whether it 
conforms to the standard of reasonable care demanded by law. That is 
a question for the court and the duty of deciding it cannot be delegated 
to any profession or group in the commun ity. 1215 
Thus, all material risks should be disclosed to a patient prior to obtaining the 
patient's consent, a material risk being defined as 
when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should 
know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance 
to the risk ... 
in determining whether or not to forego the proposed 
therapy. 1216 
Similarly, in the Canadian case of Reibl v. Hughes it was held that: 
[the] scope of the duty of disclosure ... is not a question that 
is to be 
concluded on the basis of medical evidence alone ... What is under 
consideration here is the patient's right to know what risks are involved 
in undergoing or forgoing certain surgery or other treatment. 1217 
UK LAW - REVISITED: 
It is clear, therefore, that the UK, when considering standards of information 
disclosure, differs from other jurisdictions, such as Australia, Canada and 
parts of the United States. Indeed, the position is at odds with that in most 
other common law countries and is notably isolated within the context of the 
European Community. Patients in these other jurisdictions will be better 
informed than their UK counterparts where the decision on what information to 
disclose appears, in the main, to be decided by health carers. This goes 
against everything that has been argued regarding patient autonomy. From an 
autonomy based perspective there is a requirement to disclose any 
information which a patient needs to know to allow full participation in the 
decision making process. 
The discussion regarding the duty to disclose so far has revolved around the 
disclosure of potential risks arising out of a particular treatment. 
Earlier, risks 
relevant to the particular doctor were mentioned and concerns raised about 
1215 FvR (1983) 33 SASR 189,194. 
1216 Canterbury v. Spence (1972) 464 F (2d) 772,787 
1217 Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1,13. 
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unwise enthusiasts, poorly trained staff and inadequate facilities. 1218 The 
question that needs to be asked is whether these risks need to be disclosed. 
Kennedy and Grubb, commenting on the American case of Faya and Rossi v Almaraz 1219 , suggest that courts in the UK would take the view that non- disclosure by a doctor of his or her HIV or hepatitis status breached the doctor's duty of care . 
1220 This risk is one not inherent in the procedure but 
rather related to the doctor concerned. Legally however there is no difference. The patient has been exposed to a risk and the question is whether it was 
negligent not to disclose it. The court held that it was negligent. 
Similarly, in Behringer Estate v Princeton Medical Center 1221 the court ruled that a hospital had the right and the duty to inform patients that the plaintiff 
plastic surgeon was infected with HIV, even though the surgeon contested 
that the risk of transmission was negligible. This implies that the court 
believed the patient had a right to know about this risk. 
UK courts have not considered the question of the doctor's duty to disclose 
alternative forms of treatment. However, this has been considered in Canada 
where a failure to disclose that a more conservative form of treatment was 
available to the patient was held to be a breach of the doctor's duty to the 
patient. 1222 Thus the failure of a doctor to disclose essential information, such 
as alternative treatment options, did not allow the patient to make a choice. 
Using similar reasoning, Kennedy and Grubb pose a question of particular 
pertinence to this thesis: is a doctor required to disclose his inexperience and 
thus the greater likelihood of something going wrong? When league tables are 
available would the doctor's position in that table or that of his hospital need to 
be disclosed? 
The Bristol Inquiry report recommended that patients are entitled to be 
informed about the experience of the clinician undertaking the procedure. 1223 
Reasonable conduct does not vary according to a defendant's level of 
experience and once a health carer performs a task the patient can assume 
he has the competence to perform it with skill and care. 1224 Once a doctor 
holds himself out as being more experienced than he actually is, he must 
reach that standard. 1225 A doctor would be negligent if he undertook treatment 
for which he knew he lacked the necessary experience and skill. 
1218 Dollery CT. Clinical pharmacology. In Ethical committees for clinical research: report of a symposium,. Medico- 
pharmaceutical forum, London. 1982, p127. 
1219 Faya and Rossi v Almaraz (1993) 620 A. 2d: 327 (Maryland CA). 
1220 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. 3rd ed. London: Butterworths, 2000, at 712-3. 
1221 Behringer Estate v Princeton Medical Center (1992) 592 A. 2d: 1251 (New Jersey Supreme Court) 
1222 Haughia v Paine (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 624 (Sask CA) 
1223 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001: 
Recommendation 102. 
1224 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002, at p 159. 
1225 R v. Bateman (1925) 94 LJKB 791 (CCA) 
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However, the law in the UK allows medical authority to set the standards. taking precedence over patient autonomy. It is therefore likely that, provided a responsible body of medical opinion would not have disclosed this information, any claim for non-disclosure of inexperience would fail. Current 
medical practice in the UK is not to discuss personal results, thereby denying 
patients material information that is needed to make an autonomous choice. 
There are currently no UK legal cases specifically addressing the issue of disclosure of either alternative treatment or the operator's expedence. However, the question of whether the operator was sufficiently experienced has recently been considered in the case of Ryan v East London and City, HA 
and ORS. 1 26 In this case one of the allegations was that the defendants were too inexperienced to perform the operation. The expert witnesses were split 
on this and the judge declined to find the defendants liable. 
While I am satisfied that ... 
[the operation] did indeed stretch Mr 
Hamlyn in particular to the limit I am not prepared to find that on the 
totality of the evidence I have heard that he, and/or Mr Sabin fell below 
the appropriate standard. 1227 
The question of disclosure of the operator's experience and track record is a 
major issue regarding the consent process. A patient describing her ordeal 
during treatment for cancer complained that she was not told that four doctors 
furthering their education would be actively involved in her care and her 
agreement was not sought. 1228 Similarly, an editorial on carotid 
endarterectomy stated that it was imperative for all vascular surgeons to use 
their own personal and unit data, as opposed to citing the results of 
international studies, in discussions with patients on the risk associated with 
the procedure. 1229 
This was endorsed by the GIVIC in the Bristol case. The GIVIC insisted that 
surgeons must quote their own mortality figures. In this case the estimates of 
the risk of death given were substantially less than the true risk of surgery in 
that unit. There was no justification for the rosy glow where the operations 
were elective, could be performed elsewhere and the difference between 
success and failure was potentially many years of life. It appears to be self- 
evident that parents had a right to know the truth from both referring 
cardiologists and the surgeon. 
Similarly, an article on the use of laparoscopic herniorraphy stated that for the 
patient to be able to give informed consent surgeons untrained in the 
technique but capable of performing 'open' surgery would need to say that: 
1226 Ryan v East London and City, HA and Ors (2001) Transcript No HQ0004817- 
1227 Ryan v East London and City, HA and Ors (2001) Transcript No HQ0004817, at 24. 
1228 Blennerhassett M. Deadly charades. BMJ 1998; 316: 1890-3. 
1229 Naylor AR, London NJM, Bell PRF. Carotid endarterectomy versus carotid angioplasty. Lancet 1997: 349- '103-4, 
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the results of laparoscopic repair ("keyhole surgery") are similar to those of open operation with regard to recurrence and adverse events but that the procedure costs more and hurts less. If return to full activity 
was an issue, as it is for many patients, then they would have to tell the 
patient that return to work is likely to be slower after open repair, but that a government agency and they themselves prefer this method. '230 
Clearly, if the patient then chooses laparoscopic repair, referral to a suitable 
colleague who undertakes such operations is required. In a previous chapter it 
was stated that NICE was reluctant to recommend laparoscopic hernia repair. 
The implication here is that to obtain consent not only is knowledge of the 
relevant guideline required but also disclosure that the recommendations are 
not being followed. 
The question of disclosure of experience was central to the Australian case of 
Chappel V Hart. 1231 The case concerned the failure to advise of risks inherent 
in a medical procedure. The plaintiff successfully argued that she had not 
been warned of the risk of injury and would not have consented had she 
known of the risks. Furthermore she claimed that she would have deferred 
treatment until someone more experienced was available to undertake the 
procedure and therefore the injury she suffered, damage to her vocal cords, 
was due to the failure of that disclosure. This was accepted by the court. 
There was, however, no evidence that Dr Chappel had performed the 
operation negligently. 
Australian courts had already accepted that, following Rogers v Whittaker, 1232 
doctors should disclose material risks. 1233 Chappel v Hart was an unusual 
case in that the patient had made her concerns very clear. If those concerns 
had been met, as required by law, the likelihood is that she would not have 
been injured. One of the judges speaking for the majority said: 
Although no statistical or other evidence was called to demonstrate that 
recourse to a more experienced surgeon would necessarily have 
reduced the risk of the kind of injury that occurred (and while some risk 
was unavoidable), intuition and commonsense suggest that the higher 
the skill of the surgeon, the less is the risk of any perforation of the 
oesophagus into the mediastinum. ... 
intuition and commonsense 
suggest that the greater the skill and more frequent the performance, 
the less the risk of perforation. 1234 
Thus, although the nature of the risk would have been the same had she 
been 
operated on by someone more experienced, the degree of risk would 
have 
been diminished. 
1230 Motson RW. Why does NICE not recommend laparoscopic herniorraphy? BMJ 2002; 
324: 1092-4 at 1093 
1231 Chappel v. Hart [1998] HCA 55. 
1232 Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 
1233 Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 490. 
1234 Chappel v Hart [1998] 72 AUR 1344 (HCA) at para 97. 
22-1 
If the foreseeable risk to Mrs Hart was the loss of an opportunity to undergo surgery at the hands of a more experienced surgeon, the duty 
would have been a duty to inform her that there were more experienced surgeons practising in the field. Because the risk was a risk of physical injury, the duty was to inform her of that risk. 1235 
There are problems with this line of argument. Firstly it is impossible for every 
patient to demand referral to the most experienced surgeon. The most 
experienced surgeon can only operate on a few of the total number of cases 
requiring treatment. The vast majority of patients will therefore have to be 
treated by less experienced doctors. Also, the only way to get to become the 
most experienced surgeon in a particular field is to undertake the most cases. 
One of the judges in Chappel addressed the first point. 
To the complaint that [the experienced surgeon] could not possibly 
undertake every Dohlman's operation (any more than the most skilful 
barrister can appear for every client) the answer comes back. This was 
not an ordinary patient. It was an inquisitive, persistent and anxious 
one who was found to have asked a particular question to which she 
received no proper answer. Had a proper answer been given, as the 
law required, it was found that she would not have undergone the 
operation at the hands of Dr Chappel when she did. 1236 
This implies that, in Australia, if a case is brought against a surgeon for failure 
to disclose his experience or what his results were (as recommended by the 
Bristol Inquiry report 1237), when asked, and injury befalls the patient, a claim in 
negligence could succeed. It also implies different standards of care 
depending on the experience of the operator because no evidence was 
presented that the performance of the operation was undertaken negligently 
by Dr Chappel. Indeed in the UK the judge in the case of Ashcroft v Mersey 
RHA stated that 
the more skilled a person is, the more care that is expected of him. 1238 
The court expected a higher degree of care from someone professing to be a 
specialist. 
However, what also needs to be born in mind in Chappel is that there was an 
element of subjectivity in the standard of care required because the patient 
had been so persistent and had made her concerns very clear. This was no 
ordinary patient. This is, as argued, much more in keeping with the principle of 
1235 Chappel v Hart [1998] 72 AU R 1344 (HCA) at para 10 
1236 Chappel v Hart [1998] 72 AUR 1344 (HCA) at para 99. 
1237 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at 
the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HIVISO, 2001: 
Recommendation 102. 
1238 Ashcroft v Mersey RHA [1983] 2 All ER 245 at 247. 
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respect for autonomy. It is for the individual patient to decide what he or she ought to know, if true individual decision-making is to be allowed. 
Would a lower standard of care be acceptable if a junior identified himself as such to the patient? An analysis of a similar situation was undertaken in the 
previously discussed case of Nettleship v Weston. 1239 
This brings me to the defence of volenti non fit injuria. Does it apply to the instructor? In former times this defence was used almost as an 
alternative defence to contributory negligence. Either defence defeated 
the action. Now that contributory negligence is not a complete defence, 
but only ground for reducing the damages, the defence of volenti non fit 
injuria has been closely considered, and, in consequence, it has been 
severely limited. Nothing will suffice short of an agreement to waive 
any claim for negligence. The plaintiff must agree, expressly or implied, 
to waive any claim for the injury that may befall him due to lack of 
reasonable care by the defendant; or more accurately, due to the 
failure of the defendant to measure up to the standard of care that the 
law requires of him. 1240 
However, it is unlikely that a court would accept that any such agreement by a 
patient was truly voluntary rather than reached under the duress of the 
circumstances. Within a state organised National Health Service, the courts 
are unlikely to entertain arguments that the standard of care may be lowered 
by agreement. 'Dumbing down' of the duty is contrary to public PoliCY. 1241 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear what significance a patient may place on 
being treated by a Senior House Officer rather than a Specialist Registrar. 
Unless the patient knew what either was capable of, disclosure of this 
information would not lead to a real choice being made. In other words, the 
patient would need to understand the implications of any disclosure that is 
made. 
The problem is how to reconcile two different requirements. On the one hand 
doctors need to learn on the job and obtain the necessary experience. This is 
in the interests of society and benefits future patients. On the other hand, the 
patient under the doctor's care needs to be protected from potential harm or 
at least to have the risk of harm minimised. 
One answer to this dilemma, discussed in the previous chapter, lies in 
adequate supervision. If a doctor lacks the competence to undertake a 
particular procedure, whatever he does to the patient must be under 
supervision by a more experienced colleague, as recommended by the Bristol 
Inquiry. 1242 Recommendation 99 proposed that doctors undertaking 
procedures for the first time need to be properly trained and directly 
1239 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581. 
1240 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,587 g/h/j. 
1241 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p423-4. 
1242 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's 
heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001 
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supervised. The Government accepted this recommendation. 124 - The appropriate course of action, therefore, appears to be for the junior doctor to disclose their inexperience to the patient but also to state that they will be directly supervised by a more senior and experienced colleague. However, 
while in the main inexperienced trainee doctors are supervised by 
consultants, the same cannot be said of consultants attempting new procedures. 
However, there is some evidence that this recommendation regarding 
supervision is starting to be put into practice. 1244 Consultant surgeons hoping 
to limit their learning curve when starting to undertake the 'Ross procedure' all 
undertook a course in aortic root surgery, refined their surgical technique 
through cadaveric dissection, undertook the first operation with an expert, and 
later assisted each other with the operation. The authors felt that these 
strategies had paid dividends, not only in limiting mortality but also in 
minimising the morbidity that would have been associated with such an 
operation. 
If it is accepted that doctors should disclose their experience to the patient, 
should they also disclose that the procedure they are undertaking is 
experimental or innovative at a personal level? 
Failure to obtain any consent could lead to a charge of battery, as discussed 
earlier. However it is more likely that the patient would claim that, although 
consent was given, all the relevant issues had not been discussed. The case 
would then be heard in negligence. The Bristol Inquiry recommended that 
patients are always entitled to know the extent to which a procedure which 
they are about to undergo is innovative or experimental. 1245 There have been 
very few cases in the UK in which this issue was raised. In the case of child B, 
discussed in an earlier chapter, the experimental nature of the proposed 
treatment was specifically referred to. However, the case turned on whether 
the health authority was justified in refusing to fund the treatment. 1246 
A more recent case concerned a patient who had been referred to an 
orthopaedic surgeon because of pain in her spine. 1247 After a number of 
operations, including a lumbar spinal decompression and fusion, the patient 
was left with bladder, bowel and sexual dysfunction. One of the issues before 
the court was whether the plaintiffs consent to the operation had been 
negligently obtained and, if so, whether she would have undergone the 
operation had consent been properly sought. 
1243 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health's Response to the 
Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. CM 5363. 
London: HMSO, 2002 
1244 Hasan A, Pozzi M, Hamilton JRL. New surgical procedures: can we minimise the leaming curve? BMJ 
2000; 320: 171-3 
1245 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's 
heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HIVISO, 
2001 
1246 Rv Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B (a minor) (1995) 23 BMLR 1 (CA). 
1247 Newbury v Bath DHA 1998,47BMLR 138 
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The plaintiff argued that the method used, the insertion of Harrington rods, was so exceptional that the surgeon was expected to explain that to the 
plaintiff. The judge stated: 
the issue here is whether the plaintiff was entitled to more information than she was given. I accept that there may well be circumstances 
where a patient is entitled to be told that a proposed operation is not in the mainstream of treatment. That would ... be so if it involved a method which was entirely new or even relatively untried. ... My personal view is that it would have been desirable to tell [the patient] 
that the use of Harrington rods for this kind of surgery was unusual and to set out the alternatives ... 
[The surgeon] was, however, under no duty to do So. 1248 
Thus, the judge appeared to distinguish between an unusual procedure and 
an experimental one. The implication was that an experimental procedure 
would need to be disclosed. 
However, in Canada it was held that a distinction was to be made between 
the information needing to be disclosed if the case was one of research as 
compared to whether it was a case of innovative therapy. It was not accepted 
that every new development in medical methodology was research as this 
would discourage advances in the field of medicine. 1249 
Canadian law therefore appears to hold that innovation is to be distinguished 
from research. A similar decision was made in the American case of Karp v 
coo/eY1250. 
At this point it might be pertinent to return to the issue of therapeutic privilege 
discussed earlier. The acceptance that certain facts may be omitted only 
applies to certain specific items that the doctor must show would distress the 
patient if disclosed. As a general rule jurisdictions with an objective patient- 
based standard of disclosure are less inclined to entertain notions of 
therapeutic privilege than those utilising professional based standards. 1251 
For example, although early North Carolina law stated that 'any conflict 
between [the physician's primary duty to do what is best for the patient] and 
that of a frightening disclosure ordinarily should be resolved in favor of the 
primary d Uty, 1252 , 
the Appellate Court later ruled that these earlier cases no 
longer reflected the law of informed consent. 1253 
In Australia, the Supreme Court of South Australia held that 
1248 Newbury v Bath DHA 1998,47BMLR 138,150. 
1249 Zimmer v. Ringrose (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 215 (Alberta Court of Appeal) 
1250 Karp v. Cooley 493 F 2d 408 (1974) (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth 
Circuit) 
1251 Giesen D. International Medical Malpractice Law. JCB Mohr: Tubigen, 1988, at para 377 
1252 Watson v. Clutts, 136 SE2d 617,621 (NC 1964) 
1253 Nelson v. Patdck, 326 SE2d 45 (NC App 1985) 
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The extent of the duty of disclosure must depend greatly on the 
patient's expressed or apparent desire for information 
... An express and apparently seriously intended request for information necessary to 
make an informed decision will ordinarily place the doctor under an obligation to give a truthful and careful answer. I say "ordinarily" because there may be circumstances in which reasonable care for the 
patient may justify or even require an evasive or less than fully candid 
answer even to a direct request; and a doctor may in the exercise of his skill and judgement reasonably judge that a request is made, not 
out of a desire for a frank answer but out of a desire for reassurance. A 
doctor should hesitate long, however, before withholding the full truth 
as to real risk of harm or failure when asked to explain them. ... The governing consideration is the right of every human being to make 
the decisions which affect his own life and welfare and to determine the 
risks which he is willing to undertake. The presumption is clearly in 
favour of disclosure of the information which is relevant to the making 
of the decision. 1254 
And although the leading American case of Canterbury v. Spence admitted 
that 
the second exception [to the general rule of disclosure] obtains when 
risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the patient as to 
become unfeasible or contra-indicated from a medical point of view ... 
the court continued 
[but] to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully 
circumscribed ..., 
for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule 
itself. 1255 
This was reiterated in the US President's Commission in 'Making Health Care 
Decisions': 
The obvious danger with such an exception is the ease with which it 
can swallow the rule, thereby legitimating wholesale noncompliance 
with the general obligation of disclosure. Accordingly, some courts and 
commentators hold that the scope of therapeutic privilege should be 
severely circumscribed, and that, at the least, the privilege should not 
apply in situations when the potential harm to the patient from full 
disclosure would result not from the disclosure itself but from a 
treatment decision the practitioner fears the patient might make as a 
result of the information disclosed. 
1256 
This implies that it would not be acceptable to utilise therapeutic pdvilege 
when discussing innovative practice, whether of the experimental type or 
1254 F v. R (1983) 33 SASR 189,192 
1255 Canterbury v. Spence 464 F2d 772,789 (DC Cir 1972) 
1256 President's Cornmission: Making Health Care Choices. US Government Printing 
Office: 1983, at 95-6 
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when learning due to inexperience (i. e. personal innovation). in terms of 
prioritising what any patient would want to know, the fact that the treatment 
was innovative would be high on any patient's list, as would knowledge of the 
experience of the operator. Disclosure of both would lead to the patient being treated in an autonomous manner and thus make an informed choice. Without 
that knowledge it is submitted that an informed choice cannot possibly be 
made. Thus, therapeutic privilege cannot be used to justify not telling the 
patient about the innovator's inexperience in case it unduly worries them. 
Evidence of change?: 
There is some evidence that the deferential respect shown to the medical 
profession in the UK is diminishing 1257 , although earlier in this chapter it was 
argued that this is not quite to the extent that some commentators believe. 
However, there have been a few recent cases where the judge has assessed, 
and rejected, the reasonableness of medical practice. In McAllister v. 
Lewisham and North Southwark HA Rougier J held a senior consultant 
neurosurgeon liable in negligence for failing to disclose adequate information 
regarding the risks associated with a particular operation. 
I have come to the conclusion that those who say that the warnings 
given ... were 
inadequate were right ... 
It is in this sphere that I am 
compelled to hold that Mr Strong [consultant neurosurgeon] fell below 
the standard which could have been expected of him. 1258 
In Lybert v. Warrington HA 1259 the court held that a warning given by the 
defendant was inadequate. Most importantly, in Smith v. Tunbridge Wells 
HA 1260 the judge directly rejected expert opinion. In this case Morland J held a 
consultant negligent for not giving a patient a warning of a particular risk, even 
though it was accepted that, in failing to do so, the defendant was doing what 
other experienced, competent surgeons would have done. He held that 
omission to be neither reasonable nor responsible. 
In my judgement ... general surgeons 
in 1988 ... would 
have regarded 
it as the proper and accepted practice to warn such a patient of the risk 
of impotence. 1261 
The previously mentioned case of Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS 
Trustl 262 has also indicated that the courts will depart from the medical 
professional approach if they see fit, the ultimate test being what the court 
itself thinks was a reasonable amount of information to give the patient. 
1263 
However, although the court here appeared supportive of the individual 
patient approach, it concluded that in this case it would not be proper 
for the 
1257 Marriot vW Midlands RHA and Others [1999] Lloyd's Rep Med 
23. 
1258 McAllister v. Lewisham and North Southwark HA [1994] 5 Med 
LR 343,352. 
1259 Lybert v. Warrington HA [1996] 7 Med LIR 71 
1260 Smith v. Tunbridge Wells HA [1994] 5 Med LR 334 
1261 Smith v. Tunbridge Wells HA [1994] 5 Med LR 334,388. 
1262 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998) 48 
BMLR 118, CA. 
1263 McCall Smith A. Obtaining consent for examination and treatment. 
BMJ 2001; 32-2: 810-1. 
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courts to interfere with the clinical opinion of the expert medical men 
responsible. 1264 
In Penney, Palmer and Cannon v. East Kent HA1265 the judges did not blindly follow expert evidence. The opinion of the defendants' experts, that it was 
appropriate to classify a slide as 'negative' (for tumour), was held to be 
illogical given the factual finding of what the slide disclosed. In this regard, the 
judge did not apply the Bolarn test because he was required to make findings 
of fact, i. e. what was on the slide. Both sets of experts agreed that the 
screeners, were wrong. What was further debated, however, was whether their 
conduct was excusable. This is a question of standards and thus does fall 
within the Bolam principle. The judge had to decide what ought to have been 
done. This is a normative question. It implies, once again, that judges are 
prepared to set standards for the profession, rather than merely accepting 
professional practice. We thus seem to be moving away from a descriptive 
doctrine towards a normative one and setting standards for doctors based, in 
the words of Montrose, on an ethical foundation. 1266 
An ethical foundation: 
As has been argued, this is a far better foundation on which to base these 
standards, not only from the 'patient's autonomy' perspective but also from 
that of the medical profession itself. The General Medical Council, for 
example, states that doctors are expected to be aware of the legal principles 
set by relevant case law regarding consent, this case law giving a guide to 
what should be considered the minimum requirements of good practice. 1267 
However, what needs to be disclosed in law is that which no reasonably 
prudent doctor would fail to disclose. There is little way of doctors knowing 
exactly what they need to disclose until after the event. 1268 
There is even great difficulty in identifying a common practice amongst 
doctors with regard to information disclosure. 
It is precisely because a lack of knowledge of what other doctors tell 
their patients that a signed form that merely states that the patient has 
consented to, for example, 'radiotherapy to the chest wall and adjacent 
lymph node areas' is totally inadequate from both the doctor's and the 
patient's point of view ... no oncologist 
knows what the professional 
standard is in this situation. The signing of a consent form is an 
obligato7 ritual which has little value in terms of meaningful 
consent. 
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Thus the law fails on both counts. it fails to provide guidance for 
doctors and 
also fails to provide a remedy for patients who claim they have not 
been 
1264 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998) 48 BMLR 
118, CA. 
1265 Penney, Palmer and Cannon v. East Kent HA [2000] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep Med 41 (CA) 
9- 1266 Montrose JL. Is negligence an Ethical or a Sociological Concept? 
1 58,21 MLR 259-ý 
1267 General Medical Council. Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. 
February 1999. 
1268 Brazier M. Patient Autonomy and Consent to Treatment: the Role of the 
Law? (1987) 7LS 169. 
1269 Paterson IC. Consent to Treatment: Somebody's Moved the Goalposts. 
Clin Oncology 1994; 6: 179 at 181 
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properly informed. The law is simply too blunt an instrument, applied post hoc, and too far removed from the practical realities of the consulting room or hospital ward . 
1270 The medical and legal professions, and the larger society to which they belong, thus have not dealt satisfactoMy with the social, moral, 
and legal issues involved in therapeutic innovation with human subjects as 
exemplified by the Karp case. 1271 UK law has not considered many of the 
aspects of innovation, especially with regard to disclosure of information 
appropriate to making an autonomous choice, where there has been a 
consistent failure to disclose all relevant facts. 
While the UK courts have not gone as far as foreign jurisdictions in 
demanding a patient-centred approach to information disclosure, other 
institutions in the UK have made the first moves towards an 'individual patient' 
approach based on the ethical principle of respect for autonomy. The 
traditional guardians of clinical standards, the Royal Colleges of Medicine, 
have become more and more proactive, issuing guidelines about good 
practice with reference to treatment and procedures. 1272 In turn, the General 
Medical Council, in its recent guidelines, has emphasised the need to provide 
information in an intelligible way. Further, 'when providing information [the 
doctor] must do [his] best to find out about patients' individual needs and 
priorities. 1273 
The information which patients want or ought to know, before deciding 
whether to consent to treatment or an investigation may include... 
advice about whether a proposed treatment is experimental-,... 
whether doctors in training will be involved, ... 
1274 
Additionally, at paragraph 13 the GIVIC states: 
Obtaining informed consent cannot be an isolated event. It involves a 
continuing dialogue between [the doctor and the patient]... 
Whenever possible, [the doctor] should discuss treatment options at a 
time when the patient is best able to understand and retain the 
information. ... In particular the doctor should ... 
-explain the probabilities of success, or the risk of failure of, or 
harm 
associated with options for treatment, using accurate data;... 
-allow patients sufficient time to reflect, before and after making a 
decision, especially where the information is complex or the severity of 
the risks is great. Where patients have difficult understanding 
information, or there is a lot of information to absorb, it may be 
appropriate to provide it in manageable amounts, with appropriate 
1270 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 at 133. 
1271 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to fail: a social view of organ transplants and dialysis. Chicago: 
University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. The Case of the Artificial Heart, 135-197. 
1272 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? Med L Rev 2000; 8: 85,99. 
1273 General Medical Council. Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. November 
1998. 
1274 General Medical Council. Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. 
February 1999, para 5. 
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wriften or other back-up material, over a period of time, or to repeat it. 1275 
Similarly, the British Medical Association Ethics Department has recently stated 1276 that: 
Patients involved in innovative therapies need to know: 
Why the therapy is proposed in their case The evidence to support its use and the areas of uncertainty 
about it 
Whether is has had any form of ethical review The clinician's experience with it 
The alternatives, if any 
How it differs from standard treatment 
The likely risks and benefits for themselves 
The measures for safety monitoring and support that will be 
provided if things go wrong 
The likely future use of the therapy, if successful. 
Indeed, Jones believes that 
It is difficult to envisage any court, whether applying Bolam or any other 
standard, coming up with such a detailed set of rules by way of 
guidance. 1277 
The public outcry that has followed recent medical disasters such as 
Shipman 1278 
, 
Alder Heyl 279and BristoI1280 suggests that society will not be as 
accepting of deficiencies in the medical profession as it once was. Doctors 
need to be sensitive to the changing views of society. Over time, opinions 
change about what constitutes acceptable behaviour. It is contended that 
following the GIVIC guidelines described above would have led to better 
protection for the patients concerned in the two areas of innovation under 
consideration, namely the early heart transplants and the occurrences at 
Bristol. In these cases the patients concerned would have received 
information, namely the experimental nature of the procedure or the 
experience (and performance) of the operator, that would have been pivotal in 
making the decision about whether to proceed with the proposed treatment, 
thereby enhancing their autonomy. Furthermore, such actions would have 
protected not only the patient but the doctor as well. 
1275 General Medical Council. Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. February 1999, para 13. 
1276 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMJ Publishing Group. 2004,499. 
1277 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 at 133. 
1278 Dyer C. Shipman inquiry to investigate 466 deaths. BMJ 2001; 322: 1201. 
1279 Hunter M. Alder Hey report condemns doctors, management and coroner. BMJ 2001; 322: 255 
1280 Dyer C. Bristol doctors found guilty of serious professional misconduct. BMJ 1998: 316: 1924. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS: 
Patients are asking for greater involvement in what happens to them, reflected by a gradual evolution in the legal control of medical practice. 1281 This control 
may vary depending on the form that the doctor patient relationship takes. 
Traditionally it has been held that a doctor may come in contact with a patient in one of three ways: as part of the normal therapeutic doctor/patient 
relationship, when involved in clinical research and when acting as an 
impartial medical examiner. The fundamental difference is the objective of the 
contact between patient and doctor. This is of major importance when 
considering the difference between therapy and research. In the therapeutic 
setting the physician is expected to act in the patient's interest, with the intent 
being the treatment and resulting benefit of that patient. However, when 
involved in research, the primary objective changes and becomes the 
accumulation of medical knowledge, although there may also be benefit to the 
research subject. Thus, the distinction between therapy and research derives 
from intent. 1282 Because there are different intentions and objectives, ethical 
and legal rules of consent, confidentiality and negligence may vary according 
to the model of contact. 
A NEW MODEL OF CONTACT- INNOVATION: 
This thesis is proposing a fourth model of contact. Some procedures or 
treatments lie in the grey area between medical treatment and research. 
Thus, Brazier uses the case of Simms v Simms and another 1283 to illustrate 
this point. 
... 
if a doctor caring for patients with new variant CJD attempts a novel 
treatment as a last resort, knowing that there is no conventional 
treatment that will prolong the patient's life, has he crossed that line 
and made his patient a research subject? 1284 
This fourth model of contact is that of innovative practice. This, in turn, has 
been defined as taking two forms: experimental and personal. In experimental 
innovation a completely new intervention is being attempted. As an example 
of this, this thesis has utilised the first heart transplants as an illustration. In 
personal innovation the proposed technique has already been established but 
the practitioner concerned has either never attempted it before or is still 
learning how to perform it. The concept of learning curves is inextricably 
linked to this latter form of innovation, best illustrated by the occurrences in 
Bristol. 1285 1286 
1281 British Medical Association. Rights and responsibilities of doctors. BMA, 1992,2nd ed, P xxi. 
1282 Royal College of Physicians. Research Involving Patients. Royal College of 
Physicians, London, 1990 at 5 
1283 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All 
ER 669. 
1284 Brazier M. Medicine, Patients and the Law. 3rd ed. London: Penguin, 2003, P405. 
1285 Ramsay, S. Evidence against "Bristol-case" doctors found proven. Lancet 
1998; 351: 1707 
1286 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the 
Public Inquiry into children's heart surgefy at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). 
London: HIVISO, 2001 
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This concept of experimentation and personal innovation as being separate from both therapy and research has been largely unrecognised but it i's important because it allows re-evaluation of the ethical and legal requirements for each. If these distinctions are not made, ethical and legal norms, 
guidelines, and regulations may be developed that do not fit the class of 1287 activities to which they are applied . 
A CONTINUUM: 
However, the distinction does not necessarily lead to clear, circumscribed 
entities, as there appears to be a continuum ranging from normal medical 
treatment, through innovation (encompassing both experimental and personal innovation), to research, depending on the balance of therapy and generation 
of knowledge intended. In addition, considerations such as mortality rates, 
patient selection criteria, media coverage and the number of surgeons and 
centres undertaking a particular procedure help to define where along the 
continuum it lies. 
Although there will be ambiguities in deciding at what stage along this 
continuum a particular patient contact lies, it has been argued that it is 
nonetheless important to recognise that innovative practice needs to be 
assessed separately from research or treatment. 
However, attitudes towards the introduction of innovative practice remain 
archaic. Whereas strict licensing laws exist for the introduction of new drugs, 
new surgical and other invasive procedures are assimilated relatively 
unchecked 1288 , with no assessment of 
their efficacy and usually no guidance 
on their use. 1289 Chalmers and Silverman have argued that these double 
standards are inexcusable and those who suggest that 'the interests of 
patients involved in poorly controlled, casual experiments are less in need of 
formal protection [than those involved in research] must be called to 
account. 1290 
EXAMPLES OF INNOVATION: 
The introduction of heart transplantation was used to illustrate the need for a 
separate assessment of experimental practice. These first patients were 
subjected to an experimental procedure designed to obtain knowledge and for 
the personal benefit (in terms of personal fame) of the surgeons. This was 
especially so after the implantation of the first artificial heart. 
1291 The medical 
community was deeply divided over its merits. Some believed it was a brilliant 
scientific breakthrough while others felt it was a severe breach of ethics, a 
reckless attempt undertaken solely in the interests of ambition. 
1292 For 
1287 Levine Ri. In: Legal and ethical issues in human research and treatment. 
Ed Gallant DIVI, Force R. Halsted 
Press, New York, 1978, p86 
1288 Ridgway PF, Darzi AW. Placebos and standardising new surgical techniques. 
BIVIJ 2002; 325; 560. 
1289 Dent T, Wortley S, Campbell B. New interventional procedures. BIVIJ 2004; 329: 
3-4. 
1290 Chalmers 1, Silverman WA. Professional and public double standards on clinical experimentation. 
Control Clin 
Trials 1987; 8: 388-91 at 391. 
1291 Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971. 
1292 Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 at p4l 
1. 
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example, Annas alleges that many of these early procedures were purely non- therapeutic and intended only to benefit society. 1293 
With respect to personal innovation, the General Medical Council found three Bristol doctors guilty of serious professional misconduct because they 
continued to undertake paediatric cardiac procedures despite colleagues' 
concerns about excess mortality. 1294 One of the doctors argued that every 
surgeon experienced a learning curve when he or she started undertaking a 
new procedure. 1295 
Patients, whether experimented upon or suffering at the hands of personal innovators, deserve protection. As illustrated by the introduction of the early heart transplants and artificial pump or the events in Bristol, some patients did 
not receive this. This is the consequence of a failure to regulate innovation 
adequately. 
The interests of such patients need to be safeguarded. The law plays a vital 
role in regulating the practice of medicine. Three types of law have been 
described. 1296 In its strictest sense the courts or Parliament make 'the law'. 
Professional 'law' on the other hand is made and policed by regulatory bodies. 
The third type of 'law' describes sets of rules made only to offer guidance. 
SELF- REGULATION: 
With respect to 'professional law', it has been argued that professionals are 
more concerned with doing what is right than avoiding punishment. 1297 Self- 
regulation is essential to the concept of being a profession. It is clear, 
however, that self-regulation failed to protect patients during the early heart 
transplant years and the events in Bristol. 
When the early heart transplants were undertaken, the ambitions of the 
surgeons involved led to the interests of the patients being overridden. 
Rejection problems had not been resolved at that time' 298 and yet, despite 
this, the surgeons still undertook the operations. The failure of self-regulation 
can be shown to an even greater degree when the first artificial heart pump 
was implanted. Its design had been stolen from a colleague. Such operations 
were undertaken solely in the interests of ambition. 1299 Patient interests were 
of secondary importance. 
Similarly, self-regulation failed to protect the patients in Bristol. The whole 
episode could have been avoided if local 'informal' self-regulation through 
peer pressure had materialised and expressed concerns been acted upon. 
Immediate colleagues, their employer, and professional bodies outside Bristol, 
1293 Annas G. Death and the Magic Machine. Western New England Law Review 
1987; 9: 89 at 98. 
1294 Ramsay, S. Evidence against "Bristol-case" doctrs found proven. Lancet 1998; 
351: 1707 
1295 Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GIVIC's findings. BMJ 1998; 
316: 1691 
1296 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. Oxford University Press, 1997, p5- 
1297 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. Oxford University Press, 1997, p5- 
1298 Ross D. in: Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1971 at p291. 
1299 Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 at p4l 
1. 
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such as the Royal College of Surgeons and the Department of Health, were aware of the poor success rate but either failed to act or did not use their 
position of authority to force a change in practice. 1300 
The subsequent public inquiry was clearly critical of the system of self- 
regulation. 1301 While recognising the problem of 'learning curves' and that 
competence is acquired gradually with an upward gradient of success, it was 
critical of the assumption that failure was initially inevitable and for that reason justifiable. 1302 It suggested three guiding principles; supervision, a system 
within hospitals for managing innovation, and openness and honesty with the 
patient. 1303 
Therefore it is clear that, in the past, self-regulation did not succeed in 
regulating innovation and protecting patients, with deep-seated flaws in the 
culture of the medical profession. There is therefore a need to change the 
basis of professional regulation so that the profession performs as the public 
and individual patients expect. 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION: 
The Government and National Health Service management have introduced 
their own plans for strengthening institutional responsibility for the standard of 
patient services through external review and clinical governance. 1304 1305 The 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the Commission for 
Health Improvement (CH 1)1306, more recently replaced by the Commission for 
Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI) and then by the Healthcare 
Commission, were created to influence the clinical practice of doctors and 
manage the introduction of new technologies. 1307 
Many of their recommendations are based on evidence-based medicine 
(EBM), creating guidelines for treatment or new technology. However, the 
value of EBM is limited. Searching for precise answers in the form of numbers 
and probabilities can only have a limited role in medicine. 1308 One of the 
fundamental flaws of EBIVI is that it fails to cater for the individual. 1309 The 
1300 Anon. First lessons from the "Bristol case. " Lancet 1998; 351: 1669 
1301 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001 
1302 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at 
the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HIVISO, 2001, chapter 25. 
14. 
1303 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into children's 
heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HMSO, 2001, chapter 
25: 
14. 
1304 Secretary of State for Health. The new NHS: modem, dependable (Cmnd 
3807). London: HMSO, 1997. 
1305 Secretary of State for Health. A first class service: quality in the new NHS. 
London: Department of Health, 
1998. 
1306 Secretary of State for Health. A first class service: quality in the NHS. 
Londoný Stationery Office, 1998. 
1307 Smith R. NICE: a panacea for the NHS? BMJ 1999; 318: 823-4. 
1308 Kleinert S. Rationing of healthcare- how should it be done? Lancet 1998; 
352: 1244. 
1309 Ellis SJ. Some unanswered questions about NICE. JR Soc Med 
1999; 92: 538-9 
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technique of meta-analysis is also flawed because it depends on the statistical 
averaging of different trials performed in different places by different people for different purposes. An evidence-based decision will need to vary from one 
patient to another according to individual circumstances. 1310 
A further problem is that matters of cost are also considered 131 1, implying a 
shift of emphasis to cost-effectiveness. This requires the making of value 
judgements on what should be accepted or rejected. There are serious flaws 
in the use of cost-effectiveness as a basis of rationing. While cost- 
effectiveness comparisons can inform debate, they cannot direct it. 1312 
Furthermore, although NICE has taken over the functions of SERNIP and be 
responsible for evaluating new technology, it is unclear how it will achieve this 
since most new interventional procedures are surgical in nature and thus 
difficult to be assessed through placebo-controlled trials. 
With regard to clinical guidelines, the main problems are that they are not very 
good at recommending treatment for an individual patient, they are frequently 
founded on limited evidence and they can be subjective. 
Thus, external governmental control through NICE and the creation of 
guidelines is unlikely to be successful on its own and unlikely to lead to patient 
protection from the effects of innovation. 
LEGAL REGULATION: 
This leaves the third form of law, namely that made by the courts or 
Parliament, to be examined to see whether it is better able to protect patients. 
Medical malpractice may give rise to two common law actions in court. The 
first is that of trespass to the person, or battery. The second is that of 
negligence. The latter forms the basis of most malpractice claims and is by far 
the more important of the two when considering the regulation of innovation. 
In most cases of medical negligence the key question is whether the 
professional has reached the standard of care required of them by the law. 
That standard was established by the cases of Hunter v. Hanleyl 
313 and 
Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee. 
1314 
In essence, both cases state that professionals are to be judged against the 
standards of their peers. Experts appearing before the court merely have to 
regard the defendants' actions as being within the range of acceptable 
practice. This, in turn, means a minimal level of acceptable practice, not what 
the expert would have liked to see happen. 
1315 Furthermore, the House of 
1310 Haynes RB, Devereaux PJ. Physicians'and patients' choices in evidence based pracbce. 
BMJ 2002: 324: 1350. 
1311 Anon. NICE to sort clinical 'wheat from chaff. BMJ 1999; 318: 416. 
1312 Ellis SJ. Some unanswered questions about NICE. JR Soc Med 
1999; 92: 538-9 
1313 Hunter v. Hanley [1955] SC 200, SLT 213. 
1314 Bolamv Friern HMC [1957] 2 All ER 118, [1957]l WLR 582 
1315 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003. p170 
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Lords has stated that it will not choose between different bodies of medical 
opinion 1316 , (provided they are both regarded as responsible and suitable 
qualified), implying that there could be no judicial intervention to declare 
standard medical practice to be negligent. The law imposes the duty of care but the standard of care is a matter of medical judgment. 1317 
This appears to run against the normal principles of negligence, in which there is an expectation that the judiciary will scrutinise a particular practice and 
assess whether it is reasonable. Thus, the professional, or Bolam, test 
appears to have been softened by various statements made in cases such as Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors 1318 and more recently Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA 131 9 and Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS 320 Trust' 
In Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Govemors, for example, the court 
reserved the right to decide that even standard practice may be negligent. 1321 
The practice held by the body of responsible practitioners had to be one that 
was rightly and properly held. A judge could reject a unanimous medical view 
if he were satisfied that it was manifestly wrong. 1322 
The more recent case of Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA 1323 also indicated 
that judges are becoming less reluctant to set standards for doctors. In the 
Court of Appeal, it was held that the judge should consider the evidence and 
decide whether a clinical practice put the patient unnecessarily at risk. 1324 In 
the House of Lords, it was held that the court had to be satisfied that the 
exponents of the body of opinion relied on could demonstrate that such 
opinion had a logical basis. 1325 
Such statements have lead some commentators to suggest that Bolitho has 
4 reinterpreted Bolam' 1326 and has handed the ultimate power of deciding 
whether a particular medical practice is acceptable or not back to the 
courts. 1327 Others have claimed that Bolitho restores Bolam to its proper and 
original IiMitS1328 and that the first casualty may be the supremacy of the 
9 reasonable doctor test'. 
1329 
1316 Maynard v. W. Midlands RHA [1985] 1 All ER 635,1 WLR 634,639. 
1317 Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [19851 AC 871 at 881. 
1318 Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
1319 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1993] 4 Med LR 381, [1997] 4 All ER 771. 
1320 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998) 48 BMLR 118, CA. 
1321 Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1984] 1 All ER 1018 
1322 Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1984] QB 493 at 513, [1984] 
1 All ER 1018 at 1028, CA 
1323 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1993] 4 Med LR 381, [1997] 4 All 
ER 771. 
1324 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1993] 13 BMLR 111 (CA) at 119 
1325 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1997] 4 All ER 771,778 
1326 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p441- 
1327 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish 
Publishing, 2002. 
1328 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? MLR 2000; 8: 85. 
1329 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? MLR 2000; 8: 85, at 
108-9. 
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However, a recent analysis of appropriate POst-Bo/itho cases showed a 
significant number still relied on Bolam. 1330 Furthermore, BOlitho appears to 
have been used most commonly as a test of credibility rather than as a 
standard per se. Thus, although Bolitho may be a step in the dght direction, it 
does not travel far enough down the road of judicial scrutiny. 1331 The plaintiff 
still faces significant problems in trying to overcome the barrier of the judiciary 
allowing the expert professionals to determine what is acceptable practice. 1332 
Although the courts will examine medical experts' evidence, it appears that 
this expertise will only be overridden when the medical experts hold views that 
the judges believe no reasonable doctor could hold. 
Failure of legal regulation of experimentation: 
Historically the law has regarded failed experimentation as a species of 
negligence. 1333 However, it is important for experimentation to occur so that 
medical knowledge improves and society benefits. In certain cases resort to 
an experimental technique may be appropriate but it must be made with 1334 
caution . 
Indeed, the courts do allow some discretion to develop medical 
practice 1335 , as shown 
by the recent granting of permission by the English 
High Court for the injection of an unlicensed experimental treatment into the 
brains of two teenagers suffering from variant Creutzfeld Jacob disease 
(vCJD). 1336 1337 These were two separate cases heard together. 
The judge concluded that: 
... 
there was a responsible body of relevant professional opinion which 
supports this innovative treatment. 1338 
Since then two other cases requesting the use of experimental innovative 
treatment have been heard by the courts. Both were heard in the High Court 
of Justice (Family Division). The first was heard on the 1 oth of October 
2003.1339Here the Trust applied under the court's inherent jurisdiction for an 
order that the treatment was lawful and in the best interests of the patient. In 
the second 1340 the patient sought a declaration that it was lawful for him to 
receive the experimental treatment. In both it was held that, although 
innovative, the treatment was proper since a responsible body of medical 
opinion supported its use. It is interesting to note that in all these cases 
involving the intracerebral infusion of pentosan polysulphate, the treatment 
1330 Maclean A. Beyond Bolam and Bolitho. MI-Int 2002; 5: 205-30. 
1331 Keown J. Reining in the Bolam test. CLJ 1998; 57: 248,249. 
1332 Maclean A. Beyond Bolam and Bolitho. MI-Int 2002; 5: 205-30,222. 
1333 Dickens BM. What is a medical experiment? Can Med Assoc 11975; 113: 
635-9 at 636 
1334 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 
2002,6th ed, 9.38. 
1335 McHardy v Dundee General Hospitals' Board of Management. 
(1960) SLT (Notes) 19 
1336 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 
All ER 669 
1337 Dyer 0. Family finds hospital willing to give experimental CJD treatment. 
BMJ 2003; 326: 8. 
1338 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 
1 All ER 669,681. 
1339 An NHS Trust v HM [2004] Lloyd's Rep Med 207. 
1340 EP v Trusts A, B and C. [2004] Lloyd's Rep Med 211. 
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only had potential to be beneficial. Although results had been encouraging (in the case of Simms), there was no proven scientific benefit. 
It is clear, therefore, that the courts do sanction experimental therapy, 
provided it is supported by a responsible body of medical opinion. This implies 
that the rules for assessing the acceptability of experimental treatment are the 
same as for normal therapy. However, it could be argued that this is not 
adequate. As previously mentioned, clinical fervour leads doctors to 
overestimate how successful and routine a particular expedmental innovation 
has become. Also, when experimental treatment is attempted, it stands to 
reason that the patient is exposed to a greater risk, simply because the doctor 
is attempting something unknown. The courts must, in some way, take this 
extra risk to the patient into consideration. This could be achieved by requiring 
the doctor to justify his use of the experimental treatment, either on the basis 
that there was no extra risk or that the potential benefit was so great that any 
extra risk was justified. The important point here is that the courts could 
require the doctor to justify what he has done or intends to do. 
In the case of Clark v. McLennan 1341 the judge held that the defendant was 
negligent in failing to take a precaution that resulted in damage. The 
defendant had tried something innovative. 
... the 
burden lies on the defendant to show that he was not in breach 
of duty as well as to show that the damage did not result from his 
breach of d Uty. 1342 
This 'recognised risk avoidance' concept' 343 could be very useful in 
negligence cases concerning experimental innovation. The plaintiff could thus 
argue that although there was a standard way of performing an operation, the 
defendant departed from it and attempted an experimental treatment. The 
defendant, therefore, had to justify its use, as opposed to the current Hunter v 
Hanley test. 
This concept is very similar to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which gives 
rise to an inference of negligence on the defendant's part. ' 
'344 However, it 
appears that, attractive as it may be for the plaintiff to utilise this doctrine, the 
courts have shown general antipathy towards 
it. 1-145 1346 Thus, in the case of 
Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority in the House of Lord S1347 their 
Lordships held that the burden of causation still rested on the claimant alone 
and did not move to the defendants, even though negligence had been 
proved or admitted. 
1348 
1341 Clark v. McLennan [198311 All ER 416. 
1342 Clark v. McLennan [198311 All ER 416,427. 
1343 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.70 
1344 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.61. 
1345 Ratcliffe v. Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority (1998) 42 BMLR 64, [1998] 
Lloyd's Rep Med 162, CA. 
1346 Gray v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Health Authority (2000) 
57 BMLR 148. 
1347 Wilsher v. Essex AHA [1987] QB 730, [1986] 3 All ER 80 1, CA; revsd [1988] 
AC 1074, [1988] 1 All ER 87 1, H L. 
1348 Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871,882-3, 
HL. 
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Legal commentators appear to support the risk avoidance concept although they also believe that it is not acceptable to theCoUrtS. 1349 1350 The belief that 
the courts refuse to accept the risk avoidance concept, however, follows the 
determination in Wilsher, which did not concern innovative treatment. 
Furthermore, the recognised risk avoidance concept concerns the standard of 
care while the House of Lords in Wilsher refused to accept the shifting of the 
burden of proof with respect to causation. In other words, the risk avoidance 
concept could still be used for assessing innovative treatment and this would 
still be compatible with the judgement in Wilsher. 
The problem with the Law's approach is that rules created for assessing 
negligence in the normal therapeutic setting are being used for assessing the 
acceptability of experimental practice. Thus, in the case of Karp v. Cooleyl 35 1, 
which concerned the first use of an artificial heart, the court utilised traditional 
malpractice evidentiary standards, that is, those employed for medical 
diagnosis and treatment. This was inappropriate in that, despite the treatment 
clearly being experimental, the standard law of negligence applicable to 
normal treatment was used. The law failed to make a distinction. 
The medical act is not homogenous. It does not always slot conveniently into 
either therapy or research and furthermore, there is a failure to recognise 
experimental innovation. As previously mentioned, there is a continuum 
ranging from therapy through innovation to research that depends on the 
intended objective of the contact. The law fails to recognise this and is thus 
unable to examine the subtleties of each individual medical act. It is not 
acceptable for the rules created to assess negligence in a normal therapeutic 
doctor/ patient relationship to be used to assess the acceptability of an 
experimental technique. The law needs to be more sensitive and distingish 
between therapy and experimental innovation. Thus, in Karp v. Cooley 352, if 
the recognised risk avoidance concept was acceptable in law and the court 
allowed to ask the surgeon to justify the use of a technology that was 
previously untried in humans, its conclusion may have been different. 
// 1353 further illustrates the The case of DeFreitas v. O'Brien and Conne Y 
problem of utilising normal rules of negligence to assess experimental 
treatment. Here the Court of Appeal held that a small number of medical 
practitioners could constitute a 'responsible body of medical opinion' against 
which the practices of a doctor could be measured. 
13-54This had led some 
commentators to comment that 
1349 Mason JK, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 9.38. 
1350 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p170 
1351 Karp v. Cooley 493 F 2d 408 (1974) (United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit) 
1352 Karp v. Cooley 493 F 2d 408 (1974) (United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit) 
1353 DeFreitas v. O'Brien and Connelly [1993] 4 Med LR 281, [1995] 6 
Med LR 108, CA. 
1354 DeFreitas v. O'Brien and Connelly [1995] 6 Med LR 108,115, CA. 
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DeFreitas sets a worrying precedent in that perhaps now a small fringe 
group practising experimental techniques can legitimately constitute a responsible body despite being contrary to the norm. 1355 
The proper solution would therefore have been for the court in DeFreitas to 
recognise that the experimental treatment undertaken was not done routinely by the vast majority of colleagues and furthermore was risky. Could the 
defendants therefore justify its use? Unfortunately, the court simply utilised 
the established rules for assessing negligence. Medical experts established 
the standard of care and not the courts, even though it was experimental 
treatment, a situation analogous to normal therapy. The position in 
experimental practice thus seems to be excessively favourable to the medical 
profession because the law utilises the same standards to judge therapy and 
experimentation. However, if the courts accept that experimentation is a 
separate entity this should allow them some discretion to scrutinise a 
particular experimental practice to see whether it is reasonable and the 
potential increased risk acceptable. On a separate note, it also emphasises 
the need for adequately informed consent. 
Failure of legal regulation of Personal Innovation: 
The problem of the law failing to take account of the subtleties of the medical 
act is equally applicable to personal innovation, where a doctor is trying to 
learn a new technique. 
The law in the UK expects the standard of care to be achieved is that of the 
ordinary skilled doctor. It is well established that inexperience is no defence to 
a claim of negligence. In the case of Nettleship v. Weston the same standard 
of care was expected whether one was a learner driver or an experienced 
one. 1356 As a matter of public policy, the courts do not want to apply a sliding 
scale of standards of care depending on the subjective attributes of the 
particular defendant. 1357 
This means that the law in the UK makes no allowance for personal 
innovation. In medicine the leading authority regarding inexperience is Wilsher 
v. Essex Area Health Authority. 1358 In court the defendants argued that a 
junior doctor could not be expected to achieve the same standard of care as 
that of an experienced colleague. A junior doctor had to learn on the job. This 
was necessary for medicine to develop and function. If this was not allowed 
ultimately patients would suffer. Therefore unavoidable mistakes would be 
made. Although one of the judges accepted this argument, the majohty 
dismissed it and required the trainee or learner to bejudged by the same 
standard as his more experienced colleagues. 
1359 136 
1355 Khan M, Robson M, Swift K. Clinical Negligence. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002, p 166 
1356 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581. 
1357 Stauch M, Wheat K, Tingle J. Sourcebook on MediGal Law. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish, 
2002, P31 1. 
1358 Wilsher v. Essex AHA [19871 QB 730, [1986] 3 All ER 801, CA; revsd 
[1988] AC 1074, [198811 All ER 871, HL 
1359 Wilsher v Essex AHA [198613 All ER 801,831. 
1360 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1986] 3 All ER 801,813. 
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Thus the law makes no allowance for the unavoidable requirement for doctors 
to learn. As previously discussed under experimentation, it once again 
appears unwilling to appreciate the subtleties of the medical act. Consequently, the standard it uses is inappropriate. By stdctly applying the Bolam principle the courts expects a junior doctor to show the same degree of 
skill as a reasonably competent doctor, irrespective of his own level of 
experience. No allowance is made for any inexpedence on behalf of the junior doctor, although issues of supervision may become relevant. 
SOLUTIONS? 
The law needs to understand the need for doctors to gain experience. 
Otherwise, the threat of legal action may very well inhibit the search for 
experience, and this clearly would not be in the interests of future patients. 
Current application of the law of negligence to personal innovation appears to 
be too harsh because it takes no account of reality, which is that a junior 
doctor cannot have the same experience as a consultant and therefore cannot 
provide the same standard of care. It is not appropriate for the junior doctor to 
be judged as if he were a consultant, as Nettleship and Wilsher imply. 
It is unavoidable that doctors need to learn. The law needs to take account of 
this while at the same time ensuring patients are protected. A number of 
options are available. 
The first option is for the law to recognise the subtleties of the medical act. As 
previously mentioned, this is not a homogenous entity, ranging from a simple 
therapeutic intervention to non-therapeutic research. In addition, the problem 
of inexperience of the operator also needs to be understood by the law. 
Treatment of National Health Service patients is necessarily undertaken by 
junior medical staff striving to gain more experience. 
This problem has been considered quite differently by other jurisdictions and 
reached different conclusions. For example, the High Court of Australia 
refused to follow the judgement in Nettleship v. Weston 1361 and held it would 
be contrary to common sense. 1362 Although the standard of care was 
objective, it could be adjusted to fit the special relationship under which it 
arose. Reasonable care had to be related to particular circumstances. 
1363 
Thus, the standard of the duty of care arising was that of an unqualified and 
inexperienced driver. 
[it would be] unreasonable to measure the standard of skill and care 
required of the driver by reference to the skill and care that are 
reasonabV to be expected of an experienced and competent 
driver... 13 4 
1361 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581. 
1362 Cook v Cook [1987] 61 AUR 25,28. 
1363 Cook v Cook [1987] 61 ALJ R 25,31, 
1364 Cook v Cook [ 1987] 61 ALJ R 25,27. 
245 
It was the very absence of skill that lay at the heart of the special relationship. Fundamentally Cook held that 
As a duty of care is owed to individuals, the circumstances to which 
regard must be had in deciding what is required to discharge the duty 
in a particular case are the circumstances out of which the duty to the 
injured plaintiff arises. 
To follow the Nettleship approach is to deny the relevance of the 
circumstances which gave rise to the relationship out of which the duty 
of care arose .--- It would be artificial to exclude those circumstances from consideration 
in determining what is reasonable care. 1365 
Indeed, even UK law recognises that the circumstances in which a doctor 
treats his patient may be taken into account. In an emergency situation, a 
doctor will not be expected to achieve the same results as a doctor workin? in 
ideal conditions. In an emergency, errors of judgment are more excusable '366 
and an allowance made for'battle conditions'. 
1367 
The findings in Wilsher are also not entirely clear cut. Firstly there is the 
dissenting opinion of Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C. He was not able to 
accept an objective standard determined without consideration of the doctor's 
experience. 
... a 
doctor 
... should only 
be held liable for acts or omissions which a 
careful doctor with his qualifications and experience would not have 
done or ornitted. 1368 
Also, despite rejecting the notion of a duty tailored to the actor, Mustill U 
proposed that one could ascertain the standard of care by reference to the 
post' that the doctor held: 
... 
I prefer ... 
the proposition ... which relates 
the duty of care, not to 
the individual, but to the post which he occupies. . .. 
it must be 
recognised that different posts make different demands. ... the 
lower 
ranks will be occupied by those of whom it would be wrong to expect 
too much ... . 
1369 
There appears to be no significant difference between this proposition and a 
provision to take into account the inexperience of a junior doctor, 
circumstances the UK courts have refused to do. In other words, since 
junior 
jobs are undertaken by junior members of staff, and Lord Musill was prepared 
to ascertain the standard of care by reference to the post held 
by that junior 
1365 Cook v Cook [1987] 61 AUR 25,32. 
1366 The Metagama (1927) 138 LT 369 at 370. 
1367 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,812. 
1368 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,833. 
1369 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801,813. 
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member of staff, he appears to be accepting that a different standard of care could apply. 
A solution therefore lies in the courts accepting a minimum standard 
applicable to each post below which a doctor in that post cannot fall. ThIs 
recognises the inevitability of doctors gaining experience 'on the job'. 
Although this requires a fundamental change in the law, one of the fundamental principles established by Donoghue v Stevenson 1370 was that no 
case law rule or principle is ever settled for all time. 1371 
However, it would not be appropriate for the defence merely to be 
inexperience whenever a patient suffers harm when treated by a doctor 
learning a new technique. Closer supervision by more senior colleagues is 
therefore essential. 
Indeed, a more senior doctor may be found negligent if a more junior doctor is 
not adequately supervised. 1372 A consultant would also be negligent for 
inappropriate delegation to a junior if it was known that the junior was not 
capable of performing his duties properly. 1373 Even being supervised, 
however, does not necessarily absolve the trainee of responsibility. 1374 
One problem is that the Bristol doctors, being consultants and thus practising 
without supervision, could simply state that their results were unavoidable. 
They were learning a new technique and thus the level of mortality and 
morbidity was part of that learning curve. 1375 However, culpability arose 
precisely because the doctors concerned ignored their own poor results. 
Furthermore, the system of regulation, which included immediate colleagues, 
the employer, the Royal College of Surgeons and the Department of Health, 
also failed. The poor results were therefore not unavoidable. 
A further legal option is available. In Nettleship Lord Denning recognised that 
morally the learner-driver was not at fault. The injured person, nevertheless, 
needed to be compensated and the only available resource was the driver's 
insurance fund. Damages, however, were only recoverable if the driver was 
liable in law. As such, legally she, the learner-driver, was liable. 1376 
Clearly, therefore, the reason she was found liable was to allow the injured 
party to be compensated through the driver's insurance. If, however, another 
source of compensation was found, then the case may have never needed to 
come before the courts or, if it did, the decision might have been different. 
1370 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
1371 Farrar JH, Dugdale AM. Eds. Introduction to Legal Method, 2nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, p84. 
1372 Wilsher v. Essex AHA [1997] QB 730 at 774. 
1373 Mason A, McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics. Butterworths 2002,6th ed, 
9.54. 
1374 Bouchta v. Swindon HA [1996] 7 Med LR 62. 
1375 Dyer C. Surgeon blamed beginner's bad luck for cardiac deaths. BMJ 1998; 316: 1114 
1376 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,586c/d. 
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Therefore, if the law wishes to take into consideration inexperience wh I le still allowing patients recourse to the law if harmed, it needs to find another way of compensating victims. In medicine this may be achieved by the patient suing the hospital to obtain compensation for injuries suffered since employers are 
vicariously liable for any negligent acts committed by their employees. 1377 Although this does not absolve the employee of liability, there may also be direct liability for failures in services provided. Thus a hospital may owe a direct duty of care towards its patients. In Wilsher Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
said: 
... a 
health authority which so conducts its hospital that it fails to provide 
doctors of sufficient skill and experience to give the treatment on offer 
... may 
be directly liable in negligence to the patient ... 
I can see no 
reason why, in principle, the health authority should not be [directly] 
liable if its organisation is at fault. 1378 
Thus, a solution may be found if a hospital accepts direct legal responsibility 
on behalf of its inexperienced doctors. The courts, knowing that the patient 
has a source of reimbursement for the injury caused, may therefore only need 
to hold the inexperienced doctor as partially responsible, as in Jones v. 
Manchester Corporation. 1379 It may even hold that there was no negligence on 
the doctor's behalf because his inexperience was unavoidable. In such case, 
legal liability would fall entirely on the employing hospital. 
Another option is to consider aspects of information disclosure and patient 
consent. Can a patient accept a greater risk by agreeing to be treated by an 
inexperienced doctor? This leads to the issue of information disclosure and 
consent. 
CONSENT: 
It is well established that, based on the principle of autonomy, every 
competent person should decide what happens to his or her body. An 
autonomous person acts in accordance with a freely self-chosen and informed 
plan. Such actions can be analysed in terms of acting intentionally, with 
understanding, and without controlling influences that determine the action 
taken. To respect an autonomous person involves treating that person so as 
to enable him or her to act autonomously. Thus, in medicine, there is a 
positive obligation of respectful treatment in disclosing information and 
fostering autonomous decision-making . 
1380 The patient should be allowed to 
choose the treatment based on adequate information such as success rates 
and risks. 1381 Patients cannot express informed preferences unless they are 
given sufficient and appropriate information. 
1377 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p178 
1378 Wilsher v. Essex AHA. [1986] 3 All ER 801 at 833, as per Browne 
Wilkinson. 
1379 Jones v Manchester Corporation [195212 QB 852, [195212 All 
ER 125, CA. 
1380 Beauchamp TIL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001 64 
1381 Mason JK Consent to Treatment and Research in the ICU. in Ethics and the 
Law in intensive care. Pace N. 
McLean SAM (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.29-46 at p38. 
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Furthermore, because risk is evaluated not merely by looking at statistical 
numbers but also on subjective qualitative aspects, the most important aspect 
of risk assessment, which is essential in the health care setting, is that the 
person exposed to it makes that assessment. 1382 
All relevant information therefore needs to be disclosed if the aim of this 
disclosure is to protect patient autonomy. ' 383 There is therefore not only a 
requirement for doctors to disclose risks that are relevant to the patient but 
also to disclose risks and other information that are particular to the doctor. 
Two different meanings of 'informed consent' have been established. 1384 
Firstly, it can be analysed in terms of autonomous choice. This requires the 
patient, with substantial understanding and in the absence of control by 
others, to actively authorise the proposal. 
Secondly, informed consent can be analysed in terms of providing a legal 
justification for proceeding with treatment. 1385 In such a setting, informed 
consent is not always an autonomous act. The function of this second sense 
of consent is to legalise the whole of medical examination and treatment. 1386 
There is a duty of disclosure because the essence of a professional 
relationship is that the professional knows more about his subject than the 
person who seeks his help does. 1387 
Patients thus need to be given a clear explanation of any treatment proposed, 
including any risks and alternatives, before they decide whether they will 
agree to the treatment. If doctors fail to provide this information, they may be 
negligent. Much of the debate regarding the law surrounding consent has 
focussed on the appropriate standard of disclosure. 1388 This depends on 
whether it is based on what the profession believes should have been 
disclosed, known as the professional standard, or on the patient's own 
expectations; that is a patient-based standard. 
The professional standard test holds that a doctor is judged according to what 
other doctors would have done. In other words, if he failed to disclose an 
aspect of information, he would not be found guilty of negligence if a 
responsible body of medical opinion would also not have disclosed what the 
defendant failed to disclose. Even a significant minority of doctors in 
agreement with the defendant may be persuasive and leave the plaintiff 
in 
1382 Council for Science and Society. The acceptability of risks. Barry Rose, 
London, 1978 
1383 McLean SAM. A patient's right to know. Dartmouth: Medico-Legal 
Series, 1989. 
1384 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001: 78. 
1385 Re W [1992] 4 All ER 627,633 
1386 Mason JK. Consent to treatment and research in the ICU. Pace NA, McLean 
SAM eds. Ethics and the law in 
intensive care. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p30. 
1387 Holder AR. Medical Malpractice Law. New York: John Wiley, 1975, p225 
1388 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 
103-134 at 104. 
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difficulties. 1389 If such a test is used, consent would be governed by the same rules and principles that apply to ordinary malpractice cases. 1390 
The patient centred standard, in turn, can be subdivided into two; a particular patient standard and a prudent patient standard, corresponding to subjective or objective tests. 
The particular patient (subjective) test defines what information the actual 
plaintiff would have wanted disclosed to them. Although suffering from the 
possibility of hindsight, it is the only desirable standard that forcefully 
establishes the right to self-determination. 
The prudent patient (objective) test requires the establishment of what a 
reasonable person would have wanted to know. One of the problems with this 
test is that it is impossible to define what a reasonable person is. Furthermore, 
a standard determined by reference to objective criteria alone will not in all 
cases suffice to vindicate the patient's right to self-determination, which 
should be the starting point and indeed shape the boundaries of the duty of 
disclosure. 1391 
The professional, or Bolam, test is representative of the current law, although 
as discussed earlier, it has been softened by the approach taken in cases 
such as Sidawaj 392 and BofithO1393 . For example, in the House of Lords, it 
was held that the court had to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of 
opinion relied on could demonstrate that such opinion had a logical basis. 1394 
Essentially, therefore, medical expertise is to be overridden when the medical 
experts hold views that the judges believe no reasonable doctor could 
logically hold. From the courts' perspective, the standard of disclosure is tied 
to the doctor's duty rather than the patient's need for information in order to 
allow a choice to be made. This gives doctors significant discretion to 
determine the boundaries of acceptable behaviour regarding what needs to 
be disclosed, contrary to the ethical principle of respect for autonomy. 
The law's paternalistic treatment of the doctrine of informed consent 
undoubtedly provides a foundation for the medical profession's 
perception of it. There seems to be a failure on the part of doctors to 
take a step back in order to try to understand the meaning of informed 
consent. Instead the tendency is to perceive informed consent mainly 
as a medico-legal concept centred on the requirement to get a 
signature on a form. 1395 
1389 DeFreitas v. O'Brien and Connolly [1995] 6 MLR 108,115, CA. 
1390 Montgomery J. Health Care Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p227 
1391 Giesen D. International Medical Malpractice Law. J CB Mohr: Tubigen, 1988, at par 576 
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1393 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1993] 4 Med LR 381, [199714 All ER 
771. 
1394 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1997] 4 All ER 771,778 
1395 Kessel AS. On failing to understand informed consent. Br J Hosp Med 1994; 
5Z235 at 237. 
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CONSENT AND INNOVATION: 
i-tis- not entirely clear how UK law would deal with a case of innovation 
because it does not recognise the concept, whether of the expedmental or 
personal variety. 
it would be expected that a court would proceed by firstly defining what the 
standard of care was and then try to ascertain whether it was breached. To 
enable it to do this, medical opinion would be sought. The opinion of a 
responsible body of medical professionals expert in the particular field would 
have a heavy bearing on the court. So for example, with respect to the early 
heart transplants, although patients were given little and sometimes 
misleading information, it is highly unlikely any of the pioneering surgeons, 
such as Barnard or Cooley, would have been found guilty of negligence. 
They did not believe consent or the information that needed to be disclosed 
was an issue 1396 1397 while the presentation of alternatives was coloured by 
subjective factors. 1398 Referral to another befter-equipped centre was not an 
option. Furthermore, it took some time for the poor success rates during the 
early years to become known. Although the final decision would rest with the 
courts, such credible experts would likely have swayed the court into 
accepting heart transplantation and the circumstances in which it was used. 
Despite the fact that many of the patients had little understanding of what the 
operations entailed and potential risks and personal mortality figures were not 
disclosed, the professional standard test would have left the patients with little 
chance of success. A responsible body of opinion would have supported the 
operations that eminent surgeons such as Bamard, Cooley and Ross were 
undertaking. Although the patients did not give informed consent, medical 
experts would have testified that what was disclosed was sufficient and 
acceptable. The law with respect to experimentation therefore appears to be 
too soft because it utilises standards created for normal therapy, despite the 
fact that experimental procedures would carry more risk, and still rely heavily 
on professional opinion, thereby failing to respect patient autonomy. 
On the other hand, it has already been established that the law, when 
considering personal innovation, appears to be too harsh. As previously 1400 
discussed, the cases of Nettleship v. Weston 
1399and Wilsher v Essex AHA 
have shown the courts to be unwilling to accept that inexperience 
is a defence 
to a charge of negligence. No allowance has been made 
for personal 
innovation and the courts merely consider it to be part of routine 
therapy. 
However, arguments have been made that personal innovation 
is distinct from 
normal therapy and different rules need to be applied. 
To do otherwise may 
1396 Barnard C. In Experience with human heart transplantation. Proceedings of 
the Cape Town Heart 
Transplantation Symposium, 1968. Ed Shapiro HA. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 
1969, p266-7. 
1397 Cooley D. in Thorwald J. The Patients. New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1971 at p297. 
1398 Moore FID. Therapeutic innovation: Ethical boundaries in the initial clinical 
trials of new drugs and surgical 
Procedures. In Experimentation with human subjects. Ed Freund 
PA. New York: George Braziller. 1970,358-78 at 
p366. 
1399 Nettleship v Weston [197112 QB 691. 
1400 Wilsher v Essex AHA [198613 All ER 801. 
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have an inhibitory effect on doctors gaining experience. It is clearly essential that doctors are allowed to continue to learn while practising. This is in the interests of all present and future patients. 
The primary goal of consent in the medical care setting is to enable patients to make autonomous decisions about whether to authorise an intervention. '40' A 
requirement of full disclosure has already been enshrined in law when 
considering the consent process for research projects, thereby preventing 
exploitation of vulnerable patients. Thus in the Canadian case of Halushka v University of Saskatchewan 1402 the court was insistent that the research 
subject was spared no detail of his relevant condition or of his exposure to 
risk. The requirements to satisfy the legal obligations for information 
disclosure are thus much greater in the research setting than in the normal 
therapeutic doctor patient relationship. 
The subjective element and higher standards of disclosure required by the law 
when dealing with issues of research highlights two important issues. Firstly, 
the law, when it so wishes, is fully prepared to accept and respect patient 
autonomy. Secondly, the law does accept the variability of the doctor patient 
relationship, thereby recognising that circumstances may be present requiring 
different rules and standards to be adopted. 
Clearly, patients should be as informed as possible. Accepting the ethical 
principle of autonomy and self-determination means that society and the 
courts need to adopt a different legal duty of disclosure. Although disclosure 
requirements are vitally important in legal and regulatory contexts, from the 
ethical point of view, consent has less to do with the legal liability of 
professionals and more to do with patients being able to make an 
autonomous choice. 1403 
It has already been shown that UK law, by adopting the professional standard 
test, pays little respect to patient autonomy. However, other common law 
jurisdictions have long accepted the right to autonomous decision-making with 
subsequent repercussions on their laws regarding information disclosure. 
In Australia the case of Rogers v Whittaker 1404 held that what was important 
was whether the risk was material and if so then that risk had to be disclosed. 
Similarly, the Canadian case of Reibl v. Hughes held that what was under 
consideration was the patient's right to know what risks were involved in 
undergoing or forgoing certain surgery or other treatmen . 
1405 
Thus, the UK differs from other jurisdictions when considering standards of 
information disclosure. This includes most other common law countries and 
1401 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001: - 
78-9. 
1402 Halushka v University of Saskatchewan (1965) 53 DLR (2d) 
436 
1403 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics. 5th ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001 ý81 
1404 Rogers v Whiftaker [199314 Med LR 79,83 
1405 Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1,13. 
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the European Community. 1406 In these jurisdictions the law expects patients to be better informed than their UK counterparts, where the disclosure 
requirements are decided by the medical profession. This is not in keeping 
with the principle of autonomy in which there would be a requirement to 
disclose any information which a patient needed to know to allow full 
participation in the decision making process. 
To allow such participation, it would be expected that information relating to 
the particular doctor would also need to be disclosed. For example, it would be appropriate for a doctor to disclose his or her HIV or hepatitis status and failure to do so would imply a breach of the doctor's duty of care. 1407 Although 
the risk is not inherent in the procedure, it applies to the doctor concerned. 
From a legal perspective, however, there is no difference. The patient has 
been exposed to a risk and the question is whether it was negligent not to 
disclose it. 
Thus, it has been held that a hospital had the right and the duty to inform 
patients that a plastic surgeon was infected with HIV. 1408 This clearly implies 
that the court in this case believed the patient had a right to be told about this 
risk. 
UK courts as yet have not considered whether the doctor has a duty to 
disclose alternative forms of treatment. In Canada, however, a doctor was 
held liable for failing to disclose the availability of a more conservative form of 
treatment. 1409 
From the perspective of personal innovation, the question therefore that 
needs to be posed is whether a doctor is required to disclose his 
inexperience, the implication being that there is a greater likelihood of 
something going wrong. Clearly, a patient would consider such information 
very important and pivotal to the decision-making process. Indeed, the Bristol 
Inquiry report concluded that patients are entitled to be informed about the 
experience of the clinician undertaking the procedure. 141 0 However, as the law 
currently stands, the medical profession sets the standards and current 
medical practice is not to discuss personal results. It is therefore unlikely a 
case would succeed if a patient sues because a doctor has failed to disclose 
his inexperience. However, this denies patients material information that is 
essential if an autonomous choice is to be made. 
This very point was made by a patient who complained that she was not told 
that four doctors who were still learning would be actively involved in 
her care 
1406 Giesen D. International Medical Malpractice Law. J CB Mohr: Tubigen, 1988. 
1407 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. 3rd ed. London: Butterworths, 2000, at 712-3. 
1408 Behringer Estate v Princeton Medical Center (1992) 592 A. 2d: 
1251 (New Jersey Supreme Court) 
1409 Haughia v Paine (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 624 (Sask CA) 
1410 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the 
Public Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 
520700- London: HMSO, 2001, 
Recommendation 102. 
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and her agreement not sought. 1411 Similarly, an editorial claimed It was essential that vascular surgeons should quote their own personal and unit data when discussing the risks of carotid endarterectomy with patients, rather than quoting the results of international studies. 1412 
The GIVIC have endorsed this view, insisting that surgeons must quote their 
own mortality figures. 1413 In the Bristol case, parents were given estimates of the risk of death that were substantially less than those being achieved in that 
unit. Such a disclosure could not be justified for elective cases or cases that 
could be performed elsewhere. It appears undeniable that parents had a right 
to know the truth. 
The question of disclosure of experience has also been considered in the 
Australian case of Chappel V Hart. 1414 The plaintiff successfully argued that, 
not only had she not been warned of the risk of injury, but that she would also 
have deferred treatment until someone more experienced was available to 
undertake the procedure. The injury she suffered was therefore consequent 
on the failure to make that disclosure, even though there was no evidence 
that the operation had been performed negligently. 
The patient in Chappel v Hart had made her concerns very clear and the law 
required those concerns to be addressed. Had they been, she would not have 
undertaken the operation and she would not have been injured. One of the 
judges affirmed that there would be less risk to the patient the higher the skill 
of the surgeon and the more frequently the operation was performed. 1.115 
Thus, if someone with more experience had undertaken the operation, the 
degree of risk would have been less, even though the nature of that risk was 
the same. There therefore was a duty to inform her that there were more 
experienced surgeons practising in that field. 1416 
There are clearly practical problems with this line of argument. Not every 
patient can be operated on by the most experienced surgeons. Indeed, the 
vast majority of patients will have to be treated by less experienced doctors. 
However, even if experienced surgeons are only allowed to operate, how 
does one gain experience? The only way to gain experience is to undertake 
cases and this in turn requires a learning curve. 
Despite these problems, Chappel implies that a claim in negligence could 
succeed if a surgeon fails to disclose his experience or his results despite 
being asked and the patient suffers an injury. The patient had made 
her 
concerns very clear. Those concerns were not addressed and thus a claim 
in 
negligence succeeded. This is in keeping with the principle of respect 
for 
1411 Blennerhassett M. Deadly charades. BMJ 1998; 316: 1890-3. 
1412 Naylor AR, London NJM, Bell PRF- Carotid enclarterectomy versus carotid angioplasty 
Lancet 1997.349ý203-4 
1413 Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GIVIC's findings. BMJ 
1998; 316: 1691 
1414 Chappel v. Hart [1998] HCA 55. 
1415 Chappel v Hart [1998] 72 AUR 1344 (HCA) at para 97. 
1416 Chappel v Hart [1998172 AUR 1344 (HCA) at para 10 
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autonomy. The individual patient should decide what information he or she ought to be given if true individual decision-making is to be allowed. 
On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that the courts would accept the 
standard of care to be lowered because a doctor identified himself as a junior. Although in Nettleship v Weston the court held that an agreement to waive 
any claim for negligence due to inexperience would have sufficed 14'7, this is 
unlikely to happen within the conditions of medical treatment. Firstly, there 
would be doubts about the voluntary nature of such an agreement and 
secondly, any such agreement would be contrary to public policy within the 
context of the National Health Service. 1418 
Thus, while doctors need to learn on the job and obtain the necessary 
experience, any current patients also need to be protected from potential 
harm. There are a number of ways in which these two different requirements 
can be reconciled. 
Firstly, inexperienced doctors should be directly supervised by a more 
experienced colleague. 1419 Junior doctors should disclose their inexperience 
to the patient and also state that they will be directly supervised by a more 
senior and experienced colleague. This is even applicable to consultants, as 
exemplified by consultant surgeons who undertook a number of supervised 
strategies to limit a new procedure's morbidity and mortality. 1420 
A similar problem concerns whether the attempt of an experimental procedure 
should be disclosed to the patient. The Bristol Inquiry recommended that 
patients are always entitled to know the extent to which a procedure which 
they are about to undergo is innovative or experimental . 
1421 However, very 
few legal cases in the UK have addressed this issue. 
In one such case, a plaintiff argued that the surgical method used to cure a 
pain in her spine was so exceptional that it should have been explained to 
her. 1422 The judge, however, stated that the surgeon was under no duty to tell 
the patient that the surgery was unusual. He, however, did appear to 
distinguish between an unusual procedure and an experimental one 
1423 
, the 
implication being that an experimental procedure would have needed to be 
disclosed. 
1417 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 All ER 581,587 g/h/j. 
1418 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p423-4. 
1419 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the public Inquiry 
into children's heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: HIVISO, 
2001 
1420 Hasan A, Pozzi M, Hamilton JRL. New surgical procedures: can we minimise the learning curve? 
B%Q 
2000; 320: 171-3 
1421 Department of Health. Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at zhe 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. Summary and Recommendations. CM 5207(ii). London: 
HMSO, 2001 
1422 Newbury v Bath DHA 1998,47BMLR 138 
1423 Newbury v Bath DHA 1998,47BMLR 138,150. 
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Despite all this discussion, there is some evidence to show that the UK law's 
deferential respect to the medical profession is diminishing. 1424 A few recent 
cases have rejected a proposed reasonable and professionally accepted 
particular practice. 
1425 1426 1427 In particular, the case of Pearce v. United 
Bristol Healthcare NHS TruStl 428 has indicated a departure from the 
professional standard test, the ultimate test being what information the court 
itself thought ought to have been disclosed. 
1429 In this case the court held that 
a doctor had a duty to disclose significant risks, in essence advocating a more 
patient friendly test. This implies that doctors o4uqht to disclose what a 
reasonable patient would consider significant. ' 
3 
Thus, judges have recently appeared prepared to set standards for the 
profession, such standards being based on an ethical foundation. 1431 
AN ETHICAL FOUNDATION: 
The General Medical Council has stated that doctors should be familiar with 
the law regarding consent and this should be considered the minimum 
requirements of good practice. 1432 However, as has been shown throughout 
this thesis, the law fails to provide guidance for doctors and also fails to 
provide protection for patients who claim they have not been properly 
informed. The law is simply too blunt an instrument, applied post hoc, and too 
far removed from the practical realities of medicine. 1433 The social, moral, and 
legal issues involved in therapeutic innovation, as exemplified by the Karp 
case, 1434 have not been satisfactorily addressed. Indeed, UK law has not even 
recognised that innovation is a separate entity from research and therapy. 
With respect to information that needs to be disclosed in order to allow an 
autonomous choice to be made, the medical profession has consistently failed 
to disclose all relevant facts. 
However, other institutions in the UK have made the first moves towards a 
patient-centred approach based on the ethical principle of respect for 
autonomy. This is a far better foundation on which to base standards of 
disclosure, not only from the 'patient's autonomy' perspective but also from 
that of the medical profession itself. Thus, the Royal Colleges of Medicine 
have issued guidelines about good practice with reference to treatment and 
procedures 1435 while the General Medical Council (GMC) has emphasised the 
1424 Marriot vW Midlands RHA and Others [1999] Lloyd's Rep Med 23. 
1425 McAllister v. Lewisham and North Southwark HA [1994] 5 Med LR 343. 
1426 Lybert v. Warrington HA [1996] 7 Med LR 71 
1427 Smith v. Tunbridge Wells HA [1994] 5 Med LR 334 
1428 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1998) 48 BMLR 118, 
CA. 
1429 McCall Smith A. Obtaining consent for examination and treatment. BMJ 2001; 
322: 810-1 
1430 Kennedy 1, Grubb A. Medical Law. Butterworths: London, 3rd ed (2000), p709 
1431 Montrose JL. Is negligence an Ethical or a Sociological Concept? 
1958; 21 MLR 259-64 
1432 General Medical Council. Seeking Patents' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. 
February 1999. 
1433 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7: 103-134 at 
133. 
1434 Fox RC, Swazey JP. The Courage to fail: a social view of organ transplants and 
dialysis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. The Case of the Artificial Heart, 135-197. 
1435 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? Med L Rev 
2000; 8: 85,99. 
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need to provide information in an intelligible way and for the doctor to do his best to find out what the patients' individual needs and Priorities are. 14 36 
Such information includes whether a Proposed treatment is experimental and whether doctors in training will be involved. 1437 The GIVIC further stated that 
consent involved a continuing dialogue between the doctor and the patient. Information to be discussed included the probabilities of success or harm and the options for treatment. 1438 Such detailed guidelines surpass any that may be produced by any court. 1439 
Echoing the GIVIC guidelines, the British Medical Association Ethics 
Department has recently stated 1440 that: 
Patients involved in innovative therapies need to know: 
Why the therapy is proposed in their case 
The evidence to support its use and the areas of uncertainty 
about it 
Whether is has had any form of ethical review 
The clinician's experience with it 
The alternatives, if any 
How it differs from standard treatment 
The likely risks and benefits for themselves 
The measures for safety monitoring and support that will be 
provided if things go wrong 
The likely future use of the therapy, if successful. 
It is clear that following such guidelines would have led to better protection for 
the patients concerned in the two areas of innovation under consideration, 
namely the early heart transplants (experimentation) and the occurrences at 
Bristol (personal innovation). The experimental nature of the procedure or the 
experience (and performance) of the operator, pivotal in the decision-making 
process, would have had to be disclosed. Such actions would have protected 
not only the patient but the doctor as well. 
PRACTICALITIES: 
While the courts understand that patients subjected to experimentation or 
personal innovation need to be protected, the problem has been their failure 
to appreciate that both forms of innovation can be shown to be distinct from 
therapy and have therefore utilised inappropdate rules. This thesis has shown 
that rules for establishing negligence in the normal therapeutic doctor-patient 
relationship have failed to protect patients subjected to experimentation while 
being too harsh when considering personal innovators who, unavoidably, 
need to learn new skills and techniques. 
1436 General Medical Council. Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. November 1998. 
1437 General Medical Council. Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. February 1999, para 5. 
1438 General Medical Council. Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. February 1999. para 13. 
1439 Jones MA. Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories. MLR 1999; 7.103-134 at 133. 
1440 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMJ Publishing Group. 2004,499. 
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From a practical point of view, therefore, the courts, firstly. need to appreciate the subtleties of the medical act and be sensitive to the concept of innovation. This should not be difficult as many cases have already addressed issues 
raised by experimentation, such as Hunter v. Hanley'441 and Hepworth v Kerr 1442, or personal innovation, such as Wilsher v Essex 1443 and Djemal v Bexley Health A Uthorit y 1444. 
Having recognised the concept of innovation, the courts then need to 
appreciate that a particular medical intervention may lie anywhere on the 
described continuum from routine therapy, through experimentation, to 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic research. While it is recognised that there is 
a complex multivariate nature to the development of therapeutic innovation, 
the courts should be able, in individual cases, to ascertain the nature of a 
particular intervention by considering what the intention of that intervention 
was. The courts should also be able to decide at what stage the intervention 
was by considering issues such as mortality rates, how patients had been 
selected, the extent of media coverage and the evidence of experts in the field 
regarding whether the technique was accepted and established or not. Such 
evidence could also be taken from NICE, since its Interventional Procedures 
Programme assesses the safety and efficacy of new interventional 
procedures, gauges the extent of uncertainties and makes recommendations 
on their implications. 
With respect to personal innovation, the courts should be able to ascertain 
whether a particular intervention was being undertaken as part of the doctor's 
learning process and also the level of supervision on offer. 
Having established where along the continuum a particular innovative 
intervention lay, the courts then need to establish whether it was carried out 
negligently, both in terms of its actual undertaking and also in respect of what 
was disclosed to enable an informed choice to be made. 
With respect to the actual undertaking, the plaintiff would still need to prove a 
duty of care existed, that the standard of care required was not achieved, and 
that this breach caused the injuries suffered. However, while it has been 
shown that doctors themselves set the standard of care required and the 
courts in turn appear extremely reluctant to interfere with these standards, this 
should only apply to normal therapeutic situations. Normal principles of 
negligence require the judiciary to scrutinise a particular practice to see 
whether it is reasonable, irrespective of whether their professional colleagues 
believe they acted appropriately. The reasonableness test, for example, was 
Utilised in the application for the use of experimental treatment in patients 
1441 Hunter v. Hanley [1955] SC 200, SILT 213. 
1442 Hepworth v Kerr [1995] 6 Med LR 139. 
1443 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All ER 801, [1988] 
AC 1074, [1988] 1 All ER 871, HL. 
1444 Djernal v Bexley Health Authority [1995] Med LR 269. 
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suffering from variant Creutzfeld Jacob disease. 1445 Furthermore, reasonable 
care must be related to particular circumstances. 1446 
In other words, the courts, having established that a particular practice was innovative, would be able to scrutinise it for reasonableness in relation to 
those particular circumstances and not to those pertaining to normal therapy. 
The experimenting doctor would need to justify the experimental treatment to 
the court and show there was a rational basis for undertaking it. The 
involvement of NICE and any guidance offered would be particularly helpful to 
the experimenting doctor's case. Thus, although medical evidence would still 
be required, the appropriate standard of care would no longer be purely a 
matter of medical judgement. The judge would have greater leeway in finding 
that the standard of care required was not achieved if, for example, there had 
been no discussion with NICE's Interventional Procedures Programme or the 
risks involved not fully appreciated. If so, it could be held that it was not 
conducted in a responsible manner. Even then, the plaintiff would still need to 
prove causation, as per Wilsher v EsseX1447, as there has not been a reversal 
of burden of proof. 
A consequence of these changes in the law's perception is that, in the future, 
if an experimental procedure is to be attempted, it would be expected that the 
surgeon concerned would notify the hospital in which the procedure would be 
undertaken, which in turn would need to establish a clinical governance 
committee. This committee would review the evidence for the proposed 
procedure and also enquire from NICE as to its acceptability and risks. NICE 
in turn would be able to collect and analyse data pertaining to the innovation, 
arrange systematic reviews, may recommend further training and provide 
advice on the safety and efficacy of the new procedure. This would allow 
patients to be reassured that such new procedures are being monitored and 
reviewed to ensure safety. It would also allow them access to information 
about such procedures. 
When considering a case of personal innovation, the court should be able to 
take into account the inexperience of the practitioner because other avenues 
are available to it to ensure the plaintiff receives proper compensation if 
warranted. Firstly, the court would consider whether the defendant's conduct 
was reasonable in the particular circumstances, including the post held, and 
appropriate for his or her level of experience. The standard to be applied 
would therefore be of the reasonably competent doctor in that particular 
post. 1448 The level of supervision by more senior colleagues would also be 
scrutinised. If either is found to be deficient, the court has the option of finding 
the employing hospital liable, both vicariously and directly, or the consultant 
liable for failing to provide proper supervision. 
1445 Simms v Simms and another, AvA and another. [2003] 1 All ER 669. 
1446 Cook v Cook [1987161 AUR 25,31. 
1447 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871, HL. 
1448 Djemal v Bexley Health Authority [1995] Med LR 269 
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From a professional point of view, although operative experience lies at the heart of any surgical training programme, consultants in the future would be 
required to provide much greater supervision and monitoring. This should lead to a consultant based service rather than the current consultant lead one. It 
may lead to having a consultant immediately available at all hours to deal with 
any potential problems and being able to directly supervise more junior 
colleagues at all times. Although this is likely to lead to longer training 
programs, it should ensure patients are being treated by experienced and 
properly doctors at all times. A consequence of this, however, is that 
consultants may not be available for work the following day if they have been 
supervising more junior colleagues undertaking emergency work. Proper 
organisation of on-call rotas should minimise disruption. 
Furthermore, while the surgical community would expect to learn new 
techniques, there will be increasing recognition of learning curves. The 
obligation not to harm patients, central to the ethical practice of medicine, will 
mean that it would no longer be acceptable for consultants to learn new 
techniques by attempting them on their patients. Thus, new skills will need to 
be acquired under supervision, as exemplified by Hasan and colleagues. 1449 
The courts also need to establish whether the information disclosed to 
patients has enabled a proper informed choice to be made. With a few 
exceptions, the Bolam test has been utilised when assessing the acceptability 
of what has been disclosed when considering the normal therapeutic doctor- 
patient relationship. This is because the law in relation to failures in diagnosis 
and treatment also applies to failures in the realm of advice. The same does 
not apply to research, however. In this situation a full and frank disclosure of 
all significant risks would be expected to be disclosed, thereby preventing 
exploitation of vulnerable subjects. Such a disclosure would also need to be in 
language that a lay person could understand. This implies that the law, when 
considering research, is prepared to accept and respect patient autonomy and 
thus the requirements to satisfy the legal obligations for disclosure are much 
greater. 
Accepting the concept of innovation and its place on the continuum between 
therapy and research will lead to significantly more information requiring to be 
disclosed than is currently the case. This is because it would not longer be 
considered part of normal therapy, where the influence of medial opinion is 
significant, but rather closer to the requirements of disclosure for research, 
where all information needs to be disclosed. 
Thus, once the court establishes that a particular intervention was innovative, 
it would expect the doctor to have disclosed much more information than 
had 
the case been one of normal therapy, where even therapeutic privilege Is still 
acceptable in certain situations. By allowing consent to be considered 
from an 
autonomy based perspective, the court would also require disclosure of any 
information which a patient needs to know to allow full participation 
in the 
1449 Hasan A, Pozzi M, Hamilton JRL. New surgical procedures: can we minimise the 
learning curve? E3MJ 
2000; 320: 171-3. 
260 
decision making process. Because risk assessment should be performed by the person exposed to it1450, the patient would also need to be told of ijsks and other information particular to the doctor. This could include disclosure of personal results or experience. The implication of such a disclosure is that a patient may refuse to undertake the intervention and choose to go elsewhere. The important fact is that the patient now is able to make a proper informed 
choice based on information disclosed. 
While it is accepted that patients subjected to innovation need to be protected, the courts cannot undertake this in isolation. A functioning internal morality is 
still required . 
1451 The GIVIC, as the governing body of the medical profession, 
should set standards of care, competency and conduct that are beyond 
reproach. In particular, guidelines on the expected conduct of doctors faced 
with innovative treatment should be widely disseminated and taught at 
medical schools. Doctors also need to be able to communicate anxieties 
about unethical behaviour. Self regulation should make individual practitioners 
more accountable to their peers. In turn, professional bodies such as the 
Royal Colleges should act when it is apparent that patients are being harmed. 
Standards should be monitored at a local and national level. Doctors should 
also be encouraged to be increasingly openness and honest with their 
patients about uncertainty. 
There is much evidence that the professional bodies are already taking such 
action. The Royal Colleges of Medicine have issued guidelines about good 
practice with reference to treatment and procedures 1452 , while the 
GIVIC has 
emphasised the need to provide information in an intelligible way. 1453 Most 
importantly, the British Medical Association Ethics Department has recently 
issued guidelines with respect to what patients involved in innovative 
therapies should be told. 1454 All have issued more detailed guidance to protect 
patients involved in innovative therapies than the law ever could. 
CONCLUSION: 
This thesis has proposed a fourth model of contact between patient and 
doctor, that of innovation. The law fails to recognise this and therefore uses 
principles established in the context of a normal therapeutic doctor patient 
relationship to determine negligence in cases of innovation. Innovation in turn 
can take two forms, experimental or personal. 
The law treats experimentation as if it were normal therapy and is thus too 
benevolent towards experimenters. The courts currently accept the use of 
experimental treatment merely on the grounds that a responsible body of 
medical opinion supports its use. However, it has been argued that the law 
should change to require the experimenters to justify their actions. 
1450 Council for Science and Society. The acceptability of risks. Barry Rose, London, 
1978 
1451 Paul C. Internal and external morality of medicine: lessons from New Zealand. 
BMJ 2000; 320: 499-503. 
1452 Brazier M, Miola J. Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Revolution? Med L Rev 2000; 8: 85,99. 
1453 General Medical Council. Seeking Patients' Consent: The Ethical Considerations. November 
19,98. 
1454 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today. 2nd ed. London: BMJ Publishing Group. 
2004,499. 
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On the other hand, with respect to personal innovation and learning new 
techniques, the law of negligence is too harsh, taking no account of the need 
for doctors to learn and develop their skills, which is in the interests of future 
patients. Some suggestions have been proposed to overcome this. 
In summary, the benefit of recognising that innovation is a separate model of 
contact between doctor and patient is that it will be fairer to both parties. Two 
important issues have been raised. Firstly, the context in which the innovative 
treatment of either variety is administered needs to be taken into 
consideration by the courts. Standard laws of negligence, based on principles 
established when considering the normal doctor-patient relationship, do not 
take this into account. Secondly, the question of what information is disclosed 
to the patient regarding this innovation also needs to be considered. The 
doctor should inform the patient, either that the treatment proposed was 
experimental, or that he or she was inexperienced in the particular technique 
proposed. Primarily this should lead to better protection from risk for patients 
and allow them the choice of whether to proceed. However, it is also fairer to 
the doctor and provides better protection, as the patient cannot then claim that 
he or she was not fully informed and the realities of medical practice are 
respected . 
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